

Borders, Repression, and Electoral Persistence: The Legacy of 1851

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Abstract

This paper investigates how diverging historical trajectories and exposure to political repression in the 19th century influenced long-term electoral outcomes. Leveraging the natural experiment created by the 1815-1860 border separating France from the Duchy of Savoy and the County of Nice, I employ a spatial discontinuity design to estimate the political legacy of these distinct paths, characterized by different exposure to the 1851 political repression against Republicans. The results indicate that communes remaining in France during this period have a persistent preference for left-wing candidates, which is driven by limited cross-border population mixing during higher education and at work. Archival data on arrest reports reveal that the 1851 political repression increased abstention rates. Further analysis suggests the repression's long-term effects stem from its impact on local political demand and supply, as well as a contraction in the Republican activist network.

1 Introduction

In December 1851, Jean-Marie Labruyère, also known as “Chacaille”, was a mailman in the French department of Ain and a staunch defender of the Republic. “Chacaille” was very likely involved in a secret *montagnard* club¹. A few days after Napoleon III’s coup, which ended the Second Republic, “Chacaille” fearing the repression targeting those who shared his ideals, fled to Switzerland. His fate, however, was less tragic than that of some of his companions, who faced harsh consequences: some were sent to penal colonies (*i.e.* *bagne*), expelled from their communes, or even executed. This example, drawn from archival work by Devos (1992), highlights the immediate consequences of political repression². But what of its longer-term effects? Did “Chacaille”’s disappearance instill fear among his companions, prompting them to moderate their political stances? Or did it spark indignation and drive them toward more radical positions? Or did it trigger indignation and drive them towards more extreme positions? Perhaps “Chacaille”’s departure simply reduced the number of Republican activists, weakening local support for their cause. These questions invite us to examine the long-term impact of the 1851 political repression in France, particularly its influence on election results. This paper explores this topic by using the natural experiment created by the 1815–1860 border separating France from the Duchy of Savoy and Nice County, and comparing electoral outcomes in similar communes through a spatial regression discontinuity framework.

Understanding the long-term impact of political repression on electoral outcomes is important, as it sheds light on how long term political preferences are formed, and how traumatic events can reshape them. This understanding becomes even more critical given that these preferences can profoundly shape a society’s institutional and economic structure.

Political repression is inherently harmful, with extensive research highlighting its negative effects on mental health (Munczek and Tuber, 1998; Sales et al., 2000; Stammel et al., 2013) and its detrimental economic impacts through the erosion of trust (Nunn, 2009; Berniell et al., 2021; Lichter et al., 2021; Booth et al., 2022; Nikolova et al., 2022). In overall, political repression results in a variety of psychological issues³, reduces trust at both institutional and interpersonal levels, and thus undermines long-term economic development. However, when examining psychological literature more closely, the impact of repression on political attitudes is less straightforward, as victims may respond in

¹ *Montagnard* clubs were clandestine Republican organizations during the first half of the 19th century.

² Political repression is defined by Davenport (2007) as “the act of a state entity controlling a citizenry by force for political reasons, particularly for the purpose of restricting or preventing the citizenry’s ability to take part in the political life of a society.”

³ including depression, anxiety, aggressive behavior, post-traumatic stress, and prolonged grief disorder

opposing ways. On one hand, political repression can suppress opposition by instilling fear in dissidents (Young, 2019), making them more risk-averse and likely to moderate their political resistance, ultimately resulting in higher abstention rates. On the other hand, repression can deepen the perceived divide between the oppressed group and their persecutors, strengthening dissidents’ attachment to their social group (Nugent, 2020). In this context, political repression could foster a more united and polarized opposition.

Estimating the political consequences of historical events such as political repression is statistically challenging due to methodological constraints: because political repression is often targeted at specific groups, studies of its effects are prone to selection bias, making it difficult to establish a suitable counterfactual (Walden and Zhukov, 2020). The political repression in southeastern France during the 19th century offers a unique opportunity to address these challenges. This region is particularly relevant because it experienced a significant share of the 1851 repression and provides a natural experiment that mitigates selection bias. The Duchy of Savoy and the County of Nice exogenously switched between France and the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia in both 1815 and 1860. Over these 45 years, populations living along the border, with similar political and geographic characteristics, experienced divergent historical trajectories during a formative period for political opinions and had differing exposure to political repression. On the French side, Republican clubs exerted influence, and political repression was substantial. In contrast, the Italian side was less influenced by Republican ideas and avoided political repression.

In other word, the 1815–1860 border separating France from the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia created populations with comparable characteristics but distinct exposure to political repression. Consequently, this paper employs a spatial Regression Discontinuity (RD) design. This framework is particularly well-suited as it leverages the discontinuity at the border to compare similar communes on either side, enabling the estimation of the effects of political repression and differing historical trajectories while accounting for potential geographic spillover effects. Moreover, the natural experiment ensures a clean counterfactual, as communes on the Italian side escaped repression solely due to the 1815 border transition—an exogenous shift that eliminates concerns about selection bias.

Resorting to RD design and using municipality-level election results from legislative elections between 1876 and 2024 compiled by Cagé and Piketty (2023), I find that communes that were part of France between 1815 and 1860 consistently vote more for left-wing candidates and less for right-wing ones. On average, left-wing candidates received an additional 8.3 percentage points in the French municipalities, while right-wing candidates saw a decrease of 7.3 percentage points. This discontinuity accounts for 20% and 15% of the left and right vote shares, respectively, in these communes over the

entire period. These persistent differences are primarily observed in communes from both sides located within distinct academic and employment regions, where limited cross-border intermingling through higher education and work restricted the diffusion of political preferences.

This result alone sheds light on the impact of different historical trajectories, yet provides limited information on the effects of political repression. Therefore, I add the number of repressed individuals by commune in the specification, using archival data from [Farcy and Fry \(2013\)](#). The findings indicate that municipalities where citizens experienced more repression do not exhibit a stronger preference for either the left or the right but show a significantly higher abstention rate. The persisting effect of political repression can be partly attributed to the impact on local political demand, as the increased abstention rate primarily results from repression directed toward working-class citizens. Political repression also affects the local political supply, with communes where repressed citizens later held local office showing a significantly lower preference for left-wing candidates. Lastly, the events of 1851 triggered repression-related emigration⁴, which reduced the local network of Republican activists and, consequently, the preference for the left in municipalities with repressed citizens who emigrated.

This study contributes to the literature on the enduring influence of historical events, particularly on how political repression affect electoral outcomes. Prior studies on political repression have focused largely on repression during the Soviet era ([Kapelko and Markevich, 2014](#); [Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017](#); [Rozenas et al., 2017](#); [Zhukov and Talibova, 2018](#)). This research thus broadens the scope by exploring a new context in which political repression was more targeted and less indiscriminate⁵. This new context also allows for a longer-term perspective, as the events examined here occurred more than a century ago, while most studies in this literature focus on mid-20th century events. This article also contributes methodologically by employing a natural experiment, using a spatial Regression Discontinuity Design to address the challenge of non-random assignment in political repression. Additionally, it utilizes an individual-level database based on [Farcy and Fry \(2013\)](#)'s archival work, which provides a more detailed analysis of repression and allows for a deeper exploration of the mechanisms through which political repression can exert long-term effects on electoral outcomes.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the historical context of southeastern France in the 19th century. Section 3 introduces the data, the empirical strategy, and discontinuity tests. Section 4 presents the results, and

⁴This includes both self-exile and forced emigration to detention in French Guiana or Algeria.

⁵According to archival sources by [Margadant \(1979\)](#) and [Devos \(1992\)](#), the 1851 political repression affected 0.7‰ of the French population, whereas Soviet repression in Ukraine impacted percentages of the population ([Rozenas et al., 2017](#)).

Section 5 concludes.

2 Historical context

2.1 1815: Congress of Vienna’s separation

In 1815, after years of relentless warfare against European coalitions, Napoleon I was defeated, marking the end of the French Empire. The Empire’s borders were redrawn at the Congress of Vienna, where the Duchy of Savoy and the County of Nice were returned to the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia⁶. Figure A1 shows the boundaries of these regions, as well as the 1815–1860 border that separated them from France.

From that point, the two regions and France embarked on distinct historical trajectories over several key decades, which were crucial in shaping contemporary political opinions. Notably, they experienced different exposure to political repression.

2.2 Southeastern France (1815-1860)

Between 1815 and 1830, France saw a return to monarchy with the Second Restoration, followed by a shift to a constitutional monarchy under the July Monarchy from 1830 to 1848. During this period, censal suffrage⁷ limited voting rights, resulting in very few republican (*i.e.* left-wing) politicians in parliament or government. However, southeastern France became a fertile ground for republican ideas, as local politicians formed *Montagnard* clubs. These groups, particularly active in rural areas, functioned as discussion clubs where primarily young men gathered to engage in political discourse. Margadant (1979) explains the development of these clubs in southeastern France for two main factors. First, the region had a higher Protestant population, a group historically skeptical of monarchy and more inclined toward republicanism. Second, the social nature of these clubs allowed them to become hubs for the informal socialization of young men in villages, thus amplifying the influence of these political clubs.

These clubs gained particular importance with the Revolution of 1848 and the advent of the Second Republic, as the new regime and the prospect of universal male suffrage

⁶Over the centuries, wars, treaties, and alliances have seen Savoy and Nice as either independent political entities (the Duchy of Savoy, later part of the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia), parts of the French kingdom, or even occupied by Spain. Altogether, Savoy and Nice have been occupied or annexed by France seven times (1536 to 1559, 1600 to 1601, 1630 to 1631, 1690 to 1696, 1703 to 1713, 1792 to 1815, and since 1860). Figure A2 in the appendix provides a timeline of the various political entities that have governed the Duchy of Savoy and County of Nice throughout history. Table A1 summarizes the changes in political status across the territory, detailing the causes behind each shift.

⁷A form of voting rights where eligibility to vote is determined by an individual’s economic or property status. At the time, the right to vote was linked to the payment of the *cens*.

in the upcoming elections amplified their role in political life. The democrat-socialists⁸ used these clubs as platforms to promote their program, which included proposals such as the abolition of the wine tax, shifting the tax burden from the poor to the wealthy, providing low-interest loans through state banks, and allowing free use of common lands. This agenda resonated with a broad spectrum of society, ranging from farm laborers and artisans to agricultural landowners, and offered rural communities in the Southeast their first substantial experience of political engagement (Margadant, 1979). Figure 1 shows the vote for democrat-socialists per department for the legislative election of 1849⁹, documented from Bouillon (1956). It appears that *Montagnard* societies in the Southeast had short-term effects, as these departments largely voted for democrat-socialist candidates.

