CES ifo Working Papers

12314
2025

December 2025

Des nôtres? The Political Effects of Hosting Internal Evacuees

Jean Lacroix, Ricardo Piqué

CES ifo

Imprint:

CESifo Working Papers

ISSN 2364-1428 (digital)

Publisher and distributor: Munich Society for the Promotion
of Economic Research - CESifo GmbH

Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany
Telephone +49 (0)89 2180-2740

Email office@cesifo.de
https://www.cesifo.org

Editor: Clemens Fuest

An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded free of charge
· from the CESifo website: www.ifo.de/en/cesifo/publications/cesifo-working-papers
· from the SSRN website: www.ssrn.com/index.cfm/en/cesifo/
· from the RePEc website: https://ideas.repec.org/s/ces/ceswps.html

Des nôtres?
The Political Effects of Hosting Internal Evacuees

Jean Lacroix* Ricardo Pique †

November 2025

Abstract

Conflict-driven internal displacements are a common yet understudied phenomenon. We explore the political consequences of such displacements on hosting communities using the case of the forced evacuation of Alsatians to the French interior at the start of WWII. Our identification strategy leverages exogenous variations in exposure to evacuees generated by unexpected deviations from the French evacuation plan. Municipalities that were to receive evacuees from the front zone, a strip of land between the Maginot Line and the French-German border, received a larger-than-expected number of evacuees relative to others. Increased exposure to Alsatian evacuees led to greater support for left-of-center parties after WWII. Additional evidence suggests that an identity response to contact with a co-national but culturally different out-group explains these results.

Keywords: Internal displacements, electoral outcomes, identity, WWII, France.

JEL Codes: D72, D74, N44, P00

*RITM, Université Paris-Saclay, France. Email: jean.lacroix@universite-paris-saclay.fr

†Mays Business School, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, 77843, USA. Email: rpique@tamu.edu. This project has been supported by the Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR), Project POLECOWW2 ANR-21-CE41-0015. We thank Alejandro Arciniegas Herrera and Ninel Kosoyan for their excellent research assistance. We also thank participants at the European Political Science Association meeting and the Banff Applied Microeconomics Workshop, and seminar participants at IPERG (Universitat de Barcelona), Texas A&M University, and Université Paris Saclay for their comments.

Introduction

Currently, around 120 million people have been forcibly displaced due to violence, conflict, and human rights violations.[1] Recent conflicts have brought attention back to such displacements. While the focus of media and scholarly work has been on external displacement and refugees abroad (Becker and Ferrara, 2019; Steinmayr, 2021; Verme and Schuettler, 2021; Alesina and Tabellini, 2024), internal movements represent the majority of displacements (58%).[2] Yet, their consequences on hosting communities remain to be understood. Hosting internally displaced populations can be an impactful experience with important local socio-economic consequences.

In this article, we examine the political effects of this experience. Conceptually, hosting internally displaced may not impact behavior the same way as welcoming foreigners. Inter-group contact theory predicts that positive interactions between locals and guests are more likely when the two groups have similar social status and common goals (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998). Hence, transmission of out-group values and amalgamation of attitudes should be more likely among co-nationals. On the other hand, following social identity theory, exposure to co-nationals of a different background may trigger an identity response which translates into in-group focused behavior (Tajfel et al., 1979; Bonomi et al., 2021; Fouka and Tabellini, 2022; Fouka et al., 2022; Alesina and Tabellini, 2024). These two mechanisms, together with the economic burden on hosts, may account for persistent changes in hosts' political behavior, even if those displaced do not permanently settle in the area.

Estimating the causal impact of these displacements is a complex exercise. First, they are rarely accurately recorded. Second, re-settlement patterns are often endogenous to local characteristics (Peisakhin et al., 2025). Third, identifying the effect on host communities may be even more convoluted if refugees do not return to their places of origin. Observed outcomes could then result from the re-shaping of the demographic composition and the economic structure, rather than from changes in host behavior. Our empirical strategy overcomes these concerns by leveraging the characteristics of the WWII French civilian evacuation and reception plan for the French-German border zone. At the start of WWII, French authorities implemented a plan to evacuate the population living in that area. Among the evacuees, Alsatians from the department (*département*) of

[1] UNHCR Website consulted on September 27th 2024.
[2] UNHCR Website consulted on September 27th 2024

Bas-Rhin were sent to the south-west department of Haute-Vienne, more than 700km away from their homes. The Haute-Vienne reception plan called for refugees to be spread uniformly across the department. However, the plan was disrupted due to the massive, unexpected inflow of evacuees from the area between the Maginot line and the border: the "front zone". Consequently, the evacuation of the "rear zone", a strip of land immediately to the rear of the Maginot line, was halted. Contrary to the initial planning, host municipalities matched with the Alsatian front zone received significantly more evacuees than those matched with the rear.

Our identification strategy exploits this variation. It uses the origin zone to which host municipalities were matched as an instrumental variable for the share of evacuees hosted. We show that being matched with the front zone is a very strong predictor of the number of evacuees relative to the local population. Front-zone assignment increased the percentage of evacuees by 22.8 percentage points or 1.05 standard deviations. This assignment is as random as can be: after controlling for arrondissement fixed effects and basic municipal characteristics, our instrument does not predict pre-WWII political and socioeconomic outcomes. The results align with qualitative evidence that Haute-Vienne authorities did not match host municipalities to zones based on their specific characteristics.

Our results show that hosting these co-national evacuees had important political consequences: municipalities that hosted more Alsatian evacuees experienced an increase in support for left-of-center parties post-WWII. The effect peaks in 1946 and gradually decreases in the 1950s. The peak estimates imply that a one standard deviation change in the share of evacuees increased the left-of-center vote share by more than 0.5 standard deviations. This greater support for the left appears to come at the expense of the center-right. Difference-in-differences estimates portray a similar picture: while there are no differential trends in prewar vote shares, we find a shift towards left-wing parties in areas with greater presence of evacuees post-WWII. The results are robust and are not driven by spatial autocorrelation, demographic changes, differences in war victimization, access to transport networks, the presence of Vichy/occupation administration, female enfranchisement and treatment variable definition. Finally, similar results hold for the neighboring department of Vienne, which hosted Mosellans instead of Alsatians, even though their reception plan is not as conducive to the identification of causal effects.

We further explore how exposure to co-national evacuees shapes political behavior. Alsatians

were also French citizens, but were different from their hosts. They were more religious, in most cases did not speak French, and had their own set of traditions. Importantly, they were significantly more likely to support right-of-center parties both before and after the war. Based on the literature, exposure to Alsatian refugees may have influenced hosts' political behavior through three main mechanisms. First, while the majority of Alsatians were right-wing and locals were predominantly left-wing, some left-wing evacuees may have transmitted left-wing values to their hosts. Second, hosting refugees exposed locals to the costs of war and foreign aggression, consequently influencing political behavior. Third, exposure to an out-group of non-co-ethnic co-nationals may have generated an identity response among locals towards their in-group. This response may have then translated to shifts in political behavior.

An analysis of the treatment effect provides further evidence supporting this last channel: the positive effect of being matched with the front zone on the left-of-center vote share is stronger when the cultural divide between evacuees and hosts, proxied by the past religious affiliation of refugees, was wider. We also find that a greater shift to the left is observed where pre-war host support for the left was stronger. Hence, the evidence is consistent with a pre-war right-wing minority changing their political behavior and adhering to the left-wing majority following an identity response to Alsatian exposure.

Further results support this identity-response mechanism. The presence of evacuees led to an increase in the number of post-war in-group-focused civic organizations, such as those related to local recreational activities and defense of local interests. Similarly, we find that the negative effect on the vote share of right-of-center parties is largely driven by a decline in support for the MRP (*Mouvement Républicain Populaire*), a center-right party whose origins lie partly in Alsace and which had key leaders of Alsatian descent. Finally, the presence of co-ethnic French refugees does not appear to trigger the same political response.

These results highlight the important consequences of an understudied yet not uncommon phenomenon: the welcoming of displaced co-nationals. This was the case, for example, during the recent Russo-Ukrainian war or in Afghanistan from the 2000's. This contact between co-nationals often raises questions about identity, as this was the case in Syria in the 2010's for example (Hartman et al., 2021). Historical examples include the forced resettlement of 150,000 ethnic Ukrainian Polish citizens from southeastern Poland to the newly acquired Western Borderlands after WWII, and

that of more than 800,000 Soviet Germans from the Volga to Siberia and Kazakhstan in 1941. Exposure to non co-ethnic co-nationals could then reshape identity and have persistent consequences.

Related Literature Our results complement the literature on the consequences of forced migration. Most research on the topic focuses on foreign refugees.[3] Regarding internal displacements, recent work has studied their impact on factor prices (Morales, 2018; Depetris-Chauvin and Santos, 2018), human capital (Becker et al., 2020) and local policy outcomes (Charnysh, 2019; Chevalier et al., 2024). We contribute to this literature by analyzing the effect of temporary forced internal migration. Our effects highlight the impact on hosts after migrants have left, and do not capture structural socio-economic changes from migrant settlement.

More generally, we complement the broader literature on the effects of migration on the host population. In particular, we contribute to work on its impact on political attitudes and behavior (Halla et al., 2017; Dustmann et al., 2019; Giuliano et al., 2020; Dinas et al., 2021; Steinmayr, 2021; Rozo and Vargas, 2021; Lang and Schneider, 2023; Menon, 2023; Bursztyn et al., 2024). This literature hypothesizes that migration shapes the preferences of hosting communities due to both economic and cultural factors. Our contribution centers around the latter because of the temporary nature of the internal evacuations and the type of migrant we study: non-co-ethnic co-nationals.

Hence, our results also add to the literature on co-nationals returning to their homeland (Menon, 2023; Lang and Schneider, 2023; Remigereau, 2024). This literature shows that areas that welcomed co-nationals returning from abroad or colonies experienced a surge in extreme-right support. This result, which differs from our finding, is driven, however, by a compositional effect of the population, as refugees in these cases stay in hosting communities and mobilize them. In comparison, our study focuses on hosting communities, as refugees did not settle and left after a year.

Finally, we contribute to the literature on group identity and nation-building. Co-national inter-group contact may foster a common national identity (Bazzi et al., 2019; Cáceres-Delpiano et al., 2021; Carlitz et al., 2024). The latter can homogenize preferences and facilitate policy-making (Shayo, 2020; Bonomi et al., 2021). Yet, the effect of inter-group contact may depend on the development of communal values (Enke, 2019) and the definition of in-group boundaries (Fouka

[3] See Becker and Ferrara (2019); Verme and Schuettler (2021); Alesina and Tabellini (2024) for detailed reviews of the literature.

and Tabellini, 2022). Exposure to a co-national out-group may ultimately reinforce identification with a local group rather than strengthen a common "national" identity (Sidanius and Pratto, 2001). In our context, the cultural divide between Alsatians and hosts may have generated an identity response, including the strengthening of in-group identity: that of "Français de l'intérieur".[4]

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the evacuation process and the cohabitation experience in host departments. Section 2 details our analytical framework and presents suggestive evidence on the political consequences of hosting evacuees. Section 3 explains our identification strategy and describes the main data sources. Section 4 shows our main results. Section 5 provides evidence on possible mechanisms. Finally, Section 6 concludes.

1 Context: 1939 Franco-German Border Evacuation

Due to the increasing risk of conflict with Germany, in the late 1930s, France developed evacuation plans for the civilian population living near the Franco-German border. If war broke out, population transfers would start in certain areas of the border departments of Bas-Rhin, Haut-Rhin and Moselle. Evacuees were to be sent to low-density departments in the South-West of France. Those from the northern and southern parts of Bas-Rhin were to be evacuated to Haute-Vienne and Dordogne, respectively. Evacuees from Haut-Rhin were to be sent to Gers, Haute-Garonne and Landes, while those from Moselle had to evacuate to Charente, Charente-Inférieure (now Charente-Maritime) and Vienne.

Departmental prefects prepared the details of their respective evacuation plans. First, they defined the municipalities to be evacuated following basic national guidelines. Border departments were split intro three zones: front zone (*zone avant*), rear zone (*zone arrière*) and folding zone (*zone de repliement*). The first consisted of the area in front of the Maginot line and was to be evacuated immediately once conflict began. The second was a strip of land of varying width behind the front area, which was to be evacuated afterwards. Finally, evacuation of the folding zone would take place only if war conditions dictated so (i.e., a full-scale German invasion). Once the areas were set, prefects had to provide estimates on the number of evacuees per municipality. Using census population counts, prefects estimated the essential workforce that would stay to maintain basic ser-

[4]This expression is still used nowadays by some Alsatians to refer to the French population living outside of Alsace.

vices and the number of evacuees. The information was then transmitted to authorities in reception areas. Host departments' prefects had to match evacuated municipalities to host municipalities. While the reception plans were guided by the principle of population dispersion, the methodologies differed across departments. In Section 3.1, we describe the Haute-Vienne reception plan and how it contributed to exogenous variation in the presence of evacuees.

The outbreak of World War II on September 1st, 1939 led to the activation of the French general mobilization and evacuation plan. Orders based on each departmental plan were sent to mayors. These detailed how the evacuation would proceed, including information on assembly areas and routes. Evacuees had to leave immediately and were allowed only 30 kilograms of luggage. They then had to follow the train itinerary from the evacuation plan. Evacuees were sent first to staging areas in their departments, then to reception zones in neighboring interior departments, and finally to their host localities. In total, close to 30% of Alsatians and 45% of Mosellans were evacuated (Passmore, 2025).

Locals were not expecting the arrival of evacuees, but sympathized with their plight as they welcomed their arrival. Host authorities initially perceived them in a similar manner as the Spanish refugees who had escaped civil war (Bernussou, 2014). However, this attitude quickly reversed as Alsatians were recognized as compatriots entitled to a better treatment. As expected, the evacuees did not see themselves as refugees, but as a forcefully displaced population. Departmental authorities recognized this and addressed Alsatians as evacuees when communicating with Alsatian officials, but kept referring to them as refugees in internal communications (Bernussou, 2014).

In general, evacuees and hosts co-existed peacefully. The evacuees were French citizens but had unique cultural traits that were not familiar to their hosts. The most important difference was language. Alsatians spoke a dialect close to German, a fact that earned them the nickname *"ya-ya"* among locals. For the majority of evacuees, knowledge of French was limited, which hindered communication with their hosts and fostered mistrust (Bernussou, 2014). In addition, while most of southwestern France was relatively secular, evacuees were, for the most part, profoundly Christian. Due to these cultural differences, as well as Alsatians' self-perception that they were evacuees and not refugees, Alsatians had separate schools and churches. Evacuees were served by their local administrations, which were also evacuated.

