

The effect of war on redistribution preferences*

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Abstract

Do wars change preferences for redistributive state policies? We analyze this question using a preregistered survey experiment involving $N = 3920$ respondents in Russia conducted during the Russo-Ukrainian war. The order of questions in the survey was manipulated to remind some respondents of the war before measuring the outcome variables. We find that among individuals who favor the war, the war reminder increases preferences for redistribution. Our two-part design allows us to investigate the channels for this effect; we find that it is partly due to increased trust in government. We also observe an increase in prosocial preferences among individuals who support the war, but this effect is not associated with the increase in redistribution preferences.

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1 Introduction

Even in the 21st century, wars are a grim reality affecting many people around the world. Since the 1960s, more than half of the world’s nations have experienced armed conflict (Blattman and Miguel, 2010), and a quarter of the world’s population lives in conflict-affected areas (Archie, 2022).

Throughout history, warfare has profoundly influenced nation-building and public policy. Tilly et al. (1992) stated that “war made the state and the state made war”, referring to the impact of wars on important state-building decisions made by national elites—such as developing fiscal capacity, adopting national identities, or improving the provision of public goods. In this paper, we focus on a different consequence of armed conflict — its impact on public beliefs about the proper extent of redistribution of income and wealth in society.

Redistribution preferences are central to the design of government economic policy and vary widely within and across countries (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005). We hypothesized that war would affect preferences for redistributive social policies in two ways. First, the public might be more accepting of high social spending because of the “rally-round-the-flag” effect or the increased confidence in government institutions and leadership that is felt in times of conflict (Mueller, 1970). This may lead to higher preferences for redistribution, as trust in government is associated with higher acceptance of government spending (Kuziemko et al., 2015). Second, exposure to violent conflict increases cooperation in a range of real and experimental situations, with changes likely due to changes in parochial prosociality or increased preference for members of one’s own group (Bauer et al., 2016); when national identity is prominent during the war, this may lead to greater universal altruism and thus higher acceptance of redistributive taxes (Ghiglini, Juárez-Luna and Müller, 2021).

To explore these hypotheses, we focus on the Russian-Ukrainian war – an ongoing, large-scale interstate conflict that began in 2022 with Russia’s attempt to invade neighbouring Ukraine. We use the online crowdsourcing platform *Toloka*, similar in functionality to competitors mTurk and Prolific, to conduct a randomized survey experiment involving $N = 3920$ Russian respondents. Our outcome variables measure preferences toward redistribution and government spending, as well as prosocial preferences and trust in government.

To examine the effects of war, we conduct an experimental randomized treatment that varies the order of questions in the survey. Before answering the outcome questions, some respondents are asked a series of questions that encourage them to think about the war. In the baseline treatment, the war-related questions are asked at the end of the survey, after the questions that measure our outcome variables. Views about the war are polarized, with responses to all war-related questions strongly correlated with each other and with support for the war.

We report a rally-round-the-flag effect: war reminder causes an increase in confidence in Russian President Vladimir Putin, confidence in the government and police, the belief that the state is efficient, and the belief that things are on the right track in the country. The polarization of opinions about the war manifests itself in the size of the treatment effect: it is larger for individuals who are more supportive of the war. For individuals who are less supportive of the war, the rally-round-the-flag effect may be attenuated as the costs of the war become clear.

The war reminder has an ambivalent effect on prosocial preferences. The effect on donations in the dictator

game is either negative (for individuals who were less supportive of the war) or neutral (for individuals who were more supportive of the war). Additional analysis shows that this heterogeneity is the result of a stronger sense of national identity among war supporters. At the same time, other measures of altruism – the willingness to donate to good causes and hypothetical donation to charity – are positively affected by the treatment of the war. We believe this is because war can promote both in-group prosocial behavior and out-group antagonism (Bauer et al., 2016). In a dictator game, the giver has no control over who will be the recipient. Therefore, out-group antagonism will have a greater impact on the dictator’s decision when the strength of her national identity is lower and she does not perceive a randomly selected participant as a member of her in-group. This should be less of a problem in a real or hypothetical donation where the donor can choose the recipient.

Third, we find that preferences for redistribution are affected by the war treatment. The effect is heterogeneous and is caused by individuals who support the war and have more trust in government. In particular, such individuals are more likely to believe in government action to redistribute income to disadvantaged groups – the unemployed, the poor, and people in need of housing assistance.

Finally, we pay particular attention to the channels through which the experience of war affects preferences for social policy. To achieve this goal, our study follows a two-part design, collecting responses in the first part that detail our potential channels — trust in government and prosocial preferences. The second part, conducted a few days later, contains the randomized treatment and repeats the questions on trust in government, prosocial preferences, and well as questions on redistribution preferences and preferences toward government spending. In this way, we can conduct a causal mediation analysis while minimizing the impact of potential unobserved factors that (conditional on the treatment and pre-treatment observed variables) may affect both channels and redistribution preferences.

We find that among individuals who support the war, the effect of the war prime on redistribution preferences is partly due to its effect on trust in government. Previous research has shown that experimentally induced higher trust in government can lead to higher support for government redistribution (Kuziemko et al., 2015). We show that higher support for state redistributive policies can result when trust in government is increased due to a rally-round-the-flag effect. Prosocial preferences, on the other hand, do not mediate the effect of war prime on redistribution preferences, although these are also positively affected by war prime in war supporters.

The importance of the rally-round-the-flag effect for redistribution preferences is also implicit in the lack of alternative explanations. The war prime does not increase concern about inequality in society: neither an individual’s assessment of his or her relative position in the income distribution nor beliefs about the extent of income inequality in society are affected by the treatment. Support for an increase in the minimum wage (a policy that does not involve direct transfers from the government) is also not affected. We also do not find that the war treatment has any effect on beliefs about the role of luck in determining income.

The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on this topic and relates our results to that literature. Section 3 describes the experimental setup and data. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes.

2 Review of literature

It has been argued that wars play a crucial role in the development of state fiscal capacity and the establishment of the welfare state (Obinger and Petersen, 2017). Besley and Persson (2009) argue that winning an external war may be a common interest public good, leading the state to expand its tax system. According to empirical analysis by Gennaioli and Voth (2015), this happened in Europe after the 15th century, when warfare shifted from mercenary to conscript armies and technological innovations in warfare made superior financial resources a decisive factor in winning wars. Warfare and military rivalry were also closely related to the rise of primary education in 19th-century Europe (Aghion et al., 2019). Ticchi and Vindigni (2008) argue that wars can influence another type of elite decision that may ultimately lead to the production of more public goods — franchise expansions: In the case of an external threat, it may be necessary to grant soldiers the right to vote so that they have a legitimate interest in fighting. Alesina, Reich and Riboni (2020) show that the effect of investment in public goods on the public’s willingness to fight wars can be complemented by elite investment in positive national identity, while Scheve and Stasavage (2010) link war episodes to an increase in tax progressivity that leads to a more equitable distribution of the war effort. Caprettini and Voth (2023) confirm that the provision of public goods affects the public’s willingness to fight: recipients of New Deal-era redistributive policies showed more patriotism in World War II by volunteering, buying war bonds, or receiving battlefield medals. Our contribution to this literature is to examine the demand-side effects of the war on government spending and redistribution. Rather than analyzing the decisions of elites, we focus on the preferences of the masses: Do wars lead people to want more government redistribution, and why?

A large body of research addressed the factors that influence individuals’ preferences for redistributive policies, focusing on the role of income (Romer, 1975; Meltzer and Richard, 1981), beliefs about the economy (Piketty, 1995; Benabou and Tirole, 2006a; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Fisman et al., 2020; Cruces, Perez-Truglia and Tetaz, 2013; Kuziemko et al., 2015; Karadja, Mollerstrom and Seim, 2017; Alesina, Stantcheva and Teso, 2018; Gimpelson and Treisman, 2018), ethnic heterogeneity of the population (Rueda, 2018; Rueda and Stegmueller, 2019), culture or Communist heritage (Luttmer and Singhal, 2011; Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007; Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2017). Some of this literature is discussed in Mengel and Weidenholzer (2022).