Despite the growing influence of democrat-socialists in the Southeast and other rural areas of France, the conservative Party of Order secured the majority of seats in parliament during the 1849 legislative election. Political freedoms regressed to conditions similar to those under the July Monarchy, and Republicans were forced back into clandestine organizations, forming secret societies, particularly in southeastern France. However, with the prospect of winning elections and an increasing number of voters between the legislative elections of 1848 and 1849, democrat-socialists intensified their propaganda, evolving into what can now be seen as the precursor of a mass political party¹⁰ (Vigier, 1963; Margadant, 1979; Agulhon, 1979, 1992).

This mass-party-like organization provided enough leverage for democrat-socialists to respond to the events of 1851. Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, then president of the Second Republic and nephew of Napoleon I, staged a coup, granting himself dictatorial powers and establishing the French Second Empire. Based on archival work of Margadant (1979), approximately 100,000 men from 900 communes protested the coup, with 70,000 from 775 communes taking up arms against the government, and 27,000 from 270 communes engaging in violent clashes with the army. This event stands as the largest provincial uprising in French history (*i.e.* outside of Paris).

Figure 1 presents the data retrieved by Margadant (1979), detailing the location, nature, and scale of insurgency events in December 1851. Unsurprisingly, most occurred in southeastern France, where *Montagnard* clubs and secret societies were particularly active. Margadant (1979) emphasizes that political engagement through *Montagnard* clubs was the primary determinant of participation in the insurrection, noting that regions lacking such organizations generally did not join the uprising. He also adds that rebellious areas shared similar economic and social characteristics with non-rebellious


⁸The democrat-socialists were the most radically republican political offer of the time.

⁹Held under universal male suffrage.

¹⁰The political leadership was generally based in urban centers and delegated responsibilities to small committees or local branches, composed of clubs and activists in rural areas

areas,¹¹ indicating that factors beyond economic foundations or social composition drove the rebellion.

Figure 1: 1849 vote for Democrat-Socialists and 1851 insurgency events



Despite their relatively modern political structure, Republicans were caught off guard by the unexpected coup d'état, leaving them insufficient time to organize an effective insurrection, resulting in its failure. As a result, Republicans faced the most extensive political purge in France since the Reign of Terror (1793-1794) and until the end of the Second World War. Unlike those two episodes of political repression, which were associated with civil war or post-war purges, the goal of repression in 1851 was solely to secure the coup and maintain power. Based on archival research by [Margadant \(1979\)](#) and [Devos \(1992\)](#), 26,884 individuals were arrested, with 21,000 convicted; among them, 9,530 were deported, including 239 sent to the *Bagne* penal colony in French Guiana.

¹¹Specifically, like regions that did not experience rebellion, insurgent areas saw increased agricultural output, industrial growth, and could be characterized as semi-urban.

2.3 Savoy and Nice and the return to France

In the meantime, the Duchy of Savoy and the Nice County were part of the Piedmont-Sardinia Kingdom. Overall, between 1815 and 1860, these regions remained culturally and politically distant from Piedmont for several reasons: they were non-Italian-speaking, the authoritarian regime under Victor Emmanuel I (1815–1831) left the local populations of Savoy and Nice broadly dissatisfied, and the Italian unification policies pursued by the kingdom were deeply unpopular, as evidenced by numerous declarations from Savoy deputies in the Turin assembly¹².

Economically and socially, Savoy and Nice did not particularly diverge from their neighbors in southeastern France; they experienced early industrialization in the 1840s, notably in watchmaking, mining, and textiles, and had high primary school coverage, with 647 schools across 629 communes by 1847 (de Résie, 1847). Political discourse in Savoy and Nice largely focused on the entity to which the territories should belong, with factions advocating for autonomy, annexation to France or Switzerland, or remaining with Piedmont-Sardinia (Milbach, 2008; Courrière, 2019). Support for joining France grew in the 1850s, fueled by unpopular Italian unification wars, while *Savoyard* and *Niçois* newspapers like *Le Courrier des Alpes* and *L'Écho des Alpes-Maritimes* expressed pro-French sentiment. However, northern Savoy also saw a movement for Swiss annexation, gathering over 13,000 petition signatures (Guichonnet, 1982).

Unlike southeastern France, secret societies had almost negligible presence in Savoy and Nice¹³, where political discourse focused more on territorial affiliation than ideological alignment. This distinct political and institutional context not only limited Republican influence but also contributed to the rarity of political repression in these regions. In 1832, a dozen Piedmontese officers considered too liberal by the authorities were executed in Chambéry. In 1848, French republicans attempted to incite an insurrection in Savoy (Milbach, 2008). The government encouraged Savoyard emigrants in Paris to return and fuel revolutionary agitation in the region (Edighoffer, 1991). The *Voraces*-a secret society from Lyon- and Savoyard revolutionaries attempted an uprising. Around 600 men briefly took over the Chambéry town hall before being deported back

¹²“A high and powerful barrier separates Savoy from Italy, its customs, its habits, its language, its trade do not assign it any place in the great Italian family which must be constituted one day” “*Une haute et puissante barrière sépare la Savoie et l'Italie, ses mœurs, ses habitudes, sa langue, son commerce ne lui assignent aucune place dans la grande famille italienne qui doit se constituer un jour*” Pantaléon Costa de Beauregard; “If the war of Independence is popular in Piedmont, it is not in Savoy. You fight for your independence and your nationality: but we, why do we fight?” “*Si la guerre de l'Indépendance est populaire en Piémont, elle ne l'est pas en Savoie. Vous combattez pour votre indépendance et votre nationalité : mais nous, pourquoi combattons-nous ?*” Gustave de Martinel; “Your cause is not ours” “*Votre cause n'est pas la nôtre*” Charles Dufayard (sources: (Avezou, 1939; Dufayard, 1914)).

¹³Although historians note the existence of a republican secret society in Chambéry in 1821 (Pepe, 1822), its primary aim was insurrection rather than broad political mobilization

to France. Overall, political repression in Savoy and Nice remained negligible compared to southeastern France.

In 1860, Savoy and Nice were transferred back to France in an exogenous manner. Victor Emmanuel II, King of Italy and Duke of Savoy, ceded the two regions in exchange for France’s support during Italy’s war against the Austrian Empire in Lombardy.

Although a plebiscite was held¹⁴, the process lacked legitimacy; the transfer had already been formalized in the Treaty of Turin, the French army was present, and no alternatives were offered on the ballot. Widespread irregularities, such as inflated voter counts and the absence of “no” ballots¹⁵, further reflect the undemocratic nature of this vote.

In summary, Savoy and Nice exogenously changed political entities between 1815 and 1860. Consequently, these two regions followed distinct historical paths, characterized by a limited influence of republican ideas, and escaped political repression. These divergences likely left a lasting imprint on electoral behaviors, which is explored in the following sections.

3 Data and Empirical strategy

3.1 Data

The sample for this study includes nine departments, namely Jura, Ain, Haute-Savoie, Savoie, Isère, Hautes-Alpes, Alpes-de-Haute-Provence, Alpes-Maritimes, and Var. These departments were selected for their geographical proximity to the 1815-1860 border. The analysis is conducted at the municipality (commune) level, representing the smallest administrative unit, with a total of 2,685 communes. Geographic boundary data are retrieved from GADM shapefiles (the Database of Global Administrative Areas), using the 2017 commune structure.

To assess the impact of political repression on political outcomes, I use electoral results data at the municipality level from [Cagé and Piketty \(2023\)](#), covering every legislative election between 1876 and 1993, while results for 1997–2024 are obtained from the French Ministry of the Interior.¹⁶ These datasets provide vote shares for left-wing and right-wing candidates, as well as abstention rates, across all legislative elections. The left-right classification is made following the work of [Julliard \(2014\)](#).

¹⁴130,533 out of 130,839 voters in Savoy and 25,743 out of 25,933 in Nice voting “yes” ([Ménabréa, 2009](#); [Varaschin, 2009](#))


¹⁵In the commune of Levens in the County of Nice, 481 “yes” votes were recorded from only 407 registered voters ([De’Dauli, 1873](#)).

¹⁶<https://www.data.gouv.fr/fr/pages/donnees-des-elections/> . Results from the 2022 and 2024 elections at the polling station level were used to reconstruct results at the 2017 commune level for communes that merged between 2017 and 2024.

To measure political repression, I use 1851 arrest records collected and digitized by Jean-Claude Farcy (Farcy and Fry, 2013)¹⁷. These 26,848 court records document individuals arrested in December 1851, providing information on each repressed individual's name, birthplace, birth date, location in 1851, and occupation. The arrest reports also contain detailed observations from the police and intelligence services, including the arrested person's activism history. From this data, I calculate the number of repressed citizens per commune to measure the intensity of political repression. This measures enable an analysis of the impact of political repression on electoral outcomes shaped long-term electoral behaviors.

3.2 Empirical strategy

Figure 2: 1815-1860 border - 15km bandwidth



¹⁷<https://poursuivis-decembre-1851.fr/index.php?page=presentation/accueil>

To estimate whether distinct historical paths—characterized by differences in exposure to political repression in 1851—affected election results for similar municipalities along the Savoy and Nice border, I employ a spatial regression discontinuity design (illustrated in Figure 2). The model is specified as follows:

$$Y_{m,t} = \alpha + \beta French_m + [\lambda_1 D_m + \lambda_2 (D * French)_m + \lambda_3 D_m^2 + \lambda_4 (D^2 * French)_m] \\ + \psi Repressed_m + \theta X_m + \phi_t + \varepsilon_{m,t}$$

$Y_{m,t}$ represents the electoral outcome for municipality m during legislative election t , such as the vote share for left-wing or right-wing candidates, or abstention rates. The key variable of interest, $French_m$, is a binary variable equal to 1 if municipality m was located in France between 1815 and 1860. This variable captures the broad effect of distinct historical trajectories but does not isolate the specific impact of political repression. To address this, the model includes $Repressed_m$, which measures the number of repressed citizens per commune. Since repression occurred only in France, $Repressed_m$ cannot be interacted with $French_m$.

To account for proximity to the border, the model includes the distance between the 1815–1860 border and each municipality’s chief town¹⁸, along with its interaction with $French_m$ and second-degree polynomial terms (Gelman and Imbens, 2019). A vector of time-invariant controls (X) captures commune-level characteristics that may influence voting tendencies.