Locals had to share public spaces and, in many cases, their own homes. In Haute-Vienne,

around 20% of families hosted evacuees (Bernussou, 2014). Host departments were relatively poorer when compared to the evacuated. Hence, the additional burden on resources initially strained locals. Most importantly, Alsatians were surprised by the more humble local living conditions. Hosts felt the shock that Alsatian refugees experienced when facing their material conditions (Bernussou, 2014). Still, relations between the two groups remained amicable, particularly after improvements in dwelling conditions and central government transfers. Inter-group cultural activities were not uncommon, with the Christmas Tree celebrations being the most emblematic case. Government efforts were made to highlight that Alsatian tradition and create an opportunity for hosts and evacuees to mingle.

After the initial shock from the unexpected flow of evacuees, the national and departmental governments assumed responsibility for evacuee sustenance following uniform guidelines (Bernussou, 2014). Food rations and cash transfers per household member were established. Regarding housing, locals were offered voluntary agreements to host evacuees, but the needs meant that requisitions were common. Compensation for these followed government guidelines. To alleviate the lack of housing, funds were also provided to build new dwellings, though very few of these construction projects were actually completed.

In late 1939 and early 1940, both evacuees and host expected that the former's stay would last (Bernussou, 2014). However, after the Armistice of June 1940 and the annexation of Alsace to Germany, the Vichy regime agreed to send Alsatian evacuees back to Alsace. By October 1940, already 300.000 Alsatians had returned to Alsace [5]. A fraction remained in their host departments, mainly due to fear of living under the Nazi regime. When the war ended, most of these returned to Alsace, though a few permanently settled in the French interior. This share, however, remained negligible. Thus, this study focuses on how the experience of temporarily hosting evacuated co-citizens shapes the hosts' political preferences.

2 Political Consequences of Hosting Internal Evacuees

Most Alsatians lived with their hosts for less than a year. Hence, these areas did not experience the structural demographic and economic changes observed in other cases of large migration flows.

[5] https://archives.bas-rhin.fr/media/141248/AD67GdR2GMevacuation1939-1940v6.pdf

Nonetheless, the temporary hosting of internal evacuees can produce significant changes in local political behavior. Below, we describe several mechanisms explaining why these changes may occur. This section is not exhaustive but presents the most likely channels based on the context and previous literature. We then provide initial suggestive evidence on the consequences of hosting internal evacuees, which motivates a more rigorous causal analysis.

2.1 Potential Mechanisms

Identity response. Internally displaced Alsatians were not a co-ethnic but a co-national group relative to their hosts. Nominally French, evacuees differed in culture and values. These differences were reflected in prewar voting patterns: Alsatians were more likely to support right-wing parties while their hosts lived in the left-wing heartland of southwest France.

Previous literature highlights how the presence of an out-group may help construct and strengthen in-group identity. Social identity theory states that individuals categorize themselves into groups based on common characteristics (Tajfel et al., 1979). The arrival of an out-group can alter the traits used for categorization, thereby redefining in-group identity (Bonomi et al., 2021; Alesina and Tabellini, 2024) and re-drawing inter-group boundaries (Fouka and Tabellini, 2022; Fouka et al., 2022). As a consequence, citizens may adjust their political behavior to better align with that of their redefined in-group.

Similarly, forced cohabitation with an out-group may lead to antagonism towards it and further strengthen local identity (Sidanius and Pratto, 2001). Empirical evidence backs this "group threat" theory for foreign migrants (Dustmann et al., 2019; Rozo and Vargas, 2021; Steinmayr, 2021). This holds in particular when host communities are less urbanized and locals are "forcefully" exposed to the out-group in their vicinity (Campbell, 1965; Dustmann et al., 2019).

Unlike most of the related literature, which focuses on a foreign out-group, we study an out-group formed of co-nationals. For the former case, this channel would predict an increase in political support for right-wing parties as nationality becomes the salient defining characteristic (Alesina and Tabellini, 2024). In our setting, what separates hosts from evacuees are differences in cultural norms and values. Hence, similar to Dehdari and Gehring (2022), locals are expected to identify themselves less with a common French identity following contact with refugees. As a consequence, they should not be more likely to support nationalist movements. Rather, they would adapt their

political behavior to that of their in-group (Casas et al., 2024). This channel predicts an average shift towards the local majority, which is towards left-of-center parties for most of municipalities in Haute-Vienne.

Transmission of values. With the arrival of evacuees, cohabitation may result in out-group values being transferred to the in-group. Intergroup contact theory suggests that, under certain conditions, positive interactions with the out-group may arise (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998). The theory indicates that these interactions are more likely when groups have "equal social status" and common goals, and when social contact is backed by authorities (Allport, 1954). Evidence suggests state-sponsored contact among co-nationals can foster national identity (Carlitz et al., 2024). Similarly, a shift towards a common identity with the out-group may be more likely in areas that do not have a strong regional identity (Cáceres-Delpiano et al., 2021).

Inter-group transmission of values is more likely to occur in this context than in others involving foreign refugees. While Alsatians and their hosts were not co-ethnic, they were still co-nationals. Hence, their social status should be greater than that of a foreign group. Moreover, evacuees and hosts shared the common goal of fending off foreign aggression, even if locals may have questioned Alsatians' allegiance given their shared history with Germany. The inter-group contact had the auspice of the French state as Alsatians were mandated to evacuate and resettle in the French interior. Local authorities also encouraged host communities to welcome them and fostered inter-group events like the 1939 Christmas tree celebrations.

As Alsatians had more conservative attitudes and were more religious, this channel predicts locals becoming more conservative and less secular on average. Hence, if this were the predominant mechanism, we expect an average shift in political support towards the right in postwar elections. However, the effect may not be uniform as left-wing Alsatians could have emulated left-wing organizations in Haute-Vienne. An increase in the left-of-center vote share may be observed in host municipalities exposed to evacuees from more left-leaning areas.

War exposure. A broad literature has shown that direct exposure to conflict can impact political outcomes. While the effect on voter participation and civic engagement (Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Blattman, 2009; Dell and Querubin, 2018) is ambiguous, conflict appears to foster political

extremism (Fontana et al., 2023).

In our setting, the arrival of evacuees indirectly exposed hosts to conflict. Locals had to free housing space for Alsatians and share public resources with them. Hence, while conflict exposure was indirect, we may still observe findings similar to those in the previous literature, albeit more assuaged.

Most importantly, hosting a co-national group forcefully displaced due to the risk of foreign aggression may have fostered French nationalism and anti-German sentiments. Previous studies have shown that exposure to foreign coercion can boost nationalist sentiments and foster negative attitudes towards out-groups (Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017; Rozenas et al., 2017; Fouka and Voth, 2023; Ochsner and Roesel, 2024). Several host areas did not directly experience foreign repression until German troops occupied Vichy France in November 1942. Nonetheless, these were indirectly exposed to the consequences of foreign coercion since the outbreak of war.

This channel predicts an increase in support for more extremist parties at the expense of moderate groups. In particular, as war exposure comes via the hosting of a co-national group, we expect a higher vote share for nationalist forces.

2.2 Suggestive Evidence

Evidence on the consequences of hosting internally displaced persons is scarce. We provide initial suggestive evidence on the matter by examining changes in voting patterns in the main destination departments of World War II evacuees in France.[6] The left panel of Figure 1 shows the average vote share of left-wing parties in departments that were above/below median in terms of refugees hosted. Before the war, those above the median exhibited a relatively smaller vote share for the left (by around 5 percentage points). After the war, there was no distinguishable difference between the two groups. The right panel of Figure 1 plots the coefficients of an event-study. It shows that the difference in vote shares for the left between the two groups was stable before the war. After the war, left-wing support increased at a relatively faster pace in departments above the median.

These initial results warrant a causal assessment for several reasons. First, by definition, departments that hosted the most refugees were different from others. As they were in the interior, they

[6]These are the 68 departments for which the French State recorded refugees during the war (from Archives Nationales F23221).

Figure 1: Vote Share for Left-wing Parties and Exposure to Evacuees



Notes: The left panel presents the mean vote share for the left in departments with a share of refugees above the median (plain line) and below the median (dashed line). The right panel presents an event study-like graphic where the treatment variable is a dummy variable equal to one if a department's share of refugees is above the median. *Sources:* Archives Nationales F23221 and Cagé and Piketty (2023)

were less harmed by conflict. Different voting patterns could then be attributed to any other war correlates. Second, settlement patterns for refugees not considered in the initial evacuation plans are endogenous.

To provide causal evidence, we leverage municipality-level variation in settlement in one of the main hosting departments: Haute-Vienne. There, direct war exposure was limited and cannot explain migration patterns. The department was homogeneous and the nature of the reception plan created plausibly exogenous variation in exposure to internally displaced.

3 Empirical Strategy and Data

3.1 Empirical Strategy

Discussions between the authorities of Bas-Rhin and Haute-Vienne on the allocation of evacuees began in the mid-1930s. The initial reception plan implied an uneven geographic distribution of evacuees in Haute-Vienne (Bernussou, 2014). Several cantons in Haute-Vienne were not matched to front or rear-zone municipalities, but to the folding zone, which was to be evacuated only in the case of an invasion.

In 1939, an amended plan was designed. It distributed an expected 38,000 evacuees from the front zone and 30,000 evacuees rear zone of Bas-Rhin (Bernussou, 2014). These estimates were

based on population counts sent by Alsatian authorities. This new plan shared the hosting burden uniformly across the department and followed a basic rule-of-thumb allocation criterion (Bernussou, 2014). Most municipalities were expected to host front and rear zone evacuees totaling around 32.5% of their pre-war population.[7] The exception was the departmental capital of Limoges and its surrounding areas. These municipalities were reserved to create a dispersion zone for Limoges citizens and a possible staging area for the military (Bernussou, 2014). Panel A of Figure 2 illustrates the planned geographic distribution of evacuees as a percentage of the host municipality pre-war population. The white area close to the geographical center of the department is the Limoges dispersion zone. Besides this cluster, very few municipalities were planned to host evacuees numbering less than 30% or more than 35% of their population.

Figure 2: Planned Geographic Distribution of Evacuees in Haute-Vienne



Notes: Panel A shows the number of planned evacuees as a percentage of the host municipality population in 1936. Panel B shows the zone of origin of evacuees. Municipalities in red and blue were matched to front and rear-zone municipalities, respectively. Municipalities in red/white were matched to at least one locality in the front zone and one in the rear zone. Sources: (ADHV, 1939) and Bernussou (2014).

In addition to the uniform dispersion of evacuees, there was a desire to keep neighboring Bas-Rhin communities close to each other (Bernussou, 2014). As a consequence, the reception plan

[7]This was based on the population count from the last pre-war census in 1936.

matched the evacuated areas of Bas-Rhin arrondissements with host arrondissements. The Wissembourg arrondissement was paired with the host arrondissement of Bellac and, to a lesser extent, the arrondissement of Limoges, Saverne and Haguenau with the arrondissement of Limoges, and areas around Strasbourg with the arrondissement of Rochechouart and the former arrondissement of St-Yrieix. In addition, areas from the same origin canton were generally matched to the same host canton. Importantly for our identification strategy, the process of matching municipalities within cantons was guided solely by the need to keep the planned evacuees around the 32.5% mark. In most cases, evacuees from the same origin municipality were to be hosted by multiple host localities to reach this objective.

The reception plan created spatial variation in the zone of origin, front versus rear, of the population to be transferred. Panel B of Figure 2 illustrates the planned geographic distribution of front and rear-zone evacuees. The northernmost and westernmost parts were to receive front-zone evacuees. South-East of the Limoges reservation zone, most municipalities were paired to the rear. A few municipalities across the department were matched with both front and rear origin localities.

For Haute-Vienne authorities, both zones were to be evacuated. Hence, differences in the spatial distribution of front and rear-zone evacuees were not relevant. Ex-post, the zone of origin was a key driver of geographical variation in settlement. The burden of hosting evacuees laid mostly on municipalities matched with the front zone.

Alsatians started to arrive in significant numbers a few days after the outbreak of war. By the beginning of October, more than 60,000 Alsatians had settled Haute-Vienne (Bernussou, 2014).[8] Almost all of these came from the front zone.[9] Alsatian authorities had significantly underestimated the flow of civilians from the front zone, as the evacuation plan estimated 38,000 evacuees from the area. Apparently, they failed to acknowledge the level of fear among civilians living in parts of the front zone more exposed to a German attack.[10] This fear led men who were supposed to stay as essential workers to flee with their families. The unexpected inflow prompted action from host authorities.[11] The Haute-Vienne prefect requested that national and Bas-Rhin authorities send

[8] According to the November census of evacuees, there were close to 62,000 Alsatians.

[9] Except for around 3,000 evacuees from 3 municipalities in the rear zone, all refugees came from the front zone.

[10] For example, Alsatian authorities underestimated evacuees from the arrondissement of Wissembourg, which is flanked by Germany from the north and east. Moreover, some census counts on which the evacuation plan had been based were erratic (Bernussou, 2014).

[11] The situation was compounded by the fact that thousands of Parisians of Haute-Vienne origin returned to their department when war broke out (Bernussou, 2014).

no additional evacuees from the rear zone. In mid-November, the office of the Vice-Presidency confirmed that the evacuee flow would be stopped (Bernussou, 2014).

The November 1939 evacuee census revealed the disparity between the actual and planned distributions (see Figure 3). The unexpected flow from the front zone meant that some localities hosted significantly more evacuees than planned. Host municipalities matched with the front zone had to accommodate evacuees numbering, in some cases, more than 60% of the pre-war local population. On the other hand, several municipalities paired to the rear zone had no evacuees. Departmental authorities look to address, albeit partially, these imbalances by implementing decongestion transfers, which meant that some municipalities paired with the rear zone and in the Limoges reservation area eventually received some evacuees. These transfers continued between December and February but were limited in scale.

Figure 3: Actual Geographic Distribution of Evacuees in Haute-Vienne



Notes: The map shows the the number of evacuees in November 1939 as a percentage of the host municipality population in 1936. Source: Bernussou (2014).

Our empirical strategy leverages the exogenous variation in the share of refugees created by: (i) the matching of municipalities in Haute-Vienne to evacuees from either front or rear zone mu-

nicipalities in Bas-Rhin and (ii) the larger-than-expected flow of refugees from the former, which halted evacuations from the latter. To instrument for the number of internally displaced Alsatians hosted by a municipality as a percentage of the pre-war host population, we use an indicator variable equal to one if the Haute-Vienne municipality was matched to the front zone only.[12] We estimate the following two-stage least squares (TSLS) model:

$$Evacuees_i = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 FrontZone_i + x_i'\zeta + \eta_i \tag{1}$$

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \hat{Evacuees_i} + x_i'\lambda + \varepsilon_i \tag{2}$$

where y_i is the outcome in municipality i, $Evacuees_i$ is the number of evacuees as a percentage of the 1936 population (after a logarithmic transformation or in levels), and $FrontZone_i$ is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the host municipality was matched to the front zone only.[13] In our baseline specification, x_i includes municipality-level past covariates. These include planned share of evacuees, prewar population density and growth, prewar dwellings per capita, and an indicator variable for canton capital. We also control for geographic characteristics (elevation, precipitation, temperature), distance to the departmental capital, and arrondissement fixed-effects.[14] These control variables ensure that our estimates are not driven by other determinants of voting, such as economic outcomes, access to resources and political supply at the arrondissement-level.