The persistence of cross-country differences in redistribution preferences over the past century has already been noted (Iversen and Soskice, 2006, 2009). At the same time, several studies have examined the effects of formative events on redistribution preferences. Experiencing a recession can increase the demand for government action to reduce inequality (Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014). A similar effect is observed for natural disasters such as earthquakes Gualtieri, Nicolini and Sabatini (2019), traumatic personal events (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011) that are likely to be driven by the belief that effort pays off (Roland and Yang, 2017), and unexpected income shocks (Andreoli and Olivera, 2020; Somville et al., 2020; Marques II and Zakharov, 2021). Several studies analyzed the impact of the COVID pandemic on redistribution preferences. Some studies found that support for redistributive and safety net programs increased with pandemic severity (Rees-Jones et al., 2020; Cappelen et al., 2021; Goff et al., N.d.), while others reported opposite results (Daniele et al., 2020; Bellani, Fazio and Scervini, 2021). Our work contributes to this literature by considering the effects of interstate conflict

on redistribution preferences.

In our paper, we investigate the rally-round-the-flag effect as one of the reasons why wars can lead to greater advocacy of redistribution. This effect refers to people’s tendency to increase their support for political leaders, state institutions, and national symbols during times of war and other severe international crises. Previous work has shown that support for the country’s leadership increases during military crises (Parker, 1995; Baker and Oneal, 2001). In Russia in particular, reminders of foreign threats serve to deflect blame from the country’s leadership (Frye, 2019; Sirotkina and Zavadskaya, 2020)¹ while the Russian invasion of Ukraine affected Europeans’ attitudes toward supranational integration (Steiner et al., 2023). Similar results were observed in the wake of the COVID pandemic, with support for incumbent leaders, trust in government and public sector institutions, and satisfaction with the political system increasing after the lockdown (Baekgaard et al., 2020; Bol et al., 2021; Esaiasson et al., 2021; Eggers and Harding, 2022). We find robust evidence of the rally-round-the-flag effect and, similar to some previous results (Chatagnier, 2012), we find that the strength of the effect depends on trust in government.

Previous work has shown that trust in government and redistribution preferences are correlated (Svallfors, 2013). In Kuziemko et al. (2015) survey experiment, some subjects were primed to think negatively about politicians and showed less support for a range of state redistribution policies. In the Marques II and Zakharov (2021) study of the effects of a redistributive state program, the increase in program participants’ redistribution preferences is partly caused by higher trust in government and lower beliefs about state corruption. In this paper, we advance this literature further by showing that a war-induced increase in trust in government can lead the public to support policies that provide for greater government redistribution.

There is strong evidence that wars and war violence have a positive effect on cooperation and altruism in both experimental and real-world situations (Bauer et al., 2016),² and that national threats such as wars or terrorist attacks can reinforce national or regional identities (Moskalenko, McCauley and Rozin, 2006; Kuehnhanss, Holm and Mahieu, 2021; Mironova and Whitt, 2021). In a variety of contexts, it has been argued that a sense of social identity influences economic and political decisions because of the presence of altruistic concerns toward members of one’s social groups (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2010; Fowler and Kam, 2007).³ The favoring of one’s ingroup members (e.g., ethnic, linguistic, political, or racial) can manifest itself in a variety of ways, such as showing more leniency to group norm violators from one’s social group, (Bernhard, Fischbacher and Fehr, 2006) or selectively perceiving reality in ways that favor the group’s views, (Alesina, Miano and Stantcheva, 2020). Significantly for this paper, a sense of shared social identity with redistribution recipients influences redistribution preferences (Klor and Shayo, 2010; Ghiglini, Juárez-Luna and Müller, 2021) with people more willing to redistribute income when the target population is more ethnically homogeneous and therefore more likely to distribute income to

¹Although rally-round-the-flag effects observed in non-democratic contexts may be due in part to disingenuous reporting Hale (2022)

²Although evidence on the effects of COVID -19 on altruism is mixed, pandemic severity has been reported to have both a positive (Adema et al., 2021; Grimalda et al., 2021; Blanco et al., 2020) and a negative (Lohmann et al., 2020; Branas-Garza et al., 2020) effect on donations or expected donations in experimental settings.

³See Shayo (2020) for a review of the literature. Social identity refers to a person’s sense of who he or she is and to which social groups he or she belongs and the emotional significance he or she attaches to them (Tajfel, 1974).

members of their own group or in-group (Luttmer, 2001; Lindqvist and Östling, 2013; Rueda, 2018). This leads us to expect that prosocial preferences will mediate the effect of war on redistribution preferences. We find that among individuals who are more likely to support the war, the war prime indeed increases prosocial behavior; at the same time, however, this increase does not lead to a corresponding increase in redistribution preferences.

Our work finds no evidence of other channels through which the war may have influenced redistribution preferences. Perceived position on the income ladder is not affected by the war prime; in the previous literature, the belief that one is poorer relative to the rest of the population leads to greater support for redistributive measures (Cruces, Perez-Truglia and Tetaz, 2013; Kuziemko et al., 2015; Karadja, Mollerstrom and Seim, 2017). The war prime does not change the perceived importance of luck rather than hard work in determining life outcomes; previously, this belief was found to be related to redistribution preferences (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Alesina and Giuliano, 2011; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006*b*; Gualtieri, Nicolini and Sabatini, 2019). Finally, perceptions of inequality (also important for redistribution preferences, see Gimpelson and Treisman, 2018) are unaffected by the war prime.

3 Data and method

We focus on the preferences of the Russians in connection with the large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine that began on February 24. It is the largest armed conflict in Europe since World War II, involving several hundred thousand troops on both sides and has resulted in tens of thousands of military and Ukrainian civilian casualties and millions of Ukrainian refugees.

Following the onset of the invasion, Russia experienced a rally-round-the-flag effect, with rising approval ratings for Vladimir Putin and other state institutions (Center, 2023). At the same time, some of the costs of the war have been highly visible. By December 2022, when the experiment was launched, the country suffered a series of military setbacks when it had to retreat from parts of the Kherson and Kharkiv regions and made an unpopular decision to mobilize additional 300,000 troops in September-October 2022. The Russian population remains heterogeneous and polarized in its support for the war, with about a quarter of the population not supporting it (Center, 2022; Alyukov, 2022; Chapkovski and Zakharov, 2023), although the true figure is disputed and may be somewhat higher due to a substantial preference falsification (Chapkovski and Schaub, 2022).

To test our predictions, we conducted an experiment using the Toloka online platform. In terms of functionality, this platform is similar to mTurk and Prolific. It allows quickly recruiting participants to complete small tasks in exchange for a fixed participation fee and/or a variable bonus. According to independent estimates, there are about 20000 active Toloka users online during working hours (9 am to 8 pm), the majority of whom are Russian-speaking and located in Russia. Participants in the experiment were screened using the Sentry online tool.⁴

The broad description of our experimental design is as follows.

Part 1: On December 19-20, 2022, we recruited participants through the Toloka platform and asked them to complete a survey recording their sociodemographic characteristics and eliciting their trust in government

⁴See Chandler et al. (2019) for a discussion of similar screening methods.

	<i>Baseline</i>	<i>War</i>	<i>War+cost</i>
Part 1 (Dec 19-20)	Demographics Prosocial (1) Trust in gov. (1)	Demographics Prosocial (1) Trust in gov. (1)	Demographics Prosocial (1) Trust in gov. (1)
Part 2 (Dec 23-30)	Prosocial (2) Trust in gov. (2) Redistribution War War+cost Post-treatment	War Prosocial (2) Trust in gov. (2) Redistribution War+cost Post-treatment	War War+cost Prosocial (2) Trust in gov. (2) Redistribution Post-treatment

Table 1: Summary of the experimental design

and prosocial preferences.

Part 2: On December 23, 2022, we invited those who had completed Part 1 to participate in the second part of the experiment. Participants were randomly assigned to three treatment arms that differed in the order of survey questions and tasks that participants completed; the goal of the treatment was to prime the participants with various aspects of the war. In the *baseline* treatment, we first elicit trust in government and prosocial preferences, similarly to Part 1. Participants are then asked to report their redistribution preferences and their views on government spending. Finally, participants are presented with two blocks of questions related to the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war. The first block focuses on awareness of the war and support for the Russian side of the conflict. The second block emphasizes the potential costs of the conflict and asks participants to assess the likelihood of various negative outcomes of the war (such as the declaration of martial law or escalation to a nuclear conflict). In the *war* treatment, the first block of war-related questions is asked at the beginning of the survey, whereas in the *war+cost* treatment, both blocks of war-related questions are asked at the beginning. The experimental design is summarized in Table 1

Our main variable of interest is the index measuring the individual’s *redistribution preferences*. We ask whether the individual believes that the government should provide a decent standard of living for the *unemployed/housing* for those who need it/ *income assistance to the poor*/or *food for those who need it*. Similar to Alesina, Stantcheva and Teso (2018), we ask a question about the preferred allocation of 100 units of state budget among six different spending categories; the percentage allocated to *social policy* was included in the index of redistribution preferences. The index is computed by extracting the first principal component from the five questions (factor loadings are shown in Table OA1; the composition of this index, as well as the indices of trust in government and prosocial preferences, were specified during pre-registration). One question

relates to the *minimum wage*, a redistributive policy that does not involve transfers to or from the government, while general beliefs about inequality and fairness of the economic system were measured with a question about whether the *income disparity* between rich and poor Russians is too great. Citizens’ preferences toward government spending, in general, were measured with two additional questions. First, we ask whether the individual believes that *state spending* is too high and should be reduced; second, we ask about the optimal *income tax rate*. As a manipulation control, we ask about *problems that worry one the most*; one of the answer options is the war in Ukraine.