First, as noted by Chambru et al. (2021), proximity to a department’s prefecture was a key determinant of economic development in the 19th century, which may have lasting effects on voting behavior. Therefore, distances to department prefectures and major cities¹⁹ are included. Second, following Dell (2010), an interaction between each municipality’s chief town latitude and longitude is added to control for unobserved time-invariant characteristics. Third, X includes border-segment fixed effects (Dehdari and Gehring, 2022) to compare geographically proximate municipalities from both sides.

Additionally, election fixed effects ϕ are included to account for election-specific characteristics. The results are weighted by the logged population of each commune-year (m, t) (Cagé and Piketty, 2023), giving greater importance to more populated municipalities (Dell, 2010). Standard errors are clustered using Conley spatial standard errors (Conley, 2010), with a 10 km radius to account for spillovers from neighboring munic-

¹⁸Obtained from French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) data

¹⁹Distances to Annecy, Bourg-en-Bresse, Chambéry, Gap, Digne-les-Bains, Genève, Grenoble, Lons-le-Saunier, Lyon, Marseille, Nice, Toulon, Torino, and Genoa are included.

palities²⁰. On average, each cluster includes 22 municipalities.

The 1815–1860 frontier partially aligns with current departmental boundaries²¹. This historical border, shaped by wars, treaties, territorial exchanges (summarized in Table A1), and natural features²², presents questions about its exogeneity.

However, linguistic and religious evidence suggests it does not reflect major cultural divisions. As shown in Boula De Mareüil et al. (2017), *Franco-Provençal* dialects were spoken on both sides of the Duchy of Savoy frontier, and *Langue d’Oc* dialects were common on both sides of the County of Nice border²³. Similarly, both regions were predominantly Catholic.

While the border is not strictly exogenous, the 1815 switch was independent of local preferences and led similar populations to distinct historical trajectories, particularly regarding political repression. The following sections demonstrate that key characteristics are continuous across the border, supporting the validity of this regression discontinuity design and its ability to isolate the effects of the different 1815–1860 trajectories.

3.3 Discontinuities

This subsection ensures that communes on either side of the 1815–1860 border are comparable in terms of geographic, socio-economic, and pre-1815 political characteristics, ensuring that observed electoral effects stem from differences in historical trajectories, particularly exposure to political repression. The analysis focuses on a 15 km band along the border, encompassing 561 municipalities and closely aligning with the optimal bandwidth (Calónico et al., 2014)²⁴.

3.3.1 Pre-1815 characteristics

To ensure that the observed electoral effects are not driven by pre-existing differences, I test for discontinuities in geographic and political characteristics between communes from both sides.

Figure A5 presents tests for geographic variables that may influence long-term political preferences. Drawing on studies linking soil composition, rugged terrain, and crop suitability to political outcomes (Nunn and Qian, 2011; Nunn and Puga, 2012; Gooch, 2019; Siegfried, 1913), I assess soil suitability for wheat, barley, and potatoes

²⁰Regressions were run using Colella et al. (2019)’s Stata package.

²¹For example, the southern border of the County of Nice does not align with the Alpes-Maritimes departmental boundary.

²²such as rivers and mountain ridges, including the Rhône River (Haute-Savoie and Ain), Guiers River (Isère and Savoie), Var and Estéron rivers (Alpes-Maritimes), and the *Massif des Cerces* (Hautes-Alpes and Savoie).

²³Source: <https://atlas.limsi.fr/>

²⁴The optimal bandwidth was estimated at 14.5 km using the `rdbwselect` Stata command.

(FAO/GAEZ), elevation and ruggedness (CGIAR-SRTM), cropland and grazing land shares in 1800 (HYDE²⁵), and limestone soil share (*Bureau de recherches géologiques et minières*)²⁶. Results show no significant differences except for cropland share in 1800, with French communes having more cropland. However, current cropland shares and farmer proportions after 1860 (French census data, 1861–1872) are balanced. To address this, the 1800 cropland share is included as a control in robustness checks. I also examine health conditions using [Baillarger \(1873\)](#)’s data on cretinism, a disease linked to iodine deficiency in mountainous regions. Figure A6 shows no significant differences in cretinism rates between both sides.

Testing for pre-1815 political preferences is essential to rule out pre-existing ideological differences. Conducting tests for political preferences before 1815 is challenging as there were very few elections with universal or male universal suffrage at that time. The only election held under male universal suffrage before 1815 was the legislative election of 1792. But turnout was very low and close to censal suffrage levels²⁷. These votes can hardly be considered representative of the population’s opinions. Consequently, I use two proxies for pre-1815 political preferences: social conflicts (1700–1789) from the Historical Social Conflict Database ([Chambru and Maneuvrier-Hervieu, 2022](#)) and the prevalence of revolutionary names²⁸ during the French Revolution ([Blanc, 2020](#)). Figure A4 shows a map of social conflicts between 1700 and 1789 in the area, while Table A2 presents descriptive statistics for social conflict variables in the sample. Table A3 provides a list of revolutionary names, retrieved from [Bange \(1994\)](#). The occurrence of these names in communes from both sides was collected from the French genealogy website Geneanet.

As shown in Figures A7 and A8, there are no significant differences in conflict intensity or revolutionary name occurrences, suggesting no systematic political divergence before 1815.

3.3.2 Post-1860 characteristics

To ensure that differences in electoral outcomes are not driven by post-1860 divergences, I test for discontinuities in economic and demographic trajectories between French and Piedmont-Sardinian communes.

Using 1861 census data, one year after Savoy and Nice rejoined France, I find that

²⁵History database of the Global Environment, [Klein Goldewijk et al. \(2011\)](#)

²⁶Pixel resolution is 6x9km for FAO/GAEZ, 90m for CGIAR-SRTM, 6x9km for HYDE, and 25x50m for BRGM. Given the relatively low resolution, results for soil suitability and land use in 1800 should be interpreted with caution

²⁷According to [Dupuy \(2014\)](#), turnout was between 10 and 11% only

²⁸Revolutionary names refer to first names inspired by virtues, classical antiquity, and the natural world, aiming to break with traditional, monarchical, and religious values.

both sides exhibit similar population structures, socio-economic characteristics, and religious composition (Figure A9). French areas have slightly fewer Swiss nationals, but every other outcomes are balanced. Additionally, data from [Franck \(2024\)](#) on the adoption of steam-powered machines in the textile industry between 1839–1865 shows no significant differences in technology levels (Figure A10). However, I investigate whether subsequent events led to divergences that could influence electoral outcomes.

Early migration to large cities, particularly Paris, could influence political preferences through its effects on the origin population ([Barsbai et al., 2017](#)). Following [Daudin et al. \(2019\)](#), I estimate migration rates to Paris by arrondissement using TRA survey data ([Bourdieu et al., 2014](#)) and French census data. Migration shares are calculated from birth, marriage, and death locations of individuals with surnames beginning with “TRA”. Additionally, I use the occurrence of local department names in Parisian census records (1890–2000).

Discontinuity results in Table A4 show no significant differences in migration rates during the 19th century between both sides, with some measures suggesting slightly higher migration from the Piedmont-Sardinia side. This result is not particularly concerning, as it would likely increase the left vote share among stayers in the Piedmont-Sardinia communes. However, the main finding of this paper shows the opposite. Similarly, 1891–1911 census data confirm that migration to France as a whole or to major cities, including Paris, remained balanced (Table A5). Migration between both sides after 1860 was also modest (Figure A12), and population trends remained stable on both sides (Figure A11). Even though concerns about self-selected migration from one side to another cannot be entirely rule-out, these information suggest that there was no massive migration patterns between the two sides.

Both sides may have experienced differing experiences during the First and Second World Wars, potentially affecting long-term political attitudes ([Adena et al., 2021](#)). Using data from THOR (Theater History of Operations), *Mémoire des Hommes*, [Gay and Grosjean \(2023\)](#), and [Cagé et al. \(2023\)](#), I test for differences in Allied bombings, military and civilian casualties, and Nazi collaboration rates. Figures A13 and A14 indicate that both sides faced comparable wartime conditions, ruling out wartime experiences as a potential confounder.

Finally, other unobserved events may have impacted communes from both sides differently, translating into different socio-economic characteristics nowadays, which are key determinants of voting behavior ([Lewis-Beck, 1983](#); [Gaxie, 1989](#); [Gonthier, 2021](#)). Using INSEE data, I find no significant differences between communes from both sides in terms in socio-economic characteristics, including population, education, income, wealth, employment, and transport infrastructure (Figure A15). Both sides exhibit similar shares of young people, individuals without diplomas, workers, and median/mean income levels.

In summary, communes on both sides of the 1815-1860 border are homogeneous in both pre-1815 and post-1860 characteristics. They do not exhibit different political preferences prior to 1815 and have similar geographic features, migration patterns, experiences during the World Wars, and current socio-economic characteristics. This comparability ensures that observed electoral discontinuities are attributable to differences in historical trajectories between 1815 and 1860.

4 Results

This section begins by evaluating the broad impact of differing historical trajectories on electoral outcomes between communes on either side of the border, using the previously introduced model without the *Repressed_m* variable. Next, I investigate the potential role of population intermingling in shaping these results. Finally, the analysis incorporates the *Repressed_m* variable into the model to assess the specific influence of political repression on electoral outcomes.

4.1 Historical pathways and the role of population interactions

Figure 3 illustrates the discontinuity graphs for left- and right-wing vote shares, as well as abstention rates, in legislative elections from 1876 to 2024. Although descriptive, these graphs suggest that communes located in France between 1815 and 1860 exhibit a stronger preference for left-wing candidates, with a noticeable discontinuity in electoral outcomes along the border.


4.1.1 The effect of different historic trajectories

Table 1 presents the effects of being part of France between 1815 and 1860 on commune-level election outcomes for legislative elections spanning 1876 to 2024.

Communes that were located in France during this period consistently voted significantly more for left-wing candidates and less for right-wing candidates. On average, left-wing candidates received an additional 8.3 percentage points in French-side municipalities, while right-wing candidates saw a decrease of 7.3 percentage points. These effects are substantial, representing 20% of the left vote share and 15% of the right vote share across the entire period. The asymmetry between the left and right vote effects arises because some political labels, such as *Divers*, were not strictly classified as left or right.

Tables A6, A7, and A8 break these effects down across five periods: 1876–1914 (the Third Republic before World War I), 1919–1936 (the interwar period), 1945–1956 (the Fourth Republic), and 1958–2024 (the Fifth Republic). Consistent with the literature on

Figure 3: French vs. Piedmont-Sardinian (1870-2024)



the persistence of historical effects, the effects diminish over time, becoming statistically insignificant in recent elections. Figures A16, A17, and A18 further illustrate these trends for each election, highlighting the gradual decline in the effects.

