

Why do People Follow Leaders?

Evidence from 1936 Spain

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January 10, 2025

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Abstract

Why do people follow leaders? We address this question by studying the Spanish Coup of 1936, where the military split between rebels and loyalists. The 1936 chain of command largely broke down, but subordinates followed their former commanders. Officers who had served under rebel leaders before 1936 were thirteen percentage points more likely to join the rebellion, even though these leaders no longer held formal authority over them. Our identification strategy exploits rotation among military leaders to compare officers exposed to rebel leaders to their peers who served in the same posting a few years before or after. We show that our control and treatment samples are balanced in many covariates and that our findings are not driven by selection. We examine three channels through which past leaders might influence their former subordinates: coordination, indoctrination, and career concerns. Our evidence supports two channels: coordination (officers used their former leaders' choices to predict the coup's success) and career concerns (officers who followed successful coup leaders historically received faster promotions). We find no evidence for indoctrination. JEL codes: D74, N44, M51, M54, L14.

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1 Introduction

On July 17, 1936, a military uprising intended to overthrow the Spanish Republic. The army was split in two, with 35% of the officers in our sample supporting the government and 65% backing the rebels. This division allows us to study what drove the decisions of five thousand individuals. Since 22% of our sample died during the conflict, we argue that we are studying the most crucial decision of their lives: whether to support the rebellion or stay loyal to the Republic. For Spain as a whole, the coup led to a three-year civil war that foreshadowed the horrors of World War Two, with almost half a million casualties.

Our paper focuses on the role of military leadership. In particular, we find that while the 1936 chain of command was broadly disrupted, previous superiors continued to wield influence over their former subordinates. We define a leader as someone who has followers who follow voluntarily. While current commanders can rely on formal authority over their subordinates, former ones must find other ways to inspire loyalty. This raises a fundamental question: how does a leader elicit obedience without formal power? To answer this, we explore three potential mechanisms. Our analysis reveals that leaders acted as coordinators for their former subordinates, and that subordinates aligned with them due to career concerns. We find no evidence that indoctrination played a role.

We find that an officer who had served (before 1936) under a rebel leader was thirteen percentage points more likely to join the rebellion than a comparable officer who served in the same posting under retired leaders. Our identification strategy exploits rotation among military leaders. Drawing on a novel dataset of military careers, we compare officers who were exposed to rebel leaders to their peers who served a few years earlier or later in the same post but were not exposed. We show that, after accounting for posting fixed effects, treated subordinates are very similar to control subordinates in a large number of observable characteristics. Moreover, we show that our findings are not driven by selection: subordinates who arrived at a posting with or after the rebel leader (and therefore may have been hired by him) are not more likely to rebel than those who were there before.

Next, we turn to the question: Why do people follow leaders? Drawing from the theoretical literature, we develop a framework that contemplates three potential mechanisms: coordination, indoctrination, and career concerns. First, subordinates need to decide which side to support with limited information. We make two key assumptions: that the coup's success depends on the number of rebel generals and that subordinates do not know the

allegiance of every general, but they know who their former leaders support. In an attempt to join the winning side, they follow their sample of generals. Therefore, past leaders wield influence because they *coordinate* the actions of their subordinates. This first mechanism is rooted in the *present* (i.e., in July 1936).

Second, subordinates may have an ideological preference for either side, and these beliefs may have been shaped by their former leaders, i.e., they may have been *indoctrinated*. This mechanism places the influence of leadership in the *past*.

Lastly, subordinates who had previous relationships with rebel leaders may have supported the coup due to career concerns. Leaders typically favor promoting their former subordinates. If these leaders ended up on the winning side of the coup, they would gain significantly more power to advance their former subordinates' careers. Therefore, subordinates who had served under rebel leaders had a personal stake in the coup's success. This mechanism places the leaders' influence in the future.

We next proceed to test whether each of these mechanisms played a role. First, we find evidence in favor of the coordination mechanism. We show that subordinates not only follow their former leaders but also their peers' former leaders. We assume that their peer's former leaders did not affect them directly. However, if subordinates hear about their allegiances second-hand, they may also oversample them when trying to predict each side's strength.¹

To study whether the indoctrination mechanism played a role, we leverage a successful coup from 1923 and a failed one from 1932. We classify those generals who supported these uprisings but were not around in 1936 (dead or retired) as "placebo authoritarians". If indoctrination was behind our results, subordinates who served under them should disproportionately support the 1936 coup. However, their effects are small and not statistically significant. This remains the case even when we focus on those who (from retirement) endorsed the 1936 coup. Therefore, we find no evidence for the *indoctrination* mechanism.²

We also leverage the 1923 coup and the dictatorship it installed to find evidence for the *career concerns* mechanism. This dictatorship lasted until 1931 when elections were

¹Two findings further support the coordination mechanism: (1) rebel leaders had twice the influence on geographically closer former subordinates in 1936, consistent with officers needing to track nearby developments closely to save their own lives; (2) generals with command of troops in July 1936 had greater impact than those without command, consistent with their perceived importance to the coup's success.

²Additional evidence against indoctrination comes from age heterogeneity analysis. When splitting the sample by median age at treatment, we find that the effect is actually stronger for older officers, contrary to what we would expect if indoctrination were the mechanism, since younger people are typically more susceptible to belief changes (Ghitza et al., 2023).

called and the Second Spanish Republic was inaugurated. We show that subordinates who were exposed to the leaders of the 1923 coup were promoted more rapidly during the dictatorship but not during the Republic (i.e. their promotions slowed down after 1931). Therefore, we conclude that relationships with influential leaders were a determinant of promotions in Spain. It is reasonable to assume that forward-looking officers assumed that those relationships would also matter in the future.

We put our baseline effect into perspective by comparing it to the influence of 1936 leaders. We find that the 1936 chain of command was widely broken and that former leaders were as influential as current ones. This result highlights that leadership plays a role beyond and above the role of formal authority and that the bond of loyalty is not broken by transfers. Therefore, a coup-proofing strategy that relies on rotation (as the one implemented by the Spanish Republic in 1936) may be ineffective.

We also include a series of robustness checks on our results. We only list the most important here. We address selection concerns by excluding subordinates who may have been hired or fired by their leaders. Our results are unchanged if we restrict the sample to subordinates who had been serving in a posting before the leader arrived. Second, we remove concerns about reverse causality by dropping the highest-ranked subordinates. Third, we show that, after including posting fixed effects, our treatment and control samples are balanced in covariates that may predict rebellion. Fourth, we use the methods developed by Oster (2019) and Diegert et al. (2022) to show that selection on unobservables would have to be implausibly large to explain away our results.

We provide an example from our dataset that highlights both how we built our dataset and illustrates the mechanisms behind our results. There are two characters in this story: José Cuesta Monereo (a subordinate) and Miguel Cabanellas (a leader). Cuesta was Cabanellas' *aide-de-camp* in 1934, and since Cabanellas was a leader of the rebellion, the former is classified as treated in our dataset. In 1936, Cuesta was serving under a loyalist general, but he rebelled anyway. Before 1936, Cabanellas was a committed republican, so it is unlikely that he indoctrinated Cuestas with anti-republican ideals. We cannot establish for certain why Cuesta supported the rebellion, but two things are clear: First, he had a deep knowledge of the conspiracy and had, therefore, a good idea about its probability of success. Importantly, he was aware of Cabanellas' involvement (unlike the government). Second, during and after the Civil War, Cuesta got promoted very rapidly, reaching the

very top of the Army’s hierarchy.

We contribute to a growing literature on leadership. Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Bandiera et al. (2020), Becker and Hvide (2022) and Jones and Olken (2005), study the effects of leaders on firm policies, firm and startup performance, and macroeconomic outcomes, respectively.³ Cagé et al. (2023) show that WWI French veterans who served under a right-wing general were more likely to collaborate with Nazis in WWII; Dippel and Heblich (2021) show that exiled German revolutionaries boosted Union Army recruitment during the US Civil War; and Bai et al. (2023) show how an individual leader’s personal network shaped military mobilization and the subsequent distribution of political power.⁴ Our paper contributes to this literature by explicitly testing three different theoretical mechanisms, helping to answer the question: why do individuals follow leaders?

Each of our proposed mechanisms relates to theoretical papers on leadership. On coordination, we build on models where leaders help solve incomplete information problems through costly signals (Hermalin, 1998) and aid followers in selecting advantageous equilibria (Acemoglu and Jackson, 2015; Akerlof and Holden, 2016). On indoctrination, we connect to theories where leaders shape subordinates’ beliefs through controlled experiences (Van den Steen, 2010) and incentive design (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003). On career concerns, we relate to models where leaders need to credibly promise future rewards to motivate voluntary support (Myerson, 2008, 2011).⁵ To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to empirically test these theories. We find support for coordination and career concerns but not for indoctrination.

We also contribute to the literature on the individual drivers of participation in coups and civil wars. La Parra-Pérez (2020) also studies the 1936 Spanish coup and shows that professional and economic interests influenced officers’ decisions. On social determinants in particular, Naidu et al. (2021) show that Haiti’s most central families were more likely to support a coup and benefitted more afterward. Guo et al. (2024) study the role of peer

³More papers on the effect of leaders on nations and organizations are Assouad (2021), Dube and Harish (2020), Fenizia (2022), Ottinger and Voigtländer (forthcoming), and Wang (2021).

⁴The reflection problem (Manski, 1993) makes it difficult to disentangle the effects of leaders from the preferences of their followers. Our identification strategy exploits turnover in leaders to identify effects on subordinates. Some papers that use a similar strategy are: Fisman et al. (2020), Jia et al. (2015), Salgado (2024), Shih et al. (2012), Voth and Xu (2020), and Xu (2018). Relatedly, Jha and Wilkinson (2012) and Grosjean et al. (2023) also use variation in military assignments for identification.

⁵These papers and how they relate to our results are explained in more detail in Section 3. Also, see Ahlquist and Levi (2011); Bolton et al. (2010); Hermalin (2013) for reviews of this literature.

effects in participation in the American Civil War.⁶

Further, we contribute to the literature on the Spanish Civil War. Though we do not summarize the historical literature here, some relevant works are Payne (2012), Payne (2017), Preston (2015), and Thomas (2001). McLauchlin and Parra-Pérez (2019) study executions of military officers. Balcells (2011) and Balcells (2012) study violence and victimization in Catalonia and Aragon. Tur-Prats and Valencia Caicedo (2020), Rodon (2024), and Oto-Peralías (2015) study the long-term effects of the war. More generally, we contribute to the literature on the determinants of democratic breakdown and the rise of fascism.⁷

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides relevant historical background. Section 3 outlines the theoretical framework and provides some empirical predictions for the three proposed mechanisms. Section 4 presents our data sources and estimation strategies. Section 5 presents our main results, and subsections 5.1 and 5.2 respectively test the three mechanisms and subject our results to robustness checks. Section 6 recounts the biographies of Cuesta Monereo and Cabanellas, highlighting both how we built our dataset and illustrating the mechanisms behind our results. Section 7 concludes.

2 Historical Context

The setting for this paper is the Spanish Coup of 17-21 July 1936. Tensions between the left and the right (or monarchists vs. republicans, Catholic integrists vs. secularists, etc.) date back to the nineteenth century. The involvement of the military in civilian politics also had a long tradition. In this section, however, we provide only a brief background to the coup.

A left-wing coalition won the elections of February 1936. The newly formed government proceeded to remove suspect generals from key posts, successfully guessing many of their allegiances.⁸ The conspiracy was led by Emilio Mola and intended to have José Sanjurjo

⁶A larger literature modeled coups with the military as a unified actor, such as Acemoglu et al. (2010); Besley and Robinson (2010); Aidt and Leon (2018). For a more general treatment of civil wars and coups, see Blattman and Miguel (2010); Geddes (1999); Singh (2014); Verwimp et al. (2019). Fajardo (2020) studies the role of the military hierarchy in the backlash to a coup.

⁷For example, Acemoglu et al. (2022), Adena et al. (2015), Galofré-Vilà et al. (2021), Koenig (2023), Satyanath et al. (2017), and Voth and Voigtlander (forthcoming).

⁸Franco was removed as chief of staff and sent to the Canary Islands, Mola was removed as general of the Army of Africa and given a smaller command in Pamplona, and Goded was sent to the Balearic Islands. An important exception was Cabanellas, who had a reputation as a republican and was put in charge of the 5th military district. Payne (2012, p. 76) writes: “The government had not erred in its calculation that most generals in active command were loyal; very few joined the rebellion, Franco and Miguel Cabanellas, who commanded a division in Zaragoza, being the only two active major generals to do so... in many garrisons the role of middle-rank and junior officers was decisive”. See also Payne (2017, p. 316).

(then in exile) as its figurehead. Francisco Franco himself was hesitant, and the main plotters did not intend for him to play a major role in the government. On 13 July (five days before the coup), right-wing politician Calvo-Sotelo was murdered by a socialist officer. The assassination precipitated the coup, and it may have convinced Franco to join (Preston, 2015, ch. 5).

The uprising started on July 17th in Africa. Important provincial capitals like Burgos, Córdoba, and Seville had been taken by the 19th, but others like Barcelona, Valencia, and more importantly, Madrid, stayed in the government’s hands until much later. In summary, the government failed to suppress the rebellion but managed to keep control of about half of the country and half of the army (for example, 53% of the Army officers were located in government-controlled territory in July 1936).

The coup’s mixed success can be explained by a divided military. Fifty-one generals supported the coup, and thirty-four opposed it. Among those in charge of the eight military districts (arguably the most strategic posts), six remained loyal. On both sides, many generals failed to keep their troops in line.⁹ The ground was set for the Spanish Civil War, which lasted until 1939 and involved half a million casualties. Early in 1939, the rebels occupied Madrid and declared victory. Francisco Franco became dictator and remained so until his death in 1975.

Our sample is divided between officers serving in the government- and rebel-controlled areas immediately after the coup. We observe almost no variation in our dependent variable within the rebel-controlled area (93.8% of the officers supported the rebels). In contrast, the government-controlled area has significant variation (65.1% supported the rebels, 34.9% stayed loyal, see map in Figure 1). La Parra-Pérez (2020) argues that the dissimilar strategies adopted by each side explain this difference. The rebels imposed discipline and repression to intimidate those loyal to the government. In contrast, the government issued a decree declaring that “all the troops in which officers have positioned themselves against republican legality are discharged” (La Parra-Pérez, 2020, p. 18). Since most units had experienced some attempt at rebellion, this act gave freedom of action to the entire military. In short, the rebel strategy was to secure the support of the military, while the government

⁹For example, in Morocco, General Romerales remained loyal to the Republic, but was imprisoned and later executed by his subordinates. Payne (2017, p. 336) writes: “Around 4:00 AM on the nineteenth [prime minister] Martínez Barrio began to contact district military commanders by telephone... he found that several of those loyal to the regime had been virtually deposed by younger officers.”

deeply suspected it (and therefore proceeded to arm the people).¹⁰

In the next paragraphs, we give short accounts of two earlier coups, which are not part of our main analysis but which we use to test mechanisms in section 5.1.

Primo de Rivera's 1923 Coup. In 1923, a military coup overthrew a democratic government and installed a dictatorship with the support of the king. The coup was led by General Primo de Rivera in Barcelona and by a group of four generals known as the *Cuadrilátero* (quadrilateral) in Madrid. The resulting government was a military dictatorship, with Primo de Rivera as president and a Military Directory consisting of eight generals and one admiral.

In 1930, Primo de Rivera resigned and appointed a transition government, led by General Dámaso Berenguer. Democracy returned in 1931 with elections, a new constitution, and the abolition of the monarchy. Among the first acts of the republican government was a military reform that reduced the number of officers and overhauled the divisional structure. Many monarchist officers (and most of the supporters of the 1923 coup) retired then.

1932 Coup Attempt (*Sanjurjada*). On August 10, 1932, military officers attempted a coup. Among the conspirators were monarchist generals who had participated in Primo de Rivera's dictatorship, such as José Cavalcanti and Emilio Barrera. The government had full knowledge of the conspiracy and successfully repressed the coup in Madrid, imprisoning the main plotters. José Sanjurjo led the uprising in Sevilla, successfully taking control of the city. No other city was affected by the coup attempt. When news of the failure in Madrid was known in Seville, the troops returned to their barracks.