To measure ***trust in government***, we create an index consisting of four questions. We ask whether the person believes that money from the state budget is *spent efficiently* and whether he or she trusts Russian president Vladimir *Putin*, the regional *governor*, and the *police*. The index is calculated separately for Parts 1 and 2 (factor loadings are given in Table OA2). We also ask a related question — whether the individual believes the country is going the right or *wrong way*.

To measure ***prosocial preferences***, we construct an index from four different inputs. First, individuals play a take-or-give version of the *dictator game*, where a dictator’s options are between giving \$0.50 of his own wealth of \$1.00 to the recipient and taking all of the recipient’s wealth of \$0.50. Each participant has a 10% chance that his or her choice (in either the first or second part) will be implemented. Second, each person is asked about the *expected average donation* of the other experiment participants. Third, it is the hypothetical *donation to charity*; the person is confronted with a situation in which he or she unexpectedly receives 30000 rubles (about \$450 at that time) and is asked how much of this amount he or she would donate to charity. Finally, individuals are asked how willing they are (on a 10-point scale) to *contribute to good causes* without expecting anything in return. The latter two questions have been shown to be correlated with altruistic behavior in incentivized experiments (Falk et al., 2016, 2018). The index of prosocial preferences is calculated for both parts of the experiment (factor loadings are reported in Table OA3).

To measure the strength of ***national identity*** and identification with the country as a whole, we ask whether the respondent *trusts all Russian nationals*. To control for the individual level of trust, we included a question about whether one trusts *trusts people one knows personally*.

Our ***control variables*** included *gender*; *age category* (18-29; 30-49; and 50+); *higher education*; whether one is *married* or living with partner. We included a variable indicating whether the person is *employed full-time*, is a *student*, is *retired*, or works for a state company. As an *income* measure, we used a question asking to choose a phrase that best describes the financial condition of one’s family — from “We do not have enough money even to buy food” up to “We can afford anything we need without taking a loan”. In the ***post-treatment*** section we ask two questions about the individual’s exposure to the conflict — whether she has friends or relatives *taking part in the conflict* or *living in Ukraine*.

There were six questions in the first ***war-related*** to war and five questions in the block that emphasized the cost of war. Because one of the goals of our analysis is to examine whether continuing the war affects the sociopolitical preferences of war supporters and war opponents differently, we use a random forest algorithm in Appendix A.2 to construct a measure of support for the war that is based on responses in the first part of the survey and is uncorrelated with the treatment. Table OA4 shows the correlation matrix for the indices of war

support, redistribution preferences, trust in government, and prosocial preferences. Redistribution preferences are not correlated with either war support or trust in government and are only weakly correlated with prosocial preferences, while trust in government and war support are strongly correlated.

Finally, several *other questions* are used to examine the impact of war on redistribution preferences. In both parts of the survey, we ask for an estimate of one’s *income decile*; perceptions of one’s place in the income distribution have been shown to have a causal effect on redistribution preferences (Cruces, Perez-Truglia and Tetaz, 2013; Kuziemko et al., 2015; Karadja, Mollerstrom and Seim, 2017). In addition, in the second part of the survey and before the treatment, we ask whether the person believes that he or she earns more than most Russians. In the second part, we ask about the importance of *luck or hard work* for success in life — a value that is also associated with the demand for sociopolitical (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006b).

We restrict our sample to Toloka participants who identify themselves as Russian citizens. A total of 4293 people completed the first part and 3920 people completed the second part of the survey.⁵ Attrition during the second part is minimal (20 individuals) and does not depend on the treatment (one-way ANOVA $p = 0.2844$). There are 1291 individuals assigned to the control treatment, 1289 assigned to the war treatment, and 1340 assigned to the war+cost treatment. In Appendix A.1, we confirm that the assignment of participants to treatments is independent of demographic variables. The median age of participants is 35 years, younger than the median age for Russia as a whole (40.5 years). At the same time, the sample is gender balanced with 49.4% of female participants (53.8% for Russia as a whole). Participants received an average compensation of \$0.95. The average time to complete the experiment is 3.9 minutes for the first part and 9.6 minutes for the second part.

4 Results

4.1 Trust in Government

We begin by analyzing the impact of the war prime on trust in government, comparing the control group with the pooled treatment groups⁶. In Figure 2 we compare the levels of trust in government index depending on the treatment. In the right part of the figure, the comparison is made separately for two subgroups of individuals: Those with above-median and those with below-median levels of predicted war support. We do this because Russian society is polarized in its attitudes toward the war (Chapkovski and Zakharov, 2023), while polarization and political loyalty can influence information acquisition about politically relevant issues and lead to different responses along the policy support margin (Alesina, Stantcheva and Teso, 2018; Alesina, Miano and Stantcheva, 2020).

⁵We initially planned to recruit $N = 5000$ participants for Part 1 and, expecting a 15% attrition rate, $N = 4200$ participants for both parts, with $N = 1400$ participants in each treatment group. The actual attrition rate was 8.6%. In accordance with plans, we used the Sentry online tool to screen participants. A smaller-than-expected number of participants was recruited because of a higher-than-expected screenout ratio for Sentry.

⁶The war and war+cost treatment effects are examined separately in Appendix A.3.




Figure 1: The effect of the war treatment on trust in government

For individuals with war support above the median, the treatment increases trust in government ($p = 0.0021$, two-tailed t -test). For all individuals, the effect of the treatment on trust in government is positive but not significant ($p = 0.1245$). In Table 2 we continue the analysis with the OLS regressions of the index and its components; we also include the variable indicating whether the individual believes that the country is on the wrong track.

For all individuals and for individuals with war support above the median, the treatment effect is highly significant ($p = 0.0001$; the value of the index increases by 0.0596sd and 0.0968sd, respectively), as is the effect of the treatment on all individual index components ($p < 0.0242$) and on the binary variable indicating whether the individual believes the country is following the wrong path ($p = 0.0011$ and $p = 0.0835$ for all individuals and for individuals with war support above the median, respectively). For individuals with war support below the median, the treatment only affects the belief that the country is on the wrong path ($p = 0.0083$). Overall, we interpret our results as providing strong support for the rally-round-the-flag effect — trust in government is higher in the presence of a war prime. This allows us to consider the rally-round-the-flag effect as a potential channel for the impact of conflict on preferences for redistribution.

In Table OA5, we look at whether the effect of the treatment is larger in some population subgroups. We find that the effect is independent of gender, education, and income and that the effect is stronger in the 30-49 age group than in the 18-30 age group ($p = 0.0912$). It does not depend on trust in government, prosocial preferences, and strength of national identity. At the same time, the strength of the treatment effect increases with support for the war, implying that the rally-round-the-flag effect is stronger in people who support the war. This heterogeneity is highly significant ($p = 0.0007$ for Model 8, which includes only the interaction between treatment and war support, and $p = 0.0001$ for Model 9, which includes all interaction terms).




Figure 2: The effect of the war treatment on trust in government

4.2 Prosocial preferences

Next, we look at whether prosocial preferences are affected by the war prime. As Figure 4 shows, the treatment has no significant homogeneous effect on the level of prosocial preferences, neither for all individuals nor for the low/high war support subgroups.

In Table 3 we continue the analysis by regressing the prosocial preferences index and its components. The table also examines the effects of the treatment on trust toward people one knows personally and on trust toward all Russians; the latter variable measures the strength of the person's national identity.