The 1871 legislative election—the first male universal suffrage election after 1860—is

Table 1: Legislative election results (1876-2024)

Dep. Var.:	Left	Right	Abst.
French m	8.383 (1.497)***	-7.379 (1.438)***	0.378 (0.372)
N	20,015	20,015	20,006
R^2	0.42	0.47	0.65
Mean. Dep. Var.	41.41	47.18	25.59
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

missing from the primary dataset. Commune-level results for this election are unavailable in the dataset provided by [Cagé and Piketty \(2023\)](#), and the election took place under extraordinary circumstances, following France’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. This election largely served as a referendum on peace ([Lejeune, 1994](#)). Nonetheless, I retrieved commune-level election results for 1871 from the French National Archives²⁹.

Table A9 presents the baseline results for the 1871 election. According to [Julliard \(2014\)](#), Republicans at the time were divided into two main factions: moderate Republicans, who were open to alliances with conservatives³⁰, and radical Republicans, who adopted more progressive and socialist positions³¹. I classify Republican votes into these two subgroups based on National Assembly records (<https://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/sycomore/recherche>). Communes that were part of France between 1815 and 1860 voted significantly more for radical Republicans—the ideological predecessors of the left. On average, radical Republican candidates received an additional 7.8 percentage points in these municipalities³².

In summary, the different historical trajectories between 1815 and 1860 had both short-term and long-lasting impacts. The French side voted significantly more for radical Republicans in the 1871 election, and this left-wing preference persisted from 1876 to 2024, albeit with diminishing effects over time.

²⁹ *Archives Nationales de France*, Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, document numbers: C//3517-C//3564, C//3566-C//3606.

³⁰ Notable figures include Jules Ferry, Jules Grévy, and Adolphe Thiers.

³¹ Notable figures include Léon Gambetta, Louis Blanc, and Victor Hugo.

³² The first post-1860 vote was the Napoleonic plebiscite of 1870. Although not a free election, district-level results from newspaper archives suggest stronger opposition to the Empire on the French side, which aligns with a Republican voting pattern (Table A10, [Lacroix \(2018\)](#)).

4.1.2 External validity

To verify whether the 1815-1860 boundary is the one determining the observed discontinuity, placebo tests were conducted by shifting the frontier 15 km west and east. Results, presented in Table A11, confirm the importance of the 1815-1860 boundary, as these placebo frontiers do not exhibit significant differences in voting behavior.

Concerns about regional heterogeneity—whether the northern or southern segments of the border might solely drive the results—are addressed in Table A12. These findings indicate that neither the northern nor the southern part independently explains the findings.

To account for potential confounders, two additional factors were examined. First, given the significant difference in cropland share in 1800 between French and Piedmont-Sardinian municipalities, and the importance of income as a determinant of voting behavior, these variables were included in the model. As shown in Table A13, the inclusion of these variables does not alter the results. Second, migration dynamics were considered, particularly the possibility of self-selected migration based on political preferences. Controlling for population variation per commune between elections, as reported in Table A14, also leaves the main findings unchanged.

The robustness of these results was further tested using alternative dependent variables. Analyzing the relative vote share³³ produces consistent results (Table A15). Additional evidence from Sciences Po’s Inter-regional survey of political phenomena (CDSP) and Martelli (2010)’s data on French Communist Party membership supports these findings. Both datasets confirm that French departments lean more toward the left, with higher proportions of individuals identifying as left-wing, aligning with left-wing parties, or being Communist Party members (Table A16).

Finally, the baseline results are robust to several additional tests. These include clustering at the canton level (Table A17) and within 15 km spatial clusters (Table A18), as well as varying bandwidths of 10, 20, 25, and 30 km (Tables A19 and A20). Results remain stable when excluding the second-degree polynomial (Table A21), specific cantons and border groups (Figures A19 and A20), and communes that merged before 2017³⁴ does not affect the findings (Table A22).

4.1.3 Why? Homogeneous population

The previous subsection outlined the enduring influence of distinct historical trajectories on electoral outcomes. A natural question arises: why do differences between communes on either side persist, despite 150 years of shared history? One plausible explanation is

³³Defined as the vote for a political group in a given commune relative to the total sample.

³⁴representing 2.5% of the sample

the limited mixing of populations across the 1815–1860 border. When individuals rarely interact with those from different areas, entrenched beliefs are more likely to persist. In such cases, parental socialization plays a significant role in shaping political preferences, enabling intergenerational continuity of these differences (Peisakhin, 2013). Conversely, as suggested by Daudin et al. (2019) and Barsbai et al. (2017), increased contact with diverse populations can influence preferences. Residents of Piedmont-Sardinian communes, for example, might have adjusted their political views if they had more opportunities to interact with individuals from French communes.

To explore this hypothesis, I analyze whether population mixing during higher education and employment has influenced the persistence or convergence of political preferences. French academic divisions³⁵ and employment zones³⁶ provide a mean to investigate this hypothesis.

The sample is divided into two groups: communes located in the same academic division or employment zone as their neighbors across the border, and those in different ones. Communes in the same academic division or employment zone likely have more opportunities for interaction, such as attending the same universities or working in the same areas. Figures A21, A22, A23, and A24 map the academic divisions in southeastern France from 1870 to 2024, while Figures A25, A26, and A27 show INSEE-defined employment zones from 1990 onward. Using variation across communes and over time, I interact the initial model with $Different_{m,t}$, a binary variable indicating whether commune m belongs to a different academic division or employment zone from its neighbors across the 1815–1860 border during election t .


Figure 4 shows the results for the interaction model using academic divisions, with detailed results in Tables A23, A24, and A25. The model was estimated both with and without border-segment fixed effects, as it would capture variation from border groups that consistently shared or differed in academic division status. The results suggest that electoral differences are primarily driven by communes in different academic divisions. Communes where residents are more likely to intermingle during higher education (*i.e.* located in the same academic division) display smaller differences in voting behavior. Conversely, communes with limited higher education interactions exhibit more pronounced differences across the border.

Figure 5 shows the results for the interaction model using employment zones, with detailed results in Tables A26, A27, and A28. Since INSEE data on employment zones starts in 1990, this analysis focuses on legislative elections from 1993 to 2024. Once again,

³⁵An academy is an administrative district of the French Ministry of Education, responsible for overseeing education within its geographical area.

³⁶As defined by INSEE, an employment zone is a geographic area where most people work in the same place.

Figure 4: Academic divisions (1870-2024)



Notes: Coefficients estimated with a 15km bandwidth with polynomial interaction terms, commune-level controls, and border-segment fixed effects. Bars represent the 95% confidence interval, with spatial standard errors clustered at a 10km radius. Observations: 20,015.


electoral differences are more pronounced among communes in different employment zones. Communes sharing the same employment zone tend to display smaller voting disparities, while those whose residents work in separate employment zones drive the observed differences.

In summary, the persistent electoral disparities across the 1815–1860 border can be attributed to limited opportunities for population mixing, whether through higher education or at work. This isolation has likely reinforced political differences, contributing to the long-term continuity of the observed voting patterns.

4.2 The effect of the 1851 political repression

The results presented thus far primarily reflect the impact of different historical trajectories on electoral outcomes, shaped by limited population mixing across the 1815–1860 border. The political repression of 1851, which occurred exclusively on the French side, may have also contributed to these outcomes. However, the simple discontinuity does not fully capture the effects of repression. Did this repression strengthen the preference for left-wing candidates, as suggested by [Nugent \(2020\)](#), or did it dampen this preference

Figure 5: Employment zones (1990-2024)



Notes: Coefficients estimated with a 15km bandwidth with polynomial interaction terms, commune-level controls, and border-segment fixed effects. Bars represent the 95% confidence interval, with spatial standard errors clustered at a 10km radius. Observations: 20,015.

and increase abstention, as argued by [Young \(2019\)](#)?

4.2.1 Persistence of the effect


[Margadant \(1979\)](#) hypothesized that “administrative repression created martyrs to the republican cause and strengthened the solidarity of local populations against the state.” To test this idea, I examine the impact of repression on electoral outcomes by including the scale of 1851 repression at the commune level in the model.

Figure 6 maps the number of repressed citizens per commune, while Figure A29 presents the same data as a binary variable, equal to 1 if at least one individual was repressed in the commune. Table A29 provides descriptive statistics on political repression within the 15 km bandwidth. Nearly 5% of communes in the sample experienced at least one case of repression in 1851. Among the 249 French-side communes, 178 individuals were repressed in 1851—representing only a small fraction of the 26,884 individuals repressed across France.

Despite their smaller numbers, Figure A28 shows that the age and social composition of repressed individuals within the sample closely align with those of the broader

repressed population in France. However, individuals in the sample received less severe punishments and included a smaller proportion of secret society members compared to the national level.

Figure 6: 1851 repression in southeastern France



The results from including the number of repressed citizens per commune in the model are shown in Table 2³⁷. On average, communes on the French side with repressed individuals do not display a significantly stronger preference for either left- or right-wing candidates. However, these communes exhibit a significantly higher abstention rate, consistent with the “fear hypothesis” proposed by Young (2019). Specifically, the presence of repressed individuals in 1851 is associated with an abstention rate that is, on average, between 0.03 and 1.976 percentage points higher.

³⁷The *Repressed* variable is not interacted with *French_m* because there were no repressed individuals in the Savoy Duchy and the County of Nice), as these regions were not part of France in 1851. Thus, an

Table 2: Legislative election results (1876-2024) - Repressed individuals by commune

Dep. Var.:	Left	Right	Abst.
French m	7.612 (1.480) ^{***}	-6.721 (1.433) ^{***}	0.176 (0.375)
Repressed m	0.013 (0.043)	0.003 (0.042)	0.038 (0.018) ^{**}
N	20,015	20,015	20,006
R^2	0.41	0.46	0.63
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

4.2.2 External validity

These results remain consistent when using alternative archival sources. Notably, [Devos \(1992\)](#) compiled pension requests submitted by victims of the 1851 repression under the 1881 reparation law³⁸. The number of pension claims per commune serves as an alternative measure of political repression in Table [A30](#), confirming the robustness of the findings. Similarly, replacing the continuous variable of the number of repressed citizens with a binary indicator yields stable results (Table [A31](#)).

Examining the map of 1851 repression in Figure [6](#) raises two potential concerns: (1) the varying intensity of repression between the southern and northern segments of the border, with repression being more widespread in the south; and (2) less prevalent repression in French municipalities within the 15 km band compared to those farther west. To address these, Table [A32](#) separates the analysis by the northern and southern segments of the border, showing consistent results across both parts. Expanding the bandwidth to include larger areas is presented in Table [A33](#), while Figure [A30](#) maps repression with the extended band. These tests further confirm the stability of the results.