Sanjurjo was sentenced to death, but his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment by President Manuel Azaña. When a coalition of right-wing parties won the 1934 elections, Sanjurjo was pardoned and left for Portugal. This government also reincorporated other conspirators into the military, such as Manuel Goded (who later on supported the 1936 coup).

¹⁰This was confirmed by the President of the Republic, Manuel Azaña, who wrote in a post-war book: "Aiming at leaving the leaders of the coup without troops, the government freed all soldiers from obedience to their superiors. Obviously, this decree was not followed in those cities already under rebel control, but it applied to important towns under republican command... Soldiers abandoned the garrisons and almost everyone went back home... The professional officers were suspect, and the troops, mostly workers, leaned towards obeying their parties or unions..." Azaña and Jackson (1986).

3 Theoretical Framework

In this section, we present a model of leadership and coup participation that rationalizes our main result (subordinates followed their former leaders during the 1936 coup) and provides insights into the potential mechanisms (and how to test them).

There are a large number of leaders who can be of two types: rebels (denoted by $\theta = 1$) or loyalists ($\theta = 0$). A proportion p of them are rebels and $1 - p$ are loyalists (which is unknown to the agents). We assume that a coup is successful if, and only if, at least p^* of leaders are rebels. A subordinate, i , must decide whether to rebel ($d_i = 1$) or to stay loyal ($d_i = 0$). His **conditional payoffs** will be denoted as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} u_i(d_i = 1 \mid p \geq p^*) &= u_i^{r|R}, \\ u_i(d_i = 1 \mid p < p^*) &= u_i^{r|L}, \\ u_i(d_i = 0 \mid p \geq p^*) &= u_i^{\ell|R}, \\ u_i(d_i = 0 \mid p < p^*) &= u_i^{\ell|L}. \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

We use lowercase letters to denote agents' decisions (r for rebels and ℓ for loyalists) and uppercase letters to denote the outcome of the coup (R for a rebel victory and L for a loyalist victory). Note that a subordinate can be correct in two ways and wrong in two ways. He is correct if he chooses to rebel when a coup is successful (i.e. $p \geq p^*$) or if he stays loyal when a coup fails (i.e. $p < p^*$). He is wrong otherwise. It is reasonable to assume that, conditional on their choice, subordinates prefer their side to win.

Assumption 1. *Conditional payoffs satisfy*

$$u_i^{r|R} > u_i^{r|L} \quad \text{and} \quad u_i^{\ell|L} > u_i^{\ell|R}.$$

3.1 Why do subordinates follow leaders? Mechanisms

3.1.1 Coordination

Each leader's type is private information, but each subordinate observes a sample, n_i , of types

$$n_i = \{\theta_1, \dots, \theta_{n_i}\}. \tag{2}$$

We denote both the sample and its size by n_i . The officer's problem is choosing whether or not to support the coup, given n_i . For that, he acts as an econometrician with a random sample and a uniform prior distribution over the types, using n_i to update his belief. Recall that a type $\theta = 1$ is a rebel and $\theta = 0$ is a loyalist. So the officer estimates the proportion of rebels by

$$\hat{p}_i = \frac{k_i}{n_i}, \quad (3)$$

where $k_i = \sum_{j=1}^{n_i} \theta_j$ is the number of rebel leaders the officer observes.

To simplify notation, denote the (subjective) conditional probability of a successful coup by

$$\sigma_i := P(p \geq p^* \mid \hat{p}_i) \quad (4)$$

but bear in mind that σ_i is a function of k_i and n_i .

Naturally, a rational agent i should decide for rebelling if, and only if, $u_i(d_i = 1 \mid \hat{p}_i) \geq u_i(d_i = 0 \mid \hat{p}_i)$. Or, equivalently,

Proposition 1. *A subordinate i rebels if, and only if,*

$$\sigma_i \geq \frac{u_i^{\ell|L} - u_i^{r|L}}{(u_i^{\ell|L} - u_i^{r|L}) + (u_i^{r|R} - u_i^{\ell|R})}. \quad (5)$$

Proof. Check Online Appendix A.1. □

The term $u_i^{\ell|L} - u_i^{r|L}$ represents the premium for making the “right” decision when the coup fails. Its mirror image is $u_i^{r|R} - u_i^{\ell|R}$, the premium for supporting a successful coup. Condition (5) says that officer i should support the rebels if, and only if, the probability of a successful coup is bigger than an i specific threshold. Note that Assumption 1 ensures that the threshold on the right-hand-side of inequality (5) belongs to the interval $(0, 1)$.

This argument connects to previous theoretical literature. Hermalin (1998) models leadership as a solution to an incomplete information problem. Leaders know the state of the world (in particular, a productivity parameter) and communicate it to their subordinates. To make their signal credible, leaders “lead by example”, i.e., by taking a costly action (in particular, working harder in the high productivity scenario). Other papers focus on the role of leaders as coordinators, aiding their followers in choosing an advantageous equilibrium where multiple equilibria exist and where the failure to coordinate may result in a socially

suboptimal outcome (Acemoglu and Jackson, 2015; Akerlof and Holden, 2016; Bolton et al., 2013; Dewan and Myatt, 2007).

These theoretical arguments are consistent with our proposed coordination mechanism. First, generals may have more information than lower-ranking officers about the government’s strength. By joining the coup (a risky and potentially costly action), leaders signal to their subordinates that they are confident in its success. Second, coups are a stark example of coordination dilemmas because officers who fail to join the winning side may be executed (Geddes, 1999; Singh, 2014).¹¹

3.1.2 Career concerns

Although we do not develop the role of career concerns formally, we consider that the right-hand side of inequality (5) may have been different for those exposed to rebel leaders during their careers. In particular, conditionally on joining the winning side, a subordinate with former rebel leaders (now in government) may experience more rapid promotions if the rebel wins. That is, $u_i^{r|R} - u_i^{\ell|L}$ may be increasing on $\hat{p}_i$ (his estimated proportion of rebel generals).

This argument is related to theoretical contributions such as Myerson (2011) and Myerson (2008). In those papers, leaders need the active voluntary support of many individuals to compete for power. These supporters must be motivated by some expectation of future rewards in the event of their success. Since promises have to be credible, leaders are successful when they enjoy a reputation for reliably distributing patronage benefits to loyal supporters. Coup plotters may enjoy increased credibility among their former subordinates (maybe due to a history of cooperation).

3.1.3 Indoctrination

Lastly, leaders with a right-wing ideology may have indoctrinated their troops when they were in charge. These preferences may have been transferred to their subordinates through persuasion or manipulation.

¹¹Geddes (1999, p. 126): “... the most important concern for many officers deciding whether to join a coup conspiracy is their assessment of how many others will join”. After extensive interviews with army officers, Singh (2014) concludes that the risk to life trumps ideological considerations: “In fact, they believed that it would have been selfish to let their personal political beliefs guide their response. As officers, their first responsibility was to their men, and they felt it was wrong to use their troops, possibly endangering their lives, to support the side they preferred if it was likely to lose.” (Singh, 2014, p. 6).

Akerlof and Kranton (2005) argue that organizations can invest in changing the identities of their members, resulting in better performance for lower pay. They use the West Point Military Academy as an example (empirically, Ertola Navajas et al. (2022) show that military conscription changes personality and beliefs). In Van den Steen (2010), leaders can influence employees’ beliefs by controlling what experiences they learn from (called manager-directed learning). Since managers choose the organization’s actions, they determine what outcomes employees observe. Over time, employees’ beliefs tend to converge based on these shared experiences, even if they initially disagreed with the manager, which helps explain why managerial influence on culture can persist after they leave. Similarly, in Bénabou and Tirole (2003), the incentives and tasks that the principal implements can influence agents’ beliefs. Lastly, Verdier and Zenou (2015, 2018) develop models showing how cultural leaders can influence identity formation by providing community-specific public goods.

In our setting, rebel generals may have shaped subordinates’ beliefs or ideologies. For example, rebel generals may have biased their political preferences, leading them to favor right-wing or authoritarian governments. If the officers saw Spain in danger of falling into communism (and disliked this outcome), they may have a very low value for $u_i^{\ell|L}$ (maybe with $u_i^{\ell|L} - u_i^{r|L}$ approaching zero).

3.2 Testing the mechanisms

In order to test our proposed mechanisms in Section 5.1, we will distinguish between the effects of different types of generals.

Retired generals. We assume that retired generals do not affect coup success and, therefore, do not count in the estimation of $\hat{p}_i$ (key for coordination). We further assume that they cannot affect careers from retirement. Lastly, generals who participated in the coups of 1923 and 1932 may have indoctrinated their subordinates with anti-democratic or right-wing ideas.

Peers’ former generals. Subordinates can expand their sample n_i with the former generals of their 1936 peers since they can hear about their allegiances second-hand. We further assume that peers’ former generals could not have indoctrinated them and do not affect career concerns.

Table 1 summarizes how different types of leaders affect an officer’s decision to rebel. It highlights that while we have direct tests for the indoctrination and coordination mecha-

Table 1: How Different Leaders Affect an Officer’s Decision to Rebel

	Own former leaders	Peers’ former leaders
Active	indoctrination + coordination + career concerns	coordination
Retired	indoctrination	

nisms, we do not have a direct test for career concerns. We provide suggestive evidence by testing a necessary condition. We test whether subordinates of the leaders of the 1923 coup got more promotions.

4 Data and Estimation

Military careers. We build a novel dataset of officers’ careers for ten years before the coup, from 1927 to 1936, using military yearbooks (*Anuario militar de España*).¹² We use the yearbooks to track the career of every army officer during the ten years before the coup. In particular, chapter IX of each yearbook lists every officer, their date of birth, their date of entry into the Army, their seniority, and their *posting*. We use the posting (in the yearbooks, *destino*) to link officers to their leaders. Figure 2 in Section 6 contains parts of four yearbook pages as an example.

To assess the quality of the name matching across years, Table A.1 lists the number of unique individuals per year and the number of “exits”: officers who appear in a given year but not in the next. Since we only collect data on officers who were serving in 1936, all exits are temporary (that is, they reappear later on). We cannot ascertain whether these exits are due to failed name matches or due to periods of inactivity (i.e., being assigned to the reserve or temporarily incapacitated). In a typical year, between 3 and 4% of the sample exits. Reassuringly, the years with the highest number of exits (around 9%) correspond to the military reform, when many officers were transferred to the reserve.

Leader and subordinate loyalties. The original data source for the classification of officers into rebels and loyalists is Carlos Engel’s book *El Cuerpo de Oficiales de la*

¹²Available for download on the website of the Spanish National Library <https://hemerotecadigital.bne.es/hd/es/results?parent=170edc64-562e-4aa6-baca-6dfa60260d5b&t=alt-asc> We digitized the yearbooks using *Textract*, a machine learning OCR service by AWS, together with extensive manual checking and cleaning.

Guerra de España (Engel Masolvier, 2008).¹³ The book classifies the entirety of the Spanish officer corps serving in July 1936 into rebels and loyalists. Engel classifies officers using official documents and secondary sources, including promotions, rewards, punishments, and defections. For example, if an officer was promoted by the rebel side, Engel classified him as a rebel. If the government executed another officer, he classified him as a rebel.¹⁴ Importantly, Engel’s book also contains information on officers’ postings in July 1936 (which may differ from their postings when the last yearbook was printed in April 1936). See an example of a page in Figure 3 in Section 6.

We merged La Parra-Pérez (2020)’s version of the Engel dataset to our dataset on military careers using names, and occasionally manually checking additional information such as posting and rank. We achieved a very high merge success rate: we found 96.3% of the Engel officers in the yearbooks (and we cannot rule out that some of the missing officers joined the army after the yearbook was printed).

Retired generals. We added to the dataset all generals that were not present in the Engel dataset (237 individuals) but had been active at any point between 1927 and 1936. Fourteen of those 237 generals supported an earlier coup (in 1923 or 1932), and we use them to test the indoctrination mechanism. The 1923 coup supporters were conspirators (members of the *Cuadrilatero*), members of the Military Directory, and the War Minister of Primo de Rivera’s government. The 1932 coup supporters are classified according to Payne (2017).¹⁵ We further classify them into those who endorsed the 1936 coup or not, based on their biographical information in the Spanish Biographical Dictionary.¹⁶ Table A.8 contains a list of retired generals.

Government- and rebel-controlled areas. As we explained in Section 2, after the first days of the coup, Spain was divided into two zones, one controlled by the government and one by the rebels. We observe almost no variation in regions of Spain that were con-

¹³This dataset was previously digitized by La Parra-Pérez (2020). We are very thankful to the author for making his replication dataset available. And, of course, we are very thankful to Carlos Engel for his work of decades.


¹⁴Engel also uses the post-war outcomes: if an officer served under the government but was afterward reincorporated to the Army by Franco, Engel classifies him as a rebel. The opposite happens for officers who served under the rebel side but were dismissed after the war. In a robustness check, we show that our results are robust to excluding these officers (Table A.11).

¹⁵José Sanjurjo is a complicated case because he was retired in 1936 (so in our main regressions his subordinates are in our control sample), but he did more than endorse the 1936 coup, he was part of the conspiracy. Moreover, he died three days into the coup in a plane accident (on his way to join the rebellion). Our results do not change if we reclassify him.

¹⁶The Spanish Biographical Dictionary is published by the Royal Academy of History, and its entries are written by historians. Available at <https://dbe.rah.es/db e>.

trolled by the rebels right after the coup (93.8% of the officers there rebelled). In contrast, the Republican area has significant variation (65.1% supported the rebels, 34.9% stayed loyal). Since we do not observe variation in the rebel area, our baseline regressions limit the sample to officers in the Republican area. Our results remain significant if we include the full sample (our estimates become significantly smaller, as should be expected from roughly doubling the sample and adding almost no extra variation in the dependent variable).

Figure 1: Map of Spain



Map of territorial control and officer loyalty during the Spanish Civil War. Areas (or Voronoi polygons) are colored based on territorial control: for each officer in our dataset, we know whether they were in rebel (grey) or government (white) territory, and we use this information to color the area around them. The pie charts indicate the proportion of rebel (grey) and loyalist (white) officers. Note that in rebel-controlled areas, almost all officers were rebels (94%), whereas in government-controlled areas, there was substantial variation (65% were rebels). The size of the circles is proportional to the square root of the number of officers at each location.

The map in Figure 1 illustrates these patterns. The areas are colored based on territorial control: for each officer in our dataset, we know whether they were posted in rebel or government territory according to La Parra-Pérez (2020), and we use this information to

color the area around them.¹⁷ Circles show the number of officers at each location, with pie charts indicating the proportion of rebel (grey) and loyalist (white) officers.

Table A.6 shows descriptive statistics for the full army and for the army in the government-controlled zone (who are our sample in the main specification). The officers in the government zone are representative of the full army in a number of variables. For example, officer rank and tenure are higher by only 3 and 4% respectively (to be expected since it includes Madrid). Other variables are less balanced; for example, years in Africa are much higher outside (as expected since Africa was under rebel control).

4.1 Estimation

We classify every general in a given posting (including both major generals and brigadier generals) as a leader. We categorize them into rebels (51 generals), loyalists (34), and retired (237).¹⁸ Everyone else serving in the posting is a subordinate.

Our dependent variable is the subordinate’s decision to support the rebels or the government, and it varies at the individual level for 5330 subordinates. Our independent variable is the exposure to generals who rebelled in 1936. Our identification strategy exploits rotation among military leaders. We compare officers who were exposed to rebel leaders to their peers who served in the same post but were not exposed. To execute this comparison, we rely on two estimation methods (with two different datasets).

Individual-level dataset. In this dataset, the unit of observation is an individual, and the independent variable is the number of postings where an individual was treated. The independent variables of interest are the number of postings under rebels and under loyalists (note that an individual may have zero in both variables since he may have been served in postings with no generals or under a retired one). To control for different careers, we include one dummy per posting, which equals one if, at any point, the officer served there. The model includes 2165 posting dummies (described later on). We also include a set of controls that may predict rebellion. Therefore, our estimation equation is:

¹⁷The rebels (grey in the map) controlled the African colonies, most of Northern Spain, except for a strip on the Northern coast that included the Basque Country. Most of Andalusia is coded as rebel-controlled because they managed to take the cities of Seville, Granada, and Cordoba. The government-controlled Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, and most of Central and Eastern Spain. The Balearic and Canary Islands (the latter excluded from the map) were also controlled by the rebels.