We find that the effect of the war prime is ambiguous. For all individuals, it has a positive effect on the log hypothetical donation to a charity ($p = 0.0022$), with the donation being 16% higher on average in the treatment groups. Willingness to donate to good causes is also higher ($p = 0.0642$). At the same time, the average belief in the DG donations of others is lower in the treatment groups ($p = 0.0962$), while the overall index of prosocial preferences is not significantly affected by the treatment. For individuals with war support above the median, the overall index, willingness to donate, and log hypothetical donation are positively affected by the treatment ($p = 0.0892$, $p = 0.006$, and $p = 0.0489$, respectively), while donations in the dictator game and beliefs in it are not. For individuals whose war support is below the median, the overall index and charitable giving are unaffected by the treatment, log charitable giving is positively affected, while both DG giving and DG beliefs are negatively affected ($p = 0.0851$ and $p = 0.0361$, respectively). We also find that treatment has a differential effect on the strength of national identity: Trust in Russians increases for individuals with war support above the median ($p = 0.0412$) and decreases among those with war support below the median ($p = 0.022$), with no effect for all individuals.

	Index	Putin	Governor	Police	Efficient	Wrong way
Panel A: All observations						
Treatment	0.0596*** (0.0143)	0.0193*** (0.00472)	0.0127** (0.00542)	0.0145*** (0.00546)	0.0136** (0.00587)	-0.0352*** (0.0108)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912
R^2	0.8264	0.8309	0.7147	0.6904	0.6030	0.5558
Panel B: Top 50% war support						
Treatment	0.0968*** (0.0193)	0.0304*** (0.00624)	0.0216*** (0.00772)	0.0176** (0.00779)	0.0275*** (0.00833)	-0.0188* (0.0108)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	1957	1957	1957	1957	1957	1957
R^2	0.7023	0.5572	0.6408	0.6247	0.4694	0.0785
Panel C: Bottom 50% war support						
Treatment	0.0241 (0.0210)	0.00785 (0.00711)	0.00405 (0.00760)	0.0117 (0.00769)	0.00117 (0.00820)	-0.0483*** (0.0183)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	1955	1955	1955	1955	1955	1955
R^2	0.7864	0.7691	0.6904	0.6758	0.5365	0.4060

OLS regression, standard errors in parentheses. Part 1 control variables as in Table OA13.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 2: The effect of the treatment on trust in government.

In Table OA6, we examine whether the effect of the treatment can vary across population subgroups by regressing the second-period index of prosocial preferences and assuming that the effect of the treatment can be heterogeneous. We find that the effect does not depend on age, gender, income, education, prosocial preferences, trust in government, or level of war support. At the same time, the effect of the treatment varies significantly with the degree of trust in all Russians when controlling for the interaction of the treatment with the degree of trust in people one knows personally (Model 5, $p = 0.0101$ for the interaction term) and for all interaction terms (Model 9, $p = 0.0249$). We interpret this as the war reminder having a more positive effect on the prosocial preferences of those individuals who identify with the country as a whole and see themselves as part of a common social group with all their countrymen. In Figure OA1, we report the marginal effects of the treatment for different levels of trust in Russians. While for individuals who gave the lowest response (“Completely distrust”) the effect is negative, for those with the highest response (“Completely trust”) it is positive. A similar pattern is observed when we look at the individual components of the index of prosocial preferences, estimating models similar to Model 9 of Table OA6. The interaction between national identity strength and the treatment is positive for all four components and significant for DG donations and beliefs ($p = 0.0943$ and




Figure 3: The effect of the war treatment on prosocial preferences

$p = 0.0732$, respectively).

4.3 Preferences for redistribution

We next look at the effects of the treatment on redistribution preferences. In Figure 6 we compare the levels of the redistribution preferences index depending on whether the individual belonged to one of the two war treatments or to the baseline treatment. We perform the comparison for all individuals and then separately for individuals with an index of war support at/above the median and those below the median.

While the difference between treated and untreated individuals is not significant for all individuals, treatment has a positive effect on the redistribution preferences of individuals with war support above the median ($p = 0.0544$, two-tailed t -test). For individuals with war support below the median, the index is lower for treated individuals, although the difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels.

In Table 4, we continue this analysis by regressing the redistribution preferences index, as well as each of its components and several other variables on the binary treatment variable, incorporating the full set of control variables from Part 1. In Panel A of the table, we consider all individuals and find that the treatment has no effect on redistribution preferences. We then repeat our analysis separately for individuals whose index of war support is at or above the median (Panel B) and for individuals who are below the median (Panel C). The treatment affects the index of redistribution preferences for individuals with war support at or above the median; the overall index is increased by 0.107sd by the treatment ($p = 0.0143$). In this subgroup, the treatment also increases three components of this index: the belief that the government should support the poor and people with housing needs, and the share of the budget going to social policy ($p = 0.032$, $p = 0.0942$, and $p = 0.279$, respectively). For individuals whose war support index is below the median, the direction of the treatment effect is reversed: in this subgroup, the treatment reduces the index of redistribution preferences by 0.0836sd ($p = 0.0882$) and also reduces the preference toward government food aid provision ($p = 0.0187$).




Figure 4: The effect of the war treatment on prosocial preferences





Figure 5: The effect of the war treatment on redistribution preferences

	Index	DG	DG belief	Willing to give	Log donation	Trust personal	Trust Russians
Panel A: All observations							
Treatment	0.0105 (0.0192)	-0.0510 (0.0364)	-0.0706* (0.0423)	0.108* (0.0581)	0.148*** (0.0483)	0.00149 (0.00530)	-0.00241 (0.00545)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912
R^2	0.6855	0.6171	0.5262	0.5085	0.6970	0.3499	0.4483
Panel B: Top 50% war support							
Treatment	0.0485* (0.0285)	-0.00922 (0.0531)	-0.0174 (0.0612)	0.237*** (0.0863)	0.133** (0.0677)	0.00767 (0.00735)	0.0146** (0.00714)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	1957	1957	1957	1957	1957	1957	1957
R^2	0.6338	0.5992	0.5206	0.4641	0.6001	0.3617	0.3131
Panel C: Bottom 50% war support							
Treatment	-0.0245 (0.0256)	-0.0851* (0.0497)	-0.123** (0.0585)	-0.0142 (0.0776)	0.162** (0.0682)	-0.00412 (0.00765)	-0.0188** (0.00820)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	1955	1955	1955	1955	1955	1955	1955
R^2	0.7304	0.6445	0.5374	0.5394	0.7552	0.3234	0.4187

OLS regression, standard errors in parentheses. Part 1 control variables as in Table OA13.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 3: The effect of the treatment on prosocial preferences and national identity.



The bars show average values of redistribution index. The vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 6: The effect of the war treatment on redistribution preferences

Index	Unemployed	Housing	Poor	Food	Budget	Income diff	Min wage	Work-luck	Perceived inc.
Panel A: All observations									
Treatment	0.0113 (0.7317)	0.00210 (0.7993)	0.00244 (0.7412)	-0.00484 (0.5307)	0.247 (0.4363)	-0.00106 (0.8752)	0.00448 (0.4745)	0.0411 (0.3229)	0.0766 (0.1483)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912
R ²	0.0670	0.0366	0.0554	0.0472	0.0335	0.0952	0.0613	0.1149	0.4513
Panel B: Top 50% war support									
Treatment	0.107** (0.0143)	0.0186* (0.0942)	0.0210** (0.0320)	0.0169 (0.1077)	0.996** (0.0279)	0.00716 (0.4626)	0.00725 (0.4091)	0.0693 (0.2162)	-0.01000 (0.8938)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	1957	1957	1957	1957	1957	1957	1957	1957	1957
R ²	0.0927	0.0446	0.0718	0.0600	0.0306	0.1128	0.0784	0.0982	0.4272
Panel C: Bottom 50% war support									
Treatment	-0.0836* (0.0882)	-0.0137 (0.2603)	-0.0162 (0.1374)	-0.0263** (0.0187)	-0.547 (0.2208)	-0.00963 (0.3054)	0.000967 (0.9137)	0.00993 (0.8711)	0.150** (0.0455)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	1955	1955	1955	1955	1955	1955	1955	1955	1955
R ²	0.0770	0.0548	0.0470	0.0590	0.0351	0.0980	0.0645	0.0835	0.4851

OLS regression, standard errors in parentheses. Part 1 control variables as in Table OA13.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 4: The effect of the treatment on redistribution preferences.