Equation 1 uses the exogenous variation in assignment to front versus rear zone as an instrument to estimate the share of evacuees in a municipality, while Equation 2 describes the second stage of the TSLS estimation. We compute heteroskedasticy-robust standard errors and, as a robustness check, we confirm that our results hold assuming spatial autocorrelation.

For the identification strategy to hold, the instrument, $FrontZone_i$, has to be a strong predictor for $Evacuees_i$ (validity assumption). Moreover, it should affect outcomes only via the share of evacuees (exclusion restriction).

Table 1 reports the estimates for the first-stage regression. These results indicate that the in-

[12] Fourteen municipalities that were to receive evacuees from both the front zone and rear zone municipalities are assigned a value of 0 for this indicator.

[13] For brevity, we refer to municipalities being matched to the front zone rather than "front zone only" in most of the text.

[14] Population density is computed using the 1936 population and the municipality area in 1923. Dwellings per capita is calculated for 1926.

strument is a strong predictor for both the logarithmic transformation of the number of evacuees as a percentage of the 1936 population and the said variable. Under the baseline specification, being matched to the front zone only increased the former by 2.8 percentage points and the latter by 22.8. These estimates represent 0.82 and 1.05 standard deviations, respectively. The F-statistics for the weak identification test are always above 20, confirming the strength of our instrument.

Table 1: First Stage Estimates

	% Evacuees (Ln)		% Evacuees	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Matched to Front Zone Only	4.02***	2.83***	28.91***	22.81***
	(0.38)	(0.57)	(2.32)	(3.34)
Observations	201	201	201	201
Adj. R^2	.337	.389	.44	.512
K-P F-Stat	112.1	24.6	154.7	46.5
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: All columns report first stage estimates and robust standard errors for our instrumental variable. Columns 1-2 and columns 3-4 correspond to when the endogenous variable is the the log transformation of the number of evacuees in the municipality as a percentage of the 1936 population and said variable in levels, respectively. Controls include past covariates and arrondissement fixed effects. The last row reports the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Second, we provide evidence on the exclusion restriction by exploring whether being matched to the front zone predicts host municipality pre-war outcomes and characteristics. Appendix Table A2 shows the results of these balance tests. Overall, the results support the validity of the identification strategy. The instrument has no significant effect on the left-wing vote share and voter turnout in the 1932 and 1936 elections. Moreover, it is not a good predictor for pre-WWII socioeconomic characteristics such as population growth and density, as well as geographic characteristics such as elevation and temperature. We only observe a significant effect for average rainfall. While this effect is not economically meaningful, we include rainfall as a control in our baseline specification.

Appendix Table A3 further shows that after accounting for political supply with arrondissement fixed effects, front-zone assignment is not explained by pre-war host and matched origin municipalities' left-wing vote shares and by the difference between the former and the latter. Additionally, Appendix Tables A4 and A5 evidence the plan's rigidity. Even within treated units (i.e., host municipalities matched to the front zone), treatment intensity is not correlated with the left-wing support of pre-war host or matched origin municipalities. This provides further evidence that the massive arrival of evacuees was a shock which host municipalities matched to the front-zone had to absorb regardless of their characteristics.

3.2 Data

Our sample comprises the 201 municipalities (*communes*) part of the department of Haute-Vienne in 2015. We construct a time-consistent database by manually matching past municipalities to those in our 2015 baseline dataset.[15] Below, we summarize our main variables and respective sources. Appendix Table A1 shows the descriptive statistics for our primary outcomes and past covariates.

We obtain the planned number of evacuees by municipality from the final Haute-Vienne reception plan (ADHV, 1939). The plan also includes information on the municipality of origin of the evacuees. We combine this data with information on the zone of origin for municipalities in Bas-Rhin from Bernussou (2014), and compute planned evacuees by zone for each reception municipality. The actual number of evacuees by host municipality comes from Bernussou (2014) and is drawn from a census carried out on November 19th 1939. As a robustness check, we also use data on evacuee presence from an April 1940 survey available in Bernussou (2014).

Our main outcomes are postwar voting patterns in Haute-Vienne (from Cagé and Piketty, 2023). For each parliamentary election between 1928 and 1958, we obtain the vote share for each political group. We focus on the vote share of left-of-center parties.[16] Our sample ends with the first election of the French Fifth Republic, the last before the 1962 presidential referendum, which led to direct presidential elections.

[15] We account for the creation, merger, and dissolution of municipalities, but we do not consider for territorial transfer between existing units.

[16] We use the variable proposed by Cagé and Piketty (2023), which also includes half of the vote obtained by any centrist party. This partially sifts out some artificial variations in vote shares from the reclassification of parties over different elections.

Data on covariates comes from various sources. We control for past demographic characteristics by using information from the 1936 and 1926 population censuses. We compute the average elevation and slope for each municipality using data from Jarvis et al. (2008), and calculate average rainfall and temperature using information from between 1970 and 2000 from Fick and Hijmans (2017).

We check the robustness of our results by incorporating additional covariates (Appendix C). We use data from the 1946 population census to check for changes in postwar population. We control for railroad access by geo-referencing the 1930s rail network in and around Haute-Vienne.[17] We control for wartime administration by using data on Vichy France/German administrative services.[18] Finally, we use data on electoral participation from Cagé and Piketty (2023).

For our mechanism analysis, we use data on religious affiliation in origin municipalities from the 1905 German population census (Statistischen Bureau für Elsaß -Lothringen, 1908) to examine the heterogeneity of the treatment effect. We explore changes in in-group social behavior by analyzing the creation of local civic organizations listed in the *Journal Officiel*.[19]. To check the effect on other political outcomes, we use data on the number of collaborators with the Nazi/Vichy regime from Cagé et al. (2023). Data on other (non-Alsatian) French refugees comes from the June 5th 1940 refugee count ADHV (1940). Finally, we check for the external validity of our results by using data for neighboring Vienne from the Vienne Departmental Archives. The information includes the reception plan and the November 1939 refugee count.

4 Results

4.1 Main Results

As a first step, we compute OLS estimates for the effect of evacuees on left-of-center vote shares. The results are shown in Appendix Table B1. This variable predicts a higher vote share for left-of-center parties both for pre and post-war. This result could be explained by the endogenous sorting of resettlement patterns. To overcome the limitations of correlational evidence and minimize selection

[17]For this, we use the Carte du réseau des chemins de fer de la Compagnie d'Orléans available at https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b53121224t

[18]Data from https://www.adresses-france-occupee.fr/Adresses France Occupee Website.

[19]Data from https://www.journal-officiel.gouv.fr/pages/associations-recherche/

bias, we employ the instrumental variable approach as our primary specification.

We first check how our instrument relates to pre- and post-war electoral outcomes. The reduced-form estimates in Appendix Table B2 show that, under our baseline controls, municipalities matched to the front zone experienced a shift in electoral behavior only after the war. The effect peaks in 1946 and gradually decreases in the 1950s.

Given that our instrument is a strong predictor for the number of evacuees, the second stage estimates reported in Table 2 follow a similar pattern. Panel A shows the estimates for the logarithmic transformation of the number of evacuees in the municipality as a percentage of the 1936 population, while Panel B reports the results for said percentage. For both variables, we observe a positive and statistically significant effect on left-wing support in post-World War II elections. The effect peaks in 1946 when two elections took place: the first to elect the second postwar Constituent Assembly and the second to elect the first National Assembly of the Fourth Republic. For these elections, the estimates imply that a one-standard-deviation change in the share of evacuees (ln) leads to an increase in the left-of-center vote share of 0.61 and 0.56 standard deviations, respectively. The lower effect for 1945 can be explained by the difference in the nature of this election, as it served to elect the Constituent Assembly for the new republican constitution.

We provide clarity on shifts in support across the political spectrum by repeating our analysis for different electoral nuances. Appendix Tables B3 and B4 show the estimates by electoral nuance for the the logarithmic transformation of the share of evacuees and said percentage, respectively. Regarding the left-of-center bloc, center-left parties are the ones gaining the most votes relative to their pre-war baseline differences. Most importantly, the shift towards the left appears to be driven by a significant drop in center-right support. The estimates for the two 1946 elections imply that a one standard deviation increase in the share of evacuees (ln) reduces the center-right vote share by 0.67 and 0.62 standard deviations, respectively.

DiD Estimates We complement our previous results by estimating the effect of evacuees using a difference-in-differences approach. Compared to our baseline, this approach directly controls for municipal-level unobservable characteristics with municipality fixed effects. This, however, comes at the cost of directly comparing the share of left-of-center votes across elections whose supply-side factors, such as party structure, could vary over time. Appendix Table B5 reports OLS (Columns 1

Table 2: Effect of Evacuees on Left-wing Vote Share - TSLS Estimates

	Left-of-Center Vote Share (% valid votes)								
	1928	1932	1936	1945	1946(J)	1946(N)	1951	1956	1958
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A: % Evacuees - Ln (X + 0.01) - as Treatment									
% Evacuees(Ln)	0.37	0.78	-0.20	0.85*	1.70***	1.68***	1.57**	1.29**	1.04**
	(0.68)	(0.50)	(0.94)	(0.48)	(0.59)	(0.59)	(0.70)	(0.66)	(0.53)
Adj. R^2	.837	.938	.759	.28	.239	.333	.323	.369	.713
KP F-stat	24.6	24.5	24.6	24.6	24.6	24.6	20	22.8	22.6
Panel B: % Evacuees as Treatment									
% Evacuees	0.05	0.10	-0.02	0.11*	0.21***	0.21***	0.20**	0.16**	0.13**
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Adj. R^2	.835	.941	.761	.302	.288	.375	.356	.381	.725
KP F-stat	46.5	46.3	46.5	46.5	46.5	46.5	37	44.6	42.3
Observations	201	200	201	201	200	201	180	192	197

Notes: All columns report second-stage estimates and robust standard errors using a dummy for whether the municipality was matched to front-zone localities only as an instrument. In Panel A, we instrumentalize for the logarithmic transformation of the number of evacuees in the municipality as a percentage of the 1936 population, while in Panel B we instrumentalize for said percentage. Controls include past covariates and arrondissement fixed effects. The last row in each panel reports the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

and 2) and TSLS estimates (Columns 4 and 5) for our two treatment variables, and the reduced-form coefficients for our instrument (Column 3). Figure 4 illustrates the reduced-form and TSLS estimates by plotting yearly marginal effects from an event-study regression.[20]

[20] Appendix Figure B1 plots the yearly marginal effects for the OLS estimates for our two treatment variables.

Figure 4: Effect of Evacuees on Left-wing Vote Share - DiD Reduced Form and Second Stage Estimates

(a) Reduced Form



(b) TSLS: Ln(% Evacuees+0.01)



(c) TSLS: % Evacuees



Notes: Event study plots illustrating yearly effects on left-of-center vote shares. Panel (a) shows reduced-form estimates for an indicator variable for being matched to the front zone only. Blue lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Coefficients of the yearly correlation between the dummy matching indicating that a matching municipality in Haute-Vienne has been matched with a front zone municipality in Alsace (Panel a), the logarithmic transformation of the share of evacuees instrumented (Panel b) or the share of evacuees instrumented (Panel c). All coefficients are compared to the baseline coefficient of 1936.

Taking 1936 as a baseline year, Figure 4 illustrates the post-war shift in left-wing electoral support. As with the previous approach, the DiD estimates are persistent over time, but larger in magnitude. In addition, our estimates imply that increasing the share of evacuees (ln) by one standard deviation increases the left-wing vote share by half to 0.7 standard deviations.

4.2 Robustness Checks

Our baseline approach controls for a broad set of covariates that may be correlated with our instrument. The DiD esimates further support that our findings are not driven by differences in

unobservable municipality characteristics. Next, we provide additional evidence on the validity of our findings by checking that our results hold after accounting for alternative explanations and treatment definition.

Spatial Autocorrelation. Due to the design of the reception plan, our instrument may exhibit some spatial correlation. We address this potential issue in two ways. First, Appendix Table C1 shows the TSLS estimates as in Panel A of Table 2 and reports Conley standard errors accounting for spatial autocorrelation in two-stage least squares estimations using the estimator from Colella et al. (2023). We use two different distance thresholds (10 and 30km), which are above and below the diameter of the average canton. In both cases, significance levels remain largely unaffected relative to our baseline. Second, we add spatial lags to our reduced-form specification to directly control for spatial dependencies and spillovers between municipalities. Results, presented in Appendix Table C2, are of the same magnitude and significance as the reduced-form estimates of front-zone assignment in Appendix Table B2.

Demographic Changes. Historical and administrative reports indicate that most Alsatians left Haute-Vienne after the Armistice was signed (Bernussou, 2014). Still, the war might have reconfigured the population structure of host municipalities. However, the estimates of Table C3 show that neither our instrument nor the relative presence of evacuees is correlated with postwar population size and density. Our results also remain unchanged if we control for postwar population size and density in our baseline approach (Appendix Table C4).

WWII Victimization. The well-known Oradour-sur-Glane massacre perpetrated by the SS Division Das Reich in June 1944 took place in Haute-Vienne. The unit included troops of Alsatian origin who were tried, convicted and later pardoned. Appendix Table C5 shows that the results are robust to controlling for distance to Oradour-sur-Glane. We also do not observe a larger effect of front-zone assignment in host communities closer to Oradour (see Appendix Table C6 and Appendix Figure C1).

Railroad Access. Municipalities matched to the front zone, which were to receive the first evacuees, may have been those with easier access via railroads. Appendix Table C8 shows that our

estimates remain similar in magnitude and significance after controlling for distance to the railroad network.

WWII Administration and Collaboration with Germany. After the French defeat, all of Haute-Vienne was part of Vichy France, which was later formally occupied by Nazi Germany. Hence, it is unlikely that our results are driven by administrative differences - and their effect on collaboration - during World War II. We provide further evidence on this by controlling for the number of Vichy/German administrative services in a municipality or the distance to such services. The estimates in Appendix Table C7 are similar to the baseline results.

Female enfranchisement. Female enfranchisement took place in 1944. The reform was applied uniformly across France, but female registration rates and turnout may vary across municipalities. These differences, which were not captured in prewar turnout, could potentially confound our estimates. We account for this explanation by controlling for the percentage change in voter registration between the 1936 and 1945 legislative elections. Given the relatively low number of military casualties during WWII and the fact that Haute-Vienne did not experience important combat, the bulk of this increase can be attributed to new female voters.[21] The results in Appendix Table C9 are similar to baseline estimates. Accordingly, female enfranchisement alone does not explain our effects.