¹⁸There are two neutral generals, which we include in the same category as those retired. Alternative classification or exclusion does not change any of our findings.

$$y_i = \beta NPost_i^{reb} + \alpha NPost_i^{loy} + \eta NPost_i^{gen} + \sum_{j=1}^{2165} \delta_j D_{i,j} + \gamma X_i + \nu_i$$

Where $NPost_i^{reb}$ and $NPost_i^{loy}$ are the independent variables of interest, $D_{i,j}$ represents the posting dummies for each of the 2200 postings, and X_i is a vector of controls. $NPost_i^{gen}$ is the number of posts under any generals. Therefore, each additional posting under a rebel general increments rebellion probability in $\beta + \eta$. Since we consider postings with generals to be a better comparison group, we focus on β when we interpret results (i.e., the differential impact of a rebel general compared to a retired one). This decision is not consequential because η is generally close to zero.

Individual-posting level dataset. In this dataset, the unit of observation is the individual-posting, and the independent variables are two dummies that equal one if the leader of that posting was a rebel/loyalist and zero otherwise. Note that both variables equal zero if the posting had no general or the general was retired by 1936. Therefore, an individual may be treated in all, some, or no postings. To control for different careers, we include posting fixed effects. Therefore, our second estimation equation is:

$$y_i = \pi Post_{i,j}^{reb} + \mu Post_{i,j}^{loy} + \rho Post_{i,j}^{gen} + Posting_j + \rho X_i + v_{i,j}$$

Where $Post_{i,j}^{reb}$ and $Post_{i,j}^{loy}$ are the independent variables of interest, $Posting_j$ represents the posting fixed effects, and X_i is a vector of controls. $Post_{i,j}^{gen}$ equals one if there was a general in the posting.

The first specification has the advantage of the agreement between the dimension of variation of the dependent variable (the decision to rebel) and the unit of observation (the individual). However, since each individual belongs to several postings during his lifetime, we cannot clearly delineate control and treatment groups and must include the dummies in the regression. The advantage of the second specification is that the treatment and control groups are crystal clear. We compare, within each posting, those who served when a rebel/loyalist leader was in charge to those who served there at a different time. The disadvantage is that each individual appears many times in the dataset and may appear as both a treated and a non-treated unit. Reassuringly, the results are very similar under both specifications.

Posting Fixed Effects. Our identification strategy leverages posting fixed effects to

compare officers with similar career trajectories. Following the 1931 army reform that restructured military organization, the set of military postings fundamentally changed, preventing us from comparing officers across the reform. We therefore split postings into two distinct periods: 1927-1931 and 1932-1936. An advantageous consequence of this split is that each comparison group consists of officers who served in the same posting at most four years apart. We incorporate three sets of posting fixed effects: 873 unique postings from 1927-1931, 800 from 1932-April 1936, and 492 from July 1936 (from the Egel loyalty dataset). While the first two sets control for career paths, the July 1936 fixed effects additionally account for officers' locations during the coup. Tables A.4 and A.3 provide summary statistics on posting sizes and the distribution of treated postings by year, respectively.

Controls and balance. In some specifications, we include the controls listed in Table 2 and Table A.7. Specifically, we include the number of postings, tenure, corps, officer rank, years in Africa, and the variation in the hierarchy during the Republic. These variables relate to the subordinate's position in the Army, and they have been shown to predict rebellion by La Parra-Pérez (2020).

We show that our treatment and control samples are balanced in Table 2 when we include posting fixed effects. We run regressions for main treatment variables (number of postings under a rebel/posting under a rebel) on potential confounders for both datasets. None of the variables is a statistically significant predictor of treatment in the specifications with posting fixed effects. In Table A.7, we include more variables, such as corps and demotions in the 1931 reform. In Section 5.2, perform a sensitivity analysis (Oster, 2019; Diegert et al., 2022) and show that selection on unobservables would have to be implausibly large to explain away our results.

Table 2: Balance Table - Effect of Covariates on Treatment Status

Dataset:	Individual-level		Ind-Posting Level	
Treatment Variable:	N Rebel Postings		Rebel Posting	
Posting FE?	No	Yes	No	Yes
Covariates:				
Number of Postings	0.096	-0.885	0.008	0.000
<i>p-value</i>	[0.000]	[0.180]	[0.000]	[0.609]
Tenure	0.013	-0.872	0.003	0.000
	[0.000]	[0.374]	[0.000]	[0.467]
Officer Rank in 1936	0.141	-0.887	0.032	0.000
	[0.000]	[0.784]	[0.000]	[0.818]
Years in Africa	0.101	-0.887	0.014	-0.002
	[0.000]	[0.151]	[0.048]	[0.281]
Hierarchical Position Variation (1932-1936)	-0.045	-0.883	-0.004	-0.003
	[0.000]	[0.150]	[0.370]	[0.158]
Leftist Vote in Province	-0.568	-0.916	-0.136	0.024
	[0.000]	[0.224]	[0.177]	[0.112]
Treatment Variable Mean	0.247		0.073	

Each cell in this table corresponds to a regression of one covariate against our main treatment variable. For each covariate, the first row reports the coefficient and the second the p-value. Columns 1 and 3 report the regressions without fixed effects, showing unbalanced samples (i.e. with p-values below standard significance levels). Columns 2 and 4 show that, after including fixed effects, our treatment and control samples are balanced in observables. See more covariates in Table A.7.

5 Results

Table 3 presents our baseline results. In the individual level dataset, we find that individuals who served in one posting under a rebel leader are 12.7 pp more likely to rebel than those who served in none (column 3, 19% of the mean). The effect is very similar in the specification without controls (column 2, 13.9 pp), further confirming that our treatment is orthogonal once we control for postings. The results are similar in the individual-posting dataset: A subordinate who served under a rebel leader is 10.8 pp more likely to rebel than a subordinate who served in the same posting without a general or under a retired one.¹⁹

In order to assess the magnitude of our baseline result, Table 4 compares it to the impact

¹⁹The endogenous coefficients (without fixed effects) in columns 1 and 4 are smaller. A potential explanation for this finding is that the government may have placed loyal generals in charge of the most rebellious units, biasing the coefficient downwards. Surprisingly, exposure to loyalist leaders has no effect, so our main result is asymmetric. This may be because the loyalist side's actual leaders were the lawfully elected civilian authorities, and therefore, military leadership may have been less salient.

Table 3: The Effect of Former Leaders on the Decision to Rebel

	Subordinate joins the Rebels					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
N Postings under Rebel Leader	0.074*** (0.017)	0.139*** (0.046)	0.127*** (0.049)			
N Postings under Loyalist Leader	-0.038* (0.020)	0.019 (0.047)	-0.004 (0.046)			
Posting under Rebel Leader				0.078*** (0.029)	0.108*** (0.024)	0.108*** (0.026)
Posting under Loyalist Leader				-0.035 (0.031)	0.029 (0.022)	0.022 (0.021)
Dataset	Ind	Ind	Ind	Ind-Post	Ind-Post	Ind-Post
Posting FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
1936 Posting FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.651	0.651	0.651	0.686	0.686	0.686
Observations	5,330	5,330	5,330	18,126	18,126	18,126

This table shows the effect of rebel and loyalist leaders on their former subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal. The unit of observation is the individual (models 1-3) and the individual-posting (models 4-6). We report OLS regressions with no fixed effects (1 and 4), with posting fixed effects (2 and 5), and with fixed effects plus additional controls (3 and 6). The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the posting level (models 1 to 3) and doubly at the individual and posting levels (models 4 to 6). * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

of 1936 leaders on the decision to rebel. In addition to the variables already included in Table 3, we include dummies that equal one if the subordinate was serving under a rebel/loyalist leader in 1936. Note that the effect of *former* leaders remains significant and with similar magnitude (or slightly higher in some models). We find that 1936 leaders (both rebels and loyalists) had an impact in the expected direction. Compared to the impacts of former leaders, the effects range from around half (model 4) to slightly larger (model 1). Note, however, that these regressions do not include 1936 posting fixed effects (as they would be collinear with the 1936 leader variables), and therefore, we do not interpret the effect of current leaders causally.

Table 4 also shows that the 1936 chain of command was widely broken (as the coefficients for 1936 leaders are far from one). Table A.10 describes how often officers followed the decision of their commanding officer for different subsamples. In the Government-controlled area (our main sample), only 58% of officers joined the same side as their immediate superior. Our results highlight that leadership plays a role beyond the role of formal authority. Therefore, past hierarchies can be an influential determinant of coup outcomes, and transfers cannot fully coup-proof a democracy.

Table 4: The Effect of Current and Former Leaders on the Decision to Rebel

	Subordinate joins the Rebels			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
N Postings under Rebel Leader	0.137*** (0.038)	0.147*** (0.041)		
N Postings under Loyalist Leader	0.008 (0.040)	-0.013 (0.040)		
Posting under Rebel Leader			0.150*** (0.025)	0.143*** (0.026)
Posting under Loyalist Leader			0.013 (0.021)	0.010 (0.019)
Posting under Rebel Leader in 1936	0.145** (0.061)	0.112* (0.057)	0.086*** (0.028)	0.079*** (0.029)
Posting under Loyalist Leader in 1936	-0.102 (0.063)	-0.125** (0.064)	-0.058* (0.031)	-0.069** (0.032)
Dataset	Ind	Ind	Ind-Post	Ind-Post
Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1936 Posting FE	No	No	No	No
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.651	0.651	0.686	0.686
Observations	5,330	5,330	18,126	18,126

This table shows the effect of *former* and *current* rebel and loyalist leaders on their subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal. The unit of observation is the individual (models 1-2) and the individual-posting (models 3-4). We report regressions with (pre-1936) posting fixed effects (1 and 3), and with fixed effects plus additional controls (2 and 4). The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the posting level (models 1 and 2) and doubly at the individual and posting levels (models 3 and 4). * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Selection? The main threat to our identification strategy is selection. That is, would-be rebel generals may have hired like-minded subordinates. In Table 5, we show that selection does not drive our results. We classify treated subordinates as “potentially selected” if they joined a posting *after or at the same time* as the leader. Everyone else had been serving at the unit *before* the arrival of the leader. Individuals who arrived after may have been hired by the leader and therefore selected in unobservables (for example, proclivity to support a coup). In models 1 and 2, we drop potentially selected individual-postings, and the coefficient of interest remains positive and significant (only slightly bigger). In models 3 and 4, we add a variable that equals one if the individual-posting was potentially selected. The associated coefficient is not statistically significant, indicating that officers who arrived at the posting with or after a leader were not more likely to follow than those who were there before. Therefore, we conclude that leaders were not hiring based on coup proclivity or that they could not observe it.

We also account for “inverse selection”. Even if generals did not hire like-minded subordinates, they may have fired opposite-minded subordinates. If they did so as soon as they arrived (before the next yearbook), republican-minded officers would be less likely to serve under rebel generals. We also show that this is not the case. In Table A.20, we drop potentially fired subordinates (i.e., those that transferred away from a posting the year a rebel or loyalist general arrived), and our results do not change. In models 3 and 4, we add a variable that equals one if the individual-posting follows a potential transfer.

The only remaining potential source of selection is generals selecting into postings filled with like-minded subordinates. While the government appointed generals to destinations, they could influence the process. Since we include posting fixed effects, they would have to time their appointment to arrive in a year with an unusually high number of like-minded subordinates. We do not believe this was the case. First, we show in Tables 2 and A.7 that treated and control postings are not distinguishable in observables. Second, the results described in this section show that generals did not hire or fire based on coup proclivity. This fact implies that the coup proclivity of subordinates was either not relevant or not observable and unlikely to drive the rotation of generals. Third, Table A.19 shows that the effect is somewhat larger for subordinates treated during the period 1927-1931 than for those treated during 1932-1936 (though the differences in coefficients are not significant). We find this result reassuring: strategic concerns are less likely to matter so long before the coup.

Extensive and Intensive Margins. Our baseline specifications in Table 3 capture the *extensive margin* of treatment, that is, whether an individual-posting was exposed to a rebel leader or not (in the individual-level dataset, the number of postings). In Table A.17, we test the *intensive margin*. Some individuals were exposed to rebel leaders for a larger number of years. Therefore, in addition to the variables already listed, we include the sum of years under rebel and loyalist leaders. We detect no effect on the intensive margin, and the extensive margin result remains unchanged after including the new variables. This result sheds light on a potential staffing mistake by the democratic government. In an attempt to coup-proof the regime, the republic frequently rotated generals, appointing those perceived as loyal to strategic positions. In doing so, they “exposed” more officers to more generals (some of whom ended up on the rebel side). Since more years under a rebel do not increase the probability of rebellion, a better strategy may have consisted of having suspect generals

Table 5: Selection? Effect of Rebel Leaders by Date of Incorporation

	Subordinate joins the Rebels			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Posting under Rebel Leader	0.153*** (0.038)	0.169*** (0.042)	0.095*** (0.033)	0.108*** (0.032)
Posting under Loyalist Leader	-0.011 (0.039)	-0.024 (0.038)	0.042 (0.035)	0.033 (0.030)
Potentially Selected by Rebel Leader			0.015 (0.034)	-0.004 (0.029)
Potentially Selected by Loyalist Leader			-0.019 (0.041)	-0.021 (0.036)
Dataset	Ind-Post	Ind-Post	Ind-Post	Ind-Post
Drop Potentially Selected	Yes	Yes	No	No
Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1936 Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.684	0.684	0.686	0.686
Observations	16,614	16,614	18,126	18,126

This table shows the effect of rebel and loyalist leaders on their subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal. The unit of observation is the individual-posting. We classify a treated subordinate-posting as "potentially selected" if he arrived at the posting at the same time or after the leader. In models 1 and 2, we drop potentially selected observations. In models 3 and 4, we add two variables that equal one if the subordinate was potentially selected. The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are double clustered at the posting and individual levels. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

as stationary as possible.

5.1 Mechanisms

In this section, we will test the potential mechanisms behind our results. In doing so, we contribute to a wider literature that asks why individuals follow their leaders. In Section 3, we presented a theoretical framework that highlighted three potential pathways. First, generals may be *coordinating* their subordinates. We assume that the coup's success depends on the number of rebel generals and that subordinates do not know the allegiance of every general, but they observe a sample. In an attempt to join the winning side, they follow their sample of generals. Second, generals may be *indoctrinating* by transmitting authoritarian or anti-republican values. Third, subordinates may follow their former leaders out of *career concerns* since they expect rewards if the coup succeeds.

Coordination. First, we investigate whether leaders are focal points in a coordination game. We assume that officers attempt to support the winning side. When trying to estimate the split of the Army, officers oversample those they know better (their former

leaders). In this subsection, we provide suggestive evidence for this theory by showing that subordinates also follow their 1936 peers' former leaders. We assume that their peers' former leaders did not affect them directly (and therefore play no role in indoctrination or career concerns). However, if subordinates hear about their allegiances second-hand, they may also oversample them when trying to predict each side's strength.

In Table 6, the first independent variables measure the proportion of treated peers. Peers are defined as fellow subordinates who were serving in the same post in 1936. They were considered treated if they had served under a rebel/loyalist general before 1936. We find that an individual with more treated peers was also more likely to rebel. In model 1, one standard deviation increase in the proportion of peers treated by rebels (equal to 20.8% of his peers, or 7.3 officers in a posting of median size) increases the probability of rebellion in 2.4 pps. (equal to 3.7% of the mean). Model 3 presents a similar result for the individual-destination dataset, and models 2 and 4 show our findings hold when we control for the subordinate's own treatment. Since peers may have affected the subordinate's decision directly, we control for the percentage of peers that rebelled in all four regressions.²⁰

Two additional results provide credence to the coordination mechanism. First, we report heterogeneous results by distance (in 1936) between officers and subordinates. Officers had an incentive to keep track of the situation on the ground (especially to save their own lives), and had limited strategic value in tracking decisions of geographically distant generals. Therefore, for each subordinate-posting, we calculate the distance (in 1936) between the subordinate and their (former) leader, and we split the sample in two (above and below the median). We report results in Table 7. Indeed, we find that the effect is larger below the median distance (columns 1 and 3, with and without controls). It is still positive and significant above, but half the size. The difference in coefficients is significant only for the specifications with controls (p-value of the difference without controls=0.117, with controls=0.052).

