Who wants Power? Measuring Intrinsic Preferences for Power and their Behavioral Signature

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November 25, 2025

Abstract

People seek positions of influence for material objectives, but it has been argued that people also seek power for its own sake. We propose a novel elicitation strategy that allows us to measure intrinsic preferences for power, where power is defined as influence over the outcomes of others, while fully controlling for all consequentialist sources of utility. We establish the existence of such preferences in general population samples in six countries, with substantial heterogeneity across individuals. Examining this heterogeneity, we show that our behavioral measure of intrinsic preferences for power is positively associated with favorable views of authoritarianism and higher social dominance orientation, and serves as a predictor of political attitudes. We also find significant correlations between intrinsic preferences for power and distributional preferences: Intrinsic preferences for power are predictive of a lower regard for equality. Our evidence thus suggests that the attitudes and preferences of individuals that are motivated by the exercise of power for its own sake differ in systematic ways from those that are not.

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We thank seminar participants at Bergen, MIT, Pittsburgh, the Matterhorn Symposium 2023 and the ESA World Conference 2024 in Bogota for helpful comments. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from ERC Starting Grant 2018-803332 CONTROL. IRB approval was granted by the Institutional Review Board of the Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences, University of Fribourg, Switzerland on March 27, 2023 (application no 2023-03-03).

1 Introduction

> *You understand well enough how the Party maintains itself in power. Now tell me why we cling to power. What is our motive? Why should we want power? [...]*
> *Now I will tell you the answer to my question. It is this. The Party seeks power entirely for its own sake. We are not interested in the good of others ; we are interested solely in power. Not wealth or luxury or long life or happiness: only power, pure power. [...]*
> *Power is not a means, it is an end.*
>
> (O'Brien talking to Whinston in George Orwell's 1984, Orwell (1949))

Power relations are a pervasive feature of human societies. People exercise power in politics, within organizations, and even in family settings. Power also serves as a powerful motivator: many strive for power because of the instrumental benefits it offers, such as control over resources, status, or the ability to shape outcomes. Although these instrumental incentives are well understood in the literature (see, e.g., (Mill, 1859; Dahl, 1957; Parsons, 1963; Weber, 1978), it has also been argued that power itself is valued (Russell, 1938; Murray and McAdams, 1938; McClelland, 1975). For example, Russell (1938) explicitly differentiates the two concepts: *"There is, however, a great difference between power desired as a means and power desired as an end in itself. The man who desires power as a means has first some other desire, and is then led to wish that he were in a position to achieve it. The man who desires power as an end will choose his objective by the possibility of securing it. In politics, for example, one man wishes to see certain measures enacted, and is thus led to take part in public affairs, while another man, wishing only for personal success, adopts whatever programme seems most likely to lead to this result. (Russell, 1938, pp. 216-217)"*.

Despite these early characterizations in the literature and its intuitive appeal, there is surprisingly little empirical knowledge about the foundations of individual power preferences. In particular, while power's instrumental value is undisputed, reliably identifying and measuring whether people also value power for its own sake is far more challenging. The primary identification challenge being that the exercise of power almost always contains an instrumental value component, making it difficult to separate out any potential intrinsic components. This is the case, for example, for existing survey measures or observational techniques, as the two different motivations are usually jointly expressed in behaviors or responses to survey items.

However, as Russell (1938) argued, differentiating instrumental and intrinsic power motives is potentially important and non-trivial. If motivations are purely instrumental, people seek power to secure the benefits tied to the role — material rewards, status, or influence over outcomes. But if preferences for power are also intrinsic, the office itself holds value simply because it enables the exercise of power. Intrinsic motivations can thus help explain why individuals may choose to pursue or hold onto power even when the instrumental incentives are small or uncertain, and can influence how power is wielded once individuals are in a position of power. Understanding these preferences

is therefore important and holds implications for both micro-level behavior and macro-level societal outcomes.

To make any headway in understanding individual preferences for power, it is first necessary to precisely define the object of study. Given that the concept of power is complex and multi-dimensional, and a multitude of definitions of the term exist in the social sciences (e.g., (Dahl, 1957; Polsby, 1963; Lukes, 2005)), it is unavoidable to focus on a narrow, but relevant and precisely defined aspect of power that can be empirically isolated, and abstract from others that are captured in the broader definitions of the term. To this end, we draw on distinct strands in the literature that conceptualize power as (i) the general capacity to enact change (Locke, 1975), (ii) the ability to affect others' outcomes (Russell, 1938; Weber, 1978), and (iii) the ability to impose actions or outcomes in the presence of conflicting interests (Dahl, 1957; Polsby, 1963). In this paper, we exclusively focus on the second strand, the ability to influence others outcomes, assess whether this element of power is a source of intrinsic utility, and explore whether differences in revealed preferences in this dimension are predictive of differences in other relevant domains, such as preferences and attitudes.[1]

More specifically, in our experiment, participants decide how to distribute earnings between two passive participants. Power is thus operationalized as the ability to act as a social planner. In a social planner situation, instrumental utility from power can only be derived from distributional preferences over other people's outcomes, and not from self-serving material gains. In order to isolate the purely intrinsic value attached to being the social planner, our preference elicitation explicitly controls for these potential instrumental motivations.

The power preference elicitation relies on a simple two-step procedure: First, a choice set is identified that contains only alternatives—allocations of payoffs to the two passive recipients—among which an individual is revealed indifferent. Second, an individual's willingness to pay to make a choice from this choice set herself, rather than having someone else choose, is elicited. Because the individual is revealed indifferent between the alternatives in the choice set, there is no instrumental value in choosing oneself. The choice situation is private, so social image considerations (status, prestige) are also ruled out by design. Consequently, a positive willingness to pay to remain the social planner in this situation reveals an intrinsic preference to retain the allocative power of the social planner. Our approach equally allows to identify intrinsic aversion to power, which would be expressed by a negative willingness to pay. Both steps of the elicitation task are implemented using a "Dynamically Optimized Sequential Experiment" (DOSE) design (Wang et al., 2010; Chapman et al., 2022), which maximizes the information gain about the point of indifference in step 1 and

[1]Our focus on *influence on others* fundamentally differentiates this paper from earlier studies that considered intrinsic preferences for decision rights (e.g., (Fehr et al., 2013; Bartling et al., 2014)), control of own payoffs ((Owens et al., 2014)), or autonomy ((Freundt et al., 2023; Herz and Freundt, 2024)), whose object of study always included the ability to control *own outcomes*, and therefore either exclusively focused on the first strand (the ability to enact any change), or both the first and second strand were simultaneously included. The closest study to our approach is Pikulina and Tergiman (2020). We discuss our connection to this literature in depth at the end of the introduction.

the willingness to pay in step 2, and additionally allows us to estimate choice consistency at the individual level, which is important for us given the importance of eliciting precisely indifference in step 1 in order to cleanly identify intrinsic power preferences in step 2.

We conducted a large-scale online experiment on Prolific.com with a total of 1800 individuals from six different countries.[2] For the 1514 individuals for whom we could identify revealed indifference between 2 allocations in step 1,[3] we find that 41.4% have a strictly positive willingness to pay to remain the social planner in step 2, 39.8% have zero willingness to pay (purely instrumental preferences), and the willingness to pay is strictly negative for 18.8% of the subjects. Conditional on having a positive willingness to pay, individuals are willing to forego 8.2 % of their endowment in order to retain the social planner position. Conditional on having a negative willingness to pay, individuals are willing to forego 4.7% of their endowment in order *not* to be the social planner. When taking the average over all participants, the willingness to pay is positive and accounts for 2.5% of the fixed endowment in stage 2 of the elicitation task. We find no gender differences in intrinsic preferences for power.

Given the substantial heterogeneity in behaviorally revealed intrinsic preferences for power, we use these data to explore correlates of intrinsic power preferences. A first question of interest, given that some of the most powerful positions in society endow individuals with substantial influence on the distribution of wealth in a society, is whether individuals that intrinsically strive for power differ in their distributional preferences. We can provide first insights into this question by assessing the association between an individual's revealed intrinsic preference for power and their revealed distributional preference in step 1 of our elicitation task. Indeed, we find that a higher revealed intrinsic preference for power is significantly negatively associated with the weight that an individual attaches to equality in the distributional task. This finding is robust to the inclusion of socioeconomic control variables as well as other personality measures, such as the Big 5 and cultural orientation measures. It thus appears that individuals who are more strongly motivated by power as an end tend to put less weight on equality and more weight on efficiency when in a social planner position.

To gain further insights into the behavioral signature of intrinsic power preferences, we next assess their relationship to political attitudes. To this end, we included a series of questions about attitudes toward authoritarian versus democratic political systems from the World Values Survey (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; World Values Survey Association, 2022), as well as the social dominance orientation measure by Pratto et al. (1994) in a post-experimental questionnaire. Our behavioral measure of intrinsic preferences for power shows a significant and robust association with these separately elicited attitudes: Those who reveal a stronger desire for power per se in the behavioral task indicate more favorable attitudes toward authoritarian political systems in the questionnaire.

[2]US, Mexico, Uk, Germany, Poland and Portugal.

[3]Depending on the revealed choice pattern in step 1, it is possible that no indifference point can be identified. We provide details on this selection in section 2.3.

In particular, those with stronger intrinsic preferences for power are more likely to agree that strong leaders or the army are a good way to govern a country, and less likely to agree that democracy is a good way to govern a country. Intrinsic preferences for power are also significantly associated with social dominance orientation. These associations are again robust to the inclusion of socioeconomic characteristics, the distributional preference parameter, and the BIG 5 personality traits.

Third, we assess whether individuals that intrinsically strive for power differ in their political views compared to those that do not. Our data again reveals systematic differences. In particular, our measure of intrinsic preferences for power is significantly associated with more conservative views on both social and economic issues. This relationship is also corroborated in answers to topical questions, such as increased agreement to the statement that "we need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort", or "private ownership of business and industry should be increased." These associations remain significant when controlling for socioeconomic controls, and the BIG 5 personality traits (which are also strongly predictive of political attitudes in our data).

Given that we found a strong relationship between egalitarian motives in distributional preferences and intrinsic preferences for power, one might suspect that the relationship between intrinsic preferences for power and political views is driven by distributional preferences. However, the statistical association also remains intact even when the distributional preference parameter is controlled for. As expected, a stronger regard for equality is highly predictive of more liberal economic (and social) policy views.

Our study makes multiple contributions. First, the findings inform long-running debates around peoples' motivations to strive for power. In line with the reasoning of Russell (1938), McClelland (1975, 1985) and others, our task reveals that individuals indeed assign value to the exercise of power per se, where power in our setting is narrowly defined as the ability to influence the monetary outcomes of other individuals. While our study does not allow a comparison of the strengths of instrumental and intrinsic motives, we do provide a proof of concept that intrinsic preferences for power exist.

Second, our focus on power as influence over others differentiates this study from existing work on preferences for control, decision rights and autonomy, thereby advancing our understanding of individual preferences for authority. Previous experiments have demonstrated the existence of an intrinsic value of *decision rights*, defined as the right to implement effort in a project selection task with consequences for multiple parties (Fehr et al., 2013; Bartling and Fischbacher, 2012; Neri and Rommeswinkel, 2016). Subsequent research has isolated the utility consequences of *autonomy* in choice, that is, controlling own payoffs and non-interference (Owens et al., 2014; Neri and Rommeswinkel, 2016; Sloof and von Siemens, 2017; Meemann, 2023; Freundt et al., 2023; Herz and Freundt, 2024). By removing any material consequences for the self from our behavioral preference measurement, we rule out intrinsic motives linked to autonomy—which, although a strong intrinsic motive in many situations, differs fundamentally from the desire to influence others. Moreover,

distinguishing between these motives is important, since different power roles appeal to them in fundamentally different ways. While in some contexts maintaining power primarily serves to secure personal autonomy, in others it serves to enable influence over others. Understanding these differences, and the kind of individuals that are attracted to these different roles, is therefore important.

The closest study to ours is Pikulina and Tergiman (2020), who also study whether individuals intrinsically value having influence on other peoples' payoffs. Our approach, however, differs in two important ways: First, in their design subjects always possess influence over others, and identification relies on *increases* in this influence. We instead ask the more fundamental question of whether individuals intrinsically value having power to influence others versus having no such power. Second, while their design yields only a categorical classification of preference types and requires to separately account for social preference types, our design generates a continuous measure of the strength of the intrinsic power preferences without the need to separately account for social preferences. This leaner design enables easier application and a finer measure, which in turn allows us to use it to study the relationship between such preferences and other preferences and attitudes, thereby demonstrating their broader societal and political significance.

By uncovering robust associations between intrinsic preferences for power and political attitudes, we also contribute to the recent literature on the relation between preferences, personality, and political attitudes (Gerber et al., 2010a, 2011a; Cappelen et al., 2017; Fisman et al., 2017; Enke et al., 2023; Cappelen et al., 2025; Buser, 2025), which has demonstrated that personality attitudes and economic preferences are strong predictors of voting and political opinion. In particular, we uncover a robust relationship between intrinsic power preferences, conservative political views, and perceptions of authoritarian systems and social dominance. These results persist even when controlling for distributional preferences and BIG 5 personality measures, for which we can confirm the associations established in the literature.

This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes our novel preference elicitation measure. Section 3 presents results on the distribution of the elicited preference measure as well as results on correlations with other individual characteristics and attitudes. Finally, Section 4 concludes.

2 Preference Measurement

We study intrinsic preferences for power in a *Social Planner Game* that consists of two parts. In the first part, the main participant makes a series of choices, where each choice is between two distributions of earnings (points) for two other participants in the experiment (P_1 and P_2). Across choice situations, the two distributions are adjusted to present different trade-offs between efficiency and equality. The aim of step 1 is to identify two distributions A and $\tilde{B}$ such that the main participant is just indifferent between them.

In the second part, the main participant is matched with two new passive participants (P_3 and P_4), and is presented with the two distributions A and $\tilde{B}$ as identified in step 1. She can then decide

whether she wants to pay a price (positive or negative) to be the social planner herself (being able to pick one of the two distributions), or whether she lets a delegate take this decision. The delegate is yet another participant in the study. More specifically, across choice situations, the price to be paid to remain the social planner varies in order to elicit the main participant's willingness to pay for making a choice from this set herself rather than having the delegate choose. Because the main participant is revealed indifferent between A and $\tilde{B}$, there is no instrumental value attached to choosing by herself. In turn, if instrumental value were the sole determinant of the value of power, the decision maker should be indifferent between choosing herself and having the delegate choose. However, if power is intrinsically valuable, individuals should display a positive willingness to pay to be the social planner. Vice versa, individuals who are intrinsically averse to power are expected to show a negative willingness to pay. The procedure in step 2 is thus designed to elicit the main participant's willingness to pay for power for its own sake, in the absence of any instrumental value considerations.

There are thus 3 types of participants in the experiment: (i) the main decision makers, who are at the center of the study and for whom we measure intrinsic preferences for power; (ii) passive participants who receive payments according to the decisions of the main participants or the delegates in both steps; (iii) delegates who decide between the two distributions in case the main participant decides not to take the choice herself. Given that all decisions of interest are taken by the main participant, we focus the design description on this participant.[4]

2.1 Step 1: Elicitation of Indifference

The aim of step 1 of the elicitation task is to identify two allocations of earnings between the two passive participants for which the main participant is just indifferent. To this end, we utilize Dynamically Optimized Sequential Experimentation (DOSE) (Wang et al., 2010; Chapman et al., 2022), which allows us to jointly maximize the information gain about the individual's indifference point as well as her choice consistency, providing important information about the precision with which an individual's point of indifference is identified.

Each main participant goes through an individual sequence of $r = 10$ choice situations. In each situation, she has to choose between an option A and an option B, both representing distributions of points assigned to P_1 and P_2. Option A is fixed over rounds and consists of an egalitarian distribution of 2000 points for P_1 and P_2 ($x_1^A = 2000$, $x_2^A = 2000$). Option B consists of an unequal distribution of 3000 points for P_1 and an amount $x_{2,r}^B$ for P_2, with $x_{2,r}^B \in \{110, 130, ..., 2410\}$. The payoff of the main participant is independent of her choice and amounts to 2000 points. The amount that participant P_2 receives in Option B, $x_{2,r}^B$ is adjusted from round to round to identify an allocation $\tilde{B}$ such that the main participant is just indifferent between option A and option $\tilde{B}$.

[4]Participants type (ii) and (iii) are described in section 2.3.

An example of the decision screen faced by the main participant in step 1 is displayed in Figure 1.[5]

Figure 1: *Decision screen for the main participant in step 1 of the elicitation task.*



Notes: Decision screen faced by all main participants in round 1 of step 1.

Figure 2 displays three exemplary sequences that help illustrate the DOSE procedure and its advantages. Decision rounds are shown on the vertical axis (from top to bottom). The horizontal axis displays the only parameter that varied from round to round, the payoff to P_2 at option B, $x^B_{2,r}$. The decisions of the participant are shown as letters in the graph, indicating whether option A or B was chosen. The left panel shows a decision pattern of a participant who behaved in a perfectly consistent fashion. As one can see, the DOSE algorithm primarily learns about the indifference point in rounds 1-7 and narrows the potential point of indifference down to a 20 point interval (the smallest distance in the prespecified set of potential values $x^B_{2,r}$). Rounds 8-10 are then used to gain information about the consistency of the subject. At the end, the indifference point (indicated by the red line) can be identified within a 10 point range. For the individual displayed in the left hand panel, the indifference allocation was identified to be (3000, 2000), and the individual chose allocation A whenever $x^B_{2,r}$ was below 2000 and allocation B whenever $x^B_{2,r}$ was above 2000.

The middle and right hand panels are illustrative to see how the algorithm enables us to uncover inconsistencies in the choice patterns. Both participants make inconsistent choices in round 8. As a consequence, DOSE updates its estimate on choice consistency and uses the subsequent rounds to reassess its estimate of the indifference point. Unsurprisingly, choice inconsistencies do not allow us to pin down the indifference point as precisely, as illustrated by the gray areas in the figure.[6]

[5]The figure illustrates the round 1 decision screen that was faced by all main participants. Once either Option A or Option B is selected, Passive Participant 2's points in option B are updated according to the DOSE algorithm (explained below).