The treatment has no effect (either for all individuals or for either subgroup) on preferences toward the minimum wage — a redistributive policy that does not involve a transfer from the state. We also find no effect of the treatment on beliefs that income inequality is too great, or on beliefs that luck and relationships (as opposed to hard work) are important for getting ahead in life. The perceived income decile is positively affected by the treatment ($p = 0.0455$), but only for those whose war support is below the median.

In Table OA7 we examine whether the effect of the treatment on the index of redistribution preferences varies across population subgroups. Several things are observed. The effect is stronger for individuals in the 30-49 age group than for individuals in the 18-29 or 50 groups ($p = 0.0166$ and $p = 0.0570$, respectively, for Model 3; $p = 0.0343$ and $p = 0.0368$, respectively, for Model 9). The effect is also stronger for individuals with more trust in government ($p = 0.0378$ in Model 6), stronger prosocial preferences ($p = 0.0650$ in Model 7), and stronger war support ($p = 0.0026$ and $p = 0.0612$ in Model 8).

In Table OA8, we look at the effect of the treatment on preferences toward taxes and government spending. We do not find that the treatment affects beliefs that government spending is too high. At the same time, for individuals with below-median war advocacy, the treatment increases the preferred income tax rate ($p = 0.0283$) and the percent of state budget allocated to health spending ($p = 0.0203$), and simultaneously decreases the percent of state budget allocated to security spending ($p = 0.0465$).

4.4 Mediation analysis

We hypothesize that the effects of war on redistribution and state spending preferences may be mediated by either increased trust in government or increased prosocial preferences. For individuals with war support above the median, we find that all three of these variables are positively affected by the treatment. Therefore, we can test this prediction with a causal mediation analysis.

To assess the mediating effect of trust in government and prosocial preferences on redistribution preferences, we estimate the following two equations for each of the two mediating variables:

$$M_i = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 T_i + \delta_1 X_i + e_{1i} \quad (1)$$

$$Y_i = \alpha_2 + \beta_2 T_i + \gamma M_i + \delta_3 X_i + e_{2i}, \quad (2)$$

where M_i is the mediating variable (the index of either trust in government or prosocial preferences), Y_i is the index of redistribution preferences, T_i is the treatment dummy, and X_i is the full set of pretreatment controls, augmented by the the alternative mediator variable. To reject the null hypothesis of no mediation effect, we require $\beta_1 > 0$ and $\beta_1 \gamma > 0$. We derive an estimate for the latter value and obtain its 95% confidence intervals using an MCMC algorithm described in Imai, Keele and Tingley (2010). The models (1) and (2) are estimated repeatedly, with parameters drawn from the sampling distribution. For each vector of model parameters, the procedure then simulates the variables Y and M under the treatment and no treatment and calculates the average causal mediation effect (ACME) as the difference between the outcome variables when the mediator is under the treatment or not.

To demonstrate the presence of causal mediation effects, we should rule out the possibility of pre-treatment confounding factors (Bullock, Green and Ha, 2010). In other words, unobserved factors that affect our outcome

of interest — redistribution preferences — should not also affect policy-specific interactions conditional on the treatment and pretreatment variables. If this assumption holds, the error terms e_{1i} and e_{2i} will not be correlated.

Our two-part experimental design is driven by this requirement. Questions on trust in government and prosocial preferences are asked both before and after the treatment to eliminate the possibility of a correlation between the outcome variable and mediators conditional on the pretreatment variables. The correlation between our indices of trust in government in the two parts is 0.8961 (so the first-part variables explain most of the variation in the second-part trust in government index), while the corresponding value for the indices of prosocial preferences is 0.8205. An even larger share of variation in Part 2 indices is explained by pre-treatment controls because they also include socio-demographic controls, and each Part 1 index component is included separately.

To address the sensitivity of our results to potential confounders, we use a procedure described in Imai, Keele and Yamamoto (2010) and implemented in Stata using the package `medsens`. This involves fitting the (1) and (2) models under various assumptions about the correlation between the e_{1i} and e_{2i} error terms; this allows us to see how strong unobserved confounding effects must be for the mediation effect to be zero.

The results of our analysis are shown in Table 5. We find that the effect of the war prime on redistribution preferences is partially mediated by trust in government. Specifically, the treatment leads to a 0.0101sd increase in the redistribution preferences index that is mediated by trust in government, which is 0.096 of the total effect. This mediated effect is significant at the 95% level. The sensitivity for this mediator is 0.05, which is not a small value. When the index of confidence in government in the second period is regressed on the pretreatment variables, the standardized beta coefficient for gender (the largest coefficient on variables other than the components of the index of confidence in government in Part I and the predicted index of war support) is 0.048.

	Trust in government	Prosocial attitudes
ACME	0.0106 (0.0010 0.0231)	-0.0043 (-0.0120 0.0006)
Direct effect	0.0998 (0.0100 0.1891)	0.0998 (0.0100 0.1891)
Total effect	0.1104 (0.0212 0.1983)	0.0954 (0.0059 0.1851)
ρ at which ACME=0	0.0500	-0.0593

Table 5: Mediation effects of trust in government and prosocial preferences on redistribution preferences, individuals with war support above the median (95% confidence intervals).

The index of prosocial preferences, on the other hand, does not mediate the effect of the war prime treatment on redistribution preferences. The calculated ACME is negative (although not significantly so at the 95% or 90% level), implying that individuals whose prosocial preferences increased as a result of the treatment are also more likely to have their redistribution preferences reduced by the treatment.

5 Conclusion

Our study uses a survey experiment conducted during an on-going interstate conflict to examine how wars can affect public support for state spending and redistributive policies, as well as trust in government and prosocial preferences. The treatment in the experiment aims to remind participants of the ongoing war.

We find that the effect of the war depends on the polarization of views about the war. Among war supporters, there is strong evidence of a rally-round-the-flag effect: a reminder of the war increases trust in government. Using a causal mediation analysis based on the two-part design of the experiment, we show that the rally-round-the-flag effect leads to an increase in redistribution preferences among war supporters. The prosocial preferences of war supporters are positively affected by the treatment, but the effect of the treatment on redistribution preferences is not mediated by increased altruism.

It remains for future research to determine whether the effects found in this paper are long-lasting and differ depending on the duration and end of the war.

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Online appendix for “The Effect of War on Prosocial Preferences.”

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A Additional analysis

A.1 Balance tests

In Table OA9 we report the summary statistics (mean and standard deviation) for the socio-demographic variables and other variables in the pre-treatment block, broken down by the treatment. The rightmost column reports the p -values of one-way ANOVA tests. Differences were significant at conventional levels for only two variables: Log hypothetical charity donation and willingness to contribute to good causes. However, these variables were lower in the treatment groups, while the treatment effect that we observe is in the opposite direction.

To test that our covariates were globally balanced, we ran a multinomial logit regression where the dependent variable was the treatment category and the independent variables were from Table OA9. The chi-square statistic was not significant at conventional levels ($p = 0.4929$), confirming our expectation that treatment assignment was independent of pre-treatment variables.

A.2 Index of war support

In this section, we discuss the construction of the index of war support and report on the analysis establishing whether the index is affected by the treatment.

The first block of war-related questions consisted of the following: Whether one *follows news* about the war; whether one *supports* the actions of Russian forces in Ukraine; whether one believes that Russia will be able to achieve *victory*; how soon the war *will end*; whether one supports the incorporation of new *territories* into Russia; and whether the *West* is responsible for the current conflict. In Table OA10 we report the outcome of the principal component analysis of the six questions.

One of our goals is to examine whether the effect of the treatment is heterogeneous in the degree to which the individual supports the war. However, in our design, the questions eliciting war support are asked either at the beginning or at the end of the second part of the experiment and, hence, are also potentially affected by the treatment.

We deal with this problem by using a random forest algorithm implemented with `rforest` package in Stata (Schonlau and Zou, 2020) to construct a prediction of this value based on the pre-treatment variables. The resulting value is highly correlated with the war support index ($r = 0.9736$). In Table OA11 we regress the resulting measure on the treatment and demographic controls and find the coefficient for the treatment variable is not statistically significant. To check whether the effect of the treatment can be heterogeneous across different demographic groups, we also regress the dependent variable including interaction terms with the treatment dummy and the pretreatment covariates; the F-test statistic for the joint significance of the interaction terms is also reported in Table OA11 and is equal to 0.4947, indicating that the interaction terms are not jointly significant. Finally, we use the random forest algorithm to fit two models where the dependent variable is the predicted index of war support, and the independent variables do not include the treatment dummy in the first case, and include it in the second case. The inclusion of the treatment dummy does not lead to a reduction in the out-of-bag error. We interpret this result as further ruling out the treatment having an effect on the

predicted war attitudes for some subset of individuals.