Although Piedmont-Sardinian municipalities were unaffected by the 1851 repression for exogenous reasons, concerns might arise about the exogeneity of repression within the French side. Repressed communes may have specific characteristics that simultane-

interaction term would yield the same results as the *Repressed* variable.

³⁸The national reparation law, passed by Republicans in 1881, allowed victims of the 1851 political repression or their families to apply for financial compensation.

ously influence the number of repressed citizens and voting behavior. [Margadant \(1979\)](#) notes that most arrests occurred during demonstrations, often held in sub-prefectures (arrondissement chief towns). To address this, I use the distance of each municipality from the sub-prefecture to create five distance categories, ensuring homogeneity in proximity to the sub-prefecture. Table [A34](#) provides descriptive statistics for these categories. Within these bins, the likelihood of participating in a demonstration—and consequently being arrested—should be comparable, rendering arrests effectively random. Table [A35](#) reports results with fixed effects for these distance categories, narrowing the comparison to communes equidistant from the sub-prefecture. The findings remain consistent, with political repression significantly increasing abstention rates.

Finally, I use Propensity Score Matching (PSM) as an alternative method to explore the impact of repression. Repressed French municipalities are matched with Piedmont-Sardinian communes based on five observable characteristics: population, income ratio³⁹, terrain ruggedness, share of foreigners, and real-estate capital⁴⁰. Figure [A31](#) displays the distribution of propensity scores for repressed and Piedmont-Sardinian municipalities. Matches were made for each repressed municipality-year based on the closest neighbors in terms of these characteristics. Table [A36](#) confirms covariate balance, ensuring the comparability of repressed and matched communes. Table [A37](#) presents results using PSM, demonstrating that even with this alternative method, the magnitude of the results remains consistent.

4.2.3 Why? Repression impact on political demand and offer

How has the memory of the 1851 repression been transmitted from the 19th century to the present? Existing literature suggests two potential mechanisms: inter-generational transmission through parental socialization, which shapes political demand, and the influence of prominent local figures affected by repression, which impacts the political supply in their communities. Using the detailed archival data from [Farcy and Fry \(2013\)](#), particularly information on professions and family names of repressed citizens, I examine these mechanisms to understand the repression’s effect on both political demand and supply.

I first analyze the effects of repression across social classes. Repressed individuals are categorized into four groups based on their professions: working class (e.g., workers, farmers, employees), middle class (e.g., craftsmen), upper class (e.g., lawyers, professors, doctors, landlords, engineers), and public servants (e.g., policemen, army personnel,

³⁹Defined by [Cagé and Piketty \(2023\)](#) as a municipality’s mean income relative to the French national mean

⁴⁰Again defined by [Cagé and Piketty \(2023\)](#) as a municipality’s mean real-estate capital relative to the French national mean

mayors, local councilors). Table A38 provides descriptive statistics for each group.

Figure A32 shows the effects of the 1851 repression on electoral outcomes (left- and right-wing votes, and abstention rates) across these social classes during legislative elections from 1876 to 2024. The results, detailed in Tables A39, A40, and A41, indicate that higher abstention rates are primarily driven by repression targeting working-class citizens. Additionally, repression directed at public servants appears to have significantly increased preferences for left-wing parties.

Repression may also have influenced electoral outcomes by shaping the political supply, particularly through descendants of repressed individuals who later became local political leaders. These descendants, potentially serving as mayors, may have preserved the memory of repression, thus influencing the political behavior of their constituents.

To test this hypothesis, I identify repressed political dynasties (Lacroix et al., 2023), defined as mayors who share a surname with repressed individuals within a 20-kilometer radius of their commune. Using data from Farcy and Fry (2013) and genealogy records from Francegenweb, Geneawiki, and Wikipedia, I match mayoral names to those of repressed citizens. Tables A42 and A43 summarize all the repressed-mayor name matches. After excluding ambiguous matches such as the common surname “Martin” (accounting for 12 of 57 matches), 39 communes (6.9% of the sample) were identified as having at least one mayor linked to repressed ancestors. These communes are highlighted in green in Figure A33. Some control-side communes also appear green, as it is possible that repressed individuals migrated to the other side after 1851.

To measure the persistence of these dynasties, I calculate the proportion of years between 1851 and 2024 in which a commune had a mayor likely descended from repressed citizens. This measure accounts for variations in the longevity of repressed political dynasties, as the impact of a six-year versus a forty-year tenure may differ. Table A44 provides descriptive statistics for this measure.

Table 3 shows the results of incorporating this measure into the model, interacting it with the $French_m$ variable. Communes with longer-lasting repressed political dynasties exhibit significantly lower left-wing vote shares and higher right-wing vote shares, suggesting a shift in political preferences linked to these dynasties.

In summary, the enduring effects of the 1851 political repression can be attributed to its dual impact on political demand and supply. Repression targeting working-class citizens contributed to higher abstention rates, while the influence of locally prominent figures with ties to repressed ancestors shaped the political landscape, favoring right-wing parties in affected communes.

Table 3: Legislative election results (1876-2024) - Repressed political dynasties

Dep. Var.:	Left	Right	Abs.
French m	7.659 (1.488) ^{***}	-6.777 (1.443) ^{***}	0.214 (0.373)
Rel. Length m	0.098 (0.094)	-0.145 (0.087) [*]	0.022 (0.038)
French m x Rel. Length m	-0.252 (0.112) ^{**}	0.347 (0.105) ^{***}	-0.052 (0.043)
N	20,015	20,015	20,006
R^2	0.41	0.46	0.63
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

4.2.4 Why? Emigration of repressed citizens

As highlighted in the introduction with the example of “Chacaille,” the effects of repression may have persisted through the migration of repressed citizens. According to [Margadant \(1979\)](#), approximately 34% of individuals arrested in 1851 were transported to locations such as Algeria or Guiana. This large-scale forced emigration, combined with the voluntary exile of those fearing repression, likely reduced the number of active Republicans in these communes, thereby weakening the network of left-wing activists for generations.

The archival work of [Farcy and Fry \(2013\)](#) and [Devos \(1992\)](#) provides detailed information on repressed individuals, including whether they were subjected to forced transportation or chose voluntary exile. Using this data, I construct a measure of the number of repressed citizens who left their communes due to these reasons. Table [A45](#) presents descriptive statistics for the emigration variables, and Table [4](#) shows the model results incorporating the emigration variable⁴¹.

The results indicate that communes with repressed citizens who emigrated exhibit a significantly lower preference for left-wing candidates. Specifically, these municipalities vote between 0.284 and 2.556 percentage points less for left-wing candidates in legislative elections. Notably, the coefficient for the emigration variable is larger than the repression coefficient in Table [2](#), suggesting that the mechanical reduction in the number of Re-

⁴¹Unlike the analysis of repressed political dynasties, the emigration variable is not interacted, as there were repressed citizens only on the French side.

Table 4: Election results (1876-2024) - Repressed who emigrated

Dep. Var.:	Left	Right	Abs.
French m	6.911 (1.458)***	-5.921 (1.405)***	0.193 (0.382)
Emigration m	-0.284 (0.065)***	0.132 (0.089)	-0.001 (0.087)
N	19,496	19,496	19,487
R^2	0.42	0.46	0.64
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

publican activists due to emigration had a substantial and enduring impact on electoral outcomes.

5 Conclusion

The results from these spatial discontinuity design regressions demonstrate that distinct historical trajectories during a formative century for political opinions had long-lasting effects on electoral outcomes. Comparing homogeneous communes across the 1815–1860 border reveals that the French side significantly voted more for left-wing candidates between 1876 and 2024. These findings highlight the enduring legacy of historical paths, with the French side continuing to favor the ideological heirs of 19th-century Republicans more than 150 years after the events. This persistent electoral divergence can be attributed to the limited population intermingling between both areas.

The role of political repression in shaping these differences is further explored through the number of repressed citizens per commune in 1851. French communes that experienced higher levels of repression in 1851 have significantly higher abstention rates. The 1851 repression influenced both local political demand and offer: the increased abstention rate is primarily driven by repression targeting working-class citizens, while the repression of locally prominent individuals and subsequent emigration reduced the preference for the left.

Appendix

Figure A1: Map of Savoy Duchy and Nice County




Figure A2: Historic timeline of the Duchy of Savoy and Nice County




Table A1: History of occupations and annexations of Savoy Duchy and Nice County territories

Date	Reason	Direction
1536	Italian Wars	Duchy of Savoy to France
1559	Treaty of Cateau-Cambr�sis	France to Duchy of Savoy
1660	Franco-Savoyard War	Duchy of Savoy to France
1601	Treaty of Lyon	France to Duchy of Savoy
1630	Thirty Years' war	Duchy of Savoy to France
1631	Treaty of Cherasco	France to Duchy of Savoy
1690	Nine Years' War	Duchy of Savoy to France
1696	Treaty of Turin	France to Duchy of Savoy
1703	War of the Spanish Succession	Duchy of Savoy to France
1713	Treaty of Utrecht	France to Duchy of Savoy
1742	War of the Austrian Succession	Piedmont Sardinia Kingdom to Spain
1749	Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle	Spain to Piedmont Sardinia Kingdom
1792	Annexation by the French Revolutionary forces	Piedmont Sardinia Kingdom to France
1815	Congress of Vienna	France to Piedmont Sardinia Kingdom
1860	Risorgimento and Italian Unification	Piedmont Sardinia Kingdom to France

Table A2: Descriptive statistics - Social conflicts (15km bandwidth)

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>Total riot:</i>					
1700-1789	561	0.148	0.445	0	4
1750-1789	561	0.062	0.249	0	2
<i>Riot against:</i>					
Fiscality	561	0.05	0.240	0	2
State forces	561	0.018	0.132	0	1
Lord	561	0.021	0.157	0	2
Nobles	561	0.007	0.084	0	1
Church	561	0.005	0.094	0	2
Local dignitary	561	0.002	0.042	0	1
Local authorities	561	0.005	0.094	0	2
Religion	561	0.005	0.073	0	1
Other	561	0.012	0.126	0	2

Figure A3: Topographic map




Figure A4: 1815-1860 border - Social conflicts between 1700 and 1789






Figure A5: Pre-1815 - Geographic characteristics



Notes: Coefficients estimated with a 15km bandwidth with polynomial interaction terms, commune-level controls, and border-segment fixed effects. Bars represent the 95% confidence interval, with spatial standard errors clustered at a 10km radius. Observations: 561.

Figure A6: Occurrence of cretinism




Notes: Observations: 114.