[6]The grey areas highlight the range of values of $x^B_{2,r}$ such that the participant is fully consistent *outside* of the grey area.

Figure 2: Three Exemplary Choice Sequences in Step 1 of the Elicitation Task.



Notes: The x-axis indicates the value $x^B_{2,r}$ in the respective round r, displayed on the y-axis. Each subject's choice of option A (2000,2000) vs. option B (3000,$x^B_{2,r}$) is indicated for each round by the letter in the graph. Vertical red lines represent the identified $\hat{x}^B_2$, such that the individual is just indifferent between (2000,2000) and (3000,$\hat{x}^B_2$). Grey areas provide a visual intuition for the precision with which the indifference point is identified. Outside the grey area, the individual choice pattern was perfectly consistent.

However, the fact that we can identify and quantify these inconsistencies constitutes a valuable feature of our elicitation tool, because it enables us to control for it in the analysis.

The application of DOSE requires structural assumptions that govern the selection of allocations B made by our algorithm. As the left panel of Figure 2 makes clear, these structural assumptions have no impact on the identified indifference point for consistent subjects. They simply govern the sequence of options B that is presented to the subject.[7] More specifically, we assume that the main decision makers exhibit the following spectator utility function (Cappelen et al. (2013)):

$$u_i(x_1, x_2) = x_1 + x_2 - \gamma_i|x_1 - x_2| \tag{1}$$

where x_j represents the points assigned to the passive participant P_j and γ_i represents the degree of inequality aversion of the decision maker with respect to the payoffs of the passive participants P_1 and P_2. $\gamma_i > 0$ implies inequality aversion, $\gamma_i < 0$ inequality seeking, and $\gamma_i = 0$ imply preferences for efficiency only.

Further, we assume that individual choice behavior is governed by the following probabilistic function:

$$\pi_i(A) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-\mu_i(u_i(A) - u_i(B))}} \tag{2}$$

where $\pi_i(A)$ is the probability of choosing option A over B, μ_i specifies the individual's degree of stochastic response in choice and u_i is as defined in (1).

The key individual parameter estimates that we want to obtain are $\tilde{\gamma}_i$ and $\tilde{\mu}_i$. To this end, we define a discrete parameter space for γ_i and μ_i. The parameter space for γ_i is determined by the set of potential payoffs for option $x^B_{2,r}$ and contains 116 values in the interval $[-\frac{1}{3}, \frac{7}{3}]$.[8] μ_i can take

[7] As the degree of choice inconsistency increases, the impact of the structural assumptions on the identified indifference point also increases. Again, observing these inconsistencies allows us to control for their potential impact in our analyses.

[8] The set of potential points allocated to P_2 at option B, and in turn the identifiable parameter vale γ, is deliberately

12 different values given in $\mu_i \in \{1, ..., 12\}$, ranging from almost exclusive stochasticity in choice to very high consistency in choice.[9]

Finally, we specify the function $f(\gamma_i, \mu_i)$ that assigns a probability to each parameter combination (γ_i, μ_i). The function is initiated with a uniform probability distribution over γ_i and μ_i as a prior. After each choice situation r, the joint distribution $f(\gamma_i, \mu_i)$ is updated based on individual i's choice using Bayes Rule. Based on the posterior distribution, DOSE selects the value $x^B_{2,r}$ for the next choice situation such that the information gain is maximized, using the Kullback-Leibler information criterion. At the end of step 1, the estimates $\tilde{\gamma}_i$ and $\tilde{\mu}_i$ are determined based on the posterior joint distribution over γ_i and μ_i.[10] Based on $\tilde{\gamma}_i$, the best estimate for $\tilde{B}$ is then constructed such that the main participant is expected to be just indifferent between A and $\tilde{B}$.[11]

2.2 Step 2: Elicitation of the Willingness to Pay to be the Social Planner

In step 2, the main participants are matched with different passive recipients P_3 and P_4 and are then again faced with a sequence of 10 choice situations. In each round, participants are asked if they want to choose between A and $\tilde{B}$ themselves, or delegate this choice to another participant in the experiment (the "delegate"). The decision to choose oneself is associated with paying a price that varies from situation to situation, which could be either positive or negative. In particular, we allow the price to vary in the set $p \in \{-500, -490, ..., -10, 10, ..., 500\}$. The payoff of the main participant in step 2 is independent of the potential choice of the delegate in case of delegation, and amounts to 2000 points plus or minus the price (bonus) paid to retain the right to be the social planner. An example of the decision screen faced by the main participant in step 2 is displayed in Figure 3.

We again utilized DOSE to maximize the information gain about each participant's willingness to pay to exercise the choice themselves as well as their choice consistency. To govern the selection of p from choice situation to choice situation[12], we assume that individuals' utility function is given by:

chosen such that it allows for identification of preferences that favour inequality over efficiency (when $x^B_{2,r} < 1000$), inequality averse preferences (when $x^B_{2,r} > 1000$) and for preferences on the sum of incomes only, when options A and B are indifferent for the decision maker when $x^B_{2,r} = 1000$.

[9] The choice of the parameter space for μ_i was based on ex-ante simulations. The value of 0, which implies completely random choice, has been excluded as otherwise DOSE would excessively try to learn whether or not the participants' choices are fully random, which hinders learning about the distributional preference parameter, given the limited amount of choices that we can elicit.

[10] Further details about the exact procedures of the DOSE method can be found in Appendix C.

[11] Based on $\tilde{\gamma}_i$, we can then calculate the indifferent option B from equation 1, $\tilde{\gamma}_i = \frac{\tilde{x}^B_2 - 1000}{3000 - \tilde{x}^B_2}$

[12] In round 5, if a participant had faced only positive (or only negative) prices in the preceding four rounds, we selected a random price with the opposite sign. This ensured that participants understood that prices could be positive or negative.

Figure 3: *Decision screen for the main participant in step 1 of the elicitation task.*



Notes: Decision screen in step 2 of the elicitation task. The "price" varied from round to round according to DOSE. Negative prices were displayed as "bonuses". The bottom of the screen shows the choice set, which is individually constructed for each participant depending on their choices in step 1.

$$U_i(d_i, p, c) = \begin{cases} u_i(A) + d_i - p & \text{if choosing herself (c=1)} \\ u_i(A) & \text{if delegating (c=0)} \end{cases} \tag{3}$$

where d_i is the intrinsic utility of power and $u_i(A)$ is the utility obtained with option A (because of indifference, the utility received from $\tilde{B}$ is identical).[13] The main goal of step 2 is to estimate $\tilde{d}_i$, which will be our measure for the intrinsic value assigned to power for individual i. As before, we also assume that individual choice behavior is governed by a probabilistic function:

$$\pi_i(c=1) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-\rho_i(u_i(A)+d_i-p-u_i(A))}} = \frac{1}{e^{-\rho_i(d_i-p)}} \tag{4}$$

where $\pi_i(c=1)$ is the probability of deciding to pay p for choosing oneself, and ρ_i specifies the individual's degree of stochastic response in choice in step 2.

[13]The ultimate goal of this step is to elicit any potential willingness to pay to retain power that is not linked to instrumental benefits. Assuming that the intrinsic utility component of power is additively separable is primarily done for convenience. We do not want to claim, and cannot identify, how precisely any potential intrinsic utility components enter individual utility. All we can identify is whether individuals have a willingness to pay to retain power.

The key individual parameter estimates are thus $\tilde{d}_i$ and $\tilde{\rho}_i$. To this end, we again define a discrete parameter space for $d_i \in \{-500, -490, ..., -10, 0, 10, ..., 500\}$ and for $\rho_i \in \{1, ..., 15\}$, and a uniform joint probability distribution $f(d_i, \rho_i)$ that is updated using Bayes Rule after each choice situation r. DOSE again selects the value of the price p for the next choice situation such that the information gain is maximized using the Kullback-Leibler information criterion. At the end of step 2, the estimates $\tilde{d}_i$ and $\tilde{\rho}_i$ are determined based on the posterior joint distribution over d_i and ρ_i. $\tilde{d}_i$ is our main parameter of interest, as it captures the main participant's willingness to pay for power for its own sake in the social planner game, in a situation in which power has no instrumental value. From now on, we will refer to it as the intrinsic willingness to pay for power.

2.3 Implementation, Procedures and Sample Composition

We recruited our participants using the online platform Prolific Academic in June 2023. We recruited 1800 participants to play the role of our main decision makers. Participants from 6 different countries were selected: US, UK, Germany, Portugal, Poland and Mexico (300 per country).[14] We stratified the samples by age and gender for all countries.[15] Each individual decision making session for the main participants consisted of the two steps of the behavioral elicitation task described above and a subsequent questionnaire. Each step of the elicitation task is explained to the participants before they start the respective stage of the experiment. They also have to correctly answer a set of comprehension questions before proceeding, to ensure they have understood the task (see Appendix B for screenshots of the instructions presented to the subjects, the control questions they had to answer and all pages of their decision making).[16] For each of the choice rounds in step 1 and 2, one is randomly selected to determine payments (passive participants' payments in step 1 and both the main decision maker and passive participants' payments in step 2). Payments for passive participants are implemented for sure for the randomly selected round in step 2. For step 1, payments are implemented with a 10% probability, i.e., we recruit passive participants only for 1 out of 10 main decision makers in step 1. This difference about the certainty of payments for passive participants in step 1 and 2 is fully explained to the main participants, including a question to control their understanding. Feedback on payments is only given at the very end of the study. Main participants earned, on average, 6.93£: A 2£ show up fee, a fixed payment of 2000 points[17] to complete step 1, a fixed payment of 2000 points minus [plus] the price they need to pay [need to be compensated] to decide by themselves in step 2 (if deciding so in the randomly selected round), and a fixed payment of 1.5£ to fill out the questionnaire. The questionnaire included a control

[14] We chose these six countries to sample from societies that differed in cultural values such as power distance and individualism (Hofstede, 2001).

[15] We restricted the stratification on individuals being 55 years old or younger, due to the relative lack of subjects of older ages on Prolific.

[16] They have 3 tries to answer all questions of each of the two steps correctly. If they fail to pass any set of control questions they are excluded from the study.

[17] We used an equivalence of 1200 points to 1£ for all types of participants in the experiment.

check to ensure participants were attentive.

The passive participants receive the points allocated by the decisions made by the active participants. They do not perform any task. It is explained to them how points distributions are decided and they receive the payments based on the choices made in step 1 or step 2 of the experiment (see Appendix B for screenshots of the instructions presented to the passive subjects and how they their payoffs are revealed).[18]

Finally, there is one other type of active participant in our experiment, the potential delegate. These had to make decisions about point allocations in step 2 of the study when the main decision makers decided to delegate their choices to another person. To make the design more tractable, we ex-ante recruited 4 subjects whose task was to take decisions about all potential choice sets A and $\tilde{B}$ that could potentially arise from step 1 of the elicitation procedure.[19] The delegate decision makers received a fixed amount of 3.67£ for completing the experimental session (0.5£ as a show up fee and 2000 points to complete the task), which took less than 15 minutes.[20] The decisions of the delegates were incorporated into the program, and if a main decision maker decided to delegate a decision in step 2, the decision of the respective delegate for the specific case of options A and $\tilde{B}$ was implemented.

Sample Composition

From the initial set of 1800 main participants, we exclude participants for whom we could not identify an indifference set in step 1 of the elicitation task. These are participants who chose option A in the choice situation with the highest value of $x^B_{2,r}$ in their individual sequence, or option B in the choice situation with the lowest value of $x^B_{2,r}$ in their individual sequence. These are individuals that either never switch between options in part 1, and thus are categorized as extremely inequality averse/inequality seeking—and as highly consistent—in our data, or individuals who switch at least once but are inconsistent and display extreme inequality aversion / inequality lovingness at the boundary of the parameter space. There are different explanations for such choices: subjects might not pay attention and just click the same button, they might have extreme distributional preferences, or they might use a simple heuristic for making the choices between distributions. While we cannot distinguish these possibilities, the fact that we cannot identify an indifference set for these participants, and therefore the elicitation of the willingness to pay in part 2 does not work accurately, requires their exclusion.[21] This leaves us with a data set of 1514 observations. When

[18] In total, we recruited 3960 individuals to play the role of a passive participants. In step 1, we created incentive compatibility of the distributive choices by paying out (and announcing to subjects) that the choices of one in ten main participants will effectively be implemented. Thus, we recruited 360 passive participants to pay out one decision of 180 randomly selected main participants for their step 1 decisions. Because our main interest is in measuring the willingness to pay for power in part 2 of our experimental setup, the decisions of all main participants had real consequences with certainty. Thus, we recruited 3600 passive participants to pay out one decision of each main participant for step 2.

[19] 234 different combinations of point allocations for option $\tilde{B}$ can arise in step 1 of our elicitation task. To cover them all, each of the 4 participants recruited to the role of the delegate took either 58 or 59 decisions.

[20] See Appendix B for screenshots of the instructions and the experiment presented to this type of participant.

[21] These participants still completed the full experiment. The DOSE algorithm would still assign an alternative $\tilde{B}$

including questionnaire data in the analysis, we additionally excluded observations where decision makers did not pass one of the attention checks (only 17 participants are additionally excluded).

2.4 The Questionnaire.

After the behavioral preference measurement, the main participants in the experiment answered a questionnaire that included individual characteristics, views, attitudes and psychological traits, some of which are used as control variables in our analyses, whereas others are used as outcomes to assess associations between our behavioral preference measure and individual attitudes. Below, we provide an overview of the blocks of questions that were included. More details about the exact questions asked are provided in the respective results sections.[22]

i) *Socio-demographic information*: Gender, age, income and education level.

ii) *Attitudes towards authoritarian versus democratic political systems:* Questions from different waves of the World Values Survey (WVS) asking about views about the suitability of different political systems (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; World Values Survey Association, 2022).

iii) *Various attitude questions:* Questions from different waves of the World Value Survey (WVS) asking about general political views, locus of control, redistribution views and trust (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; World Values Survey Association, 2022).

iv) *Psychological Traits and Personality Questionnaires:* Participants answered the *Power Motives scale* (McClelland, 1975, 1985, 1991), *Social Dominance Orientation Scale* (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999) and *Desirability of control Scale* (Burger and Cooper, 1979b). We also measured the Big Five personality traits using a simple single item questionnaire (John and Srivastava, 1999), as well a questionnaire to construct measures of individual cultural orientation: Horizontal Individualism (HI), Vertical Individualism (VI), Horizontal Collectivism (HC), and Vertical Collectivism (VC) (Singelis et al., 1995).

2.5 A note on identification of indifference and consistency.

Before we begin our analysis, we assess the extent to which the premise of identification of indifference is met in step 1 of our elicitation task. DOSE specifically estimates a structural consistency parameter at the individual level, and thus allows us to assess the degree of consistency.

Figure 4 displays the distribution of the estimated consistency parameters μ_i and ρ_i for step 1 and 2 of our elicitation task.[23] It can be seen that choice consistency was overall fairly high

which was used for the choice set in step 2. However, the presented choice set likely contained instrumental value.

[22] All pages of the questionnaire are also provided in Appendix B.

[23] Recall that a value of 12 [15] was the highest possible value for μ_i [ρ_i], given how we have initiated the parameter space in DOSE. $\mu = 12$ was only assigned if a subject was fully consistent across all 10 choices. Among subjects with an assigned ρ of 15, 99.2% were fully consistent. The remaining 0.8% showed very minor inconsistencies.

Figure 4: *Distribution of the consistency parameters μ_i and ρ_i.*



Notes: Distribution of the estimated consistency parameters μ_i and ρ_i for step 1 and 2 of our elicitation task.μ_i takes integer values between 1 and 2. ρ_i takes integer values between 0 and 15. Higher the estimated parameter, higher the consistency displayed by the participants.

throughout the sample. 66.38% of participants have been assigned the highest consistency parameter of 12 in stage 1 which corresponds to a fully consistent choice pattern, 84% of participants have a consistency score of at least 10, which only implies minor inconsistencies (see choice pattern in the middle panel of Figure 2), and 96% have a consistency score of $\mu \geq 8$. The distribution of the choice consistency parameter ρ for step 2 of our elicitation task is similar. The level of choice consistency in our data is thus overall fairly high, and we were able to identify precise indifference points in step 1 and WTP's in step 2 for the large majority of our participants.

Still, choice inconsistencies in step 1 constitute a potential confound for our elicitation procedure. If we failed to present the main participant with a choice set that contained options that she is materially indifferent over, the choice contains instrumental value which creates an upward bias in our estimate of intrinsic preferences for power. To control for any potential confounding effects, we thus conduct all of our analyses also on the subsample of participants that was fully consistent in step 1 of the elicitation task in order to assess the robustness of our results.

Whereas the elicitation of indifference in step 1 is a critical identifying assumption of our approach, and inconsistencies in the elicitation of indifference thus pose a major concern, inconsistencies in step 2 only represent measurement error in the willingness to pay for power for its own sake, without posing a threat to the identified preference overall. The WTP assigned to each individual still reflects the best estimate of WTP given the individual choice pattern even in the presence of choice inconsistencies. Still, we provide additional conservative robustness checks in Appendix A by further partitioning our overall sample and providing all our main results conditional on full consistency in both steps of the elicitation task.

3 Results

3.1 Intrinsic preferences for power in the overall sample.

Our data reveals that individuals, on average, exhibit a positive willingness to pay for power for its own sake.



Figure 5: (a) Histogram and (b) Cumulative distribution function of the WTP for power in step 2 of the elicitation task.
(N = 1514 full sample, N' = 1005 fully consistent individuals in stage 1).

Notes: The horizontal axis represents willingness to pay to remain the social planner in step 2 of our elicitation method, $\tilde{d}_i$. The vertical axes represents the frequency (a) (in percentage terms) and cumulative frequency (b), for each estimated value of the willingness to pay for power, d_i.