Second, in Table A.23, we decompose the treatment into two categories of generals, those who were in command of troops and those who were not, under the assumption that the latter were perceived as more instrumental for coup success. Columns 1 and 2 report the

²⁰Note that since the proportion of treated peers does not vary within the 1936 posting, we do not include 1936 posting fixed effects. Table A.22 reports regressions with controls. The results remain largely robust, but they lose significance in the most demanding specification that simultaneously includes the full set of controls, posting fixed effects, and the percentage of peers that rebelled - likely due to the high collinearity between these interconnected channels of influence.

Table 6: Coordination? The Impact of Peers' Former Leaders

	Subordinate joins the Rebels			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Prop. of treated peers (by rebels)	0.115** (0.050)	0.106** (0.049)	0.080** (0.036)	0.078** (0.036)
Prop. of treated peers (by loyalists)	-0.116* (0.061)	-0.114* (0.062)	-0.102** (0.043)	-0.101** (0.043)
N Postings under Rebel Leader		0.120*** (0.038)		
N Postings under Loyalist Leader		0.016 (0.039)		
Posting under Rebel Leader				0.130*** (0.024)
Posting under Loyalist Leader				0.023 (0.022)
Proportion of Rebel Peers	0.410*** (0.064)	0.407*** (0.064)	0.507*** (0.036)	0.505*** (0.036)
Dataset	Ind	Ind	Ind-Post	Ind-Post
Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1936 Posting FE	No	No	No	No
Controls	No	No	No	No
Mean Rebel	0.651	0.651	0.686	0.686
Observations	5,274	5,274	17,906	17,906

This table shows the effect of peers' former leaders on subordinates' decisions to rebel. The variable "Prop. of treated peers" measures the proportion of peers in 1936 who were under rebel/loyal leaders at some point prior to 1936. The unit of observation is the individual (models 1 and 2) or the individual-posting (models 3 and 4). All regressions include (pre-1936) fixed effects. The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the posting level (models 1 and 2) and doubly at the individual and posting levels (models 3 and 4). *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

results for the individual-level dataset. We find that generals who had commands in 1936 had a bigger impact on their former subordinates,²¹ and the impact for generals without command is positive but smaller by around half and not statistically significant.²²

Indoctrination? We postulate that generals with a right-wing ideology may have indoctrinated their troops when they were in charge. By revealed preference, the generals that supported the 1923 and 1932 coups (the first one succeeded and the second one failed)

²¹Table A.26 complements Table A.23 by showing that the differential effect of generals in command of troops is specific to those with a command *in 1936*, and not due to generals with commands before that. We therefore find it unlikely that these generals were in a privileged position to indoctrinate before 1936 or to give promotions after.

²²However, the difference between coefficients is not statistically significant (in model 1: difference=0.108, p-value=0.203), and it is close to zero in the individual-posting level dataset. Therefore, we only take this table as suggestive evidence of a coordination mechanism.

Table 7: Coordination? Effect of Rebel Leaders by Distance to Subordinate

	Subordinate joins the Rebels			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Posting under a Rebel Leader	0.189*** (0.042)	0.098** (0.040)	0.208*** (0.058)	0.075* (0.038)
Difference between Coefficients		0.091 (0.058)		0.134* (0.069)
Median Condition (distance in 1936)	Below	Above	Below	Above
Dataset	Ind-Post	Ind-Post	Ind-Post	Ind-Post
Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1936 Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.686	0.686	0.686	0.686
Observations	17,077	17,102	17,077	17,102

In this table, we split the sample by geographic distance between leader and subordinate in 1936 (for treated units, the control sample is the same in all regressions). For observations with multiple leaders, we calculated the average distance. We present OLS regressions with fixed effects (models 1 and 2) and with fixed effects plus additional controls (models 3 and 4). The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors doubly clustered at the posting and individual levels are in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

also had authoritarian preferences.

We show in Table 8 that officers who served under them were not more likely to rebel than soldiers who served in the same units under Republican or retired generals. Models 1 and 2 show the null result in the individual dataset (without and with controls), and Models 3 and 4 do the same in the individual-posting dataset. In Appendix Table A.24, we disaggregate the right-wing generals into those who endorsed the 1936 coup and those who did not. It makes no difference whether or not they supported the coup.²³ Therefore, we conclude that indoctrination is unlikely to be the mechanism behind our results.²⁴

Additional evidence argues against indoctrination. Since the influence of political events on beliefs is known to decrease with age (Ghitza et al., 2023), we split our sample by median age at treatment (35 years old) in Table A.27. If indoctrination were driving our results, we would expect stronger effects among younger officers. However, we find the

²³With the exception of Sanjurjo, those who supported the coup were not expected to play a major role (maybe due to their age, or because if incorporated to the Army, they would have outranked the principal conspirators). Because he was retired and because he died two days into the coup, Sanjurjo is included in this group. The results are unchanged if we exclude him.

²⁴A potential concern is that retired generals are less influential because their contact with subordinates was, on average, less recent than those of active generals. That is, their indoctrination may have faded out. However, in Table A.19, we disaggregate our main result into the dictatorship (1927-30) and the Republic (1931-36), and we find that the links made during the earlier period are stronger predictors of rebellion.

opposite pattern: the effect of rebel leaders is roughly twice as large and only statistically significant for officers above age 35. The coefficients for the younger half, while positive, are not statistically significant. Since our sample consists only of commissioned officers rather than cadets, we have very few observations in what would typically be considered the most impressionable years (under 25), making the 35-year threshold a reasonable cutoff for examining age effects.²⁵

Table 8: Indoctrination? The Effect of Right-Wing Retired Generals

	Rebel Subordinate			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
N Postings under Right-Wing Retired	0.039 (0.045)	0.022 (0.043)		
N Postings under a Rebel Leader	0.130*** (0.047)	0.122** (0.050)		
N Postings under a Loyalist Leader	0.012 (0.047)	-0.008 (0.048)		
Posting under Right-Wing Retired			0.059 (0.053)	0.044 (0.044)
Posting under a Rebel Leader			0.101*** (0.025)	0.102*** (0.027)
Posting under a Loyalist Leader			0.019 (0.020)	0.015 (0.020)
Dataset	Ind	Ind	Ind-Post	Ind-Post
Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1936 Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean rebel	0.651	0.651	0.686	0.686
Observations	5,330	5,330	18,126	18,126

This table shows the effect of retired right-wing generals on subordinates' decisions (*Rebel* = 1). These generals participated in either the 1923 or the 1932 coups. The unit of observation is the individual (models 1 and 2) and the individual-posting (models 3 and 4). We report OLS regressions with posting fixed effects (1 and 3) and with fixed effects plus additional controls (2 and 4). The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the posting level (models 1 and 2) and doubly at the individual and posting levels (models 3 and 4). *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Career concerns. The third mechanism we explore relates to potential material gains to be expected from following former leaders. In this section, we test whether previous connections to successful coup leaders led to promotions in Spain. If they did before the coup, we expect officers to anticipate rewards and, therefore, follow their former bosses.

We check whether, during the regime installed in 1923, former subordinates of coup supporters got promoted more rapidly. In Table 9, column 1, we find that they did while

²⁵For the effects of exposure to the military on personality and beliefs during the impressionable years, see Ertola Navajas et al. (2022).

the dictatorship lasted (until 1931). In column 2, we show that this pattern reversed during the Republic (after 1931). The effects are sizable, a promotion was 28 percentage points more likely for connected officers (the average probability was 42.6%). There were only ten ranks in the hierarchy (including three general-level ranks), so a promotion of this kind was a considerable step forward.²⁶

Table 9: Career Concerns? Effect of Connections on Promotions

	Promotion in Regime		Promotion in Posting	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
N Postings under a 1923 Coup Leader	0.280*** (0.074)	-0.250*** (0.066)		
N Postings under a 1936 Rebel Leader	-0.046 (0.056)	-0.159*** (0.041)		
N Postings under a 1936 Loyalist Leader	-0.086 (0.078)	-0.010 (0.042)		
Posting under a 1923 Coup Leader			0.175** (0.071)	-0.225*** (0.006)
Posting under a 1936 Rebel Leader			-0.133** (0.056)	-0.196*** (0.071)
Posting under a 1936 Loyalist Leader			0.017 (0.048)	-0.035 (0.087)
Regime	Dictatorship	Republic	Dictatorship	Republic
Dataset	Ind	Ind	Ind-Post	Ind-Post
Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1936Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean Promotions	0.426	0.286	0.298	0.249
Observations	6,936	11,273	15,910	21,375

This table shows that subordinates of the 1923 coup organizers were promoted more rapidly during the dictatorship (1927-1931) and more slowly afterward (1932-1936). The variable Promotion equals one if we observe an increase in the officer's rank. The unit of observation is the individual (models 1 and 2) and the individual-posting (models 3 and 4). For the individual dataset, consider promotions within each regime. For the individual-posting dataset, we consider promotions within the specific posting. The regressions include posting fixed effects plus additional controls. Appendix Table A.25 reports regressions without controls. Standard errors double clustered at the posting and individual level in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the effect of retired right-wing generals on subordinates' decisions (*Rebel* = 1). These generals participated in either the 1923 or the 1932 coups. The unit of observation is the individual (models 1 and 2) and the individual-posting (models 3 and 4). We report OLS regressions with posting fixed effects (1 and 3) and with fixed effects plus additional controls (2 and 4). The sample includes subordinates who were in the

²⁶The average pay increase between these ranks was 27%. Given that a connection to a general increases the probability of promotion by 28 pps., a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that for subordinates, having served under a successful coup supporter increases earnings by 7.56% within three years. This effect may be larger in a longer time frame. We obtain the salaries from San Martin Losada (1929,1941).

government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the posting level (models 1 and 2) and doubly at the individual and posting levels (models 3 and 4).

5.2 Additional Robustness Checks

Alternative sample definitions. In Table A.15, we show that our results are robust to different decisions in sample definition. First, in columns 1 and 2, we show that when we include the rebel-controlled area in our estimation, our estimates remain positive and significant (with very similar precision) but decrease by roughly half. This is to be expected since there is almost no variation in the dependent variable within the rebel-controlled area (see map in Figure 1 and explanation in section 4). In columns 3 and 4, we drop those serving under or exposed to loyal generals (instead of adding exposure to loyalists as control, as we do in the baseline). In columns 5 and 6, we drop the observations where a subordinate is treated by both a rebel and a loyalist. The estimates we obtain from these specifications are larger than in our baseline. A potential explanation for this finding is that the treatment was more intense in postings with fewer generals.

Postings without generals. A large number of postings in the control sample do not have a general in charge (by definition, those in the treatment sample are in a posting with at least one general, loyalist or rebel). Therefore, in Table A.15 (columns 7 and 8), we run a robustness check where we restrict the control sample to postings with retired generals. Our results remain substantively unchanged (though we lose significance in one of the four specifications).

The samples are smaller. The individual sample has 1,663 observations (down from 5,330), and the individual-posting sample has 2,733 (down from 18,126). This is a product of how we define the postings. In our baseline regressions, we take the postings literally (as they appear in the yearbooks, see Figure 2 for an example). Therefore, someone serving in the “First Division, Second Brigade, Third Regiment” will not be serving under a general since they were in charge of brigades and divisions, not regiments. We address this issue immediately below.

Using the military hierarchy. In order to produce estimates for the majority of the army, i.e. those not serving directly under a general, we use the Army’s organizational structure. For example, we link subordinates serving in regiments and battalions to the

generals in charge of the corresponding divisions or brigades. We report the results in Table A.16. In model 5, we count all the rebel leaders above an officer in the hierarchy. The main coefficient is positive but smaller in magnitude (around 12.6% of the size of our baseline coefficient in Table 3, model 4). This is to be expected since the relationships between high-ranking and low-ranking officers are necessarily more distant. For example, it is not even guaranteed that a given regiment is located in the same city as the divisional headquarters.

To understand more precisely how our estimates decline with organizational distance, we define the independent variable (at the individual-posting level) as:

$$\text{Rebels in Hierarchy} = \sum_{d=0}^n \text{Rebel} \times \alpha^d$$

Where *Rebel* is a dummy variable that equals one if there is a rebel general in the posting and n equals the number of levels above it. For example, the First Division has zero levels above. The First Division, Second Brigade, Third Regiment, has two. d equals zero for the literal posting where the subordinate is posted, and it increases by one for each higher-level posting. α is a parameter that adjusts by how much we discount higher-up generals for lower-ranking officers. We also compute the corresponding *Loyalists in Hierarchy* variable.

For example, take an officer posted in the First Division, Second Brigade, Third Regiment. There is one rebel general in the First Division. Therefore, we compute the independent variable as $0 \times \alpha^0 + 0 \times \alpha^1 + 1 \times \alpha^2$. With $\alpha = 1$, the independent variable equals 1. With $\alpha = 0.5$, it equals 0.25. With $\alpha = 0$, it equals 0. Therefore, $\alpha = 1$ weights all superiors equally, and $\alpha = 0$ approaches our baseline specification by only considering generals in the same posting as the subordinate.

Table A.16 reports the results. As expected, with $\alpha = 0$ the results approach the baseline (they are slightly different due to the exclusion of those outside the hierarchy, such as support or training units.). With $\alpha = 1$ (equivalent to counting the rebel leaders above an officer in the hierarchy), we find that exposure to rebel generals (more precisely, the number of levels with rebel generals) causes a 1.8 pp. increase in the probability of rebellion (equivalent to 2.6% of the mean). This effect is statistically significant and substantively important but much smaller than our baseline coefficients. We run the regressions for $\alpha = \{0.25, 0.5, 0.75\}$, and we find that our effect is decreasing in α . In conclusion, the organizational distance between the leader and the subordinate matters, and our effects are

driven by close relationships.

Reverse causality. A potential concern is that subordinates may have influenced their former leaders into joining the rebellion. Our identification strategy assumes that lower-ranking officers do not influence generals. Reassuringly, our results remain unchanged when we drop colonels and lieutenant colonels from our sample (Table A.13). These two ranks are the 6th and 7th steps in the ladder (generals are in the 8th to 10th). We also drop the highest-ranked (non-general) officer in each 1936 posting (Table A.14), and our results remain substantively unchanged.

Weights. A potential problem with the individual-posting dataset is that individuals who served in many postings are overrepresented in the dataset. Therefore, in Table A.12, we weight observations by $\frac{1}{\text{number of postings}}$. Our results remain substantively unchanged.

Alternative definition of the dependent variable. If an officer served under the government but was afterward reincorporated to the Army by Franco, he is classified as a rebel in the Engel Masolvier (2008) dataset. The opposite happens for officers who served under the rebel side but were dismissed after the war.²⁷ In Table A.11, we show that our results are robust to dropping these officers. The individual level dataset estimates (models 2 and 3) are 31 to 35% larger than the corresponding models in the baseline (Table 3). The individual-destination level dataset estimates are substantively unchanged from the baseline.

Omitted Variable Bias. A remaining concern is that, despite our strategy to deal with the issues of selection described above, treated officers are different from control officers in unobservable determinants of rebellion. Above, we argued that this is unlikely to be the case because our coefficients (after including fixed effects) remained stable after including important determinants of rebellion as control variables. That is, observables do not drive selection into the treatment. We now proceed to formally test this argument, using the methods developed by Altonji et al. (2005), Oster (2019), Masten and Poirier (2022), and Diegert et al. (2022).²⁸

Using Oster (2019)’s terminology, we will compare the “short” regression in Table 3, column 5 to the “medium” regression in column 6. We will explore under what conditions our main causal finding goes away (the effect of being in a posting under a rebel general). The short regression includes our main variable of interest “Posting under Rebel Leader”,

²⁷These officers were known at the time as “geographic loyalists” (i.e. they served in a given side because of their geographic location and not because of their preferences) and were affected by the Varela Law of 1940 (Varela was Franco’s minister for the Army).