Alternative Treatment Definition. Ultimately, we investigate whether the results depend on the functional form used to define this treatment (Appendix Table C10). We check how our results vary when using the absolute number of evacuees in 1939 (ln), the share of evacuees based on a later count (April 1940), and evacuee density in 1939.[22] All alternative treatments predict higher vote shares for the left post-war. Our instrument is valid in all cases, but it performs worse when using the absolute number of evacuees. This is reassuring, as it indicates that our baseline results are not driven by the instrument capturing the effect of host community size, given the correlation with the predicted number of evacuees. Overall, our instrument predicts the presence of evacuees even after

[21] On average, the franchise almost doubled in 1945, as one would expect in a gender-balanced society, though there is some variation in this expansion.

[22] The absolute number has the disadvantage of being strongly correlated with the size of the hosting community, given the nature of the reception plan (see Section 1).

decongestion resettlement transfers and also under different functional forms.

5 Discussion

According to our results, hosting internal evacuees shifted postwar electoral support towards left-of-center parties. This happened even though Alsatians were significantly more likely to vote for the right both before and after the war. Appendix Figure D1 highlights these differences.[23] Hence, contrary to the *transmission-of-values* channel, hosting non-co-ethnic co-national evacuees did not homogenize political preferences between the evacuees and their hosts. It also did not increase support for nationalist movements, as predicted by the *war-exposure* channel.

Below, we provide additional evidence on the mechanisms behind our findings by analyzing the (i) heterogeneity of the treatment effects relative to both identity differences and pre-contact local political behavior, (ii) the postwar presence of local civic organizations, (iii) other measures of political behavior, and (iv) the effect of other French evacuees in Haute-Vienne. The analysis empirically supports the hypothesis that exposure to an out-group triggered an identity response, shifting political behavior towards that of the pre-contact local majority. We conclude the section by showing that our main results hold for the neighboring department of Vienne.

5.1 Mechanisms

Identity differences and local political behavior. We examine how the effect of hosting evacuees varies relative to the pre-war characteristics of evacuees and hosts. A first test uses religious affiliation data from the 1905 German census to compute the religious characteristics of the planned evacuees to be hosted in each municipality.[24] Our analysis measures how the marginal effect of the instrument varies relative to the share of Protestants in the origin municipalities. Protestantism was more widely diffused in Alsace than in Haute-Vienne. Its diffusion also varied within Alsace. Hence, we can use this variation to test for the role of cultural differences in our main results.

[23] In the three previous pre-war elections, the vote share for the left in Haute-Vienne averaged around 81 percent, while it was only 40 percent in Bas-Rhin.

[24] Religious data for the post-WWI period is not available as French censuses do not ask about ethnicity or faith. However, as religious norms were persistent, particularly pre-WWII, German census data should allow us to capture differences in beliefs across origin municipalities.

A second test leverages variation in pre-contact local political behavior to determine whether the political response depends on the reference point offered by the local majority.

This analysis can serve as a test for the different mechanisms in Section 2.1. First, if the treatment effect is driven by the *transmission-of-values* channel, then one can expect an alignment towards the Alsatian pre-war majority and a shift to the right at least in areas where evacuees were more Catholic (i.e., where cultural differences between hosts and evacuees were smaller). Second, if war exposure is the dominant driver, then the marginal effect of front-zone assignment should remain relatively constant. In this case, the heightened perception of conflict due to the hosting of evacuees should not depend on their cultural background. Third, if our results stem from an identity response of the host, then the marginal effect should increase with the religious divide between hosts and evacuees. A larger divide would trigger a stronger identity response. The latter would translate into a higher vote share for the left when there is a stronger pre-existing local majority in favor of the left. In such a case, right-wing minority voters would feel different from Alsatians upon contact and then change their behavior to coalesce behind the local left-wing majority.

Figure 5 shows that the marginal effect of front-zone assignment is increasing in the share of Protestants in matched origin municipalities. When evacuees came from areas with few Protestants (below 10%), then front-zone assignment had little to no effect on post-war local voting. In those municipalities matched to Protestant-majority areas, front-zone assignment increased the postwar vote share of the left by between 5 and 10 percentage points.

These results suggest that the cultural differences between hosts and evacuees magnify the treatment effect, pointing away from the *war-exposure* channel. Moreover, as we do not observe a shift to the right even in municipalities matched to Catholic areas, it is unlikely that the *transmission-of-values* channel plays a significant role. The results are consistent with larger differences between hosts and evacuees triggering a stronger identity response. We provide further evidence on how this identity response changes political behavior by exploring how changes in voting patterns depend on pre-contact peers' voting.

Figure 6 illustrates how a greater shift to the left is observed in municipalities where prewar support for left-of-center parties was stronger prior to contact. Statistically significant effects are observed in those areas with a marked left-of-center majority (above 65% support).

The heterogeneity of the political response confirms that war exposure is not the main mecha-

Figure 5: Effect of Instrument by Share of Protestants in Matched Origin Municipalities



Notes: The graph plots the marginal effect of being matched to the front zone only by share of Protestants in matched origin municipalities estimated from the following equation: $Left_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 FrontZone \times Protestant_{1905} + \beta_2 FrontZone + \beta_3 Protestant_{1905} + \Gamma X_i + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{it}$. $Left_{it}$ is the vote share of left-of-center parties in postwar parliamentary elections, $FrontZone$ is our instrumental variable and $Protestant_{1905}$ is the difference in prewar vote share for the left between origin and host municipalities. X_i is a vector of control variable including those in our baseline estimation plus the left-of-center vote share in prewar elections. γ_t are election-year fixed effects.

nism. The lack of a significant shift to the right for any range of observed prewar peers' political behavior does not support the transmission-of-values channel. Rather, our main results appear to be driven by a pre-war right-wing-voting minority adhering to the left-wing majority after an identity response to the exposure to more right-wing non-coethnic co-nationals. Upon contact, hosts experience identity differences with evacuees. Hence, they are more likely to identify with local peers than with evacuees (first step of the identity response). As a consequence, host adapt their (political) behavior to fit these new boundaries (i.e., a second step of the identity response). Political behavior only changes when the local political majority differs from that of the evacuees (i.e., when the majority was left-of-center prior to contact). Appendix Figure D2 shows that while the identity of evacuees shapes the identity response to hosting evacuees, the political response to hosting evacuees is not determined by pre-contact evacuees' voting behavior but by the local majority.

In-group Civic Organizations. We provide more direct evidence on the *identity-response* channel by analyzing the development of local civic organizations (*associations*). We use data from

Figure 6: Effect of Instrument by Prewar Local Left-of-Center Vote Share



Notes: The graph plots the marginal effect of assignment to the front area by pre-war local left-of-center vote share coming from the following estimation: $Left_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 FrontZone \times Left_{Host,pre} + \beta_2 FrontZone + \beta_3 Left_{Host,pre} + \Gamma X_i + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{it}$. $Left_{it}$ is the vote share of left-of-center parties in postwar parliamentary elections, $FrontZone$ is our instrumental variable and $Left_{Host,pre}$ is the host municipality vote share for the left in 1936. X_i is a vector of control variable including those in our baseline estimation plus the left-of-center vote share in prewar elections. γ_t are election-year fixed effects. Estimates using differences in pre-contact political behavior in hosting communities are available in Appendix D1.

the *Journal Officiel*, in which these organizations must be declared, along with their address and mission. Our analysis leverages the content of their stated missions to classify associations into in-group and out-group organizations.[25] We then check whether their creation was affected by the hosting of evacuees.

We classify organizations by leveraging natural language processing tools to analyze the text of associations' stated missions. The clusters are structured by the relative linguistic proximity in their missions, which is based on the relative frequency of stems. Five clusters were created using topic modeling: (i) youth organizations and school partnerships, (ii) hunting and fishing, (iii) sports and propaganda, (iv) schooling and partnerships, and (v) defense of interests.[26] We define clusters (ii), (iii) and (v) as in-group-focused associations and clusters (i) and (iv) as out-group-oriented. As a result, 1397 associations are defined as out-group and 801 as in-group. Figure 7 shows the

[25] Appendix Figure E1 provides a first snapshot of differences between associations in the municipalities matched to the front zone relative to others.

[26] See Appendix E for a description of the method.

difference in mission stems between both groups. While out-group-oriented associations mention stems such as "*developp*" (=development), "*aid*" (=help) and "*lien*" (=link), in-group associations focus on "*defens*" (=defence), "*repress*" (=repression) and "*protect*" (=protection).[27]

Figure 7: Most Frequent Stems by Association Types



Notes: Stem frequency in missions of "out-group" (Left-hand side) and "In-group" associations (Right-hand side).

We then estimate the effect of hosting evacuees on the number of in-group associations per 10,000 inhabitants (ln). Results are presented in Table 3. Columns 1 to 3 show that neither our instrument nor treatment is correlated with the prewar creation of associations relative to population of in-group and out-group associations. After the war, municipalities hosting front-zone evacuees see an increase in in-group organizations than others. The estimates in Columns 5 and 6 suggest that increasing the share of evacuees in a municipality by 1 percent increases the relative number of in-group associations by 0.6 percent. The results in Panel B show that there is no corresponding post-war increase in out-group organizations.[28] These results suggest an identity response by locals:

[27] Appendix Figures E3 and E4 present both the stem frequency and the Term Frequency Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) in all clusters.

[28] Appendix Table E1 shows the same results using a variable indicating whether in-group or out-group associations have been created in municipalities in the pre-war or post-war period. Meanwhile, Appendix Table E2 presents

hosting evacuees incentivized social capital formation among in-group members, while it did not encourage bonds with individuals outside this in-group.

Table 3: Effect of Evacuees on Civic Organization Types

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Panel A: In Group Asso p.c (Log)					
	Pre War$_{1902-1939}$			Post War$_{1940-1958}$		
Front Zone Only	0.22			1.81***		
	(0.69)			(0.63)		
% Evacues (Log)		0.08			0.64**	
		(0.23)			(0.25)	
% Evacues			0.01			0.08***
			(0.03)			(0.03)
Observations	201	201	201	201	201	201
Adj. R^2	.0635	.078	.0717	.0599	-.0679	-.0394
KP F-stat		24.6	46.5		24.6	46.5
	Panel B: Out Group Asso p.c (Log)					
	Pre War$_{1902-1939}$			Post War$_{1940-1958}$		
Front Zone Only	-0.67			-0.05		
	(0.62)			(0.73)		
% Evacues (Log)		-0.24			-0.02	
		(0.21)			(0.25)	
% Evacues			-0.03			-0.00
			(0.03)			(0.03)
Observations	201	201	201	201	201	201
Adj. R^2	.183	.108	.137	.105	.103	.103
KP F-stat		24.6	46.5		24.6	46.5

Notes: All columns report robust standard errors. In Panel A: Estimation of the reduced form (Columns 1 and 4) and of the 2SLS estimation (Columns 2, 3, 5, 6) using the log number of in-group associations per 10,000 inhabitants before the war (Columns 1 to 3) and after the war (Columns 4 to 6) as dependent variable. In Panel B: Estimation of the reduced form (Columns 1 and 4) and of the 2SLS estimation (Columns 2, 3, 5, 6) using the log number of out-group associations per 10,000 inhabitants before the war (Columns 1 to 3) and after the war (Columns 4 to 6) as the dependent variable. 1936 population counts are used to compute the number of associations per inhabitant. The treatment variable is either a dummy variable for Front zone assignment (Columns 1 and 4), the logarithmic transformation of the share of evacuees instrumented (Columns 2 to 5) or the share of evacuees instrumented (Columns 3 to 6). $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Other Measures of Political Behavior. We complement our findings by examining how evacuees shaped other measures of political activity. First, we explore the effect of evacuees on collaboration

evidence that evacuees have an effect on the creation of associations after the war relative to creations before the war.

with the Vichy regime. Column 1 of Table 4 shows that the presence of evacuees had a negative effect on the density of Vichy collaborators. This is consistent with both the *identity-response* and the *war-exposure* channel. In both cases, hosts would be less willing to cooperate with a regime aligned with a foreign aggressor.

We then check the effect on vote shares of right-of-center parties. This analysis helps refine our interpretation of the baseline results. Pre-1951, the center-right was represented only by the Popular Republican Movement (MRP - *Mouvement Républicain Populaire*). In 1951, the MRP faced competition from another center-right party: the Rally of the French People (RPF - *Rassemblement du Peuple Français*). The RPF was launched in 1947 by De Gaulle as a right-of center alternative to the ruling Third Force coalition, which involved the MRP. The two parties differed in their origin. The MRP ensued from the merger of several Catholic movements and parties, including the Union Populaire Républicaine from Alsace and the Union Populaire Lorraine. Key MRP figures were of Alsatian/Mosellan descent: first party president Maurice Schumann (from Alsace) and Prime Ministers Robert Schuman (in 1947-1948 from Moselle) and Pierre Pfimlin (in 1958 from Alsace). The MRP also supported strong co-operation with West Germany. On the other hand, the Gaullist RPF was not identified with the personality of Charles de Gaulle and the Free France forces.

Columns 2 and 3 of Table 4 show a sizable and statistically significant negative effect of hosting evacuees on the standardized MRP vote share and a more minor and statistically insignificant effect on RPF support, even though the RPF's average vote share was twice that of the MRP.[29] The results provide further evidence against the *transmission-of-values* channel and support our preferred explanation of an identity response among locals.

Other French refugees. As the war unfolded, refugees from other regions of France fled to interior departments, including Haute-Vienne. According to a June 1940 count, they were around 9.000 in Haute-Vienne, less than 15% the number of Alsatians. These refugee flows were unplanned and took place after the Alsatian refugees settled in Haute-Vienne. Consequently, other French refugees may have been less likely to settle in municipalities with a large presence of Alsatians.[30] We, however, leverage the remaining variation in the presence of other French refugees to

[29] For comparability, dependent variables are standardized.

[30] This is observable in our data. The correlation coefficient between the percentage of other French refugees and the percentage of Alsatian refugees is -0.37.

Table 4: Effect of Evacuees on Other Measures of Political Activity

Dependent Variable	Ln of Collaborators p.c.	Vote Shares 1951 (% valid votes)	
		MRP	RPF
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: % Evacuees - Ln (X + 0.01) - as Treatment			
% Evacuees(Ln)	-0.14*	-0.16**	-0.08
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Adj. R^2	-.115	.0508	.4
KP F-stat	24.6	20	20
Panel B: % Evacuees as Treatment			
% Evacuees	-0.02*	-0.02**	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Adj. R^2	.0536	.0905	.406
KP F-stat	46.5	37	37
Observations	201	180	180

Notes: All columns report second stage estimates and robust standard errors for our instrumental variable. For comparability, all dependent variables have been standardized. In Panel A, we instrumentalize for the logarithmic transformation of the number of evacuees in the municipality as a percentage of the 1936 population, while in Panel B we instrumentalize for said percentage. Controls include past covariates and arrondissement fixed effects. The last row in each panel reports the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

investigate mechanisms. The cultural divide between hosts and other French refugees was significantly narrower than that with Alsatians. Hence, the *identity-response* should play a smaller role after hosting other French evacuees. If this channel is the main driver of our results, then exposure to other French refugees should not have a sizable positive effect on left-wing support.