Figure 5 panel (a) shows the distribution of the willingness to pay to remain the social planner. When considering the full sample, the average WTP amounts to 49.9 points, which is significantly different from 0 ($N = 1514$, t-test: $p < 0.001$, Wilcoxon sign-rank test (in the following WSR): $p < 0.001$). This amount represents 2.5% of the fixed endowment that the participants were endowed with for stage 2 of the elicitation task. Figure 5 panel (b) shows the cumulative distribution of the willingness to pay, both for all individuals as well as conditional on being fully consistent in step 1 of the elicitation task. For the full sample, 18.8% of the participants in the experiment exhibited a (strictly) negative WTP, implying that a significant proportion of our experimental population intrinsically dislikes determining others' payoffs. The WTP conditional on being negative is −93.9 points, equivalent to 4.7% of the endowment that the participants were endowed with for stage 2 of the elicitation task. On the other hand, 41.4% of the participants exhibited a positive WTP. The average WTP conditional on being positive is 163.5 points, equivalent to 8.2% of the step 2 endowment. Positive intrinsic preferences for power are thus more pronounced than negative intrinsic preferences for power ($n_+ = 627$, $n_- = 285$; Mann-Whitney U test $p < 0.001$ (in the following MWU)), and the share of participants with a positive WTP significantly exceeds the share with a negative WTP ($N = 912$, exact binomial (sign) test $p < 0.001$). The modal participant displays purely instrumental preferences, with 39.8% of the participants revealing a willingness to

pay equal to 0.[24]

When restricting the sample to fully consistent subjects in stage 1, the average WTP amounts to 43.9 points, still significantly different from 0 ($N = 1005$, t-test: $p < 0.001$, WSR: $p < 0.001$). The distribution is very similar to the overall sample, although slightly more subjects exhibit a willingness to pay exactly equal to 0 (45.47%).

Below we summarize our first empirical result.

Result 1 *Participants exhibit, on average, positive intrinsic preferences for power in our overall sample. There is ample heterogeneity in these preferences, with significant shares of participants displaying positive, negative and zero intrinsic preferences for power.*

Given the observed heterogeneity in intrinsic preferences for power, we next explore whether this observed heterogeneity is related to other individual characteristics and attitudes.

3.2 Intrinsic preferences for power and distributional preferences

A first natural potential correlate that we can explore using our data are distributional preferences. To this end, we utilize the measured individual inequality aversion parameter, γ_i, as defined in equation (1), which measures the weight that an individual puts on equality relative to efficiency in the social planner game. We can thus ask the question of whether the value attached to power per se is correlated with individual preferences for equity when in the position of a social planner.

Figure 6 shows the distribution of the distributional preference parameter γ_i in the full sample ($N = 1514$) as well as for the fully consistent subsample in step 1 ($N' = 1005$). The horizontal axis represents the income of passive participant 2 at option B, $\tilde{x}_2^B$, at which the decision maker is just indifferent between the egalitarian outcome of 2000 points for each participant (option A), and the unequal distribution of 3000 points for participant 1 and $\tilde{x}_2^B$ for participant 2 (option B). A higher $\tilde{x}_2^B$ implies that the decision maker shows stronger preferences for equality.[25]

Note that a social planner that only cared about efficiency ($\gamma = 0$) would choose Option A whenever $x_2^B < 1000$, Option B whenever $x_2^B > 1000$, and be indifferent exactly when $x_2^B = 1000$. Any deviation implies that the social planner engages in a trade-off between efficiency and equality. If $\tilde{x}_2^B > 1000$, the social planner is willing to forego efficiency for an increase in equality. If $\tilde{x}_2^B < 1000$, the social planner is willing to destroy efficiency for an increase in inequality.

Most participants in our sample display strong preferences for equality: 84.0% of participants exhibit some degree of inequality aversion ($\tilde{\gamma}_i > 0$). The most common indifference point is $\tilde{x}_2^B =$

[24]The average WTP for power is also significantly positive in all countries in our sample (t-test: $p < 0.001$, WSR: $p < 0.001$, for all countries). We also observe heterogeneity across countries, with the mean in Mexico being more the trice the mean in the USA. More specifically, Mexico has the highest mean WTP for power of the selected countries of the sample (t-test: $p < 0.001$, MWU: $p < 0.001$, for all pairwise comparisons, except with UK where $p < 0.05$). Participants from the USA exhibit significantly lower intrinsic preferences for power than UK, Germany and Mexico (t-test: $p = 0.022$, $p = 0.077$, $p < 0.01$, MWU: $p = 0.100$, $p = 0.088$, $p < 0.01$ respectively).

[25]There is a direct mapping from $\tilde{x}_2^B$ to $\tilde{\gamma}$ from equation (1): $\tilde{\gamma}_i = \frac{\tilde{x}_2^B - 1000}{3000 - \tilde{x}_2^B}$

Figure 6: *Distribution of distributional preferences exhibited in step 1 of the elicitation task.*



Notes: The horizontal axis represents the income of passive participant 2 at option B, $\tilde{x}_2^B$, at which the decision maker is just indifferent between option A and option B. The vertical axes represents the frequency (in percentage terms) that the participants estimated inequality aversion parameter γ_i is equal to each of the potential values of $\tilde{x}_2^B$.

2000, which implies a weight on inequality of $\gamma_i = 1$. Only 8.5% of participants display preferences for inequality ($\gamma_i < 0$). 7.5% are purely efficiency-minded and choose an indifference point of exactly 1000 points. The distribution of distributional preferences for fully consistent individuals is similar, except that extreme realizations of $\tilde{x}_2^B < 1000$ or $\tilde{x}_2^B > 2000$ become less likely.

For a first analysis and visual representation, we categorize our participants into different types based on their estimated $\tilde{\gamma}_i$. Five natural categories arise: (i) Inequality seeking ($\gamma < 0$), (ii) Benthamite ($\gamma = 0$), (iii) Equality seeking ($0 < \gamma < 1$), (iv) Pareto minded ($\gamma = 1$) and (v) strongly inequality averse ($\gamma > 1$). All categories have a natural interpretation. Those who are *inequality seeking* are willing to reduce the sum of payoffs to increase inequality. Benthamites are *purely efficiency-minded* and always choose the alternative that maximizes the sum of payoffs. Those who are *equality seeking* trade-off efficiency against equality, but only to a limited extent. Those who are *Pareto minded* require that the passive participant with the lower payoff is made at least as well off at the unequal option as at the equal option. Finally, those who are *strongly inequality averse* are even willing to make both recipients worse off in terms of absolute payoffs in order to avoid inequality.

The relative frequencies of types in our data are shown in Table 1, both for the full sample

as well as conditional on being fully consistent in step 1 of our elicitation task. As noted before, the extreme types (Inequality seeking and strongly inequality averse) become substantially less frequent when conditioning on full consistency, suggesting that some of those observations are due to noise, but they do not disappear completely. Moreover, it is noteworthy that participants with $\tilde{\gamma} = \{0, 1\}$ are almost entirely fully consistent, thus representing two substantially different distributional preference types that are particularly well identified.

Table 1: Frequency of Distributional Preference Types

	All		Consistent in Stage 1	
Type	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Inequality Seeking ($\gamma < 0$)	129	8.52	40	3.98
Benthamite ($\gamma = 0$)	113	7.46	111	11.04
Equality Seeking ($0 < \gamma < 1$)	933	61.62	629	62.59
Pareto Minded ($\gamma = 1$)	192	12.68	192	19.10
Strongly Inequality Averse ($\gamma > 1$)	147	9.71	33	3.28
Total	1,514	100	1,005	100

Notes: Frequency, in absolute number and percentage terms, of the different types of participants in terms of inequality aversion preferences, for both the full sample and for only participants who display fully consistent choices in step 1 of the elicitation task. (i) Inequality seeking ($\gamma < 0$), (ii) Benthamite ($\gamma = 0$), (iii) Equality seeking ($0 < \gamma < 1$), (iv) Pareto minded ($\gamma = 1$) and (v) strongly inequality averse ($\gamma > 1$).

Figure 7 displays the average willingness to pay to remain the social planner across the five distributional preference types. The figure shows a decreasing pattern: The more the social planner cares about equality relative to efficiency (the larger γ), the less the individual intrinsically values the exercise of power in step 2 of the elicitation task. Focusing on the two best-identified types, *efficiency minded* ($\gamma = 0$) and *Pareto minded* ($\gamma = 1$), we find a significantly higher WTP for power for the efficiency-minded type ($p < 0.01$, t-test and MWU test). Our initial analysis thus suggests a consistent pattern: Those who intrinsically value the exercise of power are less concerned about inequality.

To substantiate the analysis, we next move to regression analysis, which allows us to additionally control for sociodemographics and other characteristics of the participants. Model (1) in Table 2 shows coefficient estimates of a regression model that only includes the estimated parameter $\tilde{\gamma}$ as an explanatory variable, as well as country fixed effects, capturing the six countries from which participants were recruited. Consistent with the visual pattern in Figure 7, we find a significant negative relation between intrinsic preferences for power and the distributional preference parameter γ.

Figure 7: Willingness to pay for power by distributional preference type.



Notes: The horizontal axes represent the different types of participants in terms of inequality aversion preferences, for both the full sample and for only participants who display fully consistent choices in step 1 of the elicitation task: (i) Inequality seeking ($\gamma < 0$), (ii) Benthamite ($\gamma = 0$), (iii) Equality seeking ($0 < \gamma < 1$), (iv) Pareto minded ($\gamma = 1$) and (v) strongly inequality averse ($\gamma > 1$). The vertical axes represents the estimated average willingness to pay for power in step 1, $\tilde{d}_i$, for each of the of the categories.

Table 2: Intrinsic Preferences for Power and Distributional Preferences.

	(1) WTP Power	(2) WTP Power	(3) WTP Power	(4) WTP Power	(5) WTP Power	(6) WTP Power	(7) WTP Power	(8) WTP Power
γ	-33.41***	-32.27***	-32.24***	-31.56***	-43.08***	-41.04***	-42.11***	-40.86***
	(8.91)	(9.06)	(9.12)	(9.13)	(10.14)	(10.59)	(10.64)	(10.80)
Gender		3.82	4.11	3.95		8.85	11.98	13.47
		(7.45)	(7.90)	(8.10)		(8.46)	(8.76)	(8.89)
Age		1.35***	1.26***	1.26***		1.06**	1.02**	1.03*
		(0.45)	(0.48)	(0.48)		(0.50)	(0.53)	(0.54)
Income		-1.79	-2.04*	-2.05*		-0.50	-0.83	-1.05
		(1.22)	(1.22)	(1.24)		(1.22)	(1.26)	(1.33)
Education		2.53	1.94	2.14		9.41**	9.10**	9.01**
		(3.56)	(3.60)	(3.60)		(4.02)	(4.06)	(4.06)
Extraversion			7.11	6.17			12.89	4.80
			(13.38)	(14.49)			(15.28)	(16.43)
Agreeableness			5.52	8.32			-7.49	-11.55
			(19.98)	(20.60)			(22.02)	(22.65)
Conscientiousness			13.28	7.66			31.53	26.44
			(16.92)	(17.25)			(18.31)	(18.31)
Neuroticism			1.09	1.23			-17.83	-18.15
			(15.95)	(16.02)			(17.77)	(17.87)
Openness			13.31	8.59			19.48	12.65
			(18.08)	(18.78)			(18.08)	(17.87)
Vertical Individualism				5.84				6.16
				(5.83)				(6.57)
Horizontal Individualism				9.78				4.67
				(6.84)				(7.53)
Vertical Collectivism				-1.86				-2.84
				(6.51)				(7.72)
Horizontal Collectivism				2.36				11.98
				(8.00				(8.81)
Constant	105.2***	56.61**	35.83	-3.03	0.72	30.16	4.81	-35.07
	(11.33)	(24.57)	(30.29)	(38.59)	(37.29)	(29.48)	(35.04)	(44.00)
Fully Consistent step 1	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1514	1512	1512	1512	1005	1003	1003	1003

Notes: The dependent variable in all models is the estimated WTP for choosing yourself instead of delegating the decision in stage 2 of the elicitation task ($\tilde{d}_i$). γ is the degree of inequality aversion estimated in step 1. *Gender* is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when sex is female according to Prolific data. *Income* is included as an ordered variable representing income categories in steps of 10,000 GBP. *Education* is an ordered variable ranging over 5 categories from "less than high school" to "more than 4-year college degree". *Age* ranges from 18 to 55. The BIG 5 variables take values between 0 and 1 with a grid of 0.01. The cultural orientation indexes take values between 0 and 4 with a grid of 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Model (2) additionally controls for the following socioeconomic variables: Gender, age, income, and the level of education. The association between WTP and γ remains similar in magnitude and highly significant.[26]

In model (3), we separately add the BIG 5 personality traits. We find no significant association between any of the BIG 5 personality traits and intrinsic preferences for power, and the relationship between WTP and γ remains robust to their inclusion.[27] Finally, we additionally add measures of cultural value orientation in model (4). Again, these measures do not show significant associations with our measure for intrinsic preferences for power, and the relationship between intrinsic preferences for power and the distributional preference parameter γ remains significant.[28]

As explained in section 2.5, we assess the robustness of our results with respect to choice inconsistencies among participants by repeating our analyses conditional on the subset of fully consistent individuals in step 1, as inconsistencies in step 1 could introduce instrumental value considerations. The results for all four models are presented in columns (5-8) in Table 2. It can be seen that the relationship between WTP and γ is even increasing in magnitude and remains statistically significant in all model specifications.

We summarize the relation between participants' distributional preferences and their intrinsic preferences for power below:

Result 2 *Stronger preferences for power for its own sake are associated with weaker preferences for equality.*

3.3 Intrinsic preferences for power and attitudes towards political systems.

A pertinent question is whether individuals who intrinsically strive for the exercise of power are different from those who don't in terms of their attitudes towards the allocation and exercise of power in political systems. To provide initial insights into this issue, we analyze four questions from the "Political Action and Political Culture" module of the World Values Survey (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; World Values Survey Association, 2022), aimed at assessing levels of democratic versus authoritarian values. The precise questions that we asked were as follows: *I am going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country: (1) Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections, (2) having the army rule, (3) having a democratic political system and (4) having experts, not*

[26] Two participants did not complete the sociodemographic questionnaire,who are thus dropped when these controls are added.

[27] This is consistent with prior work finding only weak associations between behaviorally measured economic preferences and the BIG 5 personality measures from surveys, Becker et al. (2012).

[28] In subsequent analyses, we will continue to include the BIG 5 personality traits as controls, given their relevance in the literature as a potential correlate of some of the outcome variables that we study, but we will exclude the cultural orientation measures, which generally possess very little explanatory power for the outcome variables that we are considering.

government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country.[29]

We begin assessing the relationship between attitudes towards authoritarian and democratic political systems and intrinsic preferences for power by dividing our sample into those who displayed a positive WTP for power and those who did not. Such an analysis only considers the preference type—intrinsic aversion towards, indifference, or intrinsic preference for power—, but ignores the magnitude of the expressed preference.

Figure 8 displays average answers to the four questions on political systems conditional on having a positive WTP for power versus not, based on all participants. The figure shows a clear pattern: Individuals with a positive WTP for power are significantly more likely to indicate a stronger endorsement of authoritarian systems. In particular, participants with a positive WTP for power have better perceptions of a strong leader leading the country and of having the army rule (both t-test and MWU tests $p < 0.01$), and a less positive perception of a democratic political system (t-test and MWU test $p < 0.01$). We find no significant differences in the assessments of the suitability of technocracies, that is, experts taking decisions (t-test p=0.26 and MWU test p=0.19).[30]

To substantiate the analysis, we again turn to regressions which allows us to account for different strengths of intrinsic preferences for power as well as to control for socioeconomic variables and other individual characteristics. Table 3 displays coefficients of regressions on all four questionnaire items, controlling for country dummies, sociodemographic information and the big 5 psychological traits. We also present a separate regression specification for each outcome variable in which we additionally control for the individual distributional preference parameter γ.[31] Panel (A) presents results when all observations are used. Column (1) shows a positive and significant association between positive perceptions of strong leaders and intrinsic preferences for power. The magnitude of the association remains similar, but statistical significance weakens once controlling for distributional preferences in column (2). The distributional preference parameter itself is highly significantly negatively associated with holding positive views about strong leaders. In Panel B, we show the same regressions, but conditional on the subsample that showed perfectly consistent choice patterns in step 1 of our elicitation task. The results from the full sample are confirmed, and the magnitude and statistical significance of the association between intrinsic preferences for power and positive perceptions of strong leaders even becomes stronger. Similarly, the negative relation-

[29] Participants had to choose a point on a slider where one extreme was labeled as *very bad* and the other as *very good*. Each position on the slider was transformed into a variable with centesimal precision that took a value in the interval $[0, 1]$. Histograms of these four survey measures are shown in Figure A.1 in Appendix A.

[30] When restricting the sample to those who were fully consistent in step 1, the results remain robust. Participants with a positive WTP for power have better perceptions of a strong leader leading the country and of having the army rule (both t-test and MWU tests $p < 0.01$), a less positive perception of a democratic political system (t-test and MWU test $p < 0.01$), and no significant difference in the assessments of experts taking decisions (t-test p=0.28 and MWU test p=0.23).

[31] Table 3 only shows the estimated parameters on WTP and γ. Full regression results showing parameter estimates for all included covariates are shown in Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 in Appendix A.

Figure 8: *Positive Intrinsic Preferences for power and attitudes towards Authoritarian Political Systems.*



Notes: The horizontal axis divides the sample into participants with a positive WTP and those without. The bars report mean scores on each of the four questions related to attitudes toward political systems. Each question takes values between 0 and 1 with a grid of 0.01.

ship between the distributional preference parameter and perceptions of strong leaders remains significantly negative.

Moving to perceptions of having the army rule in columns (3) and (4) corroborates the findings on strong leaders. Again, a stronger revealed intrinsic preference for power in our behavioral measurement task is significantly positively associated with positive perceptions of having the army rule. Statistical significance is slightly reduced once controlling for the distributional preference parameter. Putting more weight on equality in the distributional preference is again significantly negatively associated with positive perceptions of having the army rule. Panel B again shows that conditioning the sample on full consistency in step 1 of the elicitation task does not substantially alter these results.