²⁸All the results that follow were calculated using Diegert et al. (2022)’s **regsensitivity** Stata package.

plus “Posting under Loyalist Leader”, “Posting under Any General” and posting fixed effects as always-included controls. The medium regression also contains as regressors the number of postings, tenure, officer rank, and years in Africa, the subordinate’s variation in the hierarchy during the Republic, and *corps* fixed effects (artillery, cavalry, infantry, engineers, carabineros, general staff).

We find that, for our results to be invalid, the selection into the treatment on unobservables has to be disproportionately big as a proportion of the selection on observables. First, we calculate what Masten and Poirier (2022) call the *explain away* breakdown point. That is, what value of the ratio of selection on unobservables to selection on observables is consistent with a zero causal effect? This is Oster (2019)’s main sensitivity parameter. We find that, for the causal effect to be zero, the selection on unobservables has to be 7.55 times the magnitude of the selection on observables. We make the most conservative assumption for Oster (2019)’s second sensitivity parameter (that is, the R^2 of the “long” regression with the omitted variables is set to one).

Second, we calculate the *sign change* breakdown point. That is, what value of the ratio of selection on unobservables to selection on observables is consistent with a causal effect that has a different sign from the causal effect in the baseline model? Masten and Poirier (2022) show that these points are not generally equivalent. We find a sign-change breakdown point equal to 1, the highest possible value for this parameter if we impose no limits on the size of the omitted variable bias (Theorem 4 of Masten and Poirier (2022)). A reasonable magnitude restriction on the true (unobserved) causal effect may be $\beta \geq -1$ (that is, an officer exposed to the rebels is 100pp. less likely to join the rebellion than a non-exposed officer). This is equivalent to limiting the omitted variable bias to 1.108. Imposing this restriction, we obtain a *sign change* breakdown ratio of 7.44, very similar to Oster (2019)’s *explain away* breakdown ratio.

Third, Diegert et al. (2022) argue that in the presence of endogenous controls (i.e., when the omitted variables are correlated with the included controls) the methods described above can yield incorrect results. Under very conservative assumptions (in particular, unbounded effects of the omitted variables on the treatment), we find that the ratio of selection on unobservables to selection on observables that breaks our results is equal to .402.

Common exposure to politics. Subordinates and their superiors served in the same posting and, therefore, in the same geographic location. They may have been exposed to the

same political environment, which may have colored their subsequent views about the coup. In Table A.21, we control for the average vote for the left over the subordinates’ careers. In the regressions without controls, the coefficient is negative, suggesting that a more leftist environment did decrease coup support. The coefficient becomes positive when we add the controls, likely due to collinearity with other variables. Reassuringly, our main coefficients remain unchanged.

Principal Rebel Leaders. In Table A.18, we decompose the effect of rebel leaders into the impact of “principal” leaders and the rest. Principal leaders were the eight main conspirators (listed in Table A.9), including generals elsewhere mentioned in the paper, such as Franco, Mola, Goded, and Cabanellas. We find that these leaders had a stronger pull over their former subordinates, but the differences between the coefficients are not statistically significant. Still, this is a reassuring sanity check, indicating that our results are not driven by strong effects of the most obscure rebel generals.

6 Examples from our Dataset: José Cuesta Monereo and Miguel Cabanellas

In this section, we show an example from our dataset that highlights both how we built our dataset and illustrates the mechanisms behind our results. There are two relevant people in this example: Major Cuesta Monereo (a subordinate) and General Miguel Cabanellas (a leader). Cuesta was Cabanellas’ *aide-de-camp* in 1934, and since the latter was a leader of the rebellion, the former is classified as being treated by a rebel leader in our dataset. In 1936, Cuesta was serving under a loyalist general, but he rebelled anyway.

Before 1936, Cabanellas was a committed republican, so it is unlikely that he indoctrinated Cuesta with anti-republican ideals. We cannot establish for certain why Cuesta supported the rebellion, but two things are clear: First, he had a deep knowledge of the conspiracy and had, therefore, a good idea about its probability of success. Importantly, he was aware of Cabanellas’ involvement (unlike the government). Second, during and after the Civil War, Cuesta got promoted very rapidly, reaching the very top of the Army’s hierarchy.

Figures 2 and 3 illustrate our data collection process. The first reproduces part of the military yearbooks, which we use to build our novel dataset of military careers. In particular, panels (a) and (b) show Cabanellas in 1934 and 1936, and panels (c) and (d) show Cuesta in

1934 and 1936. The last column contains the posting (*destino*), which we use to link leaders to subordinates. For example, in 1934, Miguel Cabanellas was 2nd Inspector General of the Army, and his aide-de-camp was Cuesta (note that the fact that Cabanellas is mentioned by name in Cuesta’s posting is not necessary to link them, they are matched because Cuesta’s posting includes the text “*2a Inspeccion General*”). In 1936, they were both in different postings: Cabanellas in charge of the 5th Division (Zaragoza) and Cuesta under Villa-Abrile in the 2nd Division (Seville). Figure 3 reproduces pages of Engel Masolvier (2008), which we use to classify the loyalties (support for either the rebels or the government) for both leaders and subordinates. Note that both Cabanellas (panel a) and Cuesta (panel b) have an “N” next to their names, indicating their rebel (“Nationalist”) allegiance, while Villa-Abrile has an “R” (“Republican”).

Cabanellas. Miguel Cabanellas²⁹ joined the army in 1889 and got “meteoric” promotions during the 1910s, thanks to his performance in battle in Africa. He was promoted to brigadier general in 1919. He did not support Primo de Rivera’s coup in 1923, but he was still promoted to major general in 1924. He was put in reserve in 1926. He conspired against the government in 1929 and 1930, the last year of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera. Around this time, he joined an association of like-minded republican generals, the *Asociación de Ciudadanía Militar*. He was also a mason (Paz Sánchez, 2004).

After the end of the dictatorship and the abolition of the monarchy, he was rehabilitated by the new republican government. He had important commands during the early 1930s, including Inspector General of the Army. At that time, Cuesta Moreneo was his *aide-de-camp*, and they traveled the country inspecting regiments. We have an account of one such visit to the VII Brigade. Cabanellas demanded the officers to say “long live the Republic” when they saluted with their sabers, and suggested they hang artwork with some sort of allegory of the Republic (summarized in Coque (2017), pp. 154-155, based on Guarner (1975)).³⁰

In January 1936 he got assigned command of the 5th Division, based in Zaragoza. When the left won the February elections, the government replaced many of the division commanders with more loyal generals (e.g., Franco was sent to Canarias, Goded to the Balearic

²⁹The biographical information in these paragraphs is mostly based on Cabanella’s entry in the Biographical Dictionary of the Spanish Royal Academy of History (Egea Bruno, 2024).

³⁰As a further confirmation of Cabanella’s republicanism, he participated in politics as a candidate for the Radical Republican Party in 1933. In a manifesto, he proclaimed: “*I am not a Marxist nor an anti-Marxist, I recognize the proletarian desires as just...*” (Egea Bruno, 2024). Coque (2017) describes him as “one of the most republican bosses in the Army” (p. 154, our translation).

Islands, etc.). Due to his reputation as a republican, Cabanellas was confirmed in his post. On June 5th, Mola (the main plotter) got him to join the conspiracy (Coque (2017), p. 104). His rebellion was a complete surprise for the government. It is not entirely clear why he joined the uprising, as he did not share the ideas of conservative and monarchist officers such as Franco and Mola. His participation was crucial: Zaragoza, strategically located between Madrid and Barcelona, fell to the rebels, with all the troops and resources of the 5th Division and with little opposition from loyalist forces.

Cuesta's pre-coup career. Cuesta Moreneo³¹ graduated from the Toledo Infantry Academy in 1913 and participated in campaigns in Morocco in 1924 and 1925, where he was described as “affable, cultured, active and tireless in the fulfillment of his duties and, in short, a brilliant Chief of Staff”.

From 1931 to 1934, he was *aide-de-camp* of General Miguel Cabanellas. In 1933, Cabanellas was named chief of the 2nd General Inspection of the Army, and Cuesta accompanied him in visits to garrisons all over Spain. Coque (2017) affirms that the pair had “strong personal ties” and that Cuesta may have been influenced by Cabanellas’ republicanism “within an idea of social progress, but with order.” Cuesta corresponded to Cabanellas about the coup (for example, in a letter dated April 28th, 1936) (Coque, 2017, pp. 101-102).

In 1935, Cuesta was assigned to the 2nd division, headquartered in Sevilla. In February 1936, General Villa-Abrille was appointed to command the division by the new leftist government.

The coup in Seville. In mid-June, Villa-Abrille was approached by rebel general Queipo de Llano, but he refused to join the conspiracy (Serem (2012), p. 28). However, he failed to report the conspirators to the government. When assessing the coup’s chances, Mola concluded that despite the lack of support by the top ranks, success in Seville (and all of Andalusia) was almost certain, thanks to the support of the middle ranks (including Cuesta) (Coque, 2017, pp. 101-102, 151-152).

When the coup was launched on July 18, the rebels, led by General Queipo de Llano, took control of Seville’s largest regiment in just a few hours. Because Villa-Abrille was a recent arrival to Seville, and because his more competent subordinates carried out the coup successfully Serem (2012) argues that Villa-Abrille was the leader of the 2nd Division “in

³¹The biographical information in these paragraphs is mostly based on Cuesta’s entry in the Biographical Dictionary of the Spanish Royal Academy of History (Gómez y González de la Buelga, 2024)

name only” (p. 58).³² By the end of the day, the rebels had secured the main government buildings, and Queipo de Llano addressed the population through the radio. During the following three days, the rebels managed to defeat loyalist forces in the workers’ neighborhoods, where militias had risen up to defend the Republic. The rebels’ success in Seville was key. It was the fourth largest city in Spain and the biggest to fall to the rebels in July. Strategically, it was crucial for the arrival of rebel African troops to the Peninsula (Serem, 2012, p. 52).

Cuesta’s post-coup career. In the civil war that followed the coup, Cuesta Moreneo played an important command role under General Queipo, including in the battles of Málaga and Peñarroya. He also acted as a liaison between Queipo and Franco. When the war was over, he was destined to the Army’s General Staff with the rank of lieutenant colonel. He eventually made it to the top of the military hierarchy: he was promoted to brigadier general in 1947, major general in 1951, and lieutenant general in 1957. For reference, without counting bonuses, a lieutenant general’s salary was 2.72 times a major’s (Cuesta’s rank at the beginning of the war) (San Martín Losada, 1929, 1941).

³²In February 1939, Villa-Abrile he was sentenced to six years in prison by a rebel court. He died in 1946, shortly after finishing his sentence.

Figure 2: Example from our dataset: yearbooks

Número por clase.	NOMBRES	FECHAS			Procedencia.....	DESTINO O SITUACIÓN
		del nacimiento	del ingreso en el servicio	de antigüedad		
	TENIENTES GENERALES (A extinguir)					
	EXCMOS. SEÑORES:					
1	☉ D. Pío López Pozas.....	7- 4-71	30- 8-88	22- 4-927	Inf.*	Disponible 1.ª División.
2	★ M. M. D. Alberto Castro Girona....	7-10-75	14- 9-92	1-10-927	Inf.*	Disponible 1.ª División.
3	☉ D. José Rodríguez Casademunt....	8-12-70	31- 8-86	9-11-928	Inf.*	Presidente del Consejo Director de las Asambleas de las Ordenes Militares de San Fernando y San Hermenegildo.
	GENERALES DE DIVISIÓN					
	EXCMOS. SEÑORES:					
1	D. Eduardo López de Ochoa y Portuondo.....	31- 1-77	27- 8-98	10- 1-924	Inf.*	3.ª Inspección General.
2	★ Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer.....	1- 1-72	22- 8-89	19- 5-924	Cab.*	2.ª Inspección General.
3	★ D. Angel Rodríguez del Barrio....	28- 8-76	28- 8-93	19-10-925	Inf.*	1.ª Inspección Gral.-Vicepresidente Consejo Superior de la Guerra.-Presidente Junta Clasificadora de Generales y Coroneles.

(a) Cabanellas in 1934

GENERALES DE DIVISIÓN					
EXCMOS. SEÑORES:					
1 D. Eduardo López de Ochoa y Portuondo.....	31- 1-77	27- 8-93	10- 1-924	Inf.*	Disponible.
2 Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer.....	1- 1-72	22- 8-89	19- 5-924	Cab.*	5.ª División.
3 D. Ángel Rodríguez del Barrio....	28- 8-76	28- 8-93	19-10-925	Inf.*	1.ª Inspección Gral.-Vicepresidente Consejo Superior de la Guerra.-Presidente Junta Clasificadora de Generales y Coroneles.

(b) Cabanellas in 1936

46 O. P. A. D. Ángel Negrón Cuevas.....	27- 4- 95	30- 8-909	2- 2-924	1.ª División orgánica.
47 D. Luis Serrano Gómez.....	17-12- 92	1- 3-909	6- 3-924	5.ª División orgánica.
48 Francisco Mut Ramón.....	3- 2- 94	30- 8-910	13- 3-924	4.ª División orgánica.
49 José Cuesta Monereo.....	5-12- 95	28- 8-910	13- 3-924	Ayudante de Campo del General Cabanellas (M) 2.ª Insp. General del Ejército.
50 Enrique González Pons.....	22- 4- 89	29- 8-909	15- 3-924	Sec. Topografía de la 2.ª División.
51 Miguel Rodríguez Pavón.....	1-11- 92	30- 1-911	31- 7-924	Sección Cartográfica.

(c) Cuesta in 1934

26 O. P. A. D. Ángel Negrón Cuevas.....	27- 4- 95	30- 8-909	2- 2-924	1.ª División orgánica.
27 D. Luis Serrano Gómez.....	17-12- 92	1- 3-909	6- 3-924	5.ª División orgánica.
28 Francisco Mut Ramón.....	3- 2- 94	30- 8-910	13- 3-924	4.ª División orgánica.
29 José Cuesta Monereo.....	5-12- 95	28- 8-910	13- 3-924	2.ª División orgánica.
30 Enrique González Pons.....	22- 4- 89	29- 8-909	15- 3-924	Sec. Topografía 2.ª División.
31 Miguel Rodríguez Pavón.....	1-11- 92	30- 1-911	31- 7-924	E. M. C., Sec.ª Cartográfica.
32 Felipe Amillo Miguel.....	2- 2- 92	31- 8-911	31- 7-924	Ayudante del Gral. Rodríguez Ramírez.

(d) Cuesta in 1936

Example of our dataset construction. In 1934, Miguel Cabanellas was 2nd Inspector General of the Army, and his *aide-de-camp* was Cuesta (note that the fact that Cabanellas is mentioned by name in Cuesta's posting is not necessary to link them, they are matched because Cuesta's posting includes "2ª Inspección General"). In 1936, they were both in different postings: Cabanellas in charge of the 5th Division and Cuesta under Villa-Abrile in the 2nd Division. These images are extracted from the 1934 and 1936 Military Yearbooks, Chapter IX, section "Generales de División" (major generals) for Cabanellas and section "Comandantes" (majors) for Cuesta.

Figure 3: Example from our dataset: Engel's book

450		CARLOS ENGEL MASOLIVER
Jefatura de la 5ª División Orgánica		
N	general de división	Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer
N	comandante de Estado Mayor	José Cebollero Garcés
El general Cabanellas falleció de enfermedad en Málaga en el año 1938.		