Table 5: Other French Refugees and Vote Share for the Left

Dependent Variable	Left-of-Center Vote Share (% valid votes)								
	1928	1932	1936	1945	1946 (Jun)	1946 (Nov)	1951	1956	1958
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A – Treatment : % Evacuees (Log) as Treatment									
% Alsatian	0.36	0.82	-0.23	0.78*	1.63***	1.60***	1.45**	1.17*	1.04**
Evacuees(Log)	(0.69)	(0.51)	(0.97)	(0.47)	(0.59)	(0.58)	(0.70)	(0.66)	(0.53)
% Other	-0.03	0.18	-0.14	-0.29*	-0.27	-0.33	-0.59**	-0.49*	-0.00
French Evacuees (Log)	(0.25)	(0.17)	(0.30)	(0.16)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.17)
Observations	201	200	201	201	200	201	180	192	197
Adj. R^2	.836	.938	.757	.294	.251	.346	.345	.381	.711
KP F-stat	23.7	23.6	23.7	23.7	23.7	23.7	19.7	22.1	21.8
Panel B – Treatment : % Evacuees as Treatment									
% Alsatian	0.04	0.10	-0.04	0.09	0.20**	0.20**	0.18*	0.13	0.12*
Evacuees	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)
% Other	-0.11	0.03	-0.25	-0.18	-0.13	-0.16	-0.29*	-0.33**	-0.08
French Evacuees	(0.19)	(0.08)	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.10)
Observations	201	200	201	201	200	201	180	192	197
Adj. R^2	.834	.94	.76	.314	.294	.38	.367	.395	.726
KP F-stat	41.8	41.7	41.8	41.8	41.8	41.8	34.3	40.1	38

Notes: All columns report second stage estimates and robust standard errors using a dummy for whether the municipality was matched to front zone localities only as an instrument. The estimation adds the percentage of other refugees as a control variable to Equation 2. The last row in each panel reports the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table 5 shows that our main results hold after controlling for the share of refugees from other French departments.[31] Moreover, the share of other French refugees is not positively correlated with post-war left-wing vote share. If anything, their presence depressed left-of-center support in the early 1950s.[32] We interpret this heterogeneity across refugee types as evidence that the presence of Alsatians, unlike that of other French co-ethnic refugees, produced an identity response among locals.

5.2 Alternative Sample and External Validity

Do our main results extend to other French departments? Unfortunately, due to data limitations and a lack of exogenous variation, we are not able to reproduce a municipal-level analysis for all hosting departments. However, we perform a similar exercise for the neighboring department of Vienne, albeit with caveats.

[31] Appendix Table F1 also shows that despite the negative correlation between the spatial distributions of the two types of refugees, our instrument is still a strong predictor for Alsatian evacuee flows even after controlling for the presence of other refugees. This lends more credence to the exclusion restriction of the instrument.

[32] The caveat is that the estimates for other French refugees are not causal and may capture the effect of unobservable municipal characteristics. OLS estimates in Appendix Table F2 show a similar pattern, even when restricting the sample to municipalities matched to the rear zone in which there was more space available for non-Alsatian refugees.

Vienne, to the northwest of Haute-Vienne, hosted evacuees from the western part of Moselle. By 1940, there were around 62,000 Mosellans in the department (Charenton, 2011). Mosellans shared a common recent past with Alsatians. Both had been under German rule for almost 50 years until the end of WWI. Hence, though the cultural divide was not as wide as in the Alsatian case, they would have still been perceived an out-group by their hosts.

The Vienne reception plan shared similarities with the Haute-Vienne one. Departmental authorities wanted to keep evacuees from the same arrondissement together, and no evacuees were to settle in a reserved zone around the departmental capital of Poitiers. However, the Vienne reception plan was more tailored and did not prescribed a uniform distribution of evacuees. The greater variation across municipalities relative to the Haute-Vienne plan suggests that local hosting capabilities played a role. Potentially, the matching with the front-zone may have also depended on these capabilities. Nonetheless, our instrument is still a good predictor of actual evacuee presence. While very few evacuees came from the rear zone, in Vienne, large unexpected flows of evacuees from the front zone were less common. Hence, the evacuation might have been better prepared by the authorities in Vienne and Moselle.

We check the external validity of our results by repeating our analysis using Vienne data. Our specification is similar to that for Haute-Vienne, with the difference that we include cantonal fixed effects to better control for the possible endogeneity of the instrument. Appendix Table G1 reports the TSLS estimates. As with Haute-Vienne, we observe a positive effect of evacuees in left-wing support, albeit not as sizable in absolute terms.

To account for possible selection into hosting evacuees, we repeat our difference-in-differences approach.[33] Figure 8 presents the event-study estimates. Prewar, no significant effects are observed. Postwar, the coefficients for front-zone assignment and the share of evacuees (ln) are statistically significant. The effects are less sizable and exhibit less persistence than in Haute-Vienne. Nonetheless, despite possible selection issues in Vienne, we observe similar results to those in Haute-Vienne and other host departments (see Figure 1).

[33]The coefficient for 1932 is statistically significant, showing some potential selection bias.

Figure 8: Effect of Evacuees on Left-wing Vote Share - DiD in Vienne



Notes: Coefficients of the yearly correlation between the dummy matching indicating that a matching municipality in Vienne has been matched with a front zone municipality in Moselle (Left Panel), the log transformation of the share of evacuees (Right Panel). All coefficients are compared to the baseline coefficient of 1936.

6 Conclusion

This paper examines how internal displacements shape the political behavior of host populations. To identify these effects, we study the evacuation of Alsatians living next to the Franco-German border to the French interior at the beginning of WWII. For identification, we utilize the exogenous assignment of municipalities in the interior department of Haute-Vienne to host evacuees from either the front or rear border zones. Host municipalities assigned to the front zone faced an unexpected surge in evacuees, which halted the evacuation in the rear zone. This created exogenous geographical variation in the share of refugees within the department.

Our results show that increased exposure to Alsatian evacuees increased the vote share for left-of-center parties after WWII. The effect peaks in the immediate years after the war and gradually decreases in the 1950s, though it remains statistically significant. Additional results underline the possibility that exposure to a co-national out-group with a different culture and values triggered an identity response among locals. After the war, municipalities that had hosted more evacuees experienced more creation of in-group-focused civic organizations. Additionally, we observe that the increase in the left-of-center vote share was more sizable where the cultural divide between evacuees and hosts was wider. The effect is also stronger when, pre-war, the local majority for the left was more substantial. This identity response shaped voting behavior as a right-wing minority coalesced around the pre-war left-wing majority. Other mechanisms may also play a role, though these are not consistent with our findings.

Our findings suggest that even a temporary exposure to internal refugees can have important political consequences. This conclusion is particularly relevant in light of current internal displacements caused by ongoing conflicts. Following displacements, locals may be exposed to a co-national out-group. This contact could reinforce local identities over national ones, potentially affecting post-war reconstruction and nation-building. The results also complement our understanding of the consequences of major wars, in particular, WWII.

Certain caveats should be considered when interpreting our results. First, the number of observations available is relatively limited. Second, our findings should be extended to other cases of internal displacements with a degree of caution. Unlike other displacements, the Alsatian case was a planned evacuation that aimed to minimize the impact on hosts. Given this, we consider that our estimates may provide a lower bound for the effects of exposure to internally displaced.

References

ADHV (1939): "Liste des communes d'origine et de correspondance," Archives Départementales de Haute-Vienne: 187 W 9.

——— (1940): "Recensement des réfugiés," Archives Départementales de Haute-Vienne: 187 W 177.

ALESINA, A. AND M. TABELLINI (2024): "The political effects of immigration: Culture or economics?" *Journal of Economic Literature*, 62, 5–46.

ALLPORT, G. W. (1954): *The Nature of Prejudice*, Addison-Wesley, Cambridge, MA.

BAZZI, S., A. GADUH, A. D. ROTHENBERG, AND M. WONG (2019): "Unity in diversity? How intergroup contact can foster nation building," *American Economic Review*, 109, 3978–4025.

BECKER, S. O. AND A. FERRARA (2019): "Consequences of forced migration: A survey of recent findings," *Labour Economics*, 59, 1–16.

BECKER, S. O., I. GROSFELD, P. GROSJEAN, N. VOIGTLÄNDER, AND E. ZHURAVSKAYA (2020): "Forced migration and human capital: Evidence from post-WWII population transfers," *American Economic Review*, 110, 1430–1463.

BELLOWS, J. AND E. MIGUEL (2009): "War and local collective action in Sierra Leone," *Journal of public Economics*, 93, 1144–1157.

BERNUSSOU, D. (2014): "Une Saison d'Alsace en Limousin," Tech. rep.

BLATTMAN, C. (2009): "From violence to voting: War and political participation in Uganda," *American Political Science Review*, 103, 231–247.

BONOMI, G., N. GENNAIOLI, AND G. TABELLINI (2021): "Identity, beliefs, and political conflict," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 136, 2371–2411.

BURSZTYN, L., T. CHANEY, T. A. HASSAN, AND A. RAO (2024): "The immigrant next door," *American Economic Review*, 114, 348–384.

CÁCERES-DELPIANO, J., A.-I. DE MORAGAS, G. FACCHINI, AND I. GONZÁLEZ (2021): "Intergroup contact and nation building: Evidence from military service in Spain," *Journal of Public Economics*, 201, 104477.

CAGÉ, J., A. DAGORRET, P. GROSJEAN, AND S. JHA (2023): "Heroes and villains: The effects of heroism on autocratic values and Nazi collaboration in France," *American Economic Review*, 113, 1888–1932.

CAGÉ, J. AND T. PIKETTY (2023): *Une histoire du conflit politique: élections et inégalités sociales en France, 1789-2022*, Paris: Seuil.

CAMPBELL, D. T. (1965): "Ethnocentric and other altruistic motives," in *Nebraska symposium on motivation*, vol. 13, 283.

CARLITZ, R., A. MORJARIA, J. MUELLER, AND P. OSAFO-KWAAKO (2024): "State building in a diverse society," *Review of Economic Studies*, rdae116.

CASAS, A., F. CURCI, AND A.-I. DE MORAGAS (2024): "Judicial decisions, backlash and secessionism: The Spanish constitutional court and Catalonia," *The Economic Journal*, 134, 3202–3231.

CHARENTON, B. (2011): "L'implantation territoriale et administrative des Mosellans dans les départements de correspondance (1939-1940) : essai de cartographie," *Les Cahiers Lorrains*, 34–47.

CHARNYSH, V. (2019): "Diversity, institutions, and economic outcomes: Post-WWII displacement in Poland," *American Political Science Review*, 113, 423–441.

CHEVALIER, A., B. ELSNER, A. LICHTER, AND N. PESTEL (2024): "Forced Migration and Local Public Policies: Evidence from Post-War West Germany," *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 22, 915–962.

COLELLA, F., R. LALIVE, S. O. SAKALLI, AND M. THOENIG (2023): "acreg: Arbitrary correlation regression," *The Stata Journal*, 23, 119–147.

DEHDARI, S. H. AND K. GEHRING (2022): "The origins of common identity: Evidence from Alsace-Lorraine," *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 14, 261–292.

DELL, M. AND P. QUERUBIN (2018): "Nation building through foreign intervention: Evidence from discontinuities in military strategies," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 133, 701–764.

DEPETRIS-CHAUVIN, E. AND R. J. SANTOS (2018): "Unexpected guests: The impact of internal displacement inflows on rental prices in Colombian host cities," *Journal of Development Economics*, 134, 289–309.

DINAS, E., V. FOUKA, AND A. SCHLÄPFER (2021): "Family history and attitudes toward outgroups: Evidence from the European refugee crisis," *Journal of Politics*, 83, 647–661.

DUSTMANN, C., K. VASILJEVA, AND A. PIIL DAMM (2019): "Refugee migration and electoral outcomes," *Review of Economic Studies*, 86, 2035–2091.

ENKE, B. (2019): "Kinship, cooperation, and the evolution of moral systems," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 134, 953–1019.

FICK, S. AND R. HIJMANS (2017): "WorldClim 2: new 1km spatial resolution climate surfaces for global land areas," *International Journal of Climatology*, 37, 4302–4315.

FONTANA, N., T. NANNICINI, AND G. TABELLINI (2023): "Historical roots of political extrem-

ism: The effects of Nazi occupation of Italy," *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 51, 723–743.

FOUKA, V., S. MAZUMDER, AND M. TABELLINI (2022): "From immigrants to Americans: Race and assimilation during the Great Migration," *The Review of Economic Studies*, 89, 811–842.

FOUKA, V. AND M. TABELLINI (2022): "Changing in-group boundaries: The effect of immigration on race relations in the United States," *American Political Science Review*, 116, 968–984.

FOUKA, V. AND H.-J. VOTH (2023): "Collective Remembrance and Private Choice: German–Greek Conflict and Behavior in Times of Crisis," *American Political Science Review*, 117, 851–870.

GIULIANO, P., M. TABELLINI, ET AL. (2020): "The seeds of ideology: Historical immigration and political preferences in the United States," Tech. rep., National Bureau of Economic Research.

HALLA, M., A. F. WAGNER, AND J. ZWEIMÜLLER (2017): "Immigration and voting for the far right," *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 15, 1341–1385.

HARTMAN, A. C., B. S. MORSE, AND S. WEBER (2021): "Violence, displacement, and support for internally displaced persons: Evidence from Syria," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 65, 1791–1819.

JARVIS, A., H. REUTER, A. NELSON, AND A. GUEVARA (2008): *Hole-filled seamless SRTM data V4*, International Center for Tropical Agriculture, www.diva-gis.org/gData.

LANG, V. AND S. A. SCHNEIDER (2023): "Immigration and nationalism in the long run," *Working Paper*.

LUPU, N. AND L. PEISAKHIN (2017): "The Legacy of Political Violence across Generations," *American Journal of Political Science*, 61, 836–851.

MENON, A. (2023): "The political legacy of forced migration: Evidence from post-WWII Germany," *Comparative Political Studies*, 56, 1398–1432.

MORALES, J. S. (2018): "The impact of internal displacement on destination communities: Evidence from the Colombian conflict," *Journal of Development Economics*, 131, 132–150.

OCHSNER, C. AND F. ROESEL (2024): "Activated history: The case of the Turkish Sieges of Vienna," *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 16, 76–112.

PASSMORE, K. (2025): "The Drôle de Guerre on the Maginot Line: Soldiers and Civilians in Alsace-Lorraine, September 1939 to June 1940," *French Historical Studies*, 48, 101–137.