Columns (5) and (6) use the answer to the question of whether having a democratic political system is a good way to govern the country. The statistical associations in the data are again consistent with individuals motivated by power per se having more favorable attitudes towards autocratic political systems, and respectively less favorable views of democratic political systems. Column (5) reveals a negative and statistically significant association between the measured intrinsic preference for power and the expressed attitude. This association is robust to the inclusion of

the distributional preference parameter in column (6), which itself is positively associated with perceptions of democracy, but not significantly so. Again, conditioning the sample on consistency in step 1 of the behavioral elicitation task (panel B) confirms the robustness of these statistical associations.

Columns (7) and (8) show regression coefficients when perceptions of "having experts rule" is used as the outcome variable. Interestingly, none of the specifications show statistically significant associations, neither for our intrinsic preference for power measure nor for the distributional preference parameter.[32]

Our questionnaire also included the social dominance orientation measure developed by (Pratto et al., 1994), which measures a person's general preference for hierarchy in social systems and for dominance over lower-status groups. Columns (9) and (10) show results from regressions that use the individual social dominance orientation as an outcome measure. Column (9) in Panel A shows that, when using the full sample, individuals with a higher measured intrinsic preference for power score significantly higher on social dominance orientation. The magnitude and statistical significance of this association becomes a bit smaller when the individual distributional preference parameter is included in column (10), which itself is highly negatively associated with social dominance orientation. Panel B again replicates these analysis, but conditional on the subset of participants that were fully consistent in step 1. It can be seen that the results are not only robust to this conditioning, but the magnitude and statistical significance of the uncovered associations become stronger.[33]

Taken together, we find a remarkably robust association between intrinsic preferences for power, positive perceptions of authoritarian views, and social dominance. Individuals with stronger intrinsic preferences for power display more positive perceptions of strong leaders and having the army rule, more negative perceptions of democracy, and score higher on social dominance orientation. We summarize the results of this section as follows:

Result 3 *Stronger intrinsic preferences for power are predictive of positive attitudes towards authoritarian political systems, and less positive attitudes towards democracy as a political system. They are also positively associated with higher social dominance orientation. Equality concerns in distributional preferences are predictive of more negative attitudes towards authoritarian political systems and lower social dominance orientation.*

[32]The full regression results shown in tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 in Appendix A show that some of the big 5 personality measures display a very strong statistical association with respect to the attitudes towards authoritarian political systems. In particular, extraversion is positively correlated with more positive views of a strong leader and of having the army rule the country. In contrast, openness negatively correlates with these views. Additionally, openness and agreeableness positively correlate with positive views on democracy and having experts governing the country.

[33]The BIG 5 are highly significantly correlated with the social dominance score, except for Conscientiousness (see Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 in Appendix A).

Table 3: Intrinsic Preferences for Power, Attitudes towards Authoritarian Political Systems and Social Dominance.

		Strong Leader		Army		Democracy		Experts		Social Dominance	
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A: All data	WTP Power	0.07**	0.06*	0.06**	0.06*	-0.07**	-0.06**	0.00	0.00	0.05**	0.04*
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
	γ		-0.11***		-0.11***		0.04		-0.02		-0.15***
			(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)
	N	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496
Panel B: Fully consistent in stage 1	WTP Power	0.12***	0.11***	0.09**	0.07*	-0.09***	-0.09**	0.02	0.02	0.09***	0.06**
		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
	γ		-0.14***		-0.16***		0.06		0.00		-0.21***
			(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)
	N	995	995	995	995	995	995	995	995	995	995
	Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Sociodemographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Big 5	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variables in all models take values between 0 and 1. WTP Power is the (standardized) estimated $\tilde{d}_i$ in stage 2 of the elicitation task. γ is the (standardized) degree of inequality aversion estimated in step 1. *Gender* is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when sex is female according to Prolific data. *Income* is included as an ordered variable representing income categories in steps of 10,000 GBP. *Education* is an ordered variable ranging over 5 categories from "less than high school" to "more than 4-year college degree". *Age* ranges from 18 to 55. The BIG 5 variables take values between 0 and 1 with a grid of 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

3.4 Intrinsic preferences for power and political views.

Our questionnaire not only included items related to authoritarianism and social dominance, but also to political views more generally. In particular, we included widely used items from the World Values Survey (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; World Values Survey Association, 2022) that ask the following questions: How interested they are in politics [Not at all interested—Very interested]; where they place themselves on social issues (e.g., same-sex marriage, abortion) [Extremely conservative—Extremely liberal]; and where they place themselves on economic issues (e.g., taxes, the economy) [Extremely conservative—Extremely left].[34]

We provide a first impression of the relationship between WTP and the answers to the three political questions outlined above by again first conditioning the responses on the preference type, that is, on having intrinsic preferences for power versus not. Figure 9 shows a clear pattern: Individuals with a revealed positive WTP are more likely to express more conservative views on both, social and economic issues. ($p < 0.01$, t-test and MWU test). We also find a negative association between WTP and participants' general interest in politics, although statistical significance is marginal (t-test $p = 0.058$ and MWU test $p = 0.034$).[35]

We again turn to regression analysis in order to account for the magnitude of the expressed preference as well as to control for relevant covariates, focusing on the same regression specifications as in the previous analyses.[36] The estimated regression coefficients broadly confirm the results from Figure 9. Columns (1)-(4) in Panel A show that a higher WTP is negatively associated with expressing liberal policy views on social (columns (1) and (2)) as well as on economic issues (columns (3) and (4)). The association is robust to controlling for the distributional preference parameter in columns (2) and (4). The distributional preference parameter itself is positively associated with liberal policy views, albeith not significantly so. When conditioning the sample on full consistency in step 1 of our elicitation task, the association between WTP and liberal policy views remains robust, and the association between the estimated distributional preference parameter and the expressed political view becomes larger in magnitude and statistically significant as well: Those who put more weight on equality express more liberal policy views in social and economic issues. Finally, the association between WTP and an expressed general interest in politics is negative, but statistical significance vanishes in Panel B.

It is also noteworthy that we find strong statistical associations between the BIG 5 personality

[34] We avoid the term "liberal" for economic issues to prevent confusion between European and U.S. usage. Questions were again answered by choosing a point on a slider that we transformed into a variable that takes centesimal values in the interval $[0, 1]$. The exact questions and how they were framed to the subjects can be found in page 2 of the questionnaire included in Appendix B. Histograms of answers to the questions can be found in Figure A.2 in Appendix A.

[35] The association between having a positive WTP and being more conservative on social and on economic issues is confirmed when conditioning the sample on full consistency in step 1 ($p < 0.01$, t-test and MWU test). The association with general interest in politics becomes insignificant.

[36] Table 4 again only shows the estimated parameters on WTP and γ. Full regression results are shown in Tables A.4, A.5 and A.6 in Appendix A.

Figure 9: *Positive Intrinsic Preferences for Power and Political Views.*



Notes: The horizontal axis splits the sample into participants with a positive WTP and those without. The bars report mean scores on each of the three main questions related to political views. Each question takes values between 0 and 1 with a grid of 0.01

scores and self-reported liberal vs. conservative political views. Participants with higher scores in Extroversion, Conscientiousness, and Neuroticism have more conservative views on both economic and social issues. On the other hand, participants with higher scores on Openness and Agreeableness tend to have more liberal political views, which is consistent with previous findings in the political science literature. See, e.g., Gerber et al. (2010b, 2011b); Sibley et al. (2012); Hirsh et al. (2010); Carney et al. (2008); Fatke (2017).

Table 4: Intrinsic Preferences for Power and Political Views I .

		Liberal Social Issues		Liberal Economic Issues		Interest in Politics	
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: All data	WTP Power	-0.07***	-0.07***	-0.08***	-0.08***	-0.06**	-0.06**
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
	γ		0.02		0.02		0.01
			(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)
	N	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496
Panel B: Fully consistent in stage 1	WTP Power	-0.08**	-0.07**	-0.08**	-0.07**	-0.04	-0.05
		(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
	γ		0.08**		0.07**		-0.01
			(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)
	N	995	995	995	995	995	995
	Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Sociodemographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Big Five	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variables in all models take values between 0 and 1. WTP Power is the (standardized) estimated $\tilde{d}_i$ in stage 2 of the elicitation task. γ is the (standardized) degree of inequality aversion estimated in step 1. *Gender* is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when sex is female according to Prolific data. *Income* is included as an ordered variable representing income categories in steps of 10,000 GBP. *Education* is an ordered variable ranging over 5 categories from "less than high school" to "more than 4-year college degree". *Age* ranges from 18 to 55. Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

In addition to the general questions on political views, we also included a set of attitudinal scales related to redistribution, public ownership, zero-sum thinking, locus of control, and generalized trust. In particular, all participants provided their individual assessments on scales with the following extremes:[37]

- *Need for (In)Equality*: "Incomes should be made more equal *vs.* we need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort". The variable is coded such that higher values imply a positioning closer to "we need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort"

- *Private vs Public Ownership*: "private ownership of business and industry should be increased *vs.* government ownership of business and industry should be increased". The variable is coded such that higher values imply a positioning closer to "government ownership of business and industry should be increased"

- *Zero sum to get rich* "people can get rich only at the expense of others *vs.* wealth can grow so there is enough for everyone". The variable is coded such that higher values imply a positioning closer to " wealth can grow so there is enough for everyone"

- *Effort vs Luck* "the extent to which income differences are due to effort over the life course *versus* luck." The variable is coded such that higher values imply a positioning closer to "luck'

- *Trust* Generalized trust was assessed using the standard generalized trust question from the world value survey: "Generally speaking, how much do you trust other people?"

Tables 5 reports regression results, again using the same set of specifications as previously, using these questionnaire items as outcome variables. Panel (A) again uses all observations. The results are broadly in line with those for the political views reported in Table 4. Columns (1) and (2) show that a stronger intrinsic preference for power is positively associated with more agreement with the statement that "we need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort", which is consistent with more conservative economic political views and potentially also higher social dominance orientation. As one would expect, the distributional preference parameter γ shows a highly significant and negative association. Panel (B) shows that these results are robust to conditioning the sample on full consistency in step 1 of our elicitation task.

Columns (3) and (4) show a negative association between intrinsic preferences for power and agreement to the statement that "government ownership of business and industry should be increased", although statistical significance becomes weaker once distributional preferences are controlled for. The estimated regression coefficients are again consistent with our previous finding

[37] See page 2 of the questionnaire in Appendix B.

that those who intrinsically value power having less liberal economic policy views. When conditioning the sample on full consistency in step 1 of our elicitation task, the association becomes weaker and loses statistical significance. The distributional preference parameter, however, remains positively and significantly associated, implying that those who put more value on equality in the distributional task also express more agreement with increased government ownership of businesses.

Columns (5) and (6) report results on zero-sum thinking. Here, we do not find any significant associations in our data. Neither intrinsic preferences for power nor the distributional preference parameter are predictive of whether individuals are more or less likely to believe that the world is zero-sum. Columns (7) and (8) reveal a significant association between intrinsic preferences for power and locus of control: A higher WTP for power is positively associated with attributing income differences to effort. The estimated coefficient on γ reveals that stronger equality concerns are positively associated with attributing income differences to luck. Conditioning the sample on those who were fully consistent in step 1 (Panel B) confirms these associations. Finally, we find no robust associations between either WTP for power or inequality aversion and generalized trust.

Overall, we find robust and consistent negative associations between our behavioral measure of intrinsic power preferences and liberal economic and social policy views. These findings are confirmed not only in general assessments of political views, but also present in assessments of specific policy issues such as the need for (in)equality, government ownership of business, or in perceptions of locus of control. It thus appears that individuals intrinsically motivated by power not only are more likely to endorse authoritarian political systems, they also tend to be more conservative in economic and social policy issues. We summarize the result of this section as follows:

Result 4 *Stronger intrinsic preferences for power predict more conservative views in social and economic issues. Individuals who put more weight on equality in their distributional preference express more liberal views in social and economic issues.*

Table 5: Intrinsic Preferences for Power and Political Views II.

		Need for (In)Equality		Private vs Public Ownership		Zero Sum to get rich		Effort vs. Luck		Trust	
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A: All data	WTP Power	0.08***	0.08***	-0.06**	-0.05*	-0.01	-0.01	0.07**	0.06**	-0.04	-0.04
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
	γ		-0.09***		0.05*		-0.02		-0.06**		0.02
			(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)
	N	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496
Panel B: Fully consistent in stage 1	WTP Power	0.10***	0.09**	-0.04	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	0.08**	0.07*	-0.04	-0.04
		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
	γ		-0.12***		0.09**		-0.03		-0.13***		0.03
			(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)
	N	995	995	995	995	995	995	995	995	995	995
	Sociodemographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Big Five	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: (1) and (2): "Incomes should be made more equal *vs.* we need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort". The variable is coded such that higher values imply a positioning closer to "we need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort". (3) and (4): "private ownership of business and industry should be increased *vs.* government ownership of business and industry should be increased". The variable is coded such that higher values imply a positioning closer to "government ownership of business and industry should be increased". (5) and (6): "people can get rich only at the expense of others *vs.* wealth can grow so there is enough for everyone". The variable is coded such that higher values imply a positioning closer to " wealth can grow so there is enough for everyone". (7) and (8): "the extent to which income differences are due to effort over the life course *versus* luck." The variable is coded such that higher values imply a positioning closer to "luck". (9) and (10): "Generally speaking, how much do you trust other people?" WTP Power is the (standardized) estimated $\tilde{d}_i$ in stage 2 of the elicitation task. γ is the (standardized) degree of inequality aversion estimated in step 1. *Gender* is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when sex is female according to Prolific data. *Income* is included as an ordered variable representing income categories in steps of 10,000 GBP. *Education* is an ordered variable ranging over 5 categories from "less than high school" to "more than 4-year college degree". *Age* ranges from 18 to 55. Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

3.5 Intrinsic preferences for power, power motives, and desirability of control.

Finally, we explore the extent to which our novel preference measure relates to existing survey based measures related to power motives, in particular the *Power Motives scale* (McClelland, 1991, 1975) and the *Desirability of control scale* (Burger and Cooper, 1979a).[38]

Power motive, also called the need for power, has been suggested as one of the main categories of human motivation (McClelland, 1975). People high on Power Motivation are argued to derive satisfaction from influencing others, controlling situations, and gaining status or prestige, the tendency to be pleased when influencing other individuals, and the recurrent concern to have impact, control, or influence others (Schultheiss and Köllner, 2021). It is argued that this motivation manifests itself in a wide range of behaviors, including leadership preferences, competitive interactions, and the pursuit of roles and responsibilities that confer influence or decision-making authority (Winter, 1973; Schultheiss, 2008). *Desirability of control* is defined as a dispositional tendency for individuals to wish for control over the environments, events and experiences in their lives (Burger and Cooper, 1979a).

While it seems intuitive to expect a relation between our measure of intrinsic preferences for power and these survey based measures, it is important to point out that a positive correlation is not a priori obvious. First, several items in both questionnaires are explicitly designed to capture instrumental motivations underlying a desire for power and control, such as status and prestige in the power motives scale survey or a wish for control over events affecting one's life in the Desirability of Control scale. As instrumental value considerations are explicitly controlled for and ruled out in our behavioral measurement, no statistical association between our measure and these items capturing instrumental components should be expected. Second, for those survey items that *may* capture intrinsic value components of power, the survey method cannot rule out that they also capture instrumental value considerations, which may attenuate a potential statistical relationship.

We again proceed in two steps. First, we conduct a group comparison between the subsamples with a positive WTP and those without, again only exploring the predictive value of the sign of the preference, not accounting for differences in magnitudes and without controlling for any other covariates. Second, we use the individually measured WTP as a continuous variable in regression frameworks, additionally controlling for the set of covariates used in previous sections.

Figure 10 shows that participants with a positive WTP also display significantly stronger power motives (both t-test and MWU tests $p < 0.01$). While individuals with positive WTP also score higher on desirability of control, this difference is not statistically significant (t-test $p = 0.158$ and MWU tests $p = 0.219$).

Turning to regression analyses, panel A in Table 6 displays the main results. Columns (1) and (2) study the relation between the power motives index and our behavioral measure of intrinsic

[38] See Appendix B for the list of all questions that comprise both indexes and how the scales are constructed.

Figure 10: *Intrinsic Preferences for Power, Power Motives, and Desirability of Control.*



Notes: The horizontal axis splits the sample into participants with a positive WTP and those without. The bars report mean scores on the Power Motive scale (left panel) and the Desirability of Control scale (right panel) for each subsample. The Power Motive scale ranges from 0 to 10; the Desirability of Control scale from 0 to 18. Both are recorded in 0.01 increments.

preferences for power. Specifications (3) and (4) focus on the desirability of control index.[39]

Using all observations in our sample in Panel A, it can be seen that, after controlling for country fixed effects as well as socioeconomic covariates and the big 5, the association between our behavioral measure and the power motives index becomes statistically insignificant (but remains positive). Conditioning on full consistency in step 1 does not alter these results.[40]

With respect to desirability of control, the regressions reveal a significant and positive association between our behavioral measure of intrinsic power preferences in both specifications (column (3) and (4) when using the the full sample (panel A). This association is also robust to conditioning the sample on consistency in step 1 of the elicitation task.[41].

Finally, table 6 shows that the distributional preference parameter γ is a strong predictor of both power motives and desirability of control: Individuals who put more weight on equality score lower in power motivation and lower in desirability of control.

[39]Table 6 only shows the regression parameters on regressors of key interest. All regression coefficients are reported in Tables A.10, A.11 and A.12 in Appendix A.

[40]It is noteworthy that all the big 5 personality measures display a very strong statistical association with the power motives scale, as shown in Tables A.10, A.11 and A.12 in Appendix A. *Extraversion, Conscientiousness, Openness and Neuroticism* show a sizeable and positive association with the power motives scale. On the other hand, participants who score more in *Agreeableness* tend to have a lower power motives scale.