(a) Cabanellas loyalty and posting in 1936, according to Engel Masolvier (2008) (p. 450)

Jefatura de la 2ª División Orgánica		
R	general de división	José Fernández-Villabril Calivara
N	teniente coronel de Artillería	Manuel Lizaúr de Paúl (ayudante)
N	comandante de Infantería	Mariano Allende Nuviola (ayudante)
N	profesor 1º de Equitación	Gabriel Fuentes Ferrer
El general Fernández-Villabril, que se había resistido a la sublevación, fue dado de baja y permaneció en prisión durante toda la guerra.		
Estado Mayor		
R	coronel de Estado Mayor	Juan Cantero Ortega
N	comandante de Estado Mayor	José Cuesta Monereo
R	comandante de Estado Mayor	Francisco Hidalgo Sánchez
N	comandante de Estado Mayor	Enrique González Pons (Sección de Topografía)
N	comandante de Estado Mayor	Manuel Lombardero Vicente
N	capitán de Estado Mayor	Manuel Escribano Aguirre
N	capitán de Estado Mayor	Manuel Gutiérrez Flores
N	capitán de Estado Mayor	Fernando Fuster Vilaplana (Sección de Topografía)
El coronel Cantero y el comandante Hidalgo fueron retirados por indecisión.		

(b) Cuesta Monereo's and Villa-Abrille's loyalty and posting in 1936, according to Engel Masolvier (2008) (pp. 390-391)

Example of our dataset construction. These are example pages from Engel Masolvier (2008). The **N** next to Cabanellas and Cuesta indicates that they joined the rebels (Nationalists), and the **R** next to Villa-Abrille means that he remained loyal to the government (Republican).

7 Discussion

For Spanish Army officers, choosing what side to support in the coup may have been the most important decision of their lives. For Spain, the split of the Army led to a civil war with half a million casualties and a forty-year-long dictatorship. Our analysis reveals that while the Republic’s strategy of replacing key generals proved insufficient for its survival, the role of the military hierarchy remained crucial, albeit in an unexpected way: subordinates followed their former leaders rather than current ones. This finding illuminates the persistent influence of past hierarchies.

Why do individuals follow leaders? We define a leader as someone who has followers who follow voluntarily. While current commanders can rely on formal authority over their subordinates, former leaders must find other ways to inspire loyalty.

The two sides in the Spanish Civil War were separated by wide ideological differences. The government had support from the left, including republicans, socialists, communists, and anarchists. The rebels were backed by the right, constituted by monarchists, conservatives, and fascists. Internationally, the government had support from the Soviet Union, while the rebels had support from Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. However, we do not find that indoctrination played a role.

Our results point to mechanisms consistent with forward-looking agents who are worried about both the immediate present (surviving the coup) and their future career prospects. We provide evidence consistent with a theory of leadership based on coordination, in which officers try to predict the winner by sampling the allegiances of their former leaders. We also find support for a theory of leadership based on reciprocity. Subordinates support their leaders because they expect material rewards if they ascend to power.

Our results also have practical insights for democratic leaders trying to coup-proof their regimes. The role of past hierarchies suggests that the bond of loyalty between a subordinate and his former leader is not broken when they are transferred away. This is especially relevant for young democracies, whose past hierarchies were shaped by former dictators. But even decisions made during democratic administrations can have unexpected consequences. The republic made frequent use of rotation to place likely loyal generals in strategic positions. In doing so, they exposed more officers to more generals (some of whom ended up on the rebel side). Since we do not find an effect on the intensive margin (i.e., more years under a rebel do not increase the probability of rebellion), keeping suspect generals as stationary as

possible may have been more effective.

In conclusion, this paper demonstrates that formal authority alone does not determine military loyalty—past hierarchical relationships play a crucial role in shaping officers’ decisions during political crises. These results have implications beyond military coups, speaking to fundamental questions about organizational behavior and institutional design. When formal and informal hierarchies diverge, the latter may prove more influential in determining individual behavior. Future research might explore whether similar dynamics exist in other organizational contexts where formal authority structures undergo rapid change, such as corporate mergers or political transitions. Our findings also suggest that institutional reforms aimed at ensuring organizational loyalty should account not just for current power structures but for the persistent influence of past hierarchical relationships.

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A Online Appendix for Why Do People Follow Leaders? Evidence from 1936 Spain

A.1 Proofs

Proof of Proposition 1.

Proof. The officer's expected utility for each choice is given by

$$\begin{aligned} u_i(d_i = 1 \mid \hat{p}_i) &= u_i^{r|R} P(p \geq p^* \mid \hat{p}_i) + u_i^{r|L} P(p < p^* \mid \hat{p}_i), \\ u_i(d_i = 0 \mid \hat{p}_i) &= u_i^{\ell|R} P(p \geq p^* \mid \hat{p}_i) + u_i^{\ell|L} P(p < p^* \mid \hat{p}_i). \end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

These are the same as

$$\begin{aligned} u_i(d_i = 1 \mid \hat{p}_i) &= \sigma_i(u_i^{r|R} - u_i^{r|L}) + u_i^{r|L}, \\ u_i(d_i = 0 \mid \hat{p}_i) &= \sigma_i(u_i^{\ell|R} - u_i^{\ell|L}) + u_i^{\ell|L} \end{aligned}$$

because $\sigma_i := P(p \geq p^* \mid \hat{p}_i)$ and, hence, $P(p < p^* \mid \hat{p}_i) = 1 - \sigma_i$.

Note that $u_i(d_i = 1 \mid \hat{p}_i) \geq u_i(d_i = 0 \mid \hat{p}_i)$ is equivalent to

$$\sigma_i(u_i^{r|R} - u_i^{r|L}) + u_i^{r|L} \geq \sigma_i(u_i^{\ell|R} - u_i^{\ell|L}) + u_i^{\ell|L}$$

or

$$\sigma_i \geq \frac{u_i^{\ell|L} - u_i^{r|L}}{(u_i^{\ell|L} - u_i^{r|L}) + (u_i^{r|R} - u_i^{\ell|R})}.$$

□

A.2 Additional Tables

A.2.1 Descriptive Tables

Table A.1: Number of Officers per Year

Year	All	Entries		Exits	Unique Individuals	Exits as % of N
		New	Returning			
1927				273	5665	4.82%
1928	436	436		214	5828	3.67%
1929	890	704	186	307	6504	4.72%
1930	333	180	153	578	6530	8.85%
1931	439	206	233	588	6391	9.20%
1932	1270	727	543	336	7073	4.75%
1933	856	381	475	262	7593	3.45%
1934	673	343	330	305	8004	3.81%
1935	883	608	275	345	8582	4.02%
1936	2710	2380	330		10947	

This table reports the number of officers per year in our dataset. The entries are officers who appear in a given year but were not present the year before. Exits are the officers who appear in that year but not in the next. Since we only look for officers present in 1936, all exits later return. We cannot ascertain whether these missing observations are due to failed name matches or due to periods of inactivity. Reassuringly, the years with the highest number of exits correspond to the military reform, when many officers were transferred to the reserve.

Table A.2: Proportion of Treated Officers by Year

	Number of Officers	Proportion of officers serving under...			
		Rebel General	Loyalist General	Retired General	Any General
All Years	5366	0.186	0.158	0.203	0.313
Monarchy	3406	0.109	0.071	0.266	0.292
Republic	5336	0.149	0.130	0.079	0.217
1927	2721	0.004	0.005	0.137	0.144
1928	2797	0.034	0.023	0.145	0.170
1929	3088	0.033	0.002	0.126	0.147
1930	3086	0.020	0.001	0.130	0.143
1931	3033	0.074	0.057	0.135	0.150
1932	3432	0.064	0.027	0.070	0.107
1933	3632	0.031	0.021	0.051	0.091
1934	3811	0.042	0.080	0.054	0.112
1935	4047	0.064	0.059	0.007	0.114
April 1936	5084	0.085	0.059	0.000	0.141
July 1936	5366	0.108	0.078	0.000	0.125

This table presents descriptive statistics for our treatment variables. It shows the proportion of *officers* serving under generals who rebelled, remained loyal, or were retired by 1936. The last column shows the proportion of officers serving under any general (the remainder were typically low-ranking officers stationed in postings with no generals). Note that columns 2, 3, and 4 do not add up to column 5 because there were postings with more than one general.

Table A.3: Proportion of Treated Postings by Year

	Number of Postings	Proportion of postings under...			
		Rebel General	Loyalist General	Retired General	Any General
All Years	1673	0.040	0.033	0.078	0.104
Monarchy	873	0.036	0.018	0.120	0.127
Republic	800	0.045	0.049	0.033	0.079
1927	546	0.011	0.004	0.103	0.108
1928	568	0.014	0.007	0.106	0.118
1929	557	0.018	0.009	0.095	0.113
1930	649	0.023	0.005	0.111	0.129
1931	620	0.031	0.013	0.079	0.106
1932	525	0.023	0.021	0.034	0.069
1933	560	0.020	0.030	0.027	0.069
1934	546	0.029	0.042	0.027	0.084
1935	529	0.030	0.036	0.011	0.066
April 1936	536	0.039	0.039	0.000	0.076
July 1936	492	0.043	0.041	0.000	0.075

This table presents descriptive statistics for our treatment variables. It shows the proportion of *postings* under generals who rebelled, remained loyal, or were retired by 1936. The last column shows the proportion of postings under any general. Note that columns 2, 3, and 4 do not add up to column 5 because there were postings with more than one general.

Table A.4: Number of Officers in Each Posting

	Min	1st Quartile	Median	Mean	3rd Quartile	Max	Std Dev
Number of officers per posting							
All Period	1	12	27	59.564	55	495	100.485
Monarchy postings	1	10	20	46.721	36	396	86.892
Republic postings	1	14	38	69.183	67	495	108.585
July 1936 postings	1	15	29	39.894	46	223	44.978
Number of officers per posting-year							
All Years	1	6	14	29.292	30	267	44.757
Monarchy postings	1	5	10	23.166	18	168	38.741
Republican Years	1	7	19	33.889	34	267	48.279
July 1936 postings	1	15	29	39.894	46	223	44.978

In the upper panel, this table shows descriptive statistics for the size of each type of posting. We use three types of postings: during the monarchy (1927-1931), those during the Republic (1932-April 1936), and the postings at the time of the coup. The first two types are different because the Republic reformed the Army structure. The postings in July 1936 are different because they do not come from the yearbooks but from Engel's loyalty dataset. Note that the numbers refer to unique individuals, and not all of them necessarily serve at the same time.

In the lower panel, we present descriptive statistics for the size of each posting-year.

Table A.5: Summary Statistics: Individual-Level Dataset

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Subordinate joins the Rebels	0.651	0.477	0	1	5330
N Postings under Rebel Leader	0.247	0.581	0	5	5330
N Postings under Loyalist Leader	0.188	0.472	0	3	5330
N Postings	3.376	1.996	1	11	5330
Tenure	22.95	8.360	5	57	5330
Officer Rank in 1936	3.448	1.485	1	7	5330
Years in Africa (core)	0.208	0.756	0	12	5330
Cavalry Corps	0.072	0.258	0	1	5330
Estado Mayor Corps	0.023	0.148	0	1	5330
Infantry Corps	0.358	0.480	0	1	5330
Engineers Corps	0.105	0.306	0	1	5330
Aviation Corps	0.050	0.219	0	1	5330
Carabineros Corps	0.080	0.271	0	1	5330
Training Corps	0.012	0.108	0	1	5330
Guardia Civil Corps	0.141	0.348	0	1	5330
Hierarchical Position variation (32-36)	0.843	0.655	-1.698	2.948	5330
Leftist Vote in Province	0.483	0.183	0	0.82	5330
Division 1	0.433	0.496	0	1	5330
Division 2	0.059	0.236	0	1	5330
Division 3	0.174	0.379	0	1	5330
Division 4	0.195	0.397	0	1	5330
Division 5	0.006	0.077	0	1	5330
Division 6	0.066	0.249	0	1	5330
Division 7	0.005	0.067	0	1	5330
Division 8	0.024	0.153	0	1	5330
Division 9	0.032	0.175	0	1	5330
Division 10	0.001	0.036	0	1	5330
Division 11	0.003	0.053	0	1	5330
Division 12	0.001	0.031	0	1	5330

This table reports summary statistics for the individual-level dataset. The dependent variable is in the first row, and the main treatment variables are in the next two. The remaining columns are controls.

Table A.6: Comparison between the Full Army and the Army in the Republican Zone

	All of Spain Mean	Republican Area Mean	Difference
Rebel Subordinate	0.803	0.651	0.152
<i>p-value</i>			0.000
<i>diff as %</i>			0.189
<i>of mean</i>			
Number of Postings	3.280	3.376	-0.096
			0.004
			-0.029
Tenure	22.088	22.959	-0.871
			0.000
			-0.039
Officer Rank in 1936	3.345	3.448	-0.103
			0.000
			-0.031
Years in Africa (Core)	0.232	0.208	0.024
			0.058
			0.105
Hierarchical Position Variation (1932-1936)	0.820	0.843	-0.024
			0.028
			-0.029
Leftist Vote in Province	0.406	0.483	-0.076
			0.000
			-0.188
Guardia de Asalto	0.031	0.046	-0.015
			0.000
			-0.493
Years in Africa (Not Only Core)	1.722	1.444	0.278
			0.000
			0.161
Posted in 1936	0.925	0.908	0.017
			0.000
			0.019
Demoted in 1931 Reform	0.057	0.056	0.001
			0.824
			0.015
Highest Ranking in Garrison (1936)	0.070	0.067	0.003
			0.502
			0.040

The purpose of this table is to compare the full Spanish Army with the Army in the government-controlled area. Since most officers in the rebel-controlled Area did not have the choice of whether or not to rebel, our baseline specifications only use the Rgovernment-controlled area.

Table A.7: Balance Table: Effect of More Covariates on Treatment Status

Dataset	N Rebel		N Loyalist		Rebel		Loyalist	
	Ind	Ind	Ind	Ind	Ind-Post	Ind-Post	Ind-Post	Ind-Post
	Posting FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Artillary Corps	-0.089	-0.880	-0.076	0.078	-0.023	0.005	-0.020	0.008
<i>p-value</i>	0.000	0.071	0.000	0.007	0.253	0.751	0.080	0.670
Cavalry Corps	0.247	-0.884	0.209	-0.040	0.073	-0.010	0.062	-0.006
	0.000	0.459	0.000	0.168	0.068	0.458	0.006	0.766
Estado Mayor Corps	1.222	-0.882	0.899	0.536	0.226	-0.033	0.163	0.023
	0.000	0.268	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.240	0.000	0.548
Infantry Corps	0.012	-0.913	0.054	0.005	0.001	0.006	0.014	-0.003
	0.468	0.111	0.000	0.793	0.932	0.532	0.178	0.802
Enginner Corps	0.002	-0.877	-0.044	-0.082	0.008	0.014	-0.009	0.003
	0.933	0.007	0.035	0.024	0.570	0.332	0.434	0.818
Aviation Corps	-0.059	-0.885	-0.076	-0.045	-0.011	-0.071	-0.019	-0.067
	0.103	0.656	0.010	0.714	0.626	0.403	0.234	0.460
Carabineros Corps	-0.122	-0.887	-0.130	-0.040	-0.042	0.051	-0.042	0.012
	0.000	0.023	0.000	0.585	0.038	0.028	0.000	0.740
Train Corps	0.425	-0.881	0.324	-0.108	0.333	-0.045	0.254	-0.032
	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.001	0.106	0.314	0.099	0.627
Guardia Civil Corps	-0.228	-0.886	-0.185	-0.038	-0.068	0.016	-0.054	-0.014
	0.000	0.419	0.000	0.586	0.020	0.213	0.000	0.383
Guardia de Asalto	-0.127	-0.885	-0.053	0.625	-0.043	-27.622	-0.021	8.657
	0.001	0.000	0.085	0.005	0.002	1.000	0.175	1.000
Years in Africa (Not only Core)	0.044	-0.885	0.034	0.005	0.004	0.000	0.003	0.001
	0.000	0.959	0.000	0.036	0.033	0.810	0.017	0.159
Posted in 1936	-0.504	-0.686	-0.369	-0.384	-0.109	-0.059	-0.080	-0.033
	0.000	0.377	0.000	0.120	0.133	0.124	0.001	0.388
Demoted in 1931 Reform	0.259	-0.885	0.201	0.029	0.045	0.000	0.034	0.007
	0.000	0.759	0.000	0.086	0.013	0.996	0.004	0.442
Highest Ranking in Garrison 1936	0.058	-0.883	0.084	0.005	-0.004	-0.007	0.006	-0.004
	0.070	0.485	0.001	0.806	0.770	0.241	0.500	0.515

Each cell in this table corresponds to a regression of one covariate against our main treatment variables. For each variable, the first row shows the coefficient, and the second the p-value. It is an extension of Table 2.