PEISAKHIN, L., N. STOOP, AND P. VAN DER WINDT (2025): "Who hosts? The correlates of hosting the internally displaced," *American Political Science Review*, 119, 1143–1158.

PETTIGREW, T. F. (1998): "Intergroup contact theory," *Annual review of psychology*, 49, 65–85.

REMIGEREAU, C. (2024): "Bringing in the Far Right: The Electoral Impact of the French Algerian Repatriates," *Available at SSRN 5006749*.

ROZENAS, A., S. SCHUTTE, AND Y. ZHUKOV (2017): "The Political Legacy of Violence: The Long-term Impact of Stalin's Repression in Ukraine," *The Journal of Politics*, 79, 1147–1161.

ROZO, S. V. AND J. F. VARGAS (2021): "Brothers or invaders? How crisis-driven migrants shape voting behavior," *Journal of Development Economics*, 150, 102636.

SHAYO, M. (2020): "Social identity and economic policy," *Annual Review of Economics*, 12, 355–389.

SIDANIUS, J. AND F. PRATTO (2001): *Social dominance: An intergroup theory of social hierarchy*

and oppression, Cambridge University Press.

STATISTISCHEN BUREAU FÜR ELSASS -LOTHRINGEN (1908): "Statistische Mitteilungen über Elsass-Lothringen 1905," Druck und Verlag von M. DuMont Schauberg In Kommission bei Friedrich Bull , Verlagsbuchhandlung.

STEINMAYR, A. (2021): "Contact versus exposure: Refugee presence and voting for the far right," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 103, 310–327.

TAJFEL, H., J. C. TURNER, W. G. AUSTIN, AND S. WORCHEL (1979): "An integrative theory of intergroup conflict," *Organizational identity: A reader*, 56, 9780203505984–16.

VERME, P. AND K. SCHUETTLER (2021): "The impact of forced displacement on host communities: A review of the empirical literature in economics," *Journal of Development Economics*, 150, 102606.

Appendix

Table of Contents

A Data and Empirical Strategy

A.1 Descriptive

Table A1: Summary Statistics for Main Variables

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Planned Evacuees (% of 1936 Pop)	201	29.6	9.6	0	41
Planned Evacuees Front Zone (% of 1936 Pop)	201	16.2	16	0	35
Municipality Matched with Front Zone Only	201	.468	.5	0	1
Actual Evacuees (% of 1936 Pop)	201	24.7	22	0	86
Left-of-Center Vote Share: 1928	201	79.8	24	18	100
1932	200	83.6	25	25	100
1936	201	76.1	22	29	100
1945	201	87.3	7.2	60	99
1946 (Jun)	200	79	9.5	48	98
1946 (Nov)	201	78.3	10	45	97
1951	180	76.8	12	43	99
1956	192	72.6	12	41	99
1958	197	85.9	13	51	100
Pop. Growth 1926-36 (Annual %)	201	-.815	1	-7.7	1.6
Pop. Density 1936 (Ln)	201	3.68	.49	2.5	7.1
Dwellings p.c. 1926	201	.25	.041	.1	.42
Distance to Closest Railroad 1936 (km)	201	5.04	4.2	.051	19
Distance to Limoges (km)	201	29.4	13	2.7	59
Avg. Temperature (° C)	201	11.2	.31	9.9	12
Avg. Precipitation (mm)	201	971	66	814	1089
Avg. Elevation (m)	201	340	90	188	660
Avg. Slope	201	1.15	.47	.4	3.4

Notes: See Section 2 for data description and sources.

A.2 IV Strategy - Validity Checks

Table A2: Placebo Regressions on Prewar Electoral Outcomes, Socioeconomic Characteristics and Other Covariates

Panel A: Pre-war Electoral Outcomes

	Left-of-Center Vote Share		Turnout	
	1932	1936	1932	1938
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Matched to Front	2.19	-0.55	-0.35	-1.10
Zone Only	(1.44)	(2.70)	(0.79)	(0.78)
Observations	200	201	200	201
Adj. R^2	.939	.765	.368	.204

Panel B: Pre-war Socioeconomic Characteristics and Other Covariates

	Pop. Growth 1926-36	Pop. Density 1936	Dwellings 1926	Distance to Railroad	Rainfall	Temperature	Elevation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Matched to Front	0.04	-0.08	0.01	-0.51	-13.66***	0.00	0.27
Zone Only	(0.14)	(0.06)	(0.01)	(0.61)	(3.69)	(0.01)	(2.40)
Observations	201	201	201	201	201	201	201
Adj. R^2	.188	.508	.468	.309	.904	.967	.982

Notes: All columns report OLS estimates and robust standard errors for a dummy for whether the municipality was matched to front-zone localities only as an instrument. Controls include past covariates and arrondissement fixed effects. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table A3: Host and Origin Political Behavior and Front-Zone Assignment

Dependent Variable	Matched to Front-Zone Only					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Panel A: Δ Left					
Δ Left$_{Origin-Hosting}$	0.01***	0.00	-0.00			
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)			
Δ Left$_{Origin-Hosting} >$ Median				0.57***	0.08	0.08
				(0.06)	(0.19)	(0.20)
Observations	185	185	185	185	185	185
Adj. R^2	.276	.361	.465	.319	.359	.465
	Panel B: Left$_{Origin}$					
Left$_{Origin}$	0.00	-0.00	-0.00			
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)			
Left$_{Origin} >$ Median				-0.05	-0.08	-0.13
				(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Observations	185	185	185	185	185	185
Adj. R^2	.000711	.358	.47	-.00311	.363	.473
	Panel C: Left$_{Hosting}$					
Left$_{Hosting}$	-0.01***	0.00	-0.00			
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)			
Left$_{Hosting} >$ Median				-0.45***	-0.03	-0.14
				(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.11)
Observations	201	201	201	201	201	201
Adj. R^2	.187	.396	.501	.202	.396	.506
Controls						
Arrdt FE		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
Baseline Controls			Yes			Yes

Notes: Estimation of the determinants of assignment to front zone in a linear probability model depending on pre-war ideological distance between hosting and refugee municipalities (Panel A), the vote share of the left in origin municipalities (Panel B), the vote for the left in hosting municipalities (Panel C). Each panel presents the coefficients of interest β_1 from the following equation: $FrontZone = \alpha + \beta_1 Left_{prewar} + \Gamma X_i + \varepsilon_i$. In Panel A, Left$_{prewar}$ is defined as the difference in vote shares for the left between origin and hosting municipalities (Columns 1 to 3) or an indicator variable equal to one if this difference is greater than the median (Columns 4 to 6). In Panel B, Left$_{prewar}$ is defined as the vote share for the left in the origin municipality (Columns 1 to 3) or an indicator variable equal to one if this variable is greater than the median (Columns 4 to 6). In Panel C, Left$_{prewar}$ is defined as the vote share for the left in the hosting municipality (Columns 1 to 3) or an indicator variable equal to one if this variable is greater than the median (Columns 4 to 6).

Table A4: Hosts Pre-war Political Behavior and Plan Compliance

Dep Variable	% Evacuees (Ln)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Left-of-Center Vote	-0.01			0.05		
Share_{1936}	(0.01)			(0.03)		
Left-of-Center Vote		-0.01			0.05	
Share_{1932}		(0.01)			(0.04)	
Left-of-Center Vote			-0.01			0.02
Share_{1928}			(0.01)			(0.02)
Obs	94	93	94	94	93	94
Adj. R^2	-.00346	.0141	.0162	.131	.0753	.0399
Controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Estimation within the subsample of municipalities assigned to host "Front zone" evacuees to determine whether pre-war municipality characteristics determine the intensity of treatment within the treated group. The dependent variable is the log-transformed share of evacuees in a municipality in November 1939. The main dependent variables are the vote share for the left in the 1928, 1932 and 1936 elections in the hosting municipalities. Controls include past covariates and arrondissement fixed effects. Robust standard errors $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table A5: Evacuees Pre-war Political Behavior and Plan Compliance

Dep Variable	% Evacuees (Ln)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Left-of-Center	0.01	0.01	0.03	-0.00		
Origin_{1936}	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)		
Left-of-Center		-0.01		0.05		
Hosting_{1936}		(0.01)		(0.03)		
Difference					0.01	-0.04
Left-of-Center $\text{Hosting-Origin}_{1936}$					(0.01)	(0.03)
Obs	94	94	94	94	94	94
Adj. R^2	-.00932	-.00994	.0256	.12	.000577	.111
Controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Estimation within the subsample of municipalities assigned to host "Front zone" evacuees to determine whether pre-war characteristics of the hosted groups determine the intensity of treatment within the treated group. The dependent variable is the log-transformed share of evacuees in a municipality in November 1939. The main dependent variables are the vote share for the left in 1936 in the municipality of origins of the evacuees and the difference in the vote share of the left between Alsatian and Haute-Vienne municipalities. The matching between municipalities in Bas-Rhin and in Haute-Vienne follows that of the evacuation plan. Controls include past covariates and arrondissement fixed effects. Robust standard errors $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

B Additional Baseline Results

Table B1: Effect of Evacuees on Left-wing Vote Share - OLS Estimates

	Left-of-Center Vote Share (% valid votes)								
	1928	1932	1936	1945	1946 (Jun)	1946 (Nov)	1951	1956	1958
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
% Evacuees(Ln)	0.68***	0.42***	0.70***	0.48***	0.82***	0.91***	0.89***	0.84***	0.48***
	(0.21)	(0.14)	(0.26)	(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.15)
Observations	201	200	201	201	200	201	180	192	197
Adj. R^2	.838	.94	.773	.303	.309	.38	.351	.38	.729

Notes: All columns report OLS estimates and robust standard errors for the log transformation of the number of evacuees in a commune as a percentage of the 1936 population. Controls include past covariates and arrondissement fixed effects. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table B2: Reduced Form Estimates

	Left-of-Center Vote Share (% valid votes)								
	1928	1932	1936	1945	1946 (Jun)	1946 (Nov)	1951	1956	1958
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Matched to Front Zone Only	1.04	2.19	-0.55	2.41*	4.81***	4.76***	4.38**	3.51*	2.94**
	(2.01)	(1.44)	(2.70)	(1.44)	(1.79)	(1.82)	(2.21)	(1.96)	(1.44)
Observations	201	200	201	201	200	201	180	192	197
Adj. R^2	.832	.939	.765	.281	.28	.343	.319	.351	.724

Notes: All columns report OLS estimates and robust standard errors for our instrumental variable. Controls include past covariates and arrondissement fixed effects. The coefficients come from the estimation of the following equation: $Left_i = \alpha + \beta_1 FrontZoneonly + \Gamma X_i + \varepsilon_i$ for each election year. $Left_i$ is the vote share for the left. Front Zone only is a binary variable equal to one if a commune in Haute Vienne was matched to a commune in the Front Zone in Alsace. X_i is a vector of control variables. Γ is a vector of coefficients. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table B3: Effect of Share of Evacuees (Log) on Vote Shares by Political Groups - TSLS Estimates

	Political Group Vote Share (% valid votes)								
Political Group	1928	1932	1936	1945	1946 (Jun)	1946 (Nov)	1951	1956	1958
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Left	-0.63	-0.34	-1.01	-0.25	0.45	0.07	0.90	0.57	0.60
	(0.85)	(0.62)	(1.06)	(0.84)	(0.71)	(0.76)	(0.93)	(0.83)	(0.90)
Center-Left	1.66*	1.12	0.96	1.04	1.19**	1.61***	0.68	0.38	0.44
	(0.98)	(0.84)	(1.17)	(0.71)	(0.54)	(0.62)	(0.70)	(0.66)	(0.75)
Center-Right	0.00	-0.74	0.46	-0.91**	-1.70***	-1.54***	-0.91**	-0.60	-0.35
	(0.00)	(0.50)	(0.95)	(0.44)	(0.58)	(0.54)	(0.38)	(0.41)	(0.41)
Right	0.29	-0.03*	-0.11	-0.00	-0.06	-0.14	-0.64	-1.03***	-0.69**
	(0.64)	(0.02)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.15)	(0.46)	(0.38)	(0.33)
Observations	201	200	201	201	200	201	180	192	197

Notes: All columns report second stage estimates and robust standard errors using a dummy for whether the commune was matched to front zone localities only as an instrument. We instrumentalize for the natural logarithm of the number of evacuees in the commune as a percentage of the 1936 population. Controls include past covariates and arrondissement fixed effects. The last row reports the number of observations. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table B4: Effect of Share of Evacuees on Vote Shares by Political Groups - TSLS Estimates

	Political Group Vote Share (% valid votes)								
Political Group	1928	1932	1936	1945	1946 (Jun)	1946 (Nov)	1951	1956	1958
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Left	-0.08	-0.04	-0.12	-0.03	0.06	0.01	0.11	0.07	0.07
	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Center-Left	0.21*	0.14	0.12	0.13	0.15**	0.20***	0.09	0.05	0.05
	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Center-Right	0.00	-0.09	0.06	-0.11**	-0.21***	-0.19***	-0.11**	-0.07	-0.04
	(0.00)	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Right	0.04	-0.00*	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.02	-0.08	-0.12***	-0.09**
	(0.08)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Observations	201	200	201	201	200	201	180	192	197

Notes: All columns report second stage estimates and robust standard errors using a dummy for whether the commune was matched to front zone localities only as an instrument. We instrumentalize for the number of evacuees in the commune as a percentage of the 1936 population. Controls include past covariates and arrondissement fixed effects. The last row reports the number of observations. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Figure B1: Effect of Evacuees on Left-wing Vote Share – DiD Estimates



Notes: Illustration of the difference-in-differences estimates where the share of evacuees using a logarithmic transformation (on the left-hand side) and the share of evacuees in a municipality (on the right-hand side) are considered as treatment. The dependent variable is the vote share for left-of-center parties. The Figure presents the coefficients βs from the estimation of the following equation: $Left_{it} = \beta_t Evacuees_i \times Year_t + \nu_t + \eta_i + \varepsilon_{it}$. All coefficients are compared to the baseline coefficient of 1936.