[41]The BIG 5 are again significantly correlated with the desirability of control scale (see Tables A.10, A.11 and A.12 in Appendix A)

Overall, the statistical associations between our behavioral measure of intrinsic preferences for power, power motives and desirability of control provide a mixed picture. While the association is directionally as one would expect, statistical support for a strong relationship is not robust to all our model specifications. As argued before, one reason for a weak relationship could be that the power motives and desirability of control indexes mix instrumental and intrinsic motivations.[42]

[42]Tables A.13 and A.14 provide item by item correlation coefficients for both surveys and our measure of intrinsic preferences for power. Because there is no official categorization of these individual items with respect to measured motives, and since it is not obvious how one should categorize individual items as picking up these different motivations, we refrain from providing cherry-picked interpretations and leave it for the reader to explore.

Table 6: Intrinsic Preferences for Power and Psychological Constructs.

		Power Motive		Desirability of Control	
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: All data	WTP Power	0.02	0.01	0.06**	0.05**
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
	γ		-0.08***		-0.03
			(0.02)		(0.03)
	N	1496	1496	1495	1495
Panel B: Fully consistent in step 1	WTP Power	0.05	0.03	0.07**	0.06*
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
	γ		-0.13***		-0.11***
			(0.03)		(0.04)
	N	995	995	994	994
	Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Sociodemographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Big 5	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variables in all models take values between 0 and 1. WTP Power is the (standardized) estimated $\tilde{d}_i$ in stage 2 of the elicitation task. γ is the (standardized) degree of inequality aversion estimated in step 1. *Female* is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when sex is female according to Prolific data. *Income* is included as an ordered variable representing income categories in steps of 10,000 GBP. *Education* is an ordered variable ranging over 5 categories from "less than high school" to "more than 4-year college degree". *Age* ranges from 18 to 55. Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

4 Conclusion

We have proposed a novel elicitation strategy to measure intrinsic preferences for power, where power is defined as influence over the payoffs of others, fully controlling for any instrumental value associated with such a role. Our results demonstrate the existence of intrinsic preferences for power in our sample, but we also find ample heterogeneity: Significant shares of participants display positive, negative and zero intrinsic preferences for power. We exploit this heterogeneity in the data to explore the behavioral signature of individuals with intrinsic power preferences. We find that our behavioral measure is highly correlated with distributional preferences: Stronger intrinsic preferences for power are predictive of a lower weight on equality relative to efficiency. In addition, stronger intrinsic preferences for power predict more positive attitudes towards authoritarian political systems, and more conservative views in social and economic issues.

Our results point to important implications that warrant further investigation: As Russell (1938) has argued, people seek positions of power for both instrumental and intrinsic reasons. On the one hand, establishing the existence of these motives matters for understanding the behavior of those in positions of authority: Acknowledging intrinsic value of power, an individual's optimal plan of action will not be the same as it would be if power were only instrumental in achieving other goals. More importantly, our findings show systematic differences in preferences and attitudes among individuals who are intrinsically motivated by power, suggesting that a distinct type of person may be especially driven to pursue positions of authority. For instance, our data suggests that individuals intrinsically motivated by power are less likely to favor redistributive policies. Future research is warranted to gain a better understanding of the relative influence of instrumental objectives, such as concrete policy preferences, and intrinsic motives on motivation to obtain positions of power.

At the same time, our study has important limitations. First, in light of the narrow definition of power in our framework, we believe that the behaviorally revealed preference is likely to be a lower-bound measure of intrinsic preferences for power. If such preferences exist even in this restricted setting, it is reasonable to expect that they would also manifest, and probably have higher utility relevance, under broader conceptualizations of power. Second, the intrinsic and instrumental value of power is unlikely to be entirely independent. If, for instance, instrumental value is positively correlated with intrinsic value, our estimates again represent a lower bound, given that we consider choice situations in which instrumental power is fully removed. Uncovering ways to identify such potential interactions and in turn the relative relevance of intrinsic and instrumental power motives is an existing avenue for future research.

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Online Appendix

Appendix A: Additional Figures and regression tables.

Table A.1: Intrinsic Preferences for Power, Attitudes towards Authoritarian Political Systems and Social Dominance — All data

	Strong Leader		Army		Democracy		Experts		Social Dominance	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
WTP Power	0.07**	0.06*	0.06**	0.06*	-0.07**	-0.06**	0.00	0.00	0.05**	0.04*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
γ		-0.11***		-0.11***		0.04		-0.02		-0.15***
		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Gender	0.04	0.01	-0.10*	-0.13**	-0.09*	-0.08	0.05	0.04	0.24***	0.20***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age	-0.01	-0.01*	-0.01	-0.01*	0.01***	0.01***	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.01	-0.01	0.03***	0.03***	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	-0.07***	-0.07***	-0.08***	-0.08***	0.05*	0.05*	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Extraversion	0.18***	0.17***	0.11***	0.10***	-0.04	-0.04	0.04	0.04	0.10***	0.09***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Agreeableness	0.01	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.13***	0.13***	0.07**	0.07**	-0.18***	-0.17***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Conscientiousness	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.01	-0.05	-0.04	0.03	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Neuroticism	0.02	0.02	0.06**	0.05*	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.12***	0.11***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Openness	-0.06**	-0.05*	-0.06**	-0.06**	0.09***	0.09***	0.07**	0.07**	-0.11***	-0.10***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	0.77***	0.82***	0.56***	0.62***	-0.50***	-0.52***	0.30	0.32	-0.24	-0.16
	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.16)	(0.16)
N	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sociodemographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Big 5	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variables in all models take values between 0 and 1. WTP Power is the (standardized) estimated $\tilde{d}_i$ in stage 2 of the elicitation task. γ is the (standardized) degree of inequality aversion estimated in step 1. *Female* is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when sex is female according to Prolific data. *Income* is included as an ordered variable representing income categories in steps of 10,000 GBP. *Education* is an ordered variable ranging over 5 categories from "less than high school" to "more than 4-year college degree". *Age* ranges from 18 to 55. The BIG 5 variables take values between 0 and 1 with a grid of 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table A.2: Intrinsic Preferences for Power, Attitudes towards Authoritarian Political Systems and Social Dominance — Fully consistent in stage 1

	Strong Leader		Army		Democracy		Experts		Social Dominance	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
WTP Power	0.12***	0.11***	0.09**	0.07*	-0.09***	-0.09**	0.02	0.02	0.09***	0.06**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
γ		-0.14***		-0.16***		0.06	0.00	0.00		-0.21***
		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)
Gender	0.03	0.00	-0.07	-0.10	-0.12*	-0.11*	0.04	0.04	0.26***	0.22***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Age	-0.01***	-0.01**	-0.01***	-0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.00	0.00	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income	-0.03**	-0.03***	0.00	0.00	0.03***	0.03***	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	-0.10***	-0.10***	-0.10***	-0.10***	0.09***	0.09***	-0.01	-0.01	-0.06**	-0.07**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Extraversion	0.17***	0.17***	0.08***	0.08***	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	0.09***	0.08***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Agreeableness	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.13***	0.13***	0.10***	0.10***	-0.19***	-0.17***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Conscientiousness	0.05	0.06*	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.01	-0.07*	-0.07*	0.04	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Neuroticism	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.14***	0.12***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Openness	-0.08**	-0.07**	-0.10***	-0.09***	0.08**	0.07**	0.06	0.06	-0.12***	-0.10***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	1.01***	1.07***	0.81***	0.88***	-0.64***	-0.67***	0.23	0.23	0.09	0.18
	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.19)
N	995	995	995	995	995	995	995	995	995	995
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sociodemographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Big 5	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variables in all models take values between 0 and 1. WTP Power is the (standardized) estimated $\tilde{d}_i$ in stage 2 of the elicitation task. γ is the (standardized) degree of inequality aversion estimated in step 1. *Female* is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when sex is female according to Prolific data. *Income* is included as an ordered variable representing income categories in steps of 10,000 GBP. *Education* is an ordered variable ranging over 5 categories from "less than high school" to "more than 4-year college degree". *Age* ranges from 18 to 55. The BIG 5 variables take values between 0 and 1 with a grid of 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table A.3: Intrinsic Preferences for Power, Attitudes towards Authoritarian Political Systems and Social Dominance — Fully consistent in stages 1 & 2

	Strong Leader		Army		Democracy		Experts		Social Dominance	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
WTP Power	0.12**	0.11**	0.08	0.08	-0.11**	-0.11**	0.04	0.04	0.07	0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
γ		-0.16***		-0.08*		0.04	-0.01	-0.01		-0.17***
		(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.05)
Gender	0.05	0.01	-0.02	-0.05	-0.08	-0.06	0.00	0.00	0.26***	0.22***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Age	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income	-0.02*	-0.02**	0.00	0.00	0.03**	0.03***	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	-0.10***	-0.10***	-0.09**	-0.09**	0.10***	0.10***	0.01	0.01	-0.09**	-0.09**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Extraversion	0.11***	0.10***	0.07**	0.07**	0.04	0.04	-0.03	-0.03	0.07**	0.07*
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Agreeableness	0.03	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.15***	0.14***	0.08*	0.08*	-0.21***	-0.20***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Conscientiousness	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.04	-0.02	-0.02	-0.08*	-0.08*	0.04	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Neuroticism	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.02	-0.04	-0.04	0.06	0.06	0.13***	0.12***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Openness	-0.09**	-0.08**	-0.08**	-0.08**	0.07*	0.07*	0.08*	0.08*	-0.09**	-0.08*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	1.00***	1.08***	0.61***	0.65***	-0.80***	-0.83***	0.27	0.27	0.16	0.24
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.24)	(0.23)
N	731	731	731	731	731	731	731	731	731	731
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sociodemographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Big 5	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variables in all models take values between 0 and 1. WTP Power is the (standardized) estimated $\tilde{d}_i$ in stage 2 of the elicitation task. γ is the (standardized) degree of inequality aversion estimated in step 1. *Female* is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when sex is female according to Prolific data. *Income* is included as an ordered variable representing income categories in steps of 10,000 GBP. *Education* is an ordered variable ranging over 5 categories from "less than high school" to "more than 4-year college degree". *Age* ranges from 18 to 55. The BIG 5 variables take values between 0 and 1 with a grid of 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table A.4: Intrinsic Preferences for Power and Political Views I — All data

	Liberal Social Issues		Liberal Economic Issues		Interest in Politics	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
WTP Power	-0.07***	-0.07***	-0.08***	-0.08***	-0.06**	-0.06**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
γ		0.02		0.02		0.01
		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Gender	-0.32***	-0.31***	-0.14***	-0.14**	0.15***	0.15***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01***	0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income	0.02*	0.02*	-0.01	-0.01	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	0.05**	0.05**	0.05*	0.05*	0.08***	0.08***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Extraversion	-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.10***	-0.10***	0.03	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Agreeableness	0.06**	0.06**	0.09***	0.09***	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Conscientiousness	-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.06**	-0.06**	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Neuroticism	-0.13***	-0.13***	-0.14***	-0.14***	0.06*	0.06*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Openness	0.16***	0.16***	0.14***	0.14***	0.08***	0.08***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	0.32*	0.31*	0.01	0.00	-1.19***	-1.19***
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
N	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sociodemographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Big Five	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variables in all models take values between 0 and 1. WTP Power is the (standardized) estimated $\tilde{d}_i$ in stage 2 of the elicitation task. γ is the (standardized) degree of inequality aversion estimated in step 1. *Female* is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when sex is female according to Prolific data. *Income* is included as an ordered variable representing income categories in steps of 10,000 GBP. *Education* is an ordered variable ranging over 5 categories from "less than high school" to "more than 4-year college degree". *Age* ranges from 18 to 55. The BIG 5 variables take values between 0 and 1 with a grid of 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table A.5: Intrinsic Preferences for Power and Political Views I — Fully consistent in stage 1

	Liberal Social Issues		Liberal Economic Issues		Interest in Politics	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
WTP Power	-0.08**	-0.07**	-0.08**	-0.07**	-0.04	-0.05
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
γ		0.08**		0.07*		-0.01
		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)
Gender	-0.31***	-0.29***	-0.13**	-0.12*	0.10	0.10
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Age	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02***	0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income	0.02**	0.02**	-0.02	-0.02	0.02**	0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	0.07**	0.07**	0.07**	0.07**	0.10***	0.10***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Extraversion	-0.10***	-0.10***	-0.13***	-0.13***	0.03	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Agreeableness	0.05*	0.05	0.11***	0.11***	-0.06	-0.06
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Conscientiousness	-0.13***	-0.13***	-0.08**	-0.08**	0.01	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Neuroticism	-0.12***	-0.11***	-0.13***	-0.12***	0.07*	0.07*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Openness	0.18***	0.18***	0.15***	0.14***	0.12***	0.12***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	0.05	0.02	-0.08	-0.11	-1.34***	-1.33***
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)
N	995	995	995	995	995	995
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sociodemographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Big Five	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variables in all models take values between 0 and 1. WTP Power is the (standardized) estimated $\tilde{d}_i$ in stage 2 of the elicitation task. γ is the (standardized) degree of inequality aversion estimated in step 1. *Female* is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when sex is female according to Prolific data. *Income* is included as an ordered variable representing income categories in steps of 10,000 GBP. *Education* is an ordered variable ranging over 5 categories from "less than high school" to "more than 4-year college degree". *Age* ranges from 18 to 55. The BIG 5 variables take values between 0 and 1 with a grid of 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table A.6: Intrinsic Preferences for Power and Political Views I — Fully consistent in stages 1 & 2

	Liberal Social Issues		Liberal Economic Issues		Interest in Politics	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
WTP Power	-0.06	-0.05	-0.10**	-0.10*	-0.10**	-0.10**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
γ		0.08*		0.06		-0.01
		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)
Gender	-0.34***	-0.32***	-0.17**	-0.15*	0.11	0.11
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Age	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02***	0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income	0.01	0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.02*	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	0.09**	0.09**	0.08**	0.08**	0.09**	0.09**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Extraversion	-0.09**	-0.09**	-0.16***	-0.16***	0.07*	0.07*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Agreeableness	0.04	0.04	0.11***	0.11***	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Conscientiousness	-0.11***	-0.11***	-0.05	-0.06	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Neuroticism	-0.07*	-0.06	-0.11**	-0.10**	0.08*	0.08
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Openness	0.14***	0.13***	0.12***	0.11***	0.12***	0.12***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	0.09	0.05	-0.01	-0.04	-1.21***	-1.20***
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.25)
N	731	731	731	731	731	731
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sociodemographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Big Five	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variables in all models take values between 0 and 1. WTP Power is the (standardized) estimated $\tilde{d}_i$ in stage 2 of the elicitation task. γ is the (standardized) degree of inequality aversion estimated in step 1. *Female* is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when sex is female according to Prolific data. *Income* is included as an ordered variable representing income categories in steps of 10,000 GBP. *Education* is an ordered variable ranging over 5 categories from "less than high school" to "more than 4-year college degree". *Age* ranges from 18 to 55. The BIG 5 variables take values between 0 and 1 with a grid of 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table A.7: Intrinsic Preferences for Power and Political Views II — All data

	Need for (In)Equality		Public vs Private Ownership		Zero Sum to Get Rich		Effort vs. Luck		Trust	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
WTP Power	0.08***	0.08***	-0.06**	-0.05*	-0.01	-0.01	0.07**	0.06**	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
γ		-0.09***		0.05*		-0.02		-0.06**		0.02
		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Gender	0.15***	0.13**	0.00	0.02	-0.08	-0.08	0.03	0.02	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age	-0.01***	-0.01***	0.00	0.00	0.01***	0.01***	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income	0.03***	0.02***	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02**	0.02**	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	-0.01	-0.01	0.10***	0.10***	-0.01	-0.01	-0.06**	-0.06**	0.06**	0.06**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Extraversion	0.10***	0.10***	-0.09***	-0.09***	0.07**	0.07**	0.18***	0.18***	0.18***	0.18***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Agreeableness	-0.08***	-0.07***	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.25***	0.25***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Conscientiousness	0.10***	0.10***	-0.09***	-0.09***	0.07**	0.07**	0.07**	0.07**	-0.11***	-0.11***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Neuroticism	0.08***	0.08**	-0.07**	-0.06**	0.08**	0.08**	0.14***	0.14***	0.12***	0.12***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Openness	-0.09***	-0.09***	0.02	0.02	0.08***	0.08***	-0.04	-0.04	0.03	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	0.13	0.14	-0.19	-0.23	0.25	0.25	-0.14	-0.11	-0.20	-0.21
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.16)
N	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sociodemographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Big Five	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variables in all models take values between 0 and 1. WTP Power is the (standardized) estimated $\tilde{d}_i$ in stage 2 of the elicitation task. γ is the (standardized) degree of inequality aversion estimated in step 1. *Female* is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when sex is female according to Prolific data. *Income* is included as an ordered variable representing income categories in steps of 10,000 GBP. *Education* is an ordered variable ranging over 5 categories from "less than high school" to "more than 4-year college degree". *Age* ranges from 18 to 55. The BIG 5 variables take values between 0 and 1 with a grid of 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Table A.8: Intrinsic Preferences for Power and Political Views II — Fully consistent in stage 1

	Need for (In)Equality		Public vs Private Ownership		Zero Sum to Get Rich		Effort vs. Luck		Trust	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
WTP Power	0.10***	0.09**	-0.04	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	0.08**	0.07*	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
γ		-0.12***		0.09**		-0.03		-0.13***		0.03
		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)
Gender	0.16**	0.13**	0.00	0.01	-0.11*	-0.12*	0.04	0.02	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Age	-0.01***	-0.01***	0.00	0.00	0.01***	0.01***	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income	0.03***	0.03***	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.02**	0.02*	0.02*	0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	-0.02	-0.02	0.11***	0.11***	0.00	0.00	-0.04	-0.05	0.08***	0.08***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Extraversion	0.11***	0.10***	-0.09***	-0.09***	0.07**	0.07**	0.16***	0.16***	0.18***	0.18***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Agreeableness	-0.07**	-0.07*	-0.02	-0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.22***	0.22***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Conscientiousness	0.12***	0.13***	-0.09***	-0.10***	0.08**	0.08**	0.11***	0.12***	-0.11***	-0.12***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Neuroticism	0.05	0.04	-0.06	-0.05	0.09**	0.09**	0.12***	0.11***	0.11***	0.11***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Openness	-0.11***	-0.11***	0.03	0.02	0.05	0.05	-0.06*	-0.05	0.04	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	0.06	0.11	-0.68***	-0.72***	0.05	0.06	-0.18	-0.12	-0.42**	-0.44**
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.20)
N	995	995	995	995	995	995	995	995	995	995
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sociodemographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Big Five	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: See Table A.7.