In Tables OA12 and OA13 we report the balance tests for two subsets of individuals used in our analysis: Those with at or above-median and those with below-median values of the war support index. For the individuals with war support above the median, the log charity donation varied across the treatment groups (though it was not different if we compare the control and pooled treatment). For individuals with below median war support, willingness to donate to good causes was higher in the control group, and DG donation varied across the treatment groups (though it was not different if we compare the control and pooled treatment). The treatment was not correlated with any other covariates. For both subsets, the covariates are globally balanced across the treatments, with the corresponding chi-square statistics 0.6343 and 0.847, respectively.

A.3 Costs of war

There were two treatment groups in our experiment. In the first group, we primed the individuals with questions related to the general awareness of and support for the war. In the second group, we added a number of questions that emphasized the costs and potential risks of conflict. In our analysis so far, the effects of these two treatments were pooled; in Tables OA14, OA16, and OA18 we consider these effects separately, regressing trust in government, prosocial preferences, and redistribution preferences on the treatment indicators and pretreatment covariates.

For all individuals, trust in the government index increases in both treatments, although the treatment effect is larger if the costs of the war are not made salient ($p = 0.0448$). Trust in Vladimir Putin and the regional governor does not decrease with the reminder about the costs of war. At the same time, both trust in police and the belief that the government is efficient is lower in the War+Cost treatment, compared with the War treatment ($p = 0.0123$ and $p = 0.055$, respectively). This might be indicative of blame-shifting, when blame for policy failures is diverted from higher to lower levels of the state apparatus (Frye, 2019; Sirotkina and Zavadskaya, 2020).

We did not find that the two treatments had different effects on either the index of prosocial preferences or any of its components, with the exception of the log hypothetical donation; the latter value increased more strongly after a reminder about the costs of war ($p = 0.0893$). For individuals with war support below the median, the reminder about the costs of war resulted in lower redistribution preferences compared with the baseline ($p = 0.033$), although the difference between the effects of the two types of treatment was not significant. The reminder about the costs of war also resulted in a higher evaluation of one's relative income, both for all individuals and for those with war support below the median; in either case, the effect was significant at $p < 0.0309$ compared with either the baseline or the war treatment.

B Supplemental tables and figures

	Part 2
State should: Help unemployed	0.461
State should: Provide housing	0.494
State should: Help poor	0.527
State should: Provide food	0.489
Budget share: Social	0.165

Eigenvector for the first principal component is 2.641; 0.528 of variance is explained

Table OA1: Factor loadings for index of redistribution preferences

	Part 1	Part 2
Government is efficient	0.485	0.502
Trust Putin	0.517	0.510
Trust governor	0.511	0.507
Trust police	0.486	0.482

Eigenvectors for the first principal component are 2.774, 2.842; 0.694, 0.711 of variance is explained

Table OA2: Factor loadings for indices of progovernment attitudes

	Part 1	Part 2
Log charity donation	0.481	0.483
DG decision	0.556	0.553
DG belief	0.503	0.483
Willing to give to good causes	0.454	0.477

Eigenvectors for the first principal component are 1.717, 1.752; 0.429, 0.438 of variance is explained

Table OA3: Factor loadings for indices of prosocial attitudes

	War support	Trust in government, Part 1	Prosocial preferences, Part 1	Redistribution
War support	1.00			
Trust in government, Part 1	0.73***	1.00		
Prosocial preferences, Part 1	0.10***	0.14***	1.00	
Redistribution	0.03	-0.02	0.08***	1.00

Table OA4: Correlation table.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Treatment	0.0446** (0.0203)	0.0717*** (0.0200)	0.0236 (0.0271)	0.0482 (0.0374)	0.0328 (0.0582)	0.0596*** (0.0143)	0.0596*** (0.0143)	0.0596*** (0.0142)	0.0213 (0.0759)
Treatment $\times$ Female	0.0297 (0.0285)								0.0467 (0.0289)
Treatment $\times$ Higher education		-0.0249 (0.0286)							-0.0341 (0.0299)
Treatment $\times$ Age 30-49			0.0553* (0.0328)						0.0336 (0.0345)
Treatment $\times$ Age 50+			0.0228 (0.0488)						-0.0121 (0.0505)
Treatment $\times$ Income category				0.0213 (0.0643)					0.0198 (0.0658)
Treatment $\times$ Trust: Know pers., Part 1					0.0318 (0.0831)				0.0661 (0.0842)
Treatment $\times$ Trust: Russians, Part 1					0.00652 (0.0714)				-0.0764 (0.0794)
Treatment $\times$ Trust in gov. index, Part 1						0.00766 (0.0143)			-0.0583*** (0.0219)
Treatment $\times$ Prosocial pref. index, Part 1							0.0000179 (0.0110)		-0.00197 (0.0112)
Treatment $\times$ War support								0.0579*** (0.0170)	0.114*** (0.0262)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912
R ²	0.8264	0.8264	0.8265	0.8264	0.8264	0.8264	0.8264	0.8269	0.8275

OLS regression, standard errors in parentheses. DV is the Part 2 trust in government index. Part 1 control variables as in Table OA13.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table OA5: The effect of treatment on trust toward government, heterogeneity analysis.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Treatment	0.0217 (0.0273)	0.0147 (0.0269)	-0.0399 (0.0365)	-0.0107 (0.0503)	-0.181** (0.0782)	0.0104 (0.0192)	0.0105 (0.0192)	0.0105 (0.0192)	-0.238** (0.102)
Treatment $\times$ Female	-0.0222 (0.0384)								-0.0197 (0.0389)
Treatment $\times$ Higher education		-0.00858 (0.0385)							-0.0191 (0.0402)
Treatment $\times$ Age 30-49			0.0711 (0.0441)						0.0743 (0.0465)
Treatment $\times$ Age 50+			0.0632 (0.0656)						0.0591 (0.0681)
Treatment $\times$ Income category				0.0393 (0.0865)					0.0168 (0.0888)
Treatment $\times$ Trust: Know pers., Part 1					0.0629 (0.112)				0.0902 (0.114)
Treatment $\times$ Trust: Russians, Part 1					0.247** (0.0960)				0.240** (0.107)
Treatment $\times$ Trust in gov. index, Part 1						0.0266 (0.0192)			0.00438 (0.0296)
Treatment $\times$ Prosocial pref. index, Part 1							-0.00629 (0.0148)		-0.0152 (0.0151)
Treatment $\times$ War support								0.0361 (0.0229)	-0.00175 (0.0353)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912
R ²	0.6855	0.6855	0.6857	0.6855	0.6863	0.6856	0.6855	0.6857	0.6866

OLS regression, standard errors in parentheses. DV is the Part 2 prosocial preferences index. Part 1 control variables as in Table OA13.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table OA6: The effect of treatment on prosocial preferences, heterogeneity analysis.




Figure OA1: The effect of the treatment on prosocial preferences, depending on the strength of national identity.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Treatment	0.0189 (0.0470)	0.0315 (0.0463)	-0.0960 (0.0627)	-0.0423 (0.0866)	0.00000955 (0.135)	0.0112 (0.0330)	0.0111 (0.0330)	0.0113 (0.0330)	0.0310 (0.176)
Treatment $\times$ Female	-0.0150 (0.0661)								0.00203 (0.0669)
Treatment $\times$ Higher education		-0.0413 (0.0663)							-0.0528 (0.0692)
Treatment $\times$ Age 30-49			0.182** (0.0759)						0.169** (0.0800)
Treatment $\times$ Age 50+			-0.0146 (0.113)						-0.0470 (0.117)
Treatment $\times$ Income category				0.0998 (0.149)					0.0598 (0.153)
Treatment $\times$ Trust: Know pers., Part 1					-0.0767 (0.193)				-0.0549 (0.195)
Treatment $\times$ Trust: Russians, Part 1					0.112 (0.165)				-0.141 (0.184)
Treatment $\times$ Trust in gov. index, Part 1						0.0687** (0.0331)			0.00828 (0.0509)
Treatment $\times$ Prosocial pref. index, Part 1							0.0470* (0.0255)		0.0428 (0.0260)
Treatment $\times$ War support								0.119*** (0.0394)	0.114* (0.0608)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912
R ²	0.0670	0.0670	0.0688	0.0671	0.0671	0.0680	0.0678	0.0691	0.0718

OLS regression, standard errors in parentheses. DV is the redistribution preferences index. Part 1 control variables as in Table OA13.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table OA7: The effect of treatment on redistribution preferences, heterogeneity analysis.