Table B5: Effect of Evacuees on Left-wing Vote Share - DiD Treatment Estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dependent Variable	Left-of-Center Vote Share (% valid votes)				
	OLS			IV	
% Evacues × PostWar	0.39***			0.52***	
	(0.05)			(0.08)	
% Evacues (Log) × PostWar		1.72***			3.77***
		(0.31)			(0.65)
Matched to Front Zone × PostWar			15.10***		
			(2.34)		
Observations	1773	1773	1773	1773	1773
Adjusted R^2	.618	.587	.606	.12	-.0341
Kleibergen-Paap F Stat				153	111

Notes: All columns report difference-in-difference estimates and standard errors clustered at the commune level. Columns 1 to 3 report OLS estimates while columns 4 and 5 report second stage estimates using a dummy for whether the commune was matched to front zone localities only as an instrument. Controls include past covariates and arrondissement fixed effects. The last row in columns 4 and 5 reports the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

C Robustness Checks

Table C1: Correction for Spatial Autocorrelation - Conley Standard Errors

	Left-of-Center Vote Share (% valid votes)								
	1928	1932	1936	1945	1946(J)	1946(N)	1951	1956	1958
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A: 10km Distance Cutoff									
% Evacuees(Ln)	0.37	0.78	-0.20	0.85	1.70**	1.68***	1.57**	1.29*	1.04*
	(0.76)	(0.63)	(0.97)	(0.52)	(0.69)	(0.63)	(0.72)	(0.67)	(0.60)
Panel B: 30 km Distance Cutoff									
% Evacuees(Ln)	0.37	0.78	-0.20	0.85***	1.70***	1.68***	1.57***	1.29***	1.04***
	(0.44)	(0.57)	(1.12)	(0.31)	(0.42)	(0.29)	(0.57)	(0.42)	(0.27)
Observations	201	200	201	201	200	201	180	192	197

Notes: All columns report second-stage estimates and robust standard errors using a dummy for whether the municipality was matched to front-zone localities only as an instrument. We instrumentalize for the logarithmic transformation the number of evacuees in the municipality as a percentage of the 1936 population, Panel A and B present estimates using a 10 km and a 30 km distance cutoff for spatial autocorrelation, respectively. The last row in each panel reports the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table C2: Correction for Spatial Autocorrelation - Spatial Autoregressive Model

	Left-of-Center Vote Share (% valid votes)								
	1928	1932	1936	1945	1946 (Jun)	1946 (Nov)	1951	1956	1958
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Front Zone	1.03	1.77	-1.40	1.73	3.46**	4.37***	3.65*	3.16*	2.94**
	(1.45)	(1.18)	(2.11)	(1.23)	(1.61)	(1.66)	(2.01)	(1.92)	(1.40)
Observations	201	200	201	201	200	201	180	192	197

Notes: All columns report reduced-form estimates and standard errors for the instrument of being matched to the front zone only. Front Zone only is a binary variable equal to one if a commune in Haute Vienne was matched to a commune in the Front Zone in Alsace. Standard errors account for spatial autocorrelation using a matrix of distances between municipalities. The estimation also directly controls for spatial lags of the dependent variable, the front zone treatment variable, and arrondissement fixed effects using the same distances matrix. Controls include past covariates and arrondissement fixed effects. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table C3: Identification and the lack of demographic change

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A:	Log(Pop in 1946)			Pop Density in 1946		
Front Zone only	-0.02			0.00		
	(0.10)			(0.09)		
% Evacuees		-0.00			0.00	
		(0.00)			(0.00)	
% Evacuees			-0.01			0.00
(Log)			(0.03)			(0.03)
Observations	201	201	201	201	201	201
Adj. R^2	.562	.56	.558	.51	.51	.51
KP F-stat		46.5	24.6		46.5	24.6
Panel B:	Log(Pop in 1936)			Pop Density in 1936		
Front Zone only	-0.02			0.00		
	(0.10)			(0.07)		
% Evacuees		-0.00			0.00	
		(0.00)			(0.00)	
% Evacuees			-0.01			0.00
(Log)			(0.03)			(0.03)
Observations	201	201	201	201	201	201
Adj. R^2	.542	.541	.539	.527	.527	.526
KP F-stat		46.5	24.6		46.5	24.6

Notes: All columns report second-stage estimates and robust standard errors using a dummy for whether the commune was matched to front-zone localities only as an instrument. We instrumentalize for the (log transformation) of the number of evacuees in the commune as a percentage of the 1936 population. Controls include past covariates and arrondissement fixed effects. The last row in each panel reports the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table C4: Controlling for an alternative explanation: Demography

Dependent Variable	Left-of-Center Vote Share (% valid votes)								
	1928	1932	1936	1945	1946 (Jun)	1946 (Nov)	1951	1956	1958
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A – Treatment : % Evacuee (Log) as Treatment									
% Evacuees(Log)	0.37	0.78	0.78	0.85*	1.69***	1.68***	1.58**	1.29**	1.04**
	(0.68)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.47)	(0.58)	(0.59)	(0.70)	(0.65)	(0.53)
Observations	201	200	200	201	200	201	180	192	197
Adjusted R^2	.836	.938	.938	.294	.256	.345	.328	.367	.714
Kleibergen-Paap F Stat	25.8	25.7	25.7	25.8	25.9	25.8	21.5	24.1	23.7
Panel B – Treatment: % Evacuees as Treatment									
% Evacuees	0.05	0.10	-0.02	0.11*	0.21***	0.21***	0.20**	0.16**	0.13**
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Observations	201	200	201	201	200	201	180	192	197
Adjusted R^2	.834	.94	.762	.305	.289	.378	.355	.377	.724
Kleibergen-Paap F Stat	47.5	47.3	47.5	47.5	47.4	47.5	38.7	45.5	43.5

Notes: All columns report second stage estimates and robust standard errors using a dummy for whether the commune was matched to front zone localities only as an instrument. In Panel A, we instrumentalize for the log transformation of the number of evacuees in the commune as a percentage of the 1936 population, while in Panel B we instrumentalize for said percentage. Controls include past covariates and arrondissement fixed effects. All estimates also control for Log(Population in 1946) and Population Density in 1946. The last row in each panel reports the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table C5: Controlling for Alternative Explanation: Distance to Oradour

Dependent Variable	Left-of-Center Vote Share (% valid votes)								
	1928	1932	1936	1945	1946 (Jun)	1946 (Nov)	1951	1956	1958
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A – Treatment : % Evacuees (Log) as Treatment									
% Evacuees (Log)	0.36	0.79	-0.18	0.86*	1.71***	1.70***	1.60**	1.31**	1.03*
	(0.68)	(0.49)	(0.91)	(0.47)	(0.59)	(0.59)	(0.69)	(0.65)	(0.52)
Observations	201	200	201	201	200	201	180	192	197
Adjusted R^2	.836	.939	.76	.278	.235	.332	.321	.37	.716
Kleibergen-Paap F Stat	24.8	24.7	24.8	24.8	24.8	24.8	21.1	22.9	23
Panel B – Treatment : % Evacuees as Treatment									
% Evacuees	0.04	0.10*	-0.02	0.11*	0.21***	0.21***	0.20**	0.16**	0.13**
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Observations	201	200	201	201	200	201	180	192	197
Adjusted R^2	.835	.941	.762	.301	.285	.376	.356	.384	.727
Kleibergen-Paap F Stat	48	47.8	48	48	47.9	48	40.4	45.9	43.6

Notes: All columns report second stage estimates and robust standard errors using a dummy for whether the commune was matched to front zone localities only as an instrument. In Panel A, we instrumentalize for the log transformation of the number of evacuees in the commune as a percentage of the 1936 population, while in Panel B we instrumentalize for said percentage. Controls include past covariates and arrondissement fixed effects. All estimates control for the log-transformed distance to Oradour. The last row in each panel reports the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table C6: Heterogeneity – Exposure to the Massacre of Oradour-sur-Glane

Dependent Variable	Left-of-Center Vote Share (% valid votes)								
	1928	1932	1936	1945	1946 (Jun)	1946 (Nov)	1951	1956	1958
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Log(Dist Oradour)	-3.60	-6.09**	-8.04**	-2.19	-4.02	-4.11	-5.94	-6.50	-0.59
	(4.10)	(2.35)	(3.43)	(2.60)	(3.53)	(3.56)	(4.46)	(4.21)	(2.89)
Front Zone Only	-13.89	-7.86	-17.12*	1.19	-1.82	2.26	0.94	-4.86	-6.34
	(11.34)	(7.40)	(9.56)	(7.53)	(10.15)	(10.49)	(12.65)	(12.39)	(8.31)
Front Zone Only × Log(Dist Oradour)	4.54	3.07	5.06*	0.38	2.03	0.78	1.08	2.57	2.82
	(3.20)	(2.05)	(2.82)	(2.19)	(2.96)	(3.04)	(3.69)	(3.63)	(2.40)
Log(Dist Oradour)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Observations	201	200	201	201	200	201	180	192	197
Adj. R^2	.832	.94	.766	.278	.278	.344	.321	.355	.726

Notes: All columns report OLS estimates and robust standard errors. Controls include past covariates and arrondissement fixed effects. The coefficients come from the estimation of the following equation: $Left_i = \alpha + \beta_1 FrontZoneonly + \beta_2 log(Dist_{Oradour}) + \beta_3 FrontZoneonly \times log(Dist_{Oradour}) + \Gamma X_i + \varepsilon_i$ for each election year. $Left_i$ is the vote share for the left. Front Zone only is a binary variable equal to one if a commune in Haute Vienne was matched to a commune in the Front Zone in Alsace. $log(Dist_{Oradour})$ is the logarithmic transformation of the distance to Oradour-sur-Glane. β_1,β_2 and β_3 are coefficients. X_i is a vector of control variables. Γ is a vector of coefficients. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Figure C1: Heterogeneity - Front Zone Only Assignment and distance to Oradour-sur-Glane.



Notes: Marginal effect of Front Zone Assignment for different values of log(distance to Oradour sur Glane) from the estimation the following equation using post-war data: $Left_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 FrontZone \times Log(Dist_{Oradour}) + \beta_2 FrontZone + \beta_2 \Delta Log(Dist_{Oradour}) + \Gamma X_i + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{it}$. Where $Left_{it}$ is the share of votes for left-of-centers candidates in parliamentary elections. $FrontZone$ is a binary variable that is assigned to a municipality in Haute-Vienne to welcome a municipality in the Alsatian Front Zone. $Log(Dist_{Oradour})$ is the log-distance of a municipality to Oradour-sur-Glane. X_i is a vector of control variable including those presented in the baseline results and vote share for the left in the pre-war elections. γ_t are election-year fixed effects. All βs are coefficients and Γ is a vector of coefficients.

Table C7: Controlling for Alternative Explanation: Occupation

Dependent Variable	Left-of-Center Vote Share (% valid votes)								
	1928	1932	1936	1945	1946 (Jun)	1946 (Nov)	1951	1956	1958
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A – Treatment : % Evacuees (Log) as Treatment									
% Evacuees (Log)	0.37	0.79	-0.23	0.90*	1.77***	1.76***	1.60**	1.35**	1.15**
	(0.71)	(0.53)	(0.96)	(0.48)	(0.60)	(0.60)	(0.69)	(0.67)	(0.57)
Observations	201	200	201	201	200	201	180	192	197
Adjusted R^2	.836	.938	.758	.282	.234	.33	.327	.363	.712
Kleibergen-Paap F Stat	22.5	22.4	22.5	22.5	22.6	22.5	19.2	20.8	19.9
Panel B – Treatment : % Evacuees as Treatment									
% Evacuees	0.04	0.10	-0.03	0.11*	0.22***	0.21***	0.20**	0.16**	0.14**
	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Observations	201	200	201	201	200	201	180	192	197
Adjusted R^2	.834	.94	.761	.31	.292	.377	.355	.378	.728
Kleibergen-Paap F Stat	46.7	46.4	46.7	46.7	46.7	46.7	37.1	44.8	40.6

Notes: All columns report second stage estimates and robust standard errors using a dummy for whether the commune was matched to front zone localities only as an instrument. In Panel A, we instrumentalize for the log transformation of the number of evacuees in the commune as a percentage of the 1936 population, while in Panel B we instrumentalize for said percentage. Controls include past covariates and arrondissement fixed effects. All estimates control for the log-number of occupation/nazi administration centers and for the log-distance to the closest of these centers. The last row in each panel reports the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table C8: Controlling for Alternative Explanation: Destination Access (Distance to Railways)

Dependent Variable	Left-of-Center Vote Share (% valid votes)								
	1928	1932	1936	1945	1946 (Jun)	1946 (Nov)	1951	1956	1958
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Panel A – Treatment : % Evacuees (Log) as Treatment								
% Evacuees (Log)	0.43	0.82	-0.24	0.87*	1.74***	1.73***	1.59**	1.28*	1.08**
	(0.70)	(0.52)	(0.97)	(0.50)	(0.61)	(0.61)	(0.72)	(0.67)	(0.54)
Observations	201	200	201	201	200	201	180	192	197
Adjusted R^2	.839	.939	.758	.277	.236	.333	.322	.365	.714
Kleibergen-Paap F Stat	25.3	25	25.3	25.3	25.1	25.3	21.7	23.6	23.2
	Panel B – Treatment : % Evacuees as Treatment								
% Evacuees	0.05	0.10*	-0.03	0.11*	0.21***	0.21***	0.20**	0.15*	0.13**
	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Observations	201	200	201	201	200	201	180	192	197
Adjusted R^2	.837	.941	.761	.298	.285	.373	.352	.38	.725
Kleibergen-Paap F Stat	45.3	45	45.3	45.3	45	45.3	36.1	43.8	41.5

Notes: All columns report second stage estimates and robust standard errors using a dummy for whether the commune was matched to front zone localities only as an instrument. In Panel A, we instrumentalize for the log transformation of the number of evacuees in the commune as a percentage of the 1936 population, while in Panel B we instrumentalize for said percentage. Controls include past covariates and arrondissement fixed effects. All estimates control for the log-distance to railways in 1936. The last row in each panel reports the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table C9: Controlling for Alternative Explanation: Female Enfranchisement

Dependent Variable	Left-of-Center Vote Share (% valid votes)								
	1928	1932	1936	1945	1946 (Jun)	1946 (Nov)	1951	1956	1958
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Panel A – Treatment : % Evacuees (Log) as Treatment								
% Evacuees (Log)	0.38	0.79	-0.17	0.83*	1.70***	1.68***	1.52**	1.30**	1.09**
	(0.68)	(0.50)	(0.92)	(0.48)	(0.60)	(0.60)	(0.71)	(0.66)	(0.53)
Observations	201	200	201	201	200	201	180	192	197
Adjusted R^2	.836	.938	.759	.285	.235	.33	.325	.365	.713
Kleibergen-Paap F Stat	24.4	24.3	24.4	24.4	24.4	24.4	19.7	22.5	22.3
	Panel B – Treatment : % Evacuees as Treatment								
% Evacuees	0.05	0.10	-0.02	0.10*	0.21***	0.21***	0.19**	0.16**	0.14**
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Observations	201	200	201	201	200	201	180	192	197
Adjusted R^2	.835	.94	.761	.303	.284	.372	.354	.378	.728
Kleibergen-Paap F Stat	45.1	44.9	45.1	45.1	45.1	45.1	35.2	43.1	40.7

Notes: All columns report second stage estimates and robust standard errors using a dummy for whether the commune was matched to front zone localities only as an instrument. In Panel A, we instrumentalize for the inverse hyperbolic sine of the number of evacuees in the commune as a percentage of the 1936 population, while in Panel B we instrumentalize for said percentage. Controls include past covariates and arrondissement fixed effects. All estimates control for the percentage increase in the franchise between 1936 and 1945. The last row in each panel reports the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table C10: Effect of Evacuees on Left-of-Center Vote Share Under Alternative Treatment Definitions - TSLS Estimates

Treatment	Left-of-Center Vote Share (% valid votes)								
	1928	1932	1936	1945	1946 (J)	1946 (N)	1951	1956	1958
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Evacuees (Ln), Nov 1939	0.32	0.68	-0.17	0.75*	1.49***	1.48***	1.37**	1.14*	0.91*
	(0.60)	(0.44)	(0.83)	(0.42)	(0.53)	(0.53)	(0.62)	(0.58)	(0.47)
% Evacuees (Ln), Apr 1940	0.42	0.89	-0.23	0.98*	1.95***	1.94***	1.85*	1.49*	1.19*
	(0.79)	(0.59)	(1.07)	(0.58)	(0.75)	(0.75)	(0.95)	(0.83)	(0.61)
Evacuee Density (Ln), Nov 1939	0.41	0.87	-0.22	0.95*	1.90***	1.88***	1.75**	1.44**	1.17**
	(0.76)	(0.56)	(1.05)	(0.53)	(0.66)	(0.66)	(0.78)	(0.73)	(0.59)
Observations	201	200	201	201	200	201	180	192	197

Notes: All columns report second stage estimates and robust standard errors using a dummy for whether the commune was matched to front zone localities only as an instrument. The estimates in rows 1,2 and 3 correspond to the logarithm of the number of evacuees in November 1939, the number of evacuees in April 1940 as a percentage of the host municipality's prewar population, and the number of evacuees relative to the municipality's area in 1923. Controls include past covariates and arrondissement fixed effects. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

D Mechanisms: Heterogeneity

Figure D1: Voting Patterns in Bas-Rhin and Haute-Vienne



Notes: The left panel shows the difference in vote share for the left between Haute-Vienne (in black) and Bas-Rhin (in grey). The right panel shows the difference in vote share for the left between Haute-Vienne (zone avant) in black, Haute-Vienne (not zone avant) in dashed black, and in Bas-Rhin in grey.