Table A.9: Intrinsic Preferences for Power and Political Views II — Fully consistent in stages 1 & 2

	Need for (In)Equality		Public vs Private Ownership		Zero Sum to Get Rich		Effort vs. Luck		Trust	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
WTP Power	0.14***	0.13**	-0.04	-0.03	0.00	0.00	0.20***	0.19***	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
γ		-0.16***		0.09*		-0.06		-0.14***		0.05
		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.04)
Gender	0.12*	0.08	-0.10	-0.07	-0.12	-0.13*	-0.06	-0.09	-0.05	-0.04
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Age	-0.01***	-0.01***	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income	0.04***	0.04***	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.03***	0.03**	0.02	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	-0.06*	-0.06*	0.09**	0.09**	-0.02	-0.02	-0.09**	-0.09**	0.10***	0.10***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Extraversion	0.11***	0.11***	-0.07*	-0.06*	0.06	0.06	0.17***	0.17***	0.19***	0.20***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Agreeableness	-0.11***	-0.10**	0.00	-0.01	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.23***	0.23***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Conscientiousness	0.12***	0.12***	-0.10**	-0.10**	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06	-0.14***	-0.14***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Neuroticism	0.04	0.02	-0.07	-0.06	0.09**	0.08*	0.17***	0.16***	0.07*	0.08*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Openness	-0.11***	-0.10***	0.01	0.00	0.04	0.05	-0.04	-0.03	0.02	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	0.21	0.29	-0.58**	-0.63**	0.15	0.18	0.09	0.16	-0.42*	-0.44*
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.24)	(0.24)
N	731	731	731	731	731	731	731	731	731	731
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sociodemographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Big Five	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: See Table A.7.

Table A.10: Power Motive and Desirability of Control — All

	Power Motive		Desirability of Control	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
WTP Power	0.02	0.01	0.06**	0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
γ		-0.08***		-0.03
		(0.02)		(0.03)
Gender	0.03	0.01	0.06	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age	-0.01***	-0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income	0.04***	0.04***	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Extraversion	0.39***	0.39***	0.21***	0.21***
	(0.02)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Agreeableness	-0.07***	-0.07***	-0.17***	-0.17***
	(0.02)	(0.11)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Conscientiousness	0.13***	0.13***	0.18***	0.18***
	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Neuroticism	0.11***	0.11***	0.15***	0.15***
	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Openness	0.11***	0.11***	0.22***	0.22***
	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Constant	0.42***	0.46***	-0.22	-0.20
	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.15)
N	1496	1496	1495	1495
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sociodemographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Big 5	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variables in all models take values between 0 and 1. WTP Power is the (standardized) estimated $\tilde{d}_i$ in stage 2 of the elicitation task. γ is the (standardized) degree of inequality aversion estimated in step 1. *Female* is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when sex is female according to Prolific data. *Income* is included as an ordered variable representing income categories in steps of 10,000 GBP. *Education* is an ordered variable ranging over 5 categories from "less than high school" to "more than 4-year college degree". *Age* ranges from 18 to 55. Standard errors in parentheses.$^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table A.11: Power Motive and Desirability of Control — Fully consistent in stage 1

	Power Motive		Desirability of Control	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
WTP Power	0.05	0.03	0.10***	0.06*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
γ		-0.13***		-0.11***
		(0.03)		(0.04)
Gender	0.01	-0.02	0.13**	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Age	-0.02***	-0.02***	0.02***	0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***	0.02*
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Extraversion	0.38***	0.38***	0.22***	0.21***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Agreeableness	-0.10***	-0.09***	-0.18***	-0.18***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Conscientiousness	0.13***	0.14***	0.17***	0.18***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Neuroticism	0.10***	0.09***	0.18***	0.17***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Openness	0.13***	0.14***	0.23***	0.24***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	0.59***	0.65**	-0.25	-0.20
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.19)
N	995	995	994	994
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sociodemographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Big 5	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variables in all models take values between 0 and 1. WTP Power is the (standardized) estimated $\tilde{d}_i$ in stage 2 of the elicitation task. γ is the (standardized) degree of inequality aversion estimated in step 1. *Female* is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when sex is female according to Prolific data. *Income* is included as an ordered variable representing income categories in steps of 10,000 GBP. *Education* is an ordered variable ranging over 5 categories from "less than high school" to "more than 4-year college degree". *Age* ranges from 18 to 55. Standard errors in parentheses.$^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table A.12: Power Motive and Desirability of Control— Fully consistent in stages 1 & 2

	Power Motive		Desirability of Control	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
WTP Power	0.06	0.05	0.07	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
γ		-0.12***		-0.16***
		(0.04)		(0.04)
Gender	0.03	0.00	0.16**	0.01
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Age	-0.02***	-0.02***	0.02***	0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***	0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	0.02	0.02	0.01	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Extraversion	0.39***	0.39***	0.24***	0.24***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Agreeableness	-0.07**	-0.06**	0.16***	-0.15***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Conscientiousness	0.11***	0.11***	0.17***	0.18***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Neuroticism	0.10**	0.09**	0.20***	0.18***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Openness	0.16***	0.17***	0.24***	0.25***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	0.46**	0.52**	-0.28	-0.20
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.27)
N	731	731	730	730
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sociodemographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Big 5	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variables in all models take values between 0 and 1. WTP Power is the (standardized) estimated $\tilde{d}_i$ in stage 2 of the elicitation task. γ is the (standardized) degree of inequality aversion estimated in step 1. *Female* is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when sex is female according to Prolific data. *Income* is included as an ordered variable representing income categories in steps of 10,000 GBP. *Education* is an ordered variable ranging over 5 categories from "less than high school" to "more than 4-year college degree". *Age* ranges from 18 to 55. Standard errors in parentheses.$^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table A.13: Correlation Matrix: WTP for Power and Power Motive items

	WTP Power	PM1	PM2	PM3	PM4	PM5	PM6	PM7	PM8	PM9	PM10
WTP Power	1.00										
PM1	0.04*	1.00									
PM2	0.05**	0.58***	1.00								
PM3	-0.01	0.10***	0.12***	1.00							
PM4	0.03	0.71***	0.54***	0.13***	1.00						
PM5	0.05**	0.42***	0.53***	0.23***	0.44***	1.00					
PM6	0.04*	0.30***	0.34***	0.27***	0.28***	0.52***	1.00				
PM7	-0.01	0.07***	0.09***	0.08***	0.11***	0.15***	0.12***	1.00			
PM8	0.07***	0.28***	0.45***	0.11***	0.27***	0.30***	0.22***	-0.02	1.00		
PM9	0.02	0.13***	0.14***	0.28***	0.10***	0.33***	0.43***	0.10***	0.14***	1.00	
PM10	0.07***	0.41***	0.37***	0.22***	0.38***	0.56***	0.50***	0.11***	0.29***	0.38***	1.00

Notes: Entries are Pearson correlation coefficients. Values rounded to two decimals. PM1 to PM 10 corresponds, keeping the order, to the items of the pages 3 and of 9 of the questionnaire. Stars denote significance based on reported p-values: $*p < 0.10$, $**p < 0.05$, $***p < 0.01$.

Table A.14: Correlation Matrix: WTP for Power and Desirability of Control.

	WTP for Power	Control1	Control2	Control3	Control4	Control5	Control6	Control7	Control8	Control9	Control10	Control11	Control12	Control13	Control14	Control15	Control16	Control17	Control18
WTP for Power	1.00																		
Control1	0.02	1.00																	
Control2	-0.01	0.02	1.00																
Control3	0.07***	0.30***	0.03	1.00															
Control4	0.07***	0.22***	0.18***	0.28***	1.00														
Control5	0.08***	0.17***	0.20***	0.13***	0.56***	1.00													
Control6	0.03	0.13***	-0.04	0.15***	0.06**	-0.09***	1.00												
Control7	0.10***	0.34***	0.07***	0.26***	0.35***	0.20***	0.24***	1.00											
Control8	0.07***	0.34***	0.07***	0.29***	0.31***	0.21***	0.18***	0.70***	1.00										
Control9	0.03	0.12***	0.14***	0.11***	0.66***	0.45***	0.09***	0.26***	0.23***	1.00									
Control10	0.08***	0.15***	0.13***	0.22***	0.47***	0.42***	0.03	0.26***	0.23***	0.42***	1.00								
Control11	0.07***	0.26***	0.01	0.38***	0.40***	0.23***	0.09***	0.33***	0.33***	0.27***	0.28***	1.00							
Control12	-0.02	0.24***	-0.00	0.07***	0.02	0.04	0.12***	0.21***	0.26***	-0.04	0.04	0.11***	1.00						
Control13	0.05**	0.19***	0.08***	0.06**	0.31***	0.20***	0.12***	0.35***	0.32***	0.22***	0.24***	0.17***	0.26***	1.00					
Control14	0.07***	0.29***	0.12***	0.37***	0.72***	0.49***	0.09***	0.36***	0.34***	0.53***	0.48***	0.48***	0.10***	0.28***	1.00				
Control15	0.04	0.13***	0.00	0.03	0.19***	0.03	0.21***	0.33***	0.32***	0.29***	0.09***	0.14***	0.07***	0.25***	0.17***	1.00			
Control16	0.05*	0.28***	0.08***	0.62***	0.36***	0.21***	0.15***	0.31***	0.30***	0.22***	0.27***	0.45***	0.11***	0.13***	0.48***	0.11***	1.00		
Control17	0.05**	0.11***	0.05*	0.01	0.23***	0.08***	0.16***	0.25***	0.19***	0.28***	0.14***	0.12***	-0.04	0.19***	0.21***	0.39***	0.08***	1.00	
Control18	0.05*	0.05**	0.05*	-0.06**	0.24***	0.08***	0.21***	0.27***	0.23***	0.38***	0.16***	0.08***	0.03	0.41***	0.16***	0.44***	0.02	0.38***	1.00

Notes: Entries are Pearson correlation coefficients. Values rounded to two decimals. PM1 to PM 10 corresponds, keeping the order, to the items of the page 3 of 9 of the questionnaire. Stars denote significance based on reported p-values: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Figure A.1: Authoritarian vs. Democratic Views: Histograms of participants' answers to the questionnaire.



Notes: The horizontal axes represent the respective answers in the questionnaire. Participants had to choose a point on a slider where the left extreme was labeled as *very bad* and the other as *very good*. Each position on the slider was transformed into a variable with centesimal precision that took a value in the interval $[0, 1]$. The vertical axes represent the fraction of participants for each point in the slider.

Figure A.2: Political Views: Histograms of participants' answers to the questionnaire.



Notes: The horizontal axes represent the respective answers in the questionnaire. Participants had to choose a point on a slider where the left extreme was labeled as *extremely conservative* and the other as *extremely liberal/left* for social and economic issues. For interest in politics, left corresponds to *Not at all interested*. Each position on the slider was transformed into a variable with centesimal precision that took a value in the interval $[0, 1]$. The vertical axes represent the fraction of participants for each point in the slider.

Appendix B: Details on the DOSE Method:

DOSE Method for Step 1 of the elicitation procedure:

DOSE adjusts the value of $x_{2,r}^B$ from choice situation to choice situation in such a way that given an individual's decision pattern in choice situations 1 to t, the choice between alternatives A and B in choice situation $t+1$ maximizes the information regarding the individual's degree of

inequality aversion as well as her choice consistency. In particular, we assume that the participant's distribution preferences and choice behavior can be characterized by the following two equations:

$$u_i(x_1, x_2) = x_1 + x_2 - \gamma_i|x_1 - x_2| \tag{5}$$

where x_j represents the points assigned to the passive participant P_j and γ_i represents the degree of inequality aversion of the decision maker with respect to the payoffs of the passive participants P_1 and P_2.

$$\pi_i(A) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-\mu_i(u_i(A)-u_i(B))}} \tag{6}$$

where $\pi_i(A)$ is the probability of choosing option A over B, μ_i specifies the individual's degree of stochastic response in choice of the decision maker i and u_i is as defined in (5).

For estimating $\hat{\gamma}_i$ and $\hat{\mu}_i$, DOSE uses sequential Bayesian updating and combines it with information entropy to increase speed of inference. To initialize DOSE, we first decided on the appropriate discrete parameter space for γ given by $\mathcal{R} \in (\gamma_1, \gamma_2, ..., \gamma_n)$ and μ, given by $\mathcal{M} \in (\mu_1, \mu_2, ..., \mu_m)$ whereby we define $\mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{M} = \mathcal{K}$ models k, one for each possible combination of γ and μ. We then assign to each model k a prior probability $p_k = Pr(\gamma_k, \mu_k) = Pr(\gamma_k)Pr(\mu_k)$.

The parameter space for γ_i is determined by the set of payoff distributions for option $x^B_{2,r}$ and contains 116 values in the interval $[-\frac{1}{3}, \frac{7}{3}]$. The range for μ is sensitive to the chosen payoff values for options A and B. Based on precision in estimating parameters of simulated subjects, we found that $\mathcal{M} \in \{1, 2, ..., 12\}$ provides a sensible parameter space for our setup. Finally, regarding the assumed prior distribution over models, we choose a uniform prior, i.e. $\forall j, i : p_j = p_i$, given that estimates that are made using different priors only slightly differ (Wang et al., 2010; Chapman et al., 2022) and given that data on the distribution of the choice consistency parameter in our setting is non-existent.

Second, we define a fixed option A that consists of an egalitarian distribution of 2000 points for each of the two passive participants, and a set of options $\mathcal{B} = \{B_1, B_2, ..., B_n\}$ with $x^B_{1,r}$ paying a payoff of 3000 points to passive participant 1 and paying a payoff of $x^B_{2,r} \in \{110, 130, ..., 2410\}$ points to passive participant 2.[43] We then define the set of all binary combinations of options A and some option B as $\mathcal{Q} \in \{(A, B_1), (A, B_2), ..., (A, B_n)\}$.

This setup allows updating prior probabilities for every model k with Bayes' rule when asking a participant to make a choice for a choice situation $Q_i \in \mathcal{Q}$ as follows:

$$p(k|a) = p(\gamma_k, \mu_k|a) = \frac{p(a|\gamma_k, \mu_k)p(\gamma_k, \mu_k)}{\sum_j^k p(a|\gamma_j, \mu_j)p(\gamma_j, \mu_j)} \tag{7}$$

where $a \in \{\text{choosing A, choosing B}\}$ denotes the individual's choice.

Iterating this procedure of asking a question and updating beliefs leads to a lower variance in the posterior probability distribution over models, i.e. a more precise estimation of an individual's true parameters. To optimize the sequence of questions with respect to the speed of inference, an information criterion is used: Following Wang et al. (2010) and Chapman et al. (2022), we define a Kullback-Leibler information number for each model k for question $Q_i \in \mathcal{Q}$:

[43] There is a direct mapping from $\tilde{x}^B_2$ to $\tilde{\gamma}$ from equation (1)): $\tilde{\gamma}_i = \frac{\tilde{x}^B_2 - 1000}{3000 - \tilde{x}^B_2}$.

$$I(k;Q_i) = \sum_a log(\frac{l_k(a;Q_i)}{\sum_{j=1}^{k} p_j l_j(a;Q_i)}) p_k l_k(a;Q_i) \tag{8}$$

where $a \in \{\text{choosing A, choosing B}\}$ denotes the binary choice between choosing option A or B and l_k is the associated likelihood of choosing a in Q_i under model k. $I(k;Q_i)$ measures how informative question Q_i is if k is the correct model. By summing up $I(k;Q_i)$ for every model and weighing according to the model's probability p_k, we get the Kullback-Leibler information number for a given question $Q_i \in Q$:

$$KL(Q_i) = \sum_{k}^{n} p_k I(a;Q_i) \tag{9}$$

Asking a participant the question $Q^* = \max_Q KL(Q)$ maximizes information gained from the observed choice. In other words, Q^* is the question that in expectation updates the prior the strongest. Iterating the process of (i) choosing Q^* given the current probability distribution and (ii) updating beliefs delivers the most informative sequence of questions at the participant level. It is important to note that, after every iteration, the current Q^* is excluded from Q for the next round.

Each participant makes a total of 10 choices, where one choice is chosen at random for payment at the end of the experiment. In each round, questions were selected according to the DOSE procedure explained above, except for round 10. In step 2 of our elicitation procedure, we will use the option B_j^* that makes the individual indifferent to option A. DOSE would likely choose a lottery in round 10 that is very close to B_j^*, which we wanted to avoid, and rather create more variety in the options the individual faced in the final choice of part 1.[44]

Because every participant starts with the same prior distribution over models k, the most informative choice situation in the first round is always the same for each participant. Because each choice situation has 2 options (choosing optipn A or option B), there are a total of $2^{10} = 1024$ possible decision paths in our elicitation procedure. We pre-specified and stored the optimal sequence of choice situations for each decision path in our experimental implementation, which made intensive computations during the experiment unnecessary.[45]

To obtain the estimates for $\hat{\gamma}$ and $\hat{\mu}$, we proceed as follows: After each choice, the distribution $f(\gamma, \mu)$ is updated leading to a posterior distribution $f(\gamma, \mu | C_1(t))$, where $C_1(t)$ denotes the sequence of choices in the first t choice situations of step 1 of the elicitation process. To identify an individual i's indifferent option, we consider the posterior probability distribution after the ninth choice, denoted by $f(\gamma, \mu | C_{1i}(9))$. The tenth choice was not included in the calculation of the indifference lottery because it only served the purpose of breaking the monotonicity of the options choice sequence and not of obtaining further information about the distribution preferences. We then first determine the maximum a posterior probability (MAP) estimate for μ, denoted μ_{MAP} given the posterior distribution $f(\gamma, \mu | C_{1i}(9))$, which is equal to the modal value of μ in $f(\gamma, \mu | C_{1i}(9))$.