	Tax rate	Spending high	Defense	Health	Education	Security	Infrastructure
Panel A: All observations							
Treatment	0.582	-0.00309	-0.0662	0.355	-0.0685	-0.289	-0.181
	(0.423)	(0.00818)	(0.301)	(0.275)	(0.265)	(0.217)	(0.246)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912
R^2	0.0691	0.1040	0.1968	0.0462	0.0573	0.0923	0.0502
Panel B: Top 50% war support							
Treatment	0.0546	0.00396	-0.381	-0.193	-0.159	-0.0125	-0.276
	(0.644)	(0.0114)	(0.474)	(0.390)	(0.341)	(0.327)	(0.304)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	1957	1957	1957	1957	1957	1957	1957
R^2	0.0829	0.0795	0.0644	0.0308	0.0263	0.0389	0.0274
Panel C: Bottom 50% war support							
Treatment	1.202**	-0.00924	0.280	0.904**	0.0229	-0.572**	-0.0882
	(0.548)	(0.0118)	(0.371)	(0.389)	(0.406)	(0.287)	(0.387)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	1955	1955	1955	1955	1955	1955	1955
R^2	0.0602	0.0768	0.1271	0.0368	0.0477	0.1126	0.0289

OLS regression, standard errors in parentheses. Part 1 control variables as in Table OA13.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table OA8: The effect of treatment on government spending preferences.

	Total	War	War+cost	Control	<i>p</i>
Age 18-29	0.28 (0.45)	0.28 (0.45)	0.27 (0.45)	0.28 (0.45)	0.914
Age 30-49	0.60 (0.49)	0.59 (0.49)	0.60 (0.49)	0.60 (0.49)	0.930
Age 50+	0.13 (0.33)	0.13 (0.34)	0.13 (0.33)	0.12 (0.33)	0.651
Higher education	0.48 (0.50)	0.47 (0.50)	0.47 (0.50)	0.50 (0.50)	0.332
Female	0.49 (0.50)	0.49 (0.50)	0.48 (0.50)	0.51 (0.50)	0.206
Income category	0.54 (0.22)	0.54 (0.22)	0.54 (0.22)	0.54 (0.22)	0.890
Fulltime	0.59 (0.49)	0.58 (0.49)	0.59 (0.49)	0.60 (0.49)	0.413
Married	0.54 (0.50)	0.55 (0.50)	0.54 (0.50)	0.54 (0.50)	0.827
Retired	0.10 (0.30)	0.09 (0.29)	0.10 (0.31)	0.09 (0.29)	0.497
Student	0.08 (0.27)	0.09 (0.28)	0.08 (0.27)	0.08 (0.26)	0.550
State employed	0.19 (0.39)	0.19 (0.39)	0.18 (0.38)	0.19 (0.39)	0.759
Trust: Putin, Part 1	0.61 (0.33)	0.60 (0.33)	0.62 (0.33)	0.62 (0.33)	0.508
Trust: Governor, Part 1	0.48 (0.30)	0.48 (0.30)	0.48 (0.29)	0.49 (0.30)	0.963
Trust: Police, Part 1	0.49 (0.28)	0.49 (0.28)	0.49 (0.28)	0.49 (0.28)	0.830
State is efficient, Part 1	0.43 (0.27)	0.43 (0.27)	0.43 (0.27)	0.43 (0.27)	0.745
Trust: Russians, Part 1	0.59 (0.22)	0.59 (0.22)	0.58 (0.22)	0.60 (0.22)	0.191
Trust: Know pers., Part 1	0.72 (0.19)	0.72 (0.19)	0.71 (0.18)	0.72 (0.19)	0.375
DG, Part 1	3.71 (1.76)	3.70 (1.76)	3.76 (1.77)	3.67 (1.73)	0.348
DG belief, Part 1	2.69 (1.84)	2.76 (1.87)	2.69 (1.84)	2.64 (1.81)	0.265
Log donation, Part 1	7.51 (2.74)	7.52 (2.73)	7.39 (2.86)	7.62 (2.61)	0.098
Wiling to donate, Part 1	6.13 (2.29)	6.20 (2.21)	5.96 (2.35)	6.24 (2.29)	0.004
Subj. inc. decile, Part 1	4.09 (2.12)	4.04 (2.09)	4.11 (2.16)	4.13 (2.12)	0.496
I earn more	3.60 (2.12)	3.59 (2.11)	3.56 (2.12)	3.66 (2.13)	0.516
<i>N</i>	3920	1289	1340	1291	

Each column reports the means and SDs of covariates in each treatment group. The rightmost column reports the *p* value for the one-way Anova test comparing the means.

Table OA9: Pre-treatment variables depending on the treatment, and balance tests

	Index
Support troops	0.488
Russian victory	0.467
New territories	0.508
West is responsible	0.492
How soon war will end	0.134
Follow events	0.162

Eigenvector for the first principal component is 3.174; 0.529 of variance is explained

Table OA10: Factor loadings for the indices of war support

Predicted war support	
Treatment	-0.00507 (0.0148)
N	3912
R^2	0.7349
Controls	YES
Interaction terms p	0.4947
Δ OOB error	-0.001

OLS regression, standard errors in parentheses. Part 1 control variables as in Table OA13.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table OA11: The effect of the treatment on the war support index

	Total	War	War+cost	Control	<i>p</i>
Age 18-29	0.21 (0.41)	0.20 (0.40)	0.19 (0.40)	0.23 (0.42)	0.336
Age 30-49	0.63 (0.48)	0.62 (0.48)	0.65 (0.48)	0.62 (0.49)	0.413
Age 50+	0.16 (0.37)	0.17 (0.38)	0.15 (0.36)	0.15 (0.36)	0.540
Higher education	0.46 (0.50)	0.44 (0.50)	0.46 (0.50)	0.48 (0.50)	0.312
Female	0.45 (0.50)	0.44 (0.50)	0.43 (0.50)	0.47 (0.50)	0.362
Income category	0.56 (0.21)	0.56 (0.21)	0.56 (0.21)	0.56 (0.22)	0.942
Fulltime	0.61 (0.49)	0.60 (0.49)	0.62 (0.49)	0.61 (0.49)	0.688
Married	0.59 (0.49)	0.60 (0.49)	0.58 (0.49)	0.58 (0.49)	0.721
Retired	0.13 (0.33)	0.13 (0.34)	0.13 (0.34)	0.12 (0.32)	0.749
Student	0.07 (0.26)	0.08 (0.27)	0.07 (0.25)	0.07 (0.26)	0.743
State employed	0.21 (0.41)	0.21 (0.41)	0.19 (0.39)	0.22 (0.42)	0.360
Trust: Putin, Part 1	0.83 (0.20)	0.82 (0.20)	0.83 (0.20)	0.83 (0.20)	0.323
Trust: Governor, Part 1	0.59 (0.26)	0.60 (0.27)	0.59 (0.26)	0.59 (0.27)	0.899
Trust: Police, Part 1	0.58 (0.26)	0.60 (0.25)	0.58 (0.26)	0.57 (0.26)	0.175
State is efficient, Part 1	0.54 (0.24)	0.54 (0.25)	0.54 (0.23)	0.55 (0.24)	0.806
Trust: Russians, Part 1	0.66 (0.20)	0.67 (0.20)	0.66 (0.20)	0.67 (0.20)	0.594
Trust: Know pers., Part 1	0.75 (0.19)	0.75 (0.19)	0.74 (0.18)	0.74 (0.20)	0.420
DG, Part 1	3.67 (1.78)	3.71 (1.76)	3.65 (1.85)	3.64 (1.73)	0.741
DG belief, Part 1	2.71 (1.83)	2.74 (1.85)	2.70 (1.85)	2.69 (1.81)	0.866
Log donation, Part 1	7.86 (2.41)	7.96 (2.32)	7.67 (2.66)	7.96 (2.22)	0.042
Wiling to donate, Part 1	6.48 (2.28)	6.60 (2.18)	6.34 (2.35)	6.52 (2.30)	0.106
Subj. inc. decile, Part 1	3.98 (2.09)	3.95 (2.08)	3.99 (2.11)	3.99 (2.08)	0.905
I earn more	3.78 (2.14)	3.79 (2.11)	3.72 (2.16)	3.84 (2.14)	0.605
<i>N</i>	1960	636	679	645	

Each column reports the means and SDs of covariates in each treatment group. The rightmost column reports the *p* value for the one-way Anova test comparing the means.