Table D1: Treatment Effect and Political Orientation in Origin Municipalities

Dependent Variable	Left-of-Center Vote Share (% valid votes)					
	1945	1946 (Jun)	1946 (Nov)	1951	1956	1958
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Panel A: Triple Interaction (continuous variable)					
Matched to Front zone Only	-4.15	-8.14	-8.16	-11.83*	-14.30**	-2.30
	(5.51)	(6.17)	(6.72)	(6.89)	(6.71)	(6.49)
$\text{Left}_{Hosting,1936}$	0.19***	0.28***	0.26***	0.30***	0.33***	0.12
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Matched to Front zone Only $\times$ $\text{Left}_{Hosting,1936}$	0.08	0.16**	0.16**	0.21***	0.23***	0.06
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Observations	201	200	201	180	192	197
Adj. R^2	.389	.445	.473	.469	.504	.739
	Panel B: Comparison of the effect below and above median					
Matched to Front zone Only $\times$ $\text{Left}_{Hosting,1936} \leq$ Median	0.56	0.93	1.26	-0.62	-2.31	0.85
	(2.05)	(1.99)	(2.22)	(2.35)	(2.17)	(1.94)
Matched to Front zone Only $\times$ $\text{Left}_{Hosting,1936} >$ Median	3.55***	6.64***	6.37***	7.79***	6.36***	3.00**
	(1.21)	(1.57)	(1.65)	(1.93)	(1.91)	(1.33)
Observations	200	199	200	179	191	196
Adj. R^2	.44	.507	.522	.533	.55	.759

Notes: All columns report OLS estimates and robust standard errors. *Panel A:* Coefficients come from from the estimation the following equation using post-war data: $Left_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 FrontZone \times Left_{Hosting,1936} + \beta_2 FrontZone + \beta_3 \Delta Left_{Hosting,1936} + \Gamma X_i + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{it}$. Where $Left_{it}$ is the share of votes for left-of-centers candidates in parliamentary elections. $FrontZone$ is a binary variable that is assigned to a municipality in Haute-Vienne to welcome a municipality in the Alsatian Front Zone. $Left_{Hosting,1936}$ is the vote share for the left in the hosting municipality before the war. X_i is a vector of control variable including those presented in the baseline results and vote share for the left in the pre-war elections. γ_t are election-year fixed effects. All βs are coefficients and Γ is a vector of coefficients. *Panel B:* Coefficients come from from the estimations of Coefficients come from from the estimation the following equation using post-war data: $Left_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 FrontZone \times \mathbb{1}(Left_{Hosting,1936} > Median) + \beta_2 FrontZone + \beta_3 \mathbb{1}(Left_{Hosting,1936} > Median) + \Gamma X_i + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{it}$. Where $Left_{it}$ is the share of votes for left-of-centers candidates in parliamentary elections. $FrontZone$ is a binary variable that is assigned to a municipality in Haute-Vienne to welcome a municipality in the Alsatian Front Zone. $\mathbb{1}(Left_{Hosting,1936} > Median)$ is a binary variable equal to one if the vote share for the left in the hosting municipality is greater than the median. X_i is a vector of control variables including those presented in the baseline results and vote share for the left in the pre-war elections. γ_t are election-year fixed effects. All βs are coefficients and Γ is a vector of coefficients. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Figure D2: Effect of Instrument by Pre-war Voting Patterns: Origin (left) and Host (right) Left Vote Share



Notes: Left – Marginal effect of Assignment to hosting Front zone municipalities depending on the left-of-center vote share of evacuees. Right – Marginal effect of assignment to hosting front zone municipalities depending on the left-of-center vote share in hosting municipalities. Estimation of Figure D1.b: $Left_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 FrontZone \times Left_{Origin,1936} + \beta_2 FrontZone + \beta_3 Left_{Origin,1936} + \beta_4 FrontZone \times Left_{Hosting,1936} + \beta_5 Left_{Hosting,1936} + \Gamma X_i + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{it}$. $Left_{it}$ is the vote share of left-of-center parties in postwar parliamentary elections, $FrontZone$ is our instrumental variable and Left_{Origin} is the prewar vote share for the left in origin municipalities and $\text{Left}_{Hosting}$ is the prewar vote share for the left in hosting municipalities. X_i is a vector of control variable including those presented in the baseline results and vote share for the left in prewar elections. γ_t are election-year fixed effects.

E Mechanisms: Civic Organizations

Figure E1: Missions of Associations - Front Zone (Left) versus Others (Right)



Notes: World clouds based on the frequency of stems in the text defining missions of associations in the declaration of associations in the *Journal Officiel*. Left panel: municipalities part of the Front zone. Right panel: Other municipalities.

To classify associations, we leverage the few sentences describing their missions in their official declaration. We created a corpus of all the missions cited at the creation of associations in Haute-Vienne between 1902 and 1958. After stemming, we created a document term matrix summarizing the presence of the different stems in each mission statement (the Document-Term matrix). This Document-Term Matrix is then used to determine the vector distance between each Document (here, the stated mission). These distances are then used to create a dendrogram (a tree-like structure) grouping into clusters documents that are the most similar and then forming larger clusters. To do so, it uses the Ward method, which minimizes the within-cluster variance when creating the dendrogram.

To determine the optimal number of clusters, we have created Figure E2 summarizing the sum of squared distance within clusters (how heterogeneous clusters are). This homogeneity increases almost by definition with the number of clusters. The "Elbow method" determines the optimal number of clusters as the number for which an "Elbow" is created in this graph. In this case, N clusters lead to an important reduction in within-cluster heterogeneity compared to N-1 clusters, while N+1 clusters would not decrease within-cluster heterogeneity compared to N clusters. In our case, the optimal number of clusters appears to be 5.

Figure E2: Elbow Method - Reduction in Within-sum of Squares



Notes: The Figure plots the total within sum of squares of the distance between documents in hypothetical clusters (y-axis) with respect to the number of hypothetical clusters (x-axis).

Figure E3: Frequency of stems in the five clusters of associations



Notes: Figure presenting the most frequent stems in the missions of the five clusters of associations.

Figure E4: Term-Frequency Inverse Document Frequency in Clusters



Notes: Figure presenting the Term frequency - Inverse document frequency of stems in the missions of the five clusters of associations.

Table E1: Effect of Evacuees on the Creation of Civic Organizations

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dep Var.	$\mathbf{1}(Asso_{1901-1939} > 0)$			$\mathbf{1}(Asso_{1940-1958} > 0)$		
	Panel A: In-group Organizations					
Front Zone Only	0.04			0.24***		
	(0.09)			(0.08)		
% Evacues (Ln)		0.01			0.08***	
		(0.03)			(0.03)	
% Evacues			0.00			0.01***
			(0.00)			(0.00)
Observations	201	201	201	201	201	201
Adj. R^2	.075	.094	.0858	.0786	-.0395	-.00813
KP F-stat		24.7	46.9		24.7	46.9
	Panel B: Out-group Organizations					
Front Zone Only	-0.09			0.00		
	(0.09)			(0.10)		
% Evacues (Log)		-0.03			0.00	
		(0.03)			(0.03)	
% Evacues			-0.00			0.00
			(0.00)			(0.00)
Observations	201	201	201	201	201	201
Adj. R^2	.179	.109	.136	.106	.107	.107
KP F-stat		24.7	46.9		24.7	46.9

*Notes:*All columns report robust standard errors. Estimation of the reduced form (Columns 1 and 4) and of the 2SLS estimation (Columns 2, 3, 5, 6) using an indicator variable for the creation of associations before the war (Columns 1 to 3) and after the war (Columns 4 to 6) as dependent variables. Panel A focuses on organizations classified as in-group oriented, while Panel B focuses on organizations classified as out-group oriented. The treatment variable is either a dummy variable for Front zone assignment (Columns 1 and 4), the log-transformation of the share of evacuees instrumented (Columns 2 to 5) or the share of evacuees instrumented (Columns 3 to 6). $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table E2: Effect of Evacuees on the Transformed Ratio of Post-war to Pre-war Civic Organizations

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Dep Var.	All Organizations			Out-Group Organizations			In-Group Organizations		
	OLS	IV		OLS	IV		OLS	IV	
Front Zone Only	0.43			0.07			0.44**		
	(0.26)			(0.23)			(0.20)		
% Evacues		0.15*			0.03			0.16**	
(Log)		(0.09)			(0.08)			(0.07)	
% Evacues			0.02*			0.00			0.02**
			(0.01)			(0.01)			(0.01)
Observations	201	201	201	201	201	201	201	201	201
Adj. R^2	.0459	-.0807	-.0286	-.036	-.038	-.0351	.0647	-.13	-.0598
KP F-stat		24.7	46.9		24.7	46.9		24.7	46.9

Notes: All columns report robust standard errors. Reduced-form (Columns 1, 4 and 7) and the TSLS estimates (Columns 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 and 9) using the ratio of 1 plus the number of civic organizations after the war over 1 plus the number of civic organizations before the war. While imperfect, this transformed ratio aims to avoid the loss of observations due to a fraction of the sample not having local civic organizations before and after the war. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

F Mechanisms: Other Refugees

Table F1: IV-First Stage – Horse race

Dep Var.	(1) % Alsatian Evacuees	(2) % Alsatian Evacuees (Log)	(3) % Other Refugees	(4) % Other Refugees (Log)
% Other	-0.64***			
French Evacues	(0.22)			
Matched to	21.67***	2.79***	-0.37	-0.54
Front Zone Only	(3.35)	(0.57)	(0.91)	(0.53)
% Other		-0.05		
French Evacues (Log)		(0.08)		
% Alsatian			-0.06***	
Evacues			(0.02)	
% Alsatian				-0.05
Evacues (Log)				(0.07)
Observations	201	201	201	201
Adj. R^2	.529	.388	.258	.0434

Notes: All columns report robust standard errors. Estimation of the first stage in the IV strategy, changing the dependent variable and controlling for the share of Alsatian refugees (Log) when estimating the first-stage for other refugees and for the share of other refugees when estimating the first-stage for Alsatian evacuees. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table F2: Other Refugees and vote share for the Left

	Left-of-Center Vote Share (% valid votes)								
Dependent Variable	1928	1932	1936	1945	1946 (Jun)	1946 (Nov)	1951	1956	1958
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Panel A: OLS Results								
% Alsatian	0.10*	0.08**	0.09**	0.07***	0.12***	0.14***	0.14***	0.12***	0.07**
Evacues	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
% Other	-0.06	0.01	-0.14	-0.19*	-0.20	-0.20*	-0.32**	-0.34**	-0.12
French Evacues	(0.19)	(0.08)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.09)
Observations	201	200	201	201	200	201	180	192	197
Adj. R^2	.837	.941	.77	.317	.313	.388	.37	.395	.73
	Panel B: OLS Results (Matched to Rear Zone)								
% Other	-0.10	0.01	-0.16	-0.27**	-0.30**	-0.32**	-0.36**	-0.47***	-0.16
French Evacues	(0.20)	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.10)
Observations	107	107	107	107	107	107	98	101	105
Adj. R^2	.766	.959	.769	.345	.352	.387	.319	.482	.642

Notes: Columns report OLS estimates as Table B1 The estimation adds the percentage of other refugees as a control variable. Panel A estimates the effect on all municipalities in the sample while Panel B restricts the sample to municipalities not only matched to the front zone. Robust standard errors are in parentheses: $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

G External validity: Vienne

Table G1: Effect of Evacuees on Left-wing Vote Share in Vienne - TSLS Estimates

	Left-of-Center Vote Share (% valid votes)								
	1928	1932	1936	1945	1946(J)	1946(N)	1951	1956	1958
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A: % Evacuees - Ln (X + 0.01) - as Treatment									
% Evacuees(Ln)	0.35	0.57*	0.36	0.71**	0.59*	0.83**	0.51*	0.59	0.43
	(0.25)	(0.32)	(0.36)	(0.32)	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.30)	(0.37)	(0.37)
Adj. R^2	.678	.533	.441	.584	.446	.429	.455	.24	.594
KP F-stat	91.2	91.5	91.5	91.5	87.4	91.8	94	85.6	83.7
Panel B: % Evacuees as Treatment									
% Evacuees	0.07	0.12*	0.07	0.15**	0.12*	0.17**	0.11*	0.12	0.09
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Adj. R^2	.682	.522	.441	.596	.449	.435	.453	.25	.6
KP F-stat	85.3	85.8	85.8	85.8	80	86.1	85.8	83.7	79.9
Observations	279	280	280	280	276	279	278	277	272

Notes: All columns report second stage estimates and robust standard errors using a dummy for whether the municipality was matched to front zone localities only as an instrument. In Panel A, we instrumentalize for the logarithmic transformation the number of evacuees in the municipality as a percentage of the 1936 population, while in Panel B we instrumentalize for said percentage. Controls include past covariates and arrondissement fixed effects. The last row in each panel reports the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic. $^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$