Table A3: Revolutionnary names


Letter	Virtue-based	Nature-inspired			Classical references			Other
		Plants	Republican Calendar	Tools	Historical	Mythological	Literature	
A	Civique	Abricot, Absinthe, Aglae, Amande, Amarante, Anémone, Armoise, Artichaut, Asperge	Brunaire	Bêche	Agrippine, Alcibiade, Anacharcis, Anacréon, Anaxagoras, Annibal, Archimède, Aristide, Aristippe, Arria, Aspasia, Atticus	Achille, Adonis, Alcide, Andromaque, Andromède, Apollon, Astyanax	Alcindor, Alzire, Athalie	Abeille, Agneau
B		Balsamine, Blé, Brocoli, Bruyère, Buis			Bélisaire, Bias, Brutus	Bellone		
C		Caillelait, Camomille, Cardière, Carline, Cerfeuil, Cerise, Chanvre, Châtaigne, Chèvrefeuille, Chou-fleur, Cinna, Cyclamen, Cyprès			Caius, Cassius, Caton, Cicéron, Cincinnatus, Clélie, Cléobule, Copernic, Coriolan, Corneille, Curtius	Castalie, Castor, Cirus	Candide, Cornélie	Chalemie, Challier, Carpe
D					Darius, Decius, Démosthène, Diogène			
E		Eglantine, Ellébore, Endive, Epeautre, Epinard, Eucharis			Epaminondas, Epicharis, Eudamidas	Elysée, Esculape, Euterpe E		
F	Egalité		Floréal, Frimaire, Fritilaire, Fromental, Fructidor	Faucille	Fabius, Fabricius			Faisan
G		Garance, Gentiane, Gesse, Groseille	Germinal	Greffoir	Genséric, Germanicus, Gracchus	Galatée		
H		Haricot, Hyacinthe			Hannibal, Helvétius, Hippocrate, Horace	Hector, Hercule, Hersé		
I		If				Iphigénie		
J		Jacinthe, Jasmin, Jonquille			Junius, Juvénal	Junon		Justinienne
L	Légalité, Liberté, Lumière, L'Union	Latulippe, Lavande, Lilas, Lupin, Luzerne			Léonidas, Lycurgue, Lucrèce			Lamontagne
M	Mentor	Maïs, Marceau, Mélisse, Menthe, Melon, Millet, Morille, Muguet, Mûre, Myrtille	Messidor		Marat, Marc-Aurèle, Mucius	Mars, Médée, Minerve		Marseille, Mont-Blanc
N	Opinion	Narcisse, Noisette, Noix	Nivôse		Numa			
O		Oignon, Olive, Orme, Oseille			Ovide	Œdipe, Orphée		
P		Pâquerette, Perce-neige, Persil, Pervenche, Piment, Pimprenelle, Pissenlit, Pivoine, Pomme, Potiron, Primevère, Prune	Pluviôse, Prairial	Panier, Plantoir, Pressoir	Périclès, Phidias, Phocion, Pompée, Porcie, Proculus, Publicola, Pyrrhus, Publicola, Pyrrhus	Pallas, Pollux, Polymnie		
R		Raiponce, Radis, Raisin, Réséda, Romarin		Râteau	Robespierre, Rousseau, Regulus		Rodogune	Romaine
S		Safran, Scaevola, Seigle, Souci, Sylvie	Septidi	Sarcloir, Serpette	Sénèque, Scipion, Socrate, Solon, Sosthène, Spartacus	Sémiramis		
T	Sanculottide	Tabac, Térébenthine, Topinambour, Tournesol, Troène, Tubéreuse	Thermidor		Thrasybule, Tibulle, Timoléon, Titus	Tell, Thalie, Themis		
U						Uranie		
V		Valériane, Véronique, Vesce, Violette	Vendémiaire, Ventôse		Virgile, Voltaire	Vulcain		
W					Washington			
Z					Zénon	Zéphir		

Figure A7: Pre-1815 - Revolutionary names




Notes: Coefficients estimated with a 15km bandwidth with polynomial interaction terms, commune-level controls, and border-segment fixed effects. Bars represent the 95% confidence interval, with spatial standard errors clustered at a 10km radius. Observations: 561.

Figure A8: Pre-1815 - Political characteristics




Notes: Coefficients estimated with a 15km bandwidth with polynomial interaction terms, commune-level controls, and border-segment fixed effects. Bars represent the 95% confidence interval, with spatial standard errors clustered at a 10km radius. Observations: 561.

Figure A9: Post-1860 - Census 1861



Notes: Coefficients estimated at the arrondissement level. Bars represent the 95% confidence interval. Observations: 37.

Figure A10: Post-1860 - steam-powered engines



Notes: Coefficients estimated at the arrondissement level. Bars represent the 95% confidence interval. Observations: 20.

Table A4: Post-1860 - Migration to Paris

	Number of migrant to Paris (TRA)	Share of migrant to Paris (TRA)	Share of local names in Paris (1890-2000)	Share of local names in Paris (1890-1910)
French c	-1473.688 (976.784)	-2.704 (0.811)***	-0.005 (0.029)**	-0.010 (0.301)
N	75	75	77	14
R^2	0.03	0.13	0.05	0.08

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Table A5: Post-1860 - Migration (census 1891-1911)

	Share of migrant	Share of migrant to large cities	Share of migrant to Paris
French c	.547 (0.333)	3.590 (6.734)	-23.425 (10.389)**
N	2,322	105	27
R^2	0.45	0.10	0.18

Standard errors in parentheses

Large cities: Paris, Lyon, Marseille, Grenoble

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Figure A11: Post-1860 - Population evolution




Figure A12: Migration between French and Piedmont-Sardinians areas (1891-1911)






Figure A13: Post-1860 - World Wars




Notes: Coefficients estimated with a 15km bandwidth with polynomial interaction terms, commune-level controls, and border-segment fixed effects. Bars represent the 95% confidence interval, with spatial standard errors clustered at a 10km radius. Observations: 561.

Figure A14: Post-1860 - Nazi collaborators (per 1000)



Notes: Coefficients estimated with a 15km bandwidth with polynomial interaction terms, commune-level controls, and border-segment fixed effects. Bars represent the 95% confidence interval, with spatial standard errors clustered at a 10km radius. Observations: 561.

Figure A15: Post-1860 - INSEE statistics (2017)



Notes: Coefficients estimated with a 15km bandwidth with polynomial interaction terms, commune-level controls, and border-segment fixed effects. Bars represent the 95% confidence interval, with spatial standard errors clustered at a 10km radius. Observations: 561.

Table A6: Legislative election results - Vote for left by period

Period:	1876-1914	1919-1936	1945-1958	1958-2024
French m	14.007 (4.085)***	17.826 (4.252)***	13.304 (2.852)***	0.138 (0.882)
N	5,479	2,703	3,067	9,265
R^2	0.49	0.37	0.48	0.52
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Table A7: Legislative election results - Vote for right by period

Period:	1876-1914	1919-1936	1945-1958	1958-2024
French m	-13.520 (3.809)***	-18.291 (4.244)***	-9.833 (2.369)***	0.526 (1.092)
N	5,479	2,703	3,067	9,265
R^2	0.46	0.34	0.46	0.45
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$


Table A8: Legislative election results - Abstention by period

Period:	1876-1914	1919-1936	1945-1958	1958-2024
French m	0.675 (1.035)	0.864 (1.041)	1.242 (0.603)**	-0.153 (0.330)
N	5,476	2,703	3,068	9,258
R^2	0.24	0.70	0.78	0.73
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.


* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Figure A16: Legislative election results - Vote for left by election




Notes: Coefficients estimated with a 15km bandwidth with polynomial interaction terms, commune-level controls, and border-segment fixed effects. Bars represent the 95% confidence interval, with spatial standard errors clustered at a 10km radius. Observations: 561.

Figure A17: Legislative election results - Vote for right by election



Notes: Coefficients estimated with a 15km bandwidth with polynomial interaction terms, commune-level controls, and border-segment fixed effects. Bars represent the 95% confidence interval, with spatial standard errors clustered at a 10km radius. Observations: 561.

Figure A18: Legislative election results - Abstention by election



Notes: Coefficients estimated with a 15km bandwidth with polynomial interaction terms, commune-level controls, and border-segment fixed effects. Bars represent the 95% confidence interval, with spatial standard errors clustered at a 10km radius. Observations: 561.

Table A9: 1871 legislative election results

Dep. Var.:	Non	Republican		
$Vote_m$	Rep.	All	Moderate	Radical
French m	-1.289 (3.053)	1.289 (3.053)	-14.823 (3.310)***	7.821 (3.499)**
N	326	326	326	326
R^2	0.80	0.80	0.71	0.83
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	No	No	No	No

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Table A10: Napoleonic plebiscite of 1870

Dep. Var.: $Vote_c$	% of votes expressed			% of registered voters		
	Yes	No	Invalid	Yes	No	Invalid
French c	-2.491 (5.303)	6.490 (3.957)	-0.813 (1.041)	-1.301 (4.291)	5.084 (2.991)*	-0.487 (0.712)
N	35	35	35	34	34	34
R^2	0.01	0.06	0.04	0.00	0.06	0.03

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Table A11: Legislative election results (1876-2024) - Placebo borders

Dep. Var.:	15km West			15km East		
	Left	Right	Abst.	Left	Right	Abst.
French m	-0.841 (0.794)	0.591 (0.715)	-0.252 (0.288)	0.300 (0.762)	-0.719 (0.833)	0.019 (0.315)
N	19,659	19,659	19,524	14,511	14,511	14,130
R^2	0.40	0.53	0.62	0.45	0.50	0.65
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Table A12: Legislative election results (1876-2024) - North vs. South

Dep. Var.:	North			South		
	Left	Right	Abst.	Left	Right	Abst.
French m	9.331 (1.798)***	-8.343 (1.692)***	0.543 (0.441)	5.404 (2.537)**	-3.844 (2.352)	-0.561 (0.712)
N	15,560	15,560	15,542	4,471	4,471	4,464
R^2	0.50	0.52	0.68	0.57	0.66	0.59
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Table A13: Legislative election results (1876-2024) - Add 1800 cropland and income

Dep. Var.:	Left	Right	Abst.
French m	8.128 (1.487)***	-7.023 (1.399)***	0.368 (0.373)
Income m,t	2.317 (1.161)**	-0.696 (1.221)	0.010 (0.404)
Cropland m	0.085 (0.049)*	-0.129 (0.053)**	0.004 (0.015)
N	20,031	20,031	20,006
R^2	0.42	0.48	0.65
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Table A14: Legislative election results (1876-2024) - Add population growth