[44] While we lose some information relative to the application of DOSE in 10 rounds, simulations have shown that the 8 rounds in which DOSE is applied deliver sufficient information on the parameters γ and μ to obtain precise parameter estimates at the individual level, at least for high levels of consistency.

[45] The fact that using an information criterion like Kullback-Leibler needs a lot of computing power to calculate the optimal question for a given round makes the calculation of optimal decision paths in real time a major implementation challenge for experiments.

Then, we calculate $\hat{\gamma}$ as the mean value of γ conditional on μ_{MAP}, that is

$$\hat{\gamma_i} = \sum_{\gamma \in \mathcal{R}} \gamma f(\gamma | C_{1i}(9), \mu_{i,MAP}).$$

Based on $\hat{\gamma}_i$, we then construct an *indifference option* $\hat{B}_i$ that assigns the payoff $\tilde{x}_2^B$ such that individual i is expected to be just indifferent between options A and $\hat{B}_i$ (rounded to the nearest multiple of 20, which was the smallest point unit used in our experiment).[46] In addition, for each individual, we obtain an estimate for $\hat{\mu}$ based on the MAP estimate for μ given $f(\gamma, \mu | C_1(10))$.[47]

DOSE Method for Step 2 of the elicitation procedure:

In step 2, we want to estimate d_i and ρ_i. We assume that an individual's choice behavior is determined by the following choice function:

$$\pi_i(c=1) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-\rho_i(v_i(d_i,p,c=1) - v_i(d_i,p,c=0))}} = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-\rho_i(d_i - p)}} \tag{10}$$

where $\pi_i(c = 1)$ is the probability of choosing to pay p for choosing oneself, and ρ_i specifies participant i's degree of stochastic response in choice.

We initialize DOSE by defining the parameter space for d, given by $\mathcal{D} \in (d_1, d_2, ..., d_n)$ and the parameter space for ρ, given by $\rho \in (\rho_1, \rho_2, ..., \rho_m)$ and assign prior probabilities to all $n \times m = k$ models. Second, we define the parameter space for prices p given by $\mathcal{P} \in (p_1, p_2, ..., p_n)$. The set of choice situations is defined by all combinations of a price p as $Q = \{([p_1, \text{"I choose"}], [0, \text{"I delegate"}]),..., ([p_n, \text{"I choose"}], [0, \text{"I delegate"}])\}$. We again chose a uniform prior distribution over all models. Based on pilot data and simulations, we chose a discrete parameter space of $\mathcal{P} \in \{-500, -490, ..., -10, 10, 20, ..., 500\}$ and $\rho \in \{1, 2, ..., 15\}$.[48] As in step 1, we pre-specified and stored the optimal sequence of choice situations in our experimental implementation, creating 1024 predetermined decision paths.

After individual i has completed her sequence of ten choices in step 2 (denoted $C_2(10)$), we consider the posterior probability distribution $f(d, \gamma | C_{2i}(10))$ to estimate the individual willingness to pay for power.[49] To this end, we determine the MAP estimate of ρ conditional on $C_{2i}(10)$,

[46] We condition on the MAP of μ instead of the mean because convergence to the true μ parameter is relatively slow. Given that we initially assume a uniform distribution over models, the posterior probability distribution over models when using the unconditional expectation still puts considerable probability mass on low levels of μ even if choice patterns are perfectly consistent. But since convergence on the true γ parameter is slower conditional on low levels of μ (because there is a larger probability that any choice is the consequence of an error rather than an expression of the true preference), taking the conditional expectation improves the precision of the chosen indifference option for participants whose true consistency is high (but may worsen it for participants with inconsistent choice patterns). However, the choice between the unconditional expectation of r and the expectation of r conditional on the modal value of μ to determine the indifference lottery is not particularly consequential for the large majority of our participants (except for highly inconsistent ones). The differences in the estimation of $\hat{\gamma}$ are small, unless subjects are highly inconsistent.

[47] Here, we include the tenth choice because it contains substantial information about an individual's choice consistency.

[48] The values of ρ have to be interpreted in connection with $v_i(d_i, p)$, as it simply scales up differences in expected utility, and values cannot be interpreted in isolation. We again chose the range of ρ such that highly inconsistent and highly consistent choice behaviors are covered.

[49] Note that we use the information from all 10 decisions to estimate $\hat{d}$. Contrary to step 1, there was no reason to choose the tenth round at random, since it is the last decision of the experiment.

denoted γ_{MAP}, and then calculate the expected value for d conditional on γ_{MAP}:[50]

$$\hat{d}_i = \sum_{d_i \in \mathcal{D}} d f_i(d|\gamma_{i,MAP}, C_{2i}(10)). \tag{11}$$

[50] We condition on the MAP of γ for the same reasons as before.

Appendix C (ADDITIONAL MATERIAL): Screenshots of the instructions, control questions, decision pages and the questionnaire.

Main Decision Makers

Participation and privacy policy

Consent form

Welcome to the study! Thank you very much for your participation. This study belongs to a project conducted by Prof. Dr. Holger Herz from the University of Fribourg in Switzerland and it is funded by the European Research Council. The study has been approved by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences at the University of Fribourg.

Study
This study takes about 30 minutes. It consists of making economic choices and of answering a set of questions on your general attitudes. There will be control questions to check your understanding of the study as well as attention checks. Repeated failure can lead to exclusion from the study and payment.

Confidentiality
Data obtained will be used for research purposes only. Your prolific-ID number will be deleted immediately upon completion of the study. The researchers will at no point receive any personally identifying information about you. The data is therefore anonymous and cannot be linked to personal data. The anonymous data will later be stored in open access repositories.

Benefits
For your participation in the study, you will receive a base payment of 2 £, plus 1.5 £ for filling out a survey at the end, plus an additional amount based on your decisions.

Costs
Your participation will take approximately 30 minutes. We do not consider there to be any other foreseeable risks, discomforts, inconveniences and harms associated with participation.

Voluntary participation
Participation in this study is voluntary, and you can choose to withdraw your participation without stating any reason at any time. If you decide to withdraw, your data will be deleted. Please note that it is impossible to delete your data once the study is finished, because then the data is anonymized and can no longer be linked to you.

Questions and Comments
Should you have questions regarding this study, please contact FriLab at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland: frilab@unifr.ch.

☐ I confirm that I have received the information about the project, that I am willing to participate and that I am at least 18 years old.

Download Consent Form

Confirm

Prolific ID

Please enter your prolific ID:

Note that your prolific ID needs to be correct, otherwise we can not link your payment to your account.

Continue

Thank you for your participation!

- The study consists of **2 parts** and a **questionnaire**.
- At the beginning of each part, the instructions for that part will be shown on your screen.
- **The total payoffs** earned in the experiment will be calculated in **points**.
- They will be converted into £ at the end of the study. The exchange rate is:

1200 points = 1 £

- You will receive a base payment of 2 £ for your participation.
- You will receive 1.5 £ for filling up the questionnaire.
- You will receive extra points in part 1 and part 2.

Total earnings = 2 £ + payoff part 1 + payoff part 2 + 1.5 £

Continue

Roles of participants in Part 1

In part 1, there are two different types of participants, **Type 1** and **Type 2**.

Each **Type 1** participant is matched with **TWO Type 2** participants.

The **type 1** participant **makes decisions** on how to **allocate payments** between the two **type 2** participants.

The **type 2** participants do not make any choices, but only receive the allocated payments.

The **type 1** participant receives a fixed payment for **part 1.**

Types do not change throughout the experiment.

You are a Type 1 participant.

Continue

Part 1

Your earnings in this part are 2000 points, **independently of your choices.**

Continue

The choice situation in part 1

- In this part, you will face a total of **10 decision rounds.**
- You will be asked to choose among different **distributions of points** between the **type 2 participants:**
  For simplicity, we will from now on label them **Participant 1** and **Participant 2**.
- You will have to choose between two options in every round: **Option A** or **Option B.**
- Your task is to choose the option you prefer.
- **Option A** is **the same** in all rounds. **Option B varies** between rounds.

Option A

Participant 1 gets 2000 points

Participant 2 gets 2000 points

Option B

Participant 1 gets 3000 points

Participant 2 gets ? points

REMARKS

- **Participant 1** and **Participant 2** always get 2.000 points in **Option A.**
- **Participant 1** always gets 3.000 in **Option B**. The amount that **Participant 2** gets in **Option B** varies from round to round.

Control Questions

The following questions ensure that you have understood the instructions. Once you have answered all questions correctly, you will be directed to the next screen.

Note: You have **three** tries to answer the questions correctly. After the third wrong answer you will not be able to finish the study and you will not receive any payment.

Which of the following is correct?	Wrong	Correct
If you choose Option A...		
*Either **Participant 1** or **Participant 2** will get 2000 points.*	○	○
*Both **Participant 1** and **Participant 2** will get 2000 points.*	○	○
If you choose Option B...		
***Participant 1** always gets 3.000 points.*	○	○
***Participant 2** gets the same points in every round.*	○	○

Confirm my answers

How the payoffs for **Participant 1** and **Participant 2** are chosen.

- You have answered the questions correctly.
- In this part of the study, for one out of ten **type 1** participants, we will effectively recruit **type 2** participants.
- Then, **one of the 10 rounds will be randomly selected for payment.**
- The option you have chosen in the selected round determines the points for **Participant 1** and **Participant 2**.
- Every decision you make may thus **affect** the actual payments to **other study participants.**
- Please click *Continue* to proceed to the choice situations.

☐ I understood the instructions

Continue

Option choice 1

In choice **round 1**:

Participant 2 gets 1070 points in **Option B**

Participant 1 always gets 3000 points in **Option B**.
Participant 1 and **Participant 2** always get 2000 points in **Option A**

Continue to choice

Option choice 1

Please choose between Option A or Option B.

Option A



Participant 1 **gets 2000 points**

Participant 2 **gets 2000 points**

Option A

Option B



Participant 1 **gets 3000 points**

Participant 2 **gets 1070 points**

Option B

End of part 1

You have completed part 1. The potentially payoff relevant choice situation will be selected at the end of the study. You will then be informed about the selected situation. Please click **Continue** to proceed to part 2.

Continue

Roles of participants in part 2

In part 2, there is an additional type of participant: **Type 3.**

Type 3 participants also make decisions that **affect the earnings** of Type 2 participants.

Therefore, there are four different participants and **three different roles:** There is one **type 1** participant, two **type 2** participants and one **type 3** participant.

Types do not change throughout the experiment.

You are still a type 1 participant.

Continue

Part 2

In every round, you receive **2000 points.** Your final payoff may **increase** or **decrease** depending on your decisions.

Continue

General Instructions

On the next screen you will see again **two options** regarding **points distributions** between **two other type 2 participants**: For simplicity, we will from now on label them **Participant 3** and **Participant 4**.

You can decide if you want to be able to **choose yourself** which one of these two options determines their payoff or if **another participant of this study (the type 3 participant)** will make this choice on your behalf.

If you decide to choose yourself, you choose the option that will determine the payoffs for **Participant 3** and **Participant 4**.

If you decide to delegate, **the type 3 participant** chooses which option will determine the payoffs for **Participant 3** and **Participant 4**. The type 3 participant earns a fixed base payment that is independent of whether or not you delegate and independent of the choices he or she makes on your behalf.

Continue

The Options

- Below, you see **Option A** and **Option B** for part 2 of the study.
- **Option A** and **Option B** remain **the same** throughout part 2 of the study.
- You will make 10 choices. The choice is whether you want to choose between these options **yourself** or whether **you let the type 3 participant make this choice for you.**

Option A

Participant 3 gets 2000 points

Participant 4 gets 2000 points

Option B



Participant 3 gets 3000 points

Participant 4 gets 580 points

Continue

How the payoffs are chosen.

- At the end of the study, for each **type 1** participant, **one of the 10 rounds** will be randomly selected to determine:
  - Your payment from part 2.
  - The payments for **Participant 3** and **Participant 4**.
- That means that, two **type 2** participants, **Participant 3** and **Participant 4**, will definitely be recruited and matched with you, and their payments will depend on your choices and potentially the choice of the **type 3** participant in the chosen round.

Continue

The Decision Situation

- You will face **10 decision rounds**, where you decide to **choose yourself** or to **delegate**.
- The decision whether you choose yourself or delegate and let **participant type 3** choose has additional payoff consequences:
  - **If you choose yourself**, you may either have to pay a **price** or you may receive a **bonus payment.**
  - **If you delegate**, there is no price or bonus.
- In the 10 rounds, **Options A** and **Option B** remain the same, while the **price** or **bonus** change between rounds.
- The following picture illustrates the payoff consequences of your choice in a given decision situation:



You choose an option yourself

Your Payoff:

Your endowment of 2000 points

+ **bonus** if there is a bonus in this situation
or
- **price** if there is a price in this situation

Participant Type 3 chooses an option for you

Your Payoff:

Your endowment of 2000 points

☐ I understood the instructions

Continue to control questions

Control Questions

The following questions ensure that you have understood the instructions. Once you have answered the questions correctly, you will be directed to the next screen.
Note: You have **three** tries to answer the questions correctly. After the third wrong answer you will not be able to finish the study and you will not receive any payment.

Is it correct that...?	Wrong	Correct
*A **Participant 3** and **Participant 4** will be recruited for sure and receive payment according to the choices in the selected round.*	○	○

Is it correct that...?	Wrong	Correct
The price for choosing an option is the same in all situations.	○	○
There can be either a price or a bonus payment associated with choosing an option yourself.	○	○

Please choose the correct answer:

Consider a situation in which there is a bonus of 100 points when you choose yourself. If you choose to let the participant type 3 to choose an option, then your payoff will be...

- ○ *Your initial endowment: 2000 points.*
- ○ *Your initial endowment plus the bonus: 2100 points.*

Consider a situation in which you have to pay a price of 200 if you choose yourself. If you decide to choose an option yourself, then your payoff will be ...

- ○ *Your initial endowment: 2000 points.*
- ○ *Your initial endowment minus the price: 1800 points.*

Confirm my answers

How the payoffs are chosen.

- You have answered the questions correctly.
- As mentioned before, at the end of the study, one choice situation will be randomly selected.
- If you decided to **choose yourself** in this situation, you will be asked to select **Option A** or **Option B** at the end of part 2.
    - The chosen Option will determine your payment from part 2 and the payments for **Participant 3** and **Participant 4**.
- If you decided **to delegate** in this situation, **the type 3 participant** will be asked to select Option A or Option B.
    - The chosen Option will determine the payments for **Participant 3** and **Participant 4**.
- Remember: The **type 3** participant earns a **fixed base payment** that is independent of whether or not you delegate, independent of the selected round, and independent of the choices he or she makes on your behalf.
- You will be informed about his/her choice at the end of the study.

☐ I understood the instructions

Continue

Choice situation 1 of 10

In choice situation 1, you **pay a price of 10 points**, if you choose an option yourself.

Continue to choice

Choice situation 1 of 10



As a reminder, the choice is between these two options:



You have made all your choices for part 2. Please click *Continue* to see which choice situation is selected to determine payoffs from part 2.

Continue

Option Choice

The computer chose **choice situation 2**.

In this situation, you decided to choose an option **yourself** and to **receive a bonus of 240 points**.

Please choose one of the options:

Option A

Participant 3 gets 2000 points

Participant 4 gets 2000 points

Option A

Option B

Participant 3 gets 3000 points

Participant 4 gets 580 points

Option B

Round Chosen by the computer

Choice situation 9 has been selected by the computer.

In this situation, you decided that **the participant type 3 chooses an option in your behalf.**

The choice will now be prompted to the other participant and you will be informed about the outcome after answering a questionnaire.

You have now completed part 2. Please click *Continue* to be directed to the payoff screen, where you will see a summary of the earnings.

Continue

End of part 2

Below, you find an overview of the **final earnings** in part 1 and 2.

PART 1:
Your earnings in this part are **2000 points.**
As explained, your choices in part 1 will be matched to a **Participant 1** and a **Participant 2** with 10% probability.
In this case, the following payments will be selected:

* **Round 3**
* You chose **Option A** in that round.
* In this round and under your option chosen, the earnings of **Participant 1** are 2000 points.
* In this round and under your option chosen, the earnings of **Participant 2** are 2000 points.

PART 2
Your earnings in this part are **2050 points.**
A explained, in part 2 one of the rounds is randomly selected and implemented with **certainty.**
Round 5 was chosen by the computer.
In this round, you decided to choose an option **yourself** and to **receive a bonus of 50 points**.
You decided that the earnings of **Participant 3** are 3000 points.
You decided that the earnings of **Participant 4** are 860 points.

PART 3: Questionnaire
Your earnings in this part are 1.5 £

The show-up fee is 2£.

Remember that 1200 points equal 1 £.

Thus, your total earnings for this study are: £6.87

Finish the study

Part 3:

Questionnaire

You will be paid an additional 1.5 £ for filling out the questionnaire.
It will take you about 5-10 minutes.

Continue

Questionnaire Page 1 of 9

Before you exit the study, we would like to ask you for some general questions.

Your answers to these questions are important to our research, please make sure to answer them carefully and honestly.

Thank you very much!

1. How old are you? --------

2. Which is your gender?
   - ○ Female
   - ○ Male
   - ○ Other
   - ○ Prefer not to say

3. What is your employment status? --------

4. The next question is about the total income of you and your family members living in your household in 2022. This figure should include income from all sources including salaries, wages, pensions, social security, dividends, interest and any other income. Please select the category that represents your household income. --------

5. Please indicate your marital status.
   - ○ Divorced
   - ○ Married
   - ○ Single
   - ○ Widowed

6. What is your highest level of education that you have achieved? --------

7. Are you religious?
   - ○ Yes
   - ○ No
   - ○ Prefer not to answer

Continue

Questionnaire 2 of 9



Questionnaire 3 of **9**

Please read each of the following items carefully, thinking about how it relates to your life, and then indicate how true it is for you.