Table A.8: List of Retired Generals who Supported Previous Coups

Name	Supported the 1923 Coup	Supported the 1932 Coup	Endorsed the 1936 Coup
Severiano Martinez Anido	Yes		Yes
José Cavalcanti de Albuquerque y Padierna	Yes	Yes	Yes
Emilio Barrera Luyando		Yes	
Dámaso Berenguer Fusté	Yes		
José Sanjurjo Sacanell	Yes	Yes	Yes*
Juan O'Donnell Vargas	Yes		
Francisco Gomez-Jordana Sousa	Yes		
Federico Berenguer Fusté	Yes		
Leopoldo de Saro Marin	Yes		
Francisco Ruiz del Portal y Martinez	Yes		
Luis Navarro y Alonso de Celada	Yes		
Dalmiro Rodriguez Pedré	Yes		
Mario Muslera Planes	Yes		Yes
Miguel Ponte y Manso de Zunfiga		Yes	Yes

This is a list of the retired generals we use to test the indoctrination mechanism (Table 8). The 1923 coup supporters were conspirators (*Cuadrilatero*), members of the Military Directory, and the War Minister of Primo de Rivera's government. The 1932 coup supporters are classified according to Payne (2017). Their endorsement of the 1936 coup is based on their biographies in Wikipedia or in the *Diccionario Biografico Electronico* of the Royal Academy of History. José Sanjurjo is a complicated case because he did more than endorse the 1936 coup, he was part of the conspiracy (despite being retired). Our results do not change if we reclassify him.

Table A.9: List of Rebel and Loyalist Generals

Name	Allegiance	Rank in 1936	Principal Rebel Conspirator	Command of Troops in 1936
Emilio Mola Vidal	Rebel	Brigadier General	Yes	Yes
Francisco Franco Bahamonde	Rebel	Major General	Yes	Yes
Gonzalo Queipo Llano Sierra	Rebel	Major General	Yes	Yes
Manuel Goded Llopis	Rebel	Major General	Yes	Yes
Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer	Rebel	Major General	Yes	Yes
Andres Saliquet Zumeta	Rebel	Major General	Yes	
Eduardo Lopez Ochoa Portuondo	Rebel	Major General	Yes	
Joaquin Fanjul Goni	Rebel	Major General	Yes	
Agustin Gomez Morato	Loyalist	Major General		Yes
Angel San Pedro Aymat	Loyalist	Brigadier General		Yes
Cristobal Pena Abuin	Loyalist	Major General		Yes
Domingo Batet Mestres	Loyalist	Major General		Yes
Eduardo Cavanna Val	Loyalist	Brigadier General		Yes
Enrique Salcedo Molinuevo	Loyalist	Major General		Yes
Fernando Martinez Monje Restoy	Loyalist	Brigadier General		Yes
Francisco Llano Encomienda	Loyalist	Brigadier General		Yes
Jose Fernandez Villa Abrille Calivara	Loyalist	Major General		Yes
Jose Iglesias Martinez	Loyalist	Brigadier General		Yes
Jose Miaja Menant	Loyalist	Brigadier General		Yes
Julian Lopez Viota	Loyalist	Brigadier General		Yes
Luis Castello Pantoja	Loyalist	Brigadier General		Yes
Manuel Cardenal Dominicis	Loyalist	Brigadier General		Yes
Manuel Romerales Quintero	Loyalist	Brigadier General		Yes
Mariano Gamir Ulibarri	Loyalist	Brigadier General		Yes
Miguel Nunez Prado Susbielas	Loyalist	Major General		Yes
Nicolas Molero Lobo	Loyalist	Major General		Yes
Rogelio Caridad Pita	Loyalist	Brigadier General		Yes
Sebastian Pozas Perea	Loyalist	Brigadier General		Yes
Toribio Martinez Cabrera	Loyalist	Brigadier General		Yes
Alvaro Fernandez Burriel	Rebel	Brigadier General		Yes
Angel Garcia Benitez	Rebel	Brigadier General		Yes
Carlos Bosch Bosch	Rebel	Brigadier General		Yes
Eduardo Martin Gonzalez Fuente	Rebel	Brigadier General		Yes
Eliseo Alvarez Arenas Romero	Rebel	Brigadier General		Yes
Fernando Capaz Montes	Rebel	Brigadier General		Yes
Francisco Patxot Madoz	Rebel	Brigadier General		Yes
Gerardo Ravassa Cuevas	Rebel	Brigadier General		Yes
Gonzalo Gonzalez Lara	Rebel	Brigadier General		Yes
Gregorio Benito Terraza	Rebel	Brigadier General		Yes
Jacinto Fernandez Ampon	Rebel	Brigadier General		Yes
Jose Bosch Atienza	Rebel	Brigadier General		Yes
Jose Garcia Aldave Mancebo	Rebel	Brigadier General		Yes
Jose Sanchez Ocana Beltran	Rebel	Major General		Yes
Justo Legorburu Dominguez Matamoros	Rebel	Brigadier General		Yes
Manuel Garcia Alvarez	Rebel	Brigadier General		Yes
Marcial Barro Garcia	Rebel	Brigadier General		Yes
Victor Carrasco Amilivia	Rebel	Brigadier General		Yes
Virgilio Cabanellas Ferrer	Rebel	Major General		Yes
Alejandro Rodriguez Gonzalez	Loyalist	Brigadier General		
Anselmo Otero Cossio Morales	Loyalist	Brigadier General		
Carlos Bernal Garcia	Loyalist	Brigadier General		
Carlos Masquelet Lacaci	Loyalist	Major General		
Celestino Garcia Antunez	Loyalist	Brigadier General		
Jose Aranguren Roldan	Loyalist	Brigadier General		
Jose Riquelme Lopez Bago	Loyalist	Major General		
Juan Garcia Gomez Caminero	Loyalist	Major General		
Juan Urbano Palma	Loyalist	Brigadier General		
Manuel Alcazar Leal	Loyalist	Brigadier General		
Manuel Cruz Boullosa	Loyalist	Brigadier General		
Pedro Cerda Lopez Mollinedo	Loyalist	Major General		
Rafael Rodriguez Ramirez	Loyalist	Brigadier General		
Abilio Barbero Saldana	Rebel	Brigadier General		
Alberto Castro Girona	Rebel	Lieutenant General		
Alfonso Moya Andino	Rebel	Brigadier General		
Angel Rodriguez Barrio	Rebel	Major General		
Antonio Losada Ortega	Rebel	Major General		
Aurelio Rodriguez Ocana	Rebel	Brigadier General		
Emilio Araujo Vergara	Rebel	Brigadier General		
Enrique Aviles Melgar	Rebel	Brigadier General		
Eugenio Espinosa Monteros Bermejillo	Rebel	Brigadier General		
Federico Cruz Boullosa	Rebel	Brigadier General		
Federico Miquel Lacour	Rebel	Brigadier General		
Jose Rodriguez Casademunt	Rebel	Lieutenant General		
Julio Bragulat Pascual	Rebel	Brigadier General		
Julio Mena Zueco	Rebel	Brigadier General		
Leopoldo Jimenez Garcia	Rebel	Brigadier General		
Luis Grijalvo Celaya	Rebel	Brigadier General		
Luis Orgaz Yoldi	Rebel	Brigadier General		
Manuel Gonzalez Carrasco	Rebel	Major General		
Manuel Llanos Medina	Rebel	Brigadier General		
Manuel Lon Laga	Rebel	Brigadier General		
Pio Lopez Pozas	Rebel	Lieutenant General		
Rafael Lopez Gomez	Rebel	Brigadier General		
Rafael Villegas Montesinos	Rebel	Major General		
Ricardo Morales Diaz	Rebel	Brigadier General		

Table A.10: Proportion Following their Superiors in 1936
by Side, Rank, Division, and Corps

		Proportion following their 1936 superiors
Area	Rebel-controlled	0.726
	Government-controlled	0.583
Rank in 1936	Second Lieutenants	0.496
	Lieutenants	0.687
	Captains	0.659
	Majors	0.627
	Lieutenant Colonels	0.530
	Colonels	0.512
Division	Division 1	0.570
	Division 2	0.628
	Division 3	0.570
	Division 4	0.601
	Division 5	0.784
	Division 6	0.709
	Division 7	0.847
	Division 8	0.660
	Balearic Islands	0.827
	Canary Islands	0.824
	Western African District	0.588
	Eastern African District	0.772
	Rifi	0.857
	Ifni	0.652
	Cape Juby	0.733
	Rio de Oro	0.500
	Gulf of Guinea	1.000
Corps	Artilleria	0.742
	Aviacion	0.466
	Caballeria	0.677
	Carabineros	0.490
	Cuerpo de Tren	0.500
	Estado Mayor	0.450
	Guardia Civil	0.593
	Infanteria	0.673
	Ingenieros	0.700
	Tercio	0.000

This table describes the widespread disruption of the 1936 chain of command. In particular, it presents the proportion of officers who chose the same side as their immediate superior (i.e., the highest-ranking officer in their posting).

A.2.2 Additional Robustness Checks

Table A.11: Baseline Results (Excluding Officers Classified with Post-War Outcomes)

	Subordinate joins the Rebels					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
N Postings under Rebel Leader	0.085*** (0.020)	0.182*** (0.046)	0.172*** (0.048)			
N Postings under Loyalist Leader	-0.048** (0.023)	0.022 (0.048)	-0.000 (0.048)			
Posting under a Rebel Leader				0.087*** (0.034)	0.118*** (0.027)	0.110*** (0.028)
Posting under a Loyalist Leader				-0.044 (0.037)	0.021 (0.025)	0.013 (0.023)
Dataset	Ind	Ind	Ind	Ind-Post	Ind-Post	Ind-Post
Posting FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
1936 Posting FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Mean rebel	0.621	0.621	0.621	0.66	0.66	0.66
Observations	4,885	4,885	4,885	16,629	16,629	16,629

This table shows the effect of rebel and loyalist leaders on their subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal. We drop those officers who Engel classified using post-war outcomes (i.e., officers who fought for the government but were reincorporated after 1939 were classified as rebels, and vice-versa). The unit of observation is the individual (models 1-3) and the individual-posting (models 4-6). We report OLS regressions with no fixed effects (1 and 4), with posting fixed effects (2 and 5), and with fixed effects plus additional controls (3 and 6). The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the posting level (models 1-3) and doubly at the individual and posting levels (models 4 to 6). *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.12: Regressions Weighted by the Inverse of the Number of Postings

	Rebel Subordinate	
	(1)	(2)
Posting under a Rebel Leader	0.117*** (0.033)	0.099*** (0.033)
Posting under a Loyalist Leader	0.045 (0.034)	0.034 (0.022)
Dataset	Ind-Post	Ind-Post
Posting FE	Yes	Yes
1936 Posting FE	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes
Mean rebel	0.686	0.686
Observations	18,126	18,126

This table shows the effect of rebel and loyalist leaders on their subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal. The unit of observation is the individual-posting. We weight observations by the inverse of the number of postings per individual. We report OLS regressions with posting fixed effects, with and without additional controls. The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are doubly clustered at the individual and posting levels (models 4 to 6). *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.13: Reverse Causality (Excluding Colonels)

	Subordinate joins the Rebels					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
N Postings under Rebel Leader	0.086*** (0.019)	0.147** (0.059)	0.131** (0.061)			
N Postings under Loyalist Leader	-0.059** (0.024)	-0.004 (0.055)	-0.016 (0.054)			
Posting under a Rebel Leader				0.084** (0.034)	0.118*** (0.026)	0.118*** (0.027)
Posting under a Loyalist Leader				-0.054 (0.036)	0.018 (0.029)	0.014 (0.025)
Dataset	Ind	Ind	Ind	Ind-Post	Ind-Post	Ind-Post
Posting FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
1936 Posting FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.651	0.651	0.651	0.686	0.686	0.686
Observations	4,893	4,893	4,893	15,942	15,942	15,942

This table shows the effect of rebel and loyalist leaders on their subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal, dropping colonels and lieutenant colonels. The unit of observation is the individual (models 1-3) and the individual-posting (models 4-6). We report OLS regressions with no fixed effects (1 and 4), with posting fixed effects (2 and 5), and with fixed effects plus additional controls (3 and 6). The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the posting level (models 1-3) and doubly at the individual and posting levels (models 4 to 6). *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.14: Reverse Causality (Excluding Highest Rank in Posting 1936)

	Subordinate joins the Rebels					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
N Postings under Rebel Leader	0.068*** (0.018)	0.136*** (0.051)	0.125** (0.053)			
N Postings under Loyalist Leader	−0.039* (0.021)	0.031 (0.054)	−0.005 (0.055)			
Posting under a Rebel Leader				0.067** (0.028)	0.109*** (0.026)	0.114*** (0.028)
Posting under a Loyalist Leader				−0.037 (0.031)	0.026 (0.023)	0.021 (0.022)
Dataset	Ind	Ind	Ind	Ind-Post	Ind-Post	Ind-Post
Posting FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
1936 Posting FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Mean rebel	0.651	0.651	0.651	0.686	0.686	0.686
Observations	4,974	4,974	4,974	16,482	16,482	16,482

This table shows the effect of rebel and loyalist leaders on their subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal, dropping the highest-ranked officers (besides generals) in each posting. The unit of observation is the individual (models 1-3) and the individual-posting (models 4-6). We report OLS regressions with no fixed effects (1 and 4), with posting fixed effects (2 and 5), and with fixed effects plus additional controls (3 and 6). The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the posting level (models 1-3) and doubly at the individual and posting levels (models 4 to 6). *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.15: The Effect of Former Leaders on the Decision to Rebel:
Alternative Sample Definitions

Individual Dataset								
Dependent Variable: Rebel Subordinate								
	<i>Including Rebel Area</i>		<i>Dropping Exposed to Loyal Generals</i>		<i>Dropping Exposed to Both Loyal and Rebel</i>		<i>Only Postings with Generals</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
N Postings under Rebel Leader	0.064*** (0.024)	0.062** (0.025)	0.350*** (0.122)	0.322*** (0.122)	0.269*** (0.103)	0.241** (0.105)	0.153* (0.091)	0.117 (0.091)
Postings FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1936 Postings FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.803	0.803	0.651	0.651	0.651	0.651	0.651	0.651
Observations	11,308	11,308	4,493	4,493	4,806	4,806	1,663	1,663
Individual-Postings Dataset								
Dependent Variable: Rebel Subordinate								
	<i>Including Rebel Area</i>		<i>Dropping Exposed to Loyal Generals</i>		<i>Dropping Exposed to Both Loyal and Rebel</i>		<i>Only Postings with Generals</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Posting under a Rebel Leader	0.051*** (0.010)	0.054*** (0.012)	0.181*** (0.050)	0.209*** (0.050)	0.187*** (0.040)	0.209*** (0.042)	0.120*** (0.023)	0.120*** (0.024)
Postings FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1936 Postings FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.813	0.813	0.686	0.686	0.686	0.686	0.686	0.686
Observations	37,285	37,285	17,118	17,118	17,593	17,593	2,733	2,733

This table shows the effect of rebel and loyalist leaders on their subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal. The level of observation is the individual (upper panel) or the individual-posting (lower panel). Columns 1 and 2 include subordinates who were in the rebel-controlled area on the day of the coup. Columns 3 and 4 exclude subordinates/subordinate-postings who served under loyalist generals. Columns 5 and 6 exclude subordinates/subordinate-postings who served under both types of general. Columns 7 and 8 restrict the sample to postings with generals. For each pair of columns, we present an OLS regression with posting fixed effects and with fixed effects plus additional controls. Standard errors clustered at the posting level (upper panel) and doubly at the individual and posting levels (lower panel) are in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.16: Effect of Rebel Leaders using the Military Hierarchy