Dep. Var.:	Left	Right	Abst.
French m	8.259 (1.501)***	-7.267 (1.408)***	0.360 (0.372)
Pop. growth m,t	0.002 (0.024)	-0.037 (0.023)	-0.062 (0.009)***
N	19,998	19,998	19,973
R^2	0.42	0.48	0.65
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Table A15: Legislative election results (1876-2024) - Relative effect

Dep. Var.:	Left	Right	Abst.
French m	0.283 (0.068)***	-0.165 (0.047)***	0.319 (0.288)
N	20,031	20,031	19,448
R^2	0.06	0.03	0.00
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Table A16: Alternative outcomes

Dep. Var. <i>Outcome_{d,t}</i>	CDSP (1985-2004)		PCF (1913-2009)
	Self-positioned Left	Close to Left party	PCF Members (%)
French <i>d</i>	0.025 (0.008)***	0.041 (0.009)***	0.159 (0.026)***
<i>N</i>	13,809	14,637	451
<i>R</i> ²	0.01	0.01	0.83
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Table A17: Legislative election results (1876-2024) - Canton clusters

Dep. Var.:	Left	Right	Abst.
French <i>m</i>	8.380 (1.930)***	-7.377 (1.608)***	0.378 (0.501)
<i>N</i>	20,031	20,031	20,006
<i>R</i> ²	0.42	0.48	0.65
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
N clusters (canton)	83	83	83

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Table A18: Legislative election results (1876-2024) - 15km radius clusters

Dep. Var.:	Left	Right	Abst.
French m	8.380 (1.565)***	-7.377 (1.462)***	0.378 (0.392)
N	20,031	20,031	20,006
R^2	0.41	0.48	0.63
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 15km radius.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Table A19: Legislative election results (1876-2024) - Alternative band (10 - 20)

Dep. Var.:	10km			20km		
	Left	Right	Abst.	Left	Right	Abst.
French m	6.813 (1.420)***	-6.160 (1.339)***	0.303 (0.367)	8.303 (1.526)***	-7.432 (1.447)***	-0.003 (0.377)
N	13,382	13,382	13,368	24,873	24,873	24,728
R^2	0.43	0.49	0.65	0.41	0.49	0.63
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Table A20: Legislative election results (1876-2024) - Alternative band (25 - 30)

Dep. Var.:	25km			30km		
	Left	Right	Abst.	Left	Right	Abst.
French m	6.948 (1.417) ^{***}	-5.892 (1.370) ^{***}	-0.423 (0.381)	6.041 (1.388) ^{***}	-4.805 (1.349) ^{***}	-0.549 (0.389)
N	30,031	30,031	29,699	35,577	35,577	35,071
R^2	0.40	0.48	0.63	0.39	0.49	0.63
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$


Table A21: Legislative election results (1876-2024) - Without 2nd degree polynomial interaction

Dep. Var.:	Left	Right	Abst.
French m	7.666 (1.526) ^{***}	-6.730 (1.436) ^{***}	0.805 (0.377) ^{**}
N	20,031	20,031	20,006
R^2	0.42	0.48	0.65
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.


* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Figure A19: Dropping border group (1870-2024)



Notes: Coefficients estimated with the main empirical strategy and without one border group. Bars represent the 95% confidence interval, with spatial standard errors clustered at a 10km radius

Figure A20: Dropping canton (1870-2024)



Notes: Coefficients estimated with the main empirical strategy and without one canton. Bars represent the 95% confidence interval, with spatial standard errors clustered at a 10km radius

Table A22: Legislative election results (1876-2024) - Without merged communes

Dep. Var.:	Left	Right	Abst.
French m	8.229 (1.503)***	-7.200 (1.413)***	0.395 (0.373)
N	19,515	19,515	19,491
R^2	0.42	0.48	0.65
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Figure A21: Academic division 1870-1920




Figure A22: Academic division 1920-1962




Figure A23: Academic division 1962-1965




Figure A24: Academic division 1965-2024




Figure A25: Employment zones 1990-2010




Figure A26: Employment zones 2010-2020




Figure A27: Employment zones 2020-2024




Table A23: Vote for left (1876-2024) - Interaction with académie

	Baseline	Inter.	Baseline no BS FE	Inter. no BS FE
French m	8.620 (1.510)***	6.853 (1.756)***	7.475 (1.508)***	5.702 (1.731)***
Different Aca. m,t		-2.261 (2.170)		-3.251 (1.670)*
French m x Diff. Aca. m,t		3.714 (2.249)*		5.314 (2.116)**
N	20,015	20,015	20,015	20,015
R^2	0.42	0.42	0.40	0.41
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	No	No
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Table A24: Vote for right (1876-2024) - Interaction with académie

	Baseline	Inter.	Baseline no BS FE	Inter. no BS FE
French m	-7.713 (1.465)***	-4.793 (1.619)***	-6.564 (1.464)***	-3.909 (1.594)**
Different Aca. m,t		4.634 (2.176)**		4.959 (1.705)***
French m x Diff. Aca. m,t		-6.136 (2.232)***		-6.986 (2.115)***
N	20,015	20,015	20,015	20,015
R^2	0.47	0.47	0.45	0.46
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	No	No
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Table A25: Abstention (1876-2024) - Interaction with académie

	Baseline	Inter.	Baseline no BS FE	Inter. no BS FE
French m	0.285 (0.371)	0.430 (0.455)	0.182 (0.368)	0.278 (0.459)
Different Aca. m,t		-0.852 (0.565)		-0.774 (0.455)*
French m x Diff. Aca. m,t		-0.306 (0.569)		0.135 (0.561)
N	20,006	20,006	20,006	20,006
R^2	0.65	0.65	0.63	0.64
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	No	No
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Table A26: Vote for left (1993-2024) - Interaction with employment zone

	Baseline	Inter.	Baseline no BS FE	Inter. no BS FE
French m	2.468 (1.126)**	1.902 (1.140)*	1.825 (1.127)	1.245 (1.149)
Different EZ m,t		-1.662 (0.914)*		-1.969 (0.838)**
French m x Diff. EZ m,t		3.221 (1.193)***		3.399 (1.162)***
N	4,488	4,488	4,488	4,488
R^2	0.54	0.55	0.52	0.53
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	No	No
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Table A27: Vote for right (1993-2024) - Interaction with employment zone

	Baseline	Inter.	Baseline no BS FE	Inter. no BS FE
French m	-2.378 (1.058)**	-1.889 (1.060)*	-1.728 (1.043)*	-1.296 (1.054)
Different EZ m,t		2.114 (0.917)**		2.185 (0.854)**
French m x Diff. EZ m,t		-3.043 (1.192)**		-2.834 (1.112)**
N	4,488	4,488	4,488	4,488
R^2	0.59	0.59	0.57	0.57
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	No	No
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Table A28: Abstention (1993-2024) - Interaction with employment zone

	Baseline	Inter.	Baseline no BS FE	Inter. no BS FE
French m	-0.219 (0.458)	-0.182 (0.472)	-0.095 (0.468)	0.029 (0.476)
Different EZ m,t		0.536 (0.464)		0.798 (0.434)*
French m x Diff. EZ m,t		-0.375 (0.572)		-0.887 (0.560)
N	4,488	4,488	4,488	4,488
R^2	0.64	0.64	0.63	0.63
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	No	No
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Figure A28: 1851 repression characteristics




Figure A29: 1851 repression in southeastern France




Table A29: Descriptive statistics - 1851 political repression (15km bandwidth)

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Repressed	561	0.317	2.900	0	52
Repressed (Binary)	561	0.048	0.214	0	1

Table A30: Legislative election results (1876-2024) - Réparations by commune

Dep. Var.:	Left	Right	Abst.
French m	8.422 (1.496)***	-7.426 (1.405)***	0.339 (0.373)
Réparations m	-0.076 (0.068)	0.089 (0.066)	0.071 (0.034)**
N	20,031	20,031	20,006
R^2	0.42	0.48	0.65
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Yes			

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Table A31: Legislative election results (1876-2024) - Repressed binary

Dep. Var.:	Left	Right	Abst.
French m	8.209 (1.496)***	-7.292 (1.409)***	0.309 (0.370)
Repressed binary m	1.346 (0.761)*	-0.674 (0.696)	0.543 (0.260)**
N	20,031	20,031	20,006
R^2	0.42	0.48	0.65
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Table A32: Legislative election results (1876-2024) - Repression North vs. South

Dep. Var.:	North			South		
	Left	Right	Abst.	Left	Right	Abst.
French m	9.163 (1.797)***	-8.246 (1.692)***	0.487 (0.438)	5.375 (2.535)**	-3.830 (2.347)	-0.668 (0.709)
Repressed m	0.596 (0.218)***	-0.343 (0.192)*	0.199 (0.078)**	0.014 (0.029)	-0.007 (0.030)	0.053 (0.019)***
N	15,560	15,560	15,542	4,471	4,471	4,464
R^2	0.51	0.52	0.69	0.57	0.67	0.61
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Table A33: Legislative election results (1876-2024) - Repression with larger band (20 - 30)

Dep. Var.:	20km			30km		
	Left	Right	Abst.	Left	Right	Abst.
French m	8.323 (1.527)***	-7.460 (1.447)***	-0.027 (0.376)	6.062 (1.389)***	-4.817 (1.348)***	-0.566 (0.389)
Repressed m	-0.034 (0.043)	0.048 (0.042)	0.040 (0.018)**	-0.046 (0.045)	0.026 (0.039)	0.035 (0.017)**
N	24,873	24,873	24,728	35,577	35,577	35,071
R^2	0.41	0.49	0.63	0.39	0.49	0.63
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Figure A30: 1851 repression in southeastern France - 30km band




Table A34: Summary of distance to subprefecture bins

Distance to sub-pref. (km)	Obs.	%	Cumulative %
0 - 7	69	12.3	12.3
7 - 14	156	27.81	40.11
14 - 21	161	28.7	68.81
21 - 28	106	18.89	87.7
More than 28	69	12.3	100

Table A35: Legislative election results (1876-2024) - Repression with distance to sub-prefecture

Dep. Var.:	Left	Right	Abst.
French m	8.123 (1.491)***	-7.279 (1.428)***	0.174 (0.368)
Repressed m	0.003 (0.040)	0.016 (0.038)	0.047 (0.018)***
N	20,031	20,031	20,006
R^2	0.42	0.48	0.65
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dist. to sub-pref. FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Figure A31: Density of propensity scores