1. **I am quite effective in getting others to agree with me.**

Not at all true — Very true

2. **I feel confident when directing the work of others.**

Not at all true — Very true

3. **Job titles have meaning and significance.**

Not at all true — Very true

4. **In an argument, I can usually win others over to my side.**

Not at all true — Very true

5. **I enjoy the opportunity to exercise control over an organization or group.**

Not at all true — Very true

6. **Opportunities to become widely known are important to me.**

Not at all true — Very true

7. **When standing in line, I don't let others get in front of me.**

Not at all true — Very true

8. **Please move the slider to "Very true" in order to show that you are paying attention.**

Not at all true — Very true

9. **I often take new employees under my wing and mentor them.**

Not at all true — Very true

10. **Possessions that are impressive to others are important to me.**

Not at all true — Very true

11. **I enjoy opportunities to influence others.**

Not at all true — Very true

Continue

Questionnaire 4 of 9

Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree that these personality traits apply to you.

1. Extraverted, enthusiastic (NOT reserved or shy)

Disagree strongly — Agree strongly

2. Agreeable, kind (NOT quarrelsome or critical)

Disagree strongly — Agree strongly

3. Dependable, self-disciplined (NOT careless or disorganized)

Disagree strongly — Agree strongly

4. Emotionally stable, calm (NOT anxious or easily upset/stressed)

Disagree strongly — Agree strongly

5. Open to new experiences, creative (NOT conventional)

Disagree strongly — Agree strongly

Continue

Questionnaire 5 of 9

Here are a number of statements that may or may not apply to you. Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree that these statements apply to you.

1. When another person does better than I do, I get tense and aroused.

Disagree strongly — Agree strongly

2. I often do "my own thing."

Disagree strongly — Agree strongly

3. Parents and children must stay together as much as possible.

Disagree strongly — Agree strongly

4. It is my duty to take care of my family, even when I have to sacrifice what I want.

Disagree strongly — Agree strongly

5. The well-being of my coworkers is important to me.

Disagree strongly — Agree strongly

6. Competition is the law of nature.

Disagree strongly — Agree strongly

7. It is important that I do my job better than others.

Disagree strongly — Agree strongly

8. I'd rather depend on myself than others.

Disagree strongly — Agree strongly

Continue

Questionnaire 6 of 9

Here are a number of statements that may or may not apply to you. Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree that these statements apply to you.

1. Family members should stick together, no matter what sacrifices are required.

Disagree strongly — Agree strongly

2. I feel good when I cooperate with others.

Disagree strongly — Agree strongly

3. Winning is everything.

Disagree strongly — Agree strongly

4. I rely on myself most of the time; I rarely rely on others.

Disagree strongly — Agree strongly

5. To me, pleasure is spending time with others.

Disagree strongly — Agree strongly

6. If a coworker gets a prize, I would feel proud.

Disagree strongly — Agree strongly

7. My personal identity, independent of others, is very important to me.

Disagree strongly — Agree strongly

8. It is important to me that I respect the decisions made by my groups.

Disagree strongly — Agree strongly

Continue

Questionnaire 7 of 9

Which of the following objects, events, or statements do you have a positive or negative feeling towards?

1. Our country would be better off if inferior groups stayed in their place.

Disagree strongly — Agree strongly

2. We should try to treat one another as equals as much as possible.

Disagree strongly — Agree strongly

3. It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.

Disagree strongly — Agree strongly

4. There should be much more equal opportunity for everyone from birth, regardless of who their parents are.

Disagree strongly — Agree strongly

5. The best people should not be expected to accept others as "equals."

Disagree strongly — Agree strongly

6. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally.

Disagree strongly — Agree strongly

7. Some people are just much better than everyone else and deserve to have power and control over others.

Disagree strongly — Agree strongly

8. No one group should dominate in society.

Disagree strongly — Agree strongly

Continue

Questionnaire 8 of 9

Please read each of the following items carefully, thinking about how it relates to your life, and then indicate how true it is for you from on a scale from 'Not at all true' to 'Very true'

1. I prefer a job where I have a lot of control over what I do and when I do it.

Not at all true — Very True

2. I enjoy political participation because I want to have as much of a say in running government as possible.

Not at all true — Very True

3. I try to avoid situations where someone else tells me what to do.

Not at all true — Very True

4. I would prefer to be a leader rather than a follower.

Not at all true — Very True

5. I enjoy being able to influence the actions of others.

Not at all true — Very True

6. Others usually know what is best for me.

Not at all true — Very True

7. I enjoy making my own decisions.

Not at all true — Very True

8. I enjoy having control over my own destiny.

Not at all true — Very True

Continue

Questionnaire 9 of 9

Please read each of the following items carefully, thinking about how it relates to your life, and then indicate how true it is for you from on a scale from 'Not at all true' to 'Very true'.

9. I would rather someone else took over the leadership role when I'm involved in a group project.

Not at all true — Very True

10. I consider myself to be generally more capable of handling situations than others are.

Not at all true — Very True

11. I'd rather run my own business and make my own mistakes than listen to someone else's orders.

Not at all true — Very True

12. I like to get a good idea of what a job is all about before I begin.

Not at all true — Very True

13. When I see a problem I prefer to do something about it rather than sit by and let it continue.

Not at all true — Very True

14. When it comes to orders, I would rather give them than receive them.

Not at all true — Very True

15. I wish I could push many of life's daily decisions off on someone else.

Not at all true — Very True

16. I prefer to avoid situations where someone else has to tell me what it is I should be doing.

Not at all true — Very True

17. There are many situations in which I would prefer only one choice rather than having to make a decision.

Not at all true — Very True

18. I like to wait and see if someone else is going to solve a problem so that I don't have to be bothered by it.

Not at all true — Very True

Continue

Type 2 Active Participants

Participation and privacy policy

Consent form

Welcome to the study! Thank you very much for your participation. This study belongs to a project conducted by Prof. Dr. Holger Herz from the University of Fribourg in Switzerland and it is funded by the European Research Council. The study has been approved by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences at the University of Fribourg.

Study
This study takes about 20 minutes. It consists of making economic choices and of answering a set of questions on your general attitudes. There will be control questions to check your understanding of the study as well as attention checks. Repeated failure can lead to exclusion from the study and payment.

Confidentiality
Data obtained will be used for research purposes only. Your prolific-ID number will be deleted immediately upon completion of the study. The researchers will at no point receive any personally identifying information about you. The data is therefore anonymous and cannot be linked to personal data. The anonymous data will later be stored in open access repositories.

Benefits
For your participation in the study, you will receive a base payment of 2 £, plus an additional amount of points that will be converted into £ at the end of the study.

Costs
Your participation will take approximately 20 minutes. We do not consider there to be any other foreseeable risks, discomforts, inconveniences and harms associated with participation.

Voluntary participation
Participation in this study is voluntary, and you can choose to withdraw your participation without stating any reason at any time. If you decide to withdraw, your data will be deleted. Please note that it is impossible to delete your data once the study is finished, because then the data is anonymized and can no longer be linked to you.

Questions and Comments
Should you have questions regarding this study, please contact FriLab at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland: frilab@unifr.ch.

☐ I confirm that I have received the information about the project, that I am willing to participate and that I am at least 18 years old.

Download Consent Form

Confirm

Prolific ID

Please enter your prolific ID:

Note that your prolific ID needs to be correct, otherwise we can not link your payment to your account.

Continue

Thank you for your participation

- The study consists of **1 part.**
- Before the study begins, the instructions will be shown on your screen.
- **The total payoffs** earned in the experiment will be calculated in **points.**
- They will be converted into £ at the end of the study. The exchange rate is:

1200 points = 1 £

- You will receive a **base payment of 2 £** for your participation.

Total earnings = payoff part 1 + 2 £

Continue

Roles of participants in Part 1

Four different individuals participate in this study, with **three different roles:**

There is one **type 1** participant, two **type 2** participants and one **type 3** participant.

The **type 1** participant can either **make a decision** on how to **allocate payments** between the two **type 2** participants, or s/he can **delegate** this decision to the **type 3** participant.

If the decision is delegated, the **type 3** participant makes the decision on how to **allocate payments** between the two **type 2** participants.

The **type 2** participants do not make any choices, but only receive the allocated payments.

The **type 1** and **type 3** participants receive fixed payments for their participation in the study.

Types do not change throughout the experiment.

You are a Type 3 participant.

Continue

General Instructions

- **Type 1** participants can either **decide themselves** how to **distribute points** between two other participants (**type 2** participants), or they can **delegate** this decision to you.
- In the following, you have to take decisions for **40 possible different scenarios** in which a **type 1** participant **delegates** this decision to you.
- Your earnings in this part are 2000 points, **independently of your choices.**
- Your choices will **influence** how much **type 2** participants **get paid**, so please make sure to read the instructions carefully!

Continue

The choice situation

- You will be asked to choose among different **distributions of points** between the **two other type 2 participants** in the experiment: For simplicity, we will from now on label them **Participant 1** and **Participant 2**.
- **Participant 1** and **Participant 2** are **anonymous** to you.
- You will have to choose between two options in every round: **Option A** or **Option B.**
- **Option A** is **the same** in all rounds. **Option B varies** between rounds.
- You will face a total of **40 decision rounds.**
- A choice situation looks like that:

Option A



Participant 1 gets 2000 points

Participant 2 gets 2000 points

Option B

Participant 1 gets 3000 points

Participant 2 gets ? points

REMARKS

- **Participant 1** and **Participant 2** always get 2.000 points in **Option A.**
- **Participant 1** always gets 3.000 in **Option B**. The amount that **Participant 2** gets in **Option B** varies from round to round.

☐ I understood the instructions

Continue to control questions

Control Questions

The following questions ensure that you have understood the instructions. Once you have answered all questions correctly, you will be directed to the next screen.

Note: You have **three** tries to answer the questions correctly. After the third wrong answer you will not be able to finish the study and you will not receive any payment.

Which of the following is correct?	Wrong	Correct
If you choose Option A...		
*Either **Participant 1** or **Participant 2** will get 2000 points.*	○	○
*Both **Participant 1** and **Participant 2** will get 2000 points.*	○	○
If you choose Option B...		
***Participant 1** always gets 3.000 points.*	○	○
***Participant 2** gets the same points in every round.*	○	○

Confirm my answers

You have now completed the instructions. Please click *Continue* to proceed to the choice situations.

Continue


Choice situation 1
In choice round 1:
Participant 2 gets 600 points in Option B
Participant 1 always gets 3000 points in Option B.
Participant 1 and Participant 2 always get 2000 points in Option A
Continue to choice

Choice Situation 1 of 45

Please choose between Option A and Option B.

Option A	Option B
	
Participant 1 gets 2000 points	**Participant 1 gets 3000 points**
Participant 2 gets 2000 points	**Participant 2 gets 600 points**
Option A	Option B

REMARKS

- You are asked to choose on behalf of participants who delegated their decision to choose between options
- Participant 1 and Participant 2 always get 2.000 points in **Option A**.
- Participant 1 **always** gets 3.000 in **Option B**. The amount that Participant 2 gets in **Option B varies** from round to round.

End of the study

You have completed the study. Please click **Continue** to proceed to a description of the payoffs.

Continue

End of the study

Summary of payoffs

Below, you find an overview of your earnings in the study.

PART 1:
Your earnings in this part are 2.000 points.

Type 1 Passive Participants

Participation and privacy policy

Consent form

Welcome to the study! Thank you very much for your participation. This study belongs to a project conducted by Prof. Dr. Holger Herz from the University of Fribourg in Switzerland and it is funded by the European Research Council. The study has been approved by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences at the University of Fribourg.

Study
This study takes about 5 minutes. It consists of making economic choices and of answering a set of questions on your general attitudes. There will be control questions to check your understanding of the study as well as attention checks. Repeated failure can lead to exclusion from the study and payment.

Confidentiality
Data obtained will be used for research purposes only. Your prolific-ID number will be deleted immediately upon completion of the study. The researchers will at no point receive any personally identifying information about you. The data is therefore anonymous and cannot be linked to personal data. The anonymous data will later be stored in open access repositories.

Benefits
For your participation in the study, you will receive an amount of points that will be converted into £ at the end of the study.

Costs
Your participation will take approximately 5 minutes. We do not consider there to be any other foreseeable risks, discomforts, inconveniences and harms associated with participation.

Voluntary participation
Participation in this study is voluntary, and you can choose to withdraw your participation without stating any reason at any time. If you decide to withdraw, your data will be deleted. Please note that it is impossible to delete your data once the study is finished, because then the data is anonymized and can no longer be linked to you.

Questions and Comments
Should you have questions regarding this study, please contact FriLab at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland: frilab@unifr.ch.

☐ I confirm that I have received the information about the project, that I am willing to participate and that I am at least 18 years old.

Download Consent Form

Confirm

Prolific ID

Please enter your prolific ID:

Note that your prolific ID needs to be correct, otherwise we can not link your payment to your account.

Continue

Thank you for your participation

- The study consists of **1 part.**
- Before the study begins, the instructions will be shown on your screen.
- **The total payoffs** earned in the experiment will be calculated in **points.**
- They will be converted into £ at the end of the study. The exchange rate is:

1200 points = 1 £

Total earnings = payoff part 1

Continue

Roles of participants in Part 1

There are two different types of participants, **Type 1** and **Type 2**.

Each **Type 1** participant is matched with **TWO Type 2** participants.

The **type 1** participant **makes decisions** on how to **allocate payments** between the two **type 2** participants.

The **type 2** participants do not make any choices, but only receive the allocated payments.

The **type 1** participant receives a fixed payment for **part 1.**

Types do not change throughout the experiment.

You are a Type 2 participant.

Continue

The choice situation

- **You do not make any decision.**
- The **type 1** participant will be asked to choose among **different distributions of points** between you and another **type 2** participant: For simplicity, we will from now on label you both **Participant 1** and **Participant 2**.
- You are either **Participant 1** or **Participant 2**.
- The **type 1** participant has to choose between two options in every round: **Option A** or **Option B.**

- A choice situation looks like that for the **type 1** participant:

Option A



Participant 1 gets 2000 points

Participant 2 gets 2000 points

Option B

Participant 1 gets 3000 points

Participant 2 gets ? points

REMARKS

- You are either **Participant 1** or **Participant 2**.

I understood the instructions

You have now completed the instructions. Please click *Continue* to proceed to the summary of the payments.

Continue

End of the study

Summary of payoffs

Type 1 participant chose an option that **assigned you a payment of 500 points.**

Remember that 1200 points equal 1 £.

Thus, your total earnings for this study are: 0.44 £

Thank you very much for your participation. Please click *Submit* to finish the study.

Submit

Type 2 Passive Participants

Participation and privacy policy

Consent form

Welcome to the study! Thank you very much for your participation. This study belongs to a project conducted by Prof. Dr. Holger Herz from the University of Fribourg in Switzerland and it is funded by the European Research Council. The study has been approved by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences at the University of Fribourg.

Study
This study takes about 5 minutes. It consists of making economic choices and of answering a set of questions on your general attitudes. There will be control questions to check your understanding of the study as well as attention checks. Repeated failure can lead to exclusion from the study and payment.

Confidentiality
Data obtained will be used for research purposes only. Your prolific-ID number will be deleted immediately upon completion of the study. The researchers will at no point receive any personally identifying information about you. The data is therefore anonymous and cannot be linked to personal data. The anonymous data will later be stored in open access repositories.

Benefits
For your participation in the study, you will receive an amount of points that will be converted into £ at the end of the study.

Costs
Your participation will take approximately 5 minutes. We do not consider there to be any other foreseeable risks, discomforts, inconveniences and harms associated with participation.

Voluntary participation
Participation in this study is voluntary, and you can choose to withdraw your participation without stating any reason at any time. If you decide to withdraw, your data will be deleted. Please note that it is impossible to delete your data once the study is finished, because then the data is anonymized and can no longer be linked to you.

Questions and Comments
Should you have questions regarding this study, please contact FriLab at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland: frilab@unifr.ch.

☐ I confirm that I have received the information about the project, that I am willing to participate and that I am at least 18 years old.

Download Consent Form

Confirm

Prolific ID

Please enter your prolific ID:

Note that your prolific ID needs to be correct, otherwise we can not link your payment to your account.

Continue

Thank you for your participation

- The study consists of **1 part.**
- Before the study begins, the instructions will be shown on your screen.
- **The total payoffs** earned in the experiment will be calculated in **points.**
- They will be converted into £ at the end of the study. The exchange rate is:

1200 points = 1 £

Total earnings = payoff part 1

Continue

Roles of participants in Part 1

Four different individuals participate in this study, with **three different roles:**

There is one **type 1** participant, two **type 2** participants and one **type 3** participant.

The **type 1** participant can either **make a decision** on how to **allocate payments** between the two **type 2** participants, or s/he can **delegate** this decision to the **type 3** participant.

If the decision is delegated, the **type 3** participant makes the decision on how to **allocate payments** between the two **type 2** participants.

The **type 2** participants do not make any choices, but only receive the allocated payments.

The **type 1** and **type 3** participants receive fixed payments for their participation in the study.

Types do not change throughout the experiment.

You are a Type 2 participant.

Continue

The choice situation

- **You do not make any decision.**
- The **type 1** and **type 3** participants will be asked to choose among **different distributions of points** between you and another **type 2** participant: For simplicity, we will from now on label you both **Participant 3** and **Participant 4**.
- You are either **Participant 3** or **Participant 4**.
- The **type 1** participant can choose between **choosing himself** or **delegate** the decision in **type 3** participant
- The **type 3** participant has to choose when **type 1** participant **delegates.**

- A choice situation looks like that for the **type 1** or **type 3** participant:



REMARKS

- You are either **Participant 3** or **Participant 4**.

I understood the instructions

You have now completed the instructions. Please click *Continue* to proceed to the summary of the payments.

Continue

End of the study

Summary of payoffs

Type 1 participant chose an option that **assigned you a payment of 500 points.**

Remember that 1200 points equal 1 £.

Thus, your total earnings for this study are: 0.44 £

Thank you very much for your participation. Please click *Submit* to finish the study.

Submit