	Rebel Subordinate				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Rebels in Hierarchy	0.100*** (0.026)	0.092*** (0.024)	0.066*** (0.019)	0.037*** (0.014)	0.018** (0.009)
Loyalists in Hierarchy	0.027 (0.020)	0.021 (0.017)	0.012 (0.013)	0.006 (0.009)	0.003 (0.006)
α	0	0.25	0.5	0.75	1
Rank	All	All	All	All	All
Postings FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1936 Postings FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.686	0.686	0.686	0.686	0.686
Observations	18,128	18,128	18,128	18,128	18,128

This table shows the effect of rebel and loyalist leaders on their subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal using the military hierarchy. The observation level is the individual-posting. For each subordinate, we sum the number of generals above him. The parameter α discounts generals (organizationally) further away from the subordinate. The distance variable counts how many levels separate a subordinate from a general. We present OLS regressions with fixed effects plus additional controls. The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors are clustered at the posting and subordinate in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.17: Extensive and Intensive Margins

	Subordinate joins the Rebels					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
N Postings under a Rebel Leader	0.063*** (0.024)	0.109** (0.049)	0.125** (0.053)			
N Postings under a Loyalist Leader	-0.027 (0.041)	-0.014 (0.068)	-0.011 (0.072)			
Sum Years under a Rebel Leader	0.007 (0.014)	0.024 (0.023)	0.0002 (0.023)			
Sum Years under a Loyalist Leader	-0.011 (0.030)	0.019 (0.039)	0.006 (0.045)			
Posting under a Rebel Leader				0.062 (0.057)	0.094*** (0.030)	0.098*** (0.032)
Posting under a Loyalist Leader				-0.022 (0.055)	0.023 (0.032)	0.018 (0.031)
Years inside Posting under a Rebel Leader				0.012 (0.024)	0.014 (0.015)	0.010 (0.014)
Years inside Posting under a Loyalist Leader				-0.012 (0.033)	-0.001 (0.027)	-0.001 (0.026)
Dataset	Ind	Ind	Ind	Ind-Post	Ind-Post	Ind-Post
Posting FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
1936 Posting FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.651	0.651	0.651	0.686	0.686	0.686
Observations	5,330	5,330	5,330	18,126	18,126	18,126

This table shows the effect of rebel and loyalist leaders on their subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal. We also include the number of years under treatment to capture the intensive margin. The unit of observation is the individual (models 1-3) and the individual-posting (models 4-6). We report OLS regressions with no fixed effects (1 and 4), with posting fixed effects (2 and 5), and with fixed effects plus additional controls (3 and 6). The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the posting level (models 1-3) and doubly at the individual and posting levels (models 4 to 6). *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.18: The Effect of Principal Rebel Leaders

	Rebel Subordinate					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
N Postings under Rebel Leader (Principal)	0.136*** (0.026)	0.148*** (0.049)	0.128*** (0.048)			
N Postings under Rebel Leader (Not Principal)	0.057*** (0.017)	0.112** (0.050)	0.112** (0.049)			
Posting under a Rebel Leader (Principal)				0.138*** (0.033)	0.148*** (0.041)	0.137*** (0.039)
Postings under a Rebel Leader (Not Principal)				0.056* (0.033)	0.081** (0.032)	0.088*** (0.033)
Dataset	Ind	Ind	Ind	Ind-Post	Ind-Post	Ind-Post
Posting FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
1936 Posting FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.651	0.651	0.651	0.686	0.686	0.686
Observations	5,330	5,330	5,330	18,126	18,126	18,126

This table shows the effect of *principal* rebel leaders on their subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal. Principal leaders are the eight main conspirators (identified in table A.9). The unit of observation is the individual (models 1-3) and the individual-posting (models 4-6). We report OLS regressions with no fixed effects (1 and 4), with posting fixed effects (2 and 5), and with fixed effects plus additional controls (3 and 6). The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the posting level (models 1-3) and doubly at the individual and posting levels (models 4 to 6). *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.19: Effect of Rebel Leaders by Time Period

	Rebel Subordinate			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Posting under a Rebel Leader	0.130** (0.054)	0.080*** (0.029)	0.134** (0.061)	0.077*** (0.027)
Diff Coefficients		0.050 (0.061)		0.057 (0.067)
Regime	Dictatorship	Republic	Dictatorship	Republic
Dataset	Ind-Post	Ind-Post	Ind-Post	Ind-Post
Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1936 Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.686	0.686	0.686	0.686
Observations	7,763	10,363	7,763	10,363

This table shows the effect of rebel leaders on their subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal. We split the sample by period: the Monarchy (1927-1931) and the Republic (1932-1936). Principal leaders are the eight main conspirators (identified in table A.9). The unit of observation is the individual-posting. We report OLS regressions with posting fixed effects (models 1 and 2) and with fixed effects plus additional controls (models 3 and 4). The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are double clustered at the individual and posting levels.

Table A.20: Selection? - Potentially Transferred/Fired Subordinate

	Rebel Subordinate			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Posting under a Rebel Leader	0.108*** (0.023)	0.105*** (0.027)	0.107*** (0.023)	0.106*** (0.026)
Posting under a Loyalist Leader	0.033 (0.025)	0.029 (0.024)	0.037 (0.025)	0.032 (0.024)
Potentially Transferred away from Rebel Leader			-0.010 (0.037)	-0.018 (0.033)
Potentially Transferred away from Loyalist Leader			0.032 (0.037)	0.040 (0.037)
Dataset	Ind-Post	Ind-Post	Ind-Post	Ind-Post
Drop Potentially Transferred	Yes	Yes	No	No
Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1936 Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.684	0.684	0.686	0.686
Observations	17,865	17,865	18,126	18,126

This table shows the effect of rebel and loyalist leaders on their subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal. The unit of observation is the individual-posting. We classify a treated subordinate-posting as "potentially transferred" if he left his previous posting at the same time or after a rebel/loyalist leader arrived. In models 1 and 2, we drop potentially selected observations. In models 3 and 4, we add two variables that equal one if the subordinate was potentially selected. The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are double clustered at the posting and individual levels. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.21: The Effect of Current and Former Leaders on the Decision to Rebel -
Controlling for Political Exposure

	Subordinate joins the Rebels					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
N Postings under Rebel Leader	0.071*** (0.018)	0.125*** (0.048)	0.113** (0.053)			
N Postings under Loyalist Leader	-0.037* (0.022)	0.028 (0.047)	0.005 (0.048)			
Posting under Rebel Leader				0.075** (0.031)	0.102*** (0.026)	0.100*** (0.028)
Posting under Loyalist Leader				-0.034 (0.034)	0.036 (0.023)	0.026 (0.021)
Carrer Political Exposure (Left)	-0.166 (0.141)	-0.102 (0.208)	0.030 (0.178)	-0.184 (0.133)	-0.177 (0.184)	0.253* (0.137)
Dataset	Ind	Ind	Ind	Ind-Post	Ind-Post	Ind-Post
Posting FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
1936 Posting FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.651	0.651	0.651	0.686	0.686	0.686
Observations	5,084	5,084	5,084	17,235	17,235	17,235

This table shows the effect of rebel and loyalist leaders on their former subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal. To control for common political exposure, we control for the support for the left over the subordinate's career. The unit of observation is the individual (models 1-3) and the individual-posting (models 4-6). We report OLS regressions with no fixed effects (1 and 4), with posting fixed effects (2 and 5), and with fixed effects plus additional controls (3 and 6). The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the posting level (models 1 to 3) and doubly at the individual and posting levels (models 4 to 6). *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

A.2.3 Additional Tables on Mechanisms

Table A.22: Coordination? The Impact of Peers' Former Leaders with Controls

	Subordinate joins the Rebels					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prop. of treated peers (by rebels)	0.134* (0.074)	0.114 (0.075)	0.046 (0.061)	0.138*** (0.044)	0.133*** (0.043)	0.054 (0.042)
Prop. of treated peers (by loyalists)	-0.195*** (0.072)	-0.194*** (0.073)	-0.127** (0.064)	-0.137*** (0.046)	-0.138*** (0.046)	-0.062 (0.044)
N Postings under Rebel Leader		0.142*** (0.042)	0.128*** (0.042)			
N Postings under Loyalist Leader		-0.004 (0.040)	-0.001 (0.040)			
Posting under Rebel Leader					0.144*** (0.026)	0.121*** (0.026)
Posting under Loyalist Leader					0.019 (0.020)	0.021 (0.020)
Proportion of Rebel Peers			0.365*** (0.076)			0.478*** (0.040)
Dataset	Ind	Ind	Ind	Ind-Post	Ind-Post	Ind-Post
Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1936 Posting FE	No	No	No	No	No	No
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.651	0.651	0.651	0.686	0.686	0.686
Observations	5,274	5,274	5,274	17,906	17,906	17,906

This table shows the effect of peers' former leaders on subordinates' decisions to rebel. The variable "Prop. of treated peers" measures the proportion of peers in 1936 who were under rebel/loyal leaders at some point prior to 1936. The unit of observation is the individual (models 1 to 3) or the individual-posting (models 4 to 6). All regressions include (pre-1936) fixed effects and controls. The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the posting level (models 1 to 3) and doubly at the individual and posting levels (models 3 to 6). *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.23: Coordination? The Effect of Generals with Command of Troops in 1936

	Rebel Subordinate			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
N Postings under Rebel Leader (in command in 1936)	0.175*** (0.066)	0.158** (0.065)		
N Postings under Rebel Leader (not in command in 1936)	0.067 (0.064)	0.066 (0.065)		
N Postings under Loyalist Leader (in command in 1936)	-0.003 (0.048)	-0.022 (0.046)		
N Postings under Loyalist Leader (not in command in 1936)	0.009 (0.077)	-0.015 (0.082)		
Posting under Rebel Leader (in command in 1936)			0.116*** (0.042)	0.112** (0.045)
Posting under Rebel Leader (not in command in 1936)			0.104*** (0.034)	0.107*** (0.026)
Posting under Loyalist Leader (in command in 1936)			0.021 (0.024)	0.016 (0.023)
Posting under Loyalist Leader (not in command in 1936)			0.065 (0.057)	0.053 (0.055)
Dataset	Ind	Ind	Ind-Post	Ind-Post
Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1936 Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean rebel	0.651	0.651	0.686	0.686
Observations	5,330	5,330	18,126	18,126

This table shows the effect of rebel and loyalist leaders on their former subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal. We further classify generals into those with and without command of troops in 1936. The unit of observation is the individual (models 1 and 2) and the individual-posting (models 3 and 4). We report regressions with posting fixed effects (1 and 3), and with fixed effects plus additional controls (2 and 4). The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the posting level (models 1-3) and doubly at the individual and posting levels (models 4 to 6). *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.24: Indoctrination - the Effect of (Endorsing or Inactive) Right-Wing Retired Generals

	Rebel Subordinate			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
N Postings under Right-Wing Retired (Endorsed the 1936 coup)	0.062 (0.041)	0.034 (0.041)		
N Postings under Right-Wing Retired (Inactive in 1936)	0.070 (0.104)	0.075 (0.103)		
N Postings under Rebel Leader	0.118** (0.052)	0.104* (0.055)		
N Postings under Loyalist Leader	0.001 (0.053)	-0.024 (0.054)		
Posting under Right-Wing Retired (Endorsed the 1936 coup)			0.060 (0.045)	0.050 (0.035)
Posting under Right-Wing Retired (Inactive in 1936)			-0.029 (0.042)	-0.038 (0.048)
Posting under Rebel Leader			0.121*** (0.028)	0.123*** (0.032)
Posting under Loyalist Leader			0.038 (0.024)	0.033 (0.023)
Dataset	Ind	Ind	Ind-Post	Ind-Post
Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1936 Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean rebel	0.651	0.651	0.686	0.686
Observations	5,330	5,330	18,126	18,126

This table shows the effect of retired right-wing generals on subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal. These generals participated in either the 1923 or the 1932 coups. This table extends Table 8 by distinguishing between those who endorsed the 1936 coup and those who were inactive by then. The unit of observation is the individual (models 1 and 2) and the individual-posting (models 3 and 4). We report OLS regressions with posting fixed effects (1 and 3) and with fixed effects plus additional controls (2 and 4). The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the posting level (models 1 and 2) and doubly at the individual and posting levels (models 3 and 4). *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.25: Career Concerns Mechanism - Without Controls

	Promotion in Regime		Promotion in Posting	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
N Postings under a 1923 Leader	0.270*** (0.074)	-0.203*** (0.059)		
N Postings under a Rebel Leader	-0.061 (0.059)	-0.106*** (0.041)		
N Postings under a Loyalist Leader	-0.067 (0.078)	0.027 (0.043)		
Posting under a 1923 Leader			0.196*** (0.067)	-0.202*** (0.005)
Posting under a Rebel Leader			-0.164*** (0.063)	-0.153*** (0.059)
Posting under a Loyalist Leader			0.021 (0.043)	-0.014 (0.080)
Regime	Dictatorship	Republic	Dictatorship	Republic
Dataset	Ind	Ind	Ind-Post	Ind-Post
Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1936 Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	No	No
Observations	6,936	11,273	15,910	21,375

This table shows that subordinates of the 1923 coup organizers were promoted more rapidly during the dictatorship (1927-1931) and more slowly afterward (1932-1936). The variable Promotion equals one if we observe an increase in the officer's rank. The unit of observation is the individual (models 1 and 2) and the individual-posting (models 3 and 4). For the individual dataset, consider promotions within each regime. For the individual-posting dataset, we consider promotions within the specific posting. The regressions include posting fixed effects. Table 9 reports regressions with controls. Standard errors double clustered at the posting and individual level in parentheses.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.26: The Effect of Generals with Command of Troops before 1936

	Rebel Subordinate			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
N Postings under Rebel Leader (in command in 1936)	0.209*** (0.064)	0.211*** (0.065)		
N Postings under Rebel Leader (in command before 1936)	0.133* (0.075)	0.101 (0.076)		
N Postings under Loyalist Leader (in command in 1936)	-0.056 (0.049)	-0.080 (0.049)		
N Postings under Loyalist Leader (in command before 1936)	0.117 (0.082)	0.115 (0.085)		
Posting under Rebel Leader (in command in 1936)			0.138*** (0.040)	0.129*** (0.044)
Posting under Rebel Leader (in command before 1936)			0.082** (0.040)	0.053* (0.028)
Posting under Loyalist Leader (in command in 1936)			-0.009 (0.028)	-0.010 (0.027)
Posting under Loyalist Leader (in command before 1936)			0.079 (0.053)	0.075 (0.050)
Dataset	Ind	Ind	Ind-Post	Ind-Post
Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1936 Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean rebel	0.651	0.651	0.686	0.686
Observations	5,009	5,009	17,838	17,838

This table shows the effect of rebel and loyalist leaders on their former subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal. We further classify generals into those with and without command of troops between 1932 and 1936. To ensure comparability, subordinates under generals never in command of troops were excluded from the sample. The unit of observation is the individual (models 1 and 2) and the individual-posting (models 3 and 4). We report regressions with posting fixed effects (1 and 3), and with fixed effects plus additional controls (2 and 4). The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the posting level (models 1-3) and doubly at the individual and posting levels (models 4 to 6). *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.27: Indoctrination? Effect of Rebel Leaders by Subordinate's Age

	Subordinate joins the Rebels			
	(2)	(3)	(5)	(6)
Posting under Rebel Leader	0.057 (0.047)	0.048 (0.044)	0.109*** (0.023)	0.113*** (0.024)
Posting under Loyalist Leader	0.064 (0.042)	0.056 (0.041)	0.030 (0.024)	0.021 (0.024)
Median Condition (above or below 35 years old)	Below	Below	Above	Above
Dataset	Ind-Post	Ind-Post	Ind-Post	Ind-Post
Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1936 Posting FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Rebel	0.686	0.686	0.686	0.686
Observations	8,564	8,564	9,538	9,538

This table shows the effect of rebel and loyalist leaders on their former subordinates' decisions to rebel or stay loyal, splitting the sample into subordinates below and above the median age in our sample (35 years old) at the time of the treatment. The unit of observation is the individual-posting. We report OLS regressions with posting fixed effects (1 and 2) and with fixed effects plus additional controls (3 and 4). The sample includes subordinates who were in the government-controlled area on the day of the coup. Standard errors (in parentheses) are doubly clustered at the individual and posting levels. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01