Table A36: Propensity Score Matching - Balance in covariates

Covariates	Mean		Bias (%)	Diff.	
	Repressed	Matched		t	P-value
Population (log) m, t	7.398	7.369	2.3	0.44	0.657
Income ratio m, t	0.877	0.876	0.4	0.10	0.924
Ruggedness m	73.54	71.243	4.0	0.94	0.345
Foreigner (%) m, t	0.098	0.098	0.0	0.00	0.998
real-estate capital m, t	0.904	0.878	5.3	1.17	0.241
N			1,741		
Mean bias (%)			2.4		
Median bias (%)			2.3		
Bias reduction (%)			9.2		
Variance Ratio			0.9		

Table A37: Legislative election results (1876-2024) - Propensity Score Matching

Dep. Var.:	Left	Right	Abst.
Repressed m	0.054 (0.062)	-0.066 (0.060)	0.055 (0.022)**
N	1,936	1,936	20,006
R^2	0.41	0.53	0.72
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Table A38: Descriptive statistics - 1851 political repression by profession (15km bandwidth)

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	% of repressed
Repressed working-class	561	0.077	0.788	0	13	52.3%
Repressed middle-class	561	0.073	0.734	0	16	35%
Repressed upper-class	561	0.027	0.209	0	3	9.8%
Repressed public servants	561	0.007	0.084	0	1	2.9%

Table A39: Vote for left (1876-2024) - Repressed by class

Social class:	Working	Middle	Upper	Public servants
French m	7.629 (1.484)***	7.629 (1.483)***	7.680 (1.484)***	7.566 (1.483)***
Repressed m	-0.054 (0.184)	-0.065 (0.108)	-0.594 (0.408)	2.218 (1.266)*
N	20,015	20,015	20,015	20,015
R^2	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Table A40: Vote for right (1876-2024) - Repressed by class

Social class:	Working	Middle	Upper	Public servants
French m	-6.735 (1.437)***	-6.724 (1.437)***	-6.755 (1.439)***	-6.647 (1.437)***
Repressed m	0.108 (0.168)	0.043 (0.111)	0.369 (0.409)	-2.917 (1.268)**
N	20,015	20,015	20,015	20,015
R^2	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$


Table A41: Abstention (1876-2024) - Repressed by class

Social class:	Working	Middle	Upper	Public servants
French m	0.174 (0.375)	0.194 (0.375)	0.257 (0.375)	0.222 (0.376)
Repressed m	0.209 (0.083)**	0.093 (0.062)	-0.527 (0.206)**	-0.691 (0.427)
N	20,006	20,006	20,006	20,006
R^2	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63
Commune controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Border Segment FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 10km radius.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.010$

Figure A32: Repression by social class (1876-2024)



Notes: Coefficients estimated with a 15km bandwidth with polynomial interaction terms, commune-level controls, and border-segment fixed effects. Bars represent the 95% confidence interval, with spatial standard errors clustered at a 10km radius. Observations: 20,015.

Table A42: Repressed-mayor 20km radius name matches (1/2)

Mayor Name	Mayor First Name	Dep. Mayor	Commune Mayor	Years	Citizen Name	Citizen First Name	Dep. Rep.	Commune Rep.
GUIGARD	Louis	01	Lhuis	1827-53	GUIGARD	Anthelme	01	Lhuis
PERRIN	Anthelme	01	Magnieu	1925-29	PERRIN	Etienne	01	Belley
BLANC	Jean-Paul	01	Virignin	2014-20	BLANC	Jean-Claude	01	Lhuis
FABRE	Lucien	04	Barcelonnette	1971-77	FABRE	Pierre	04	Barcelonnette
BICAIS	Robert	04	Beauvezet	1989-01	BICAIS	Pascal	04	Castellet-lès-Sausses
BLANC	Louis	04	Thorame-Haute		BLANC	Magloire	04	Clumanc
TRABAUD	Ferdinand	04	Ubraye	1904-05;08-25	TRABAUD	Eugène	04	Peyroules
LEON	Germaine	04	Val-de-Chalvagne	1973-01	LEON	Louis	04	Entreveaux
MARTIN	Séverin	06	Bézaudun	1892-96	MARTIN	César	06	Cagnes-sur-Mer
MARTIN	Louis Victor	06	Bézaudun	1896-04	MARTIN	César	06	Cagnes-sur-Mer
MARTIN	Auguste Joseph	06	Bézaudun	1904-12	MARTIN	César	06	Cagnes-sur-Mer
MARTIN	François	06	Bézaudun	1931-47	MARTIN	César	06	Cagnes-sur-Mer
MARTIN	Alfred	06	Bézaudun	1947-65	MARTIN	César	06	Cagnes-sur-Mer
MARTIN	Jean-Claude	06	Bonson	2020-24	MARTIN	Barthélémy	06	St-Laurent-du-Var
GIRAUD	Gustave	06	Cagnes-sur-Mer	1870-74	GIRAUD	Paulin	06	Cannes
MARTIN	Jean-Baptiste	06	Carros	1871-78	MARTIN	César	06	Cagnes-sur-Mer
CAUVIN	Séraphin	06	Castagniers	1874-75	CAUVIN	Joseph	06	Vence
AUBANEL	Antoine	06	Caussols	1913-18	AUBANEL	Jean-Baptiste	06	Vence
MOUTON	Antoine	06	Caussols	1895-96	MOUTON	Nicolas	06	Grasse
CAUVIN	Roland	06	Cipières	2001-08	CAUVIN	Joseph	06	Vence
AUGIER	Jean-Baptiste	06	Colomars	1909-10	AUGIER	Pierre	06	Cagnes-sur-Mer
AUGIER	Antoine	06	Colomars	1964-77	AUGIER	Pierre	06	Cagnes-sur-Mer
CAUVIN	Hippolyte	06	Contes	1944-45	CAUVIN	Joseph	06	Vence
PASSERON	Honoré	06	Contes	1900-04	PASSERON	François	06	St-Laurent-du-Var
GAZAGNAIRE	Georges	06	Courmes	1840-65	GAZAGNAIRE	Etienne	06	Vence
GAZAGNAIRE	Antoine	06	Courmes	1871-76	GAZAGNAIRE	Etienne	06	Vence
MARTIN	Claude Honoré	06	Coursegoules	1871-83;89-04	MARTIN	César	06	Cagnes-sur-Mer
BRUN	Joseph	06	Daluis	1849-52;55-60	BRUN	François	04	Annot

Table A43: Repressed-mayor 20km radius name matches (2/2)

Mayor Name	Mayor First Name	Dep. Mayor	Commune Mayor	Years	Citizen Name	Citizen First Name	Dep. Rep.	Commune Rep.
BRUN	Joseph	06	Daluis	1849-52;55-60	BRUN	François	04	Annot
CAUVIN	Pierre	06	Drap	1945-82	CAUVIN	Joseph	06	Vence
MARTIN	Joseph	06	Gattières	1876-86	MARTIN	Barthélémy	06	St-Laurent-du-Var
AUGIER	Marcellin	06	Gilette	1878	AUGIER	Pierre	06	Cagnes-sur-Mer
NIEL	Pierre	06	Gilette	1947-59	NIEL	Antoine	06	Vence
MERLE	Marius	06	Gréolières	1914-18	MERLE	Joseph	06	St-Cézaire-sur-Siagne
GIRAUD	Denis	06	Le Rouret	1940-44	GIRAUD	Paulin	06	Cannes
ROUX	Jacques	06	Le Rouret	1926-29	ROUX	César	06	Cannes
PASSERON	Antoine	06	Peillon	1945-72	PASSERON	François	06	St-Laurent-du-Var
PASSERON	René	06	Peillon	1995-08	PASSERON	François	06	St-Laurent-du-Var
GAZAGNAIRE	Joseph	06	Roquefort-les-Pins	1908-12	GAZAGNAIRE	Etienne	06	Vence
GIRAUD	Jean-Baptiste	06	Roquefort-les-Pins	1855-65	GIRAUD	Paulin	06	Cannes
GIRAUD	Jean	06	Roquefort-les-Pins	1944-53	GIRAUD	Paulin	06	Cannes
MARTIN	Clément	06	Roquefort-les-Pins	1915-19	MARTIN	César	06	Cagnes-sur-Mer
MARTIN	Jean	06	St-Jean-Cap-Ferrat	1920-27	MARTIN	Barthélémy	06	St-Laurent-du-Var
MARTIN	Joseph	06	St-Martin-du-Var	1971-77	MARTIN	Barthélémy	06	St-Laurent-du-Var
AUGIER	Adolphe	06	Tourrettes-sur-Loup	1935-43	AUGIER	Pierre	06	Cagnes-sur-Mer
GIRAUD	Alexandre	06	Tourrettes-sur-Loup	1896-13	GIRAUD	Paulin	06	Cannes
BEL	Jacques	06	Vallauris	1848-52	BEL	Antoine	06	Antibes
BEL	Joseph	06	Vallauris	1878	BEL	Antoine	06	Antibes
HUGUES	Emile	06	Vence	1945-59	HUGUES	Joseph	06	St-Laurent-du-Var
MARS	Antony	06	Vence	1900-01	MARS	Jean-Joseph	06	Grasse
GUTTIN	Christine	38	Chirens	2004-08;2014-2024	GUTTIN	Georges	38	St-Didier-de-la-Tour
PERRIN	François	38	Le Bouchage	1948-53	PERRIN	Etienne	01	Belley
PERRIN	François	38	Morestel	1953-64	PERRIN	Etienne	01	Belley
PICHAT	Jean-François	38	St-Laurent-du-Pont	1888-14	PICHAT	Augustin	38	Pont-de-Beauvoisin
GENIN	Louis Claudius	38	St-Sorlin-de-Morestel	1926-59	GENIN	Auguste	38	Le Bouchage
BLANC	Jean-Victor	38	Vasselin	1947-59	BLANC	Jean-Claude	01	Lhuis
BLANC	Jean-Pierre	38	Vasselin	2001-14	BLANC	Jean-Claude	01	Lhuis
GRANDJEAN	Gilbert	73	St-Pierre-d'Alvey	2001-08	GRANDJEAN	Joseph	01	Belley

Table A44: Descriptive statistics - Repressed-political dynasties (15km bandwidth)

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Mayor	561	0.057	0.231	0	1
Length mayor	561	0.888	4.403	0	42
Rel. length mayor	561	0.507	2.516	0	24

Figure A33: Communes with repressed-political dynasties




Table A45: Descriptive statistics - 1851 emigration (15km bandwidth)

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Emigration	561	0.032	0.399	0	9
Exile	561	0.007	0.084	0	1
French Guiana	561	0.002	0.042	0	1
Algeria	561	0.005	0.094	0	2

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