Table OA12: Summary statistics depending on the treatment, and balance tests, war support at or above median

	Total	War	War+cost	Control	<i>p</i>
Age 18-29	0.34 (0.48)	0.35 (0.48)	0.35 (0.48)	0.33 (0.47)	0.755
Age 30-49	0.56 (0.50)	0.56 (0.50)	0.54 (0.50)	0.58 (0.49)	0.427
Age 50+	0.09 (0.29)	0.09 (0.29)	0.10 (0.30)	0.09 (0.28)	0.591
Higher education	0.50 (0.50)	0.50 (0.50)	0.48 (0.50)	0.51 (0.50)	0.688
Female	0.54 (0.50)	0.53 (0.50)	0.54 (0.50)	0.56 (0.50)	0.489
Income category	0.52 (0.23)	0.52 (0.23)	0.52 (0.23)	0.52 (0.23)	0.935
Fulltime	0.57 (0.49)	0.56 (0.50)	0.57 (0.50)	0.59 (0.49)	0.436
Married	0.50 (0.50)	0.50 (0.50)	0.49 (0.50)	0.51 (0.50)	0.788
Retired	0.07 (0.25)	0.06 (0.23)	0.08 (0.27)	0.06 (0.24)	0.362
Student	0.09 (0.29)	0.09 (0.29)	0.10 (0.29)	0.08 (0.27)	0.500
State employed	0.16 (0.37)	0.17 (0.38)	0.17 (0.37)	0.15 (0.36)	0.694
Trust: Putin, Part 1	0.40 (0.30)	0.40 (0.29)	0.40 (0.30)	0.40 (0.29)	0.957
Trust: Governor, Part 1	0.37 (0.28)	0.37 (0.28)	0.37 (0.28)	0.38 (0.29)	0.757
Trust: Police, Part 1	0.40 (0.27)	0.39 (0.27)	0.40 (0.27)	0.40 (0.27)	0.755
State is efficient, Part 1	0.32 (0.25)	0.32 (0.25)	0.33 (0.26)	0.32 (0.24)	0.834
Trust: Russians, Part 1	0.52 (0.22)	0.52 (0.22)	0.51 (0.22)	0.53 (0.22)	0.130
Trust: Know pers., Part 1	0.69 (0.19)	0.70 (0.20)	0.69 (0.18)	0.69 (0.18)	0.695
DG, Part 1	3.76 (1.73)	3.69 (1.77)	3.88 (1.67)	3.69 (1.74)	0.075
DG belief, Part 1	2.68 (1.85)	2.77 (1.90)	2.68 (1.84)	2.58 (1.81)	0.202
Log donation, Part 1	7.16 (2.99)	7.09 (3.02)	7.11 (3.02)	7.29 (2.92)	0.422
Wiling to donate, Part 1	5.77 (2.24)	5.81 (2.18)	5.57 (2.29)	5.95 (2.25)	0.009
Subj. inc. decile, Part 1	4.21 (2.15)	4.12 (2.10)	4.24 (2.19)	4.27 (2.15)	0.453
I earn more	3.42 (2.09)	3.40 (2.09)	3.40 (2.07)	3.47 (2.10)	0.766
<i>N</i>	1960	653	661	646	

Each column reports the means and SDs of covariates in each treatment group. The rightmost column reports the *p* value for the one-way Anova test comparing the means.

Table OA13: Summary statistics depending on the treatment, and balance tests, war support below median

	Index	Putin	Governor	Police	Efficient	Wrong way
Panel A: All observations						
Treatment: War	0.0745*** (0.0169)	0.0182*** (0.00575)	0.0143** (0.00632)	0.0222*** (0.00635)	0.0197*** (0.00684)	-0.0282** (0.0131)
Treatment: War+Cost	0.0409** (0.0168)	0.0184*** (0.00570)	0.0104* (0.00627)	0.00645 (0.00629)	0.00669 (0.00678)	-0.0369*** (0.0129)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912
R^2	0.8176	0.8130	0.7104	0.6882	0.5993	0.5128
Wald $p(\text{War}=\text{War}+\text{Cost})$	0.0448	0.9765	0.5355	0.0123	0.0550	0.5012
Panel B: Top 50% war support						
Treatment: War	0.102*** (0.0227)	0.0317*** (0.00738)	0.0200** (0.00899)	0.0234*** (0.00906)	0.0271*** (0.00972)	-0.0149 (0.0127)
Treatment: War+Cost	0.0820*** (0.0223)	0.0250*** (0.00726)	0.0214** (0.00885)	0.0104 (0.00891)	0.0251*** (0.00956)	-0.0189 (0.0124)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	1957	1957	1957	1957	1957	1957
R^2	0.6957	0.5417	0.6394	0.6236	0.4647	0.0705
Wald $p(\text{War}=\text{War}+\text{Cost})$	0.3774	0.3591	0.8782	0.1477	0.8349	0.7491
Panel C: Bottom 50% war support						
Treatment: War	0.0450* (0.0251)	0.00317 (0.00870)	0.00863 (0.00891)	0.0202** (0.00893)	0.0121 (0.00955)	-0.0373* (0.0220)
Treatment: War+Cost	0.00333 (0.0251)	0.0125 (0.00869)	-0.000529 (0.00890)	0.00322 (0.00892)	-0.00971 (0.00954)	-0.0592*** (0.0220)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	1955	1955	1955	1955	1955	1955
R^2	0.7697	0.7399	0.6802	0.6718	0.5280	0.3541
Wald $p(\text{War}=\text{War}+\text{Cost})$	0.0961	0.2822	0.3017	0.0557	0.0220	0.3159

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table OA14: The effect of treatment on trust in government, separate effects of treatments

	Index	Putin	Governor	Police	Efficient	Wrong way
Panel A: All observations						
Treatment: War	0.0745*** (0.0169)	0.0182*** (0.00575)	0.0143** (0.00632)	0.0222*** (0.00635)	0.0197*** (0.00684)	-0.0282** (0.0131)
Treatment: War+Cost	0.0409** (0.0168)	0.0184*** (0.00570)	0.0104* (0.00627)	0.00645 (0.00629)	0.00669 (0.00678)	-0.0369*** (0.0129)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912
R^2	0.8176	0.8130	0.7104	0.6882	0.5993	0.5128
Wald $p(\text{War}=\text{War}+\text{Cost})$	0.0448	0.9765	0.5355	0.0123	0.0550	0.5012
Panel B: Top 50% war support						
Treatment: War	0.0879*** (0.0227)	0.0225*** (0.00724)	0.0139 (0.00909)	0.0262*** (0.00893)	0.0251** (0.00982)	-0.0123 (0.0141)
Treatment: War+Cost	0.0463** (0.0224)	0.0160** (0.00715)	0.00898 (0.00899)	0.00372 (0.00883)	0.0174* (0.00970)	-0.0206 (0.0139)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	1958	1958	1958	1958	1958	1958
R^2	0.6811	0.5705	0.6274	0.6191	0.4449	0.1161
Wald $p(\text{War}=\text{War}+\text{Cost})$	0.0571	0.3526	0.5761	0.0091	0.4155	0.5412
Panel C: Bottom 50% war support						
Treatment: War	0.0522* (0.0266)	0.0106 (0.00930)	0.0132 (0.00942)	0.0172* (0.00964)	0.0111 (0.0101)	-0.0397* (0.0220)
Treatment: War+Cost	0.0295 (0.0265)	0.0192** (0.00928)	0.00989 (0.00940)	0.00916 (0.00961)	-0.00638 (0.0101)	-0.0549** (0.0220)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	1954	1954	1954	1954	1954	1954
R^2	0.7525	0.7313	0.6595	0.6476	0.5100	0.4061
Wald $p(\text{War}=\text{War}+\text{Cost})$	0.3726	0.3386	0.7135	0.3833	0.0716	0.4710

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table OA15: The effect of treatment on trust in government, separate effects of treatments

	Index	DG	DG belief	Willing to give	Log donation	Trust personal	Trust Russians
Panel A: All observations							
Treatment: War	0.00283 (0.0222)	-0.0533 (0.0422)	-0.0806 (0.0490)	0.120* (0.0672)	0.100* (0.0559)	0.00732 (0.00614)	-0.00560 (0.00633)
Treatment: War+Cost	0.0176 (0.0220)	-0.0486 (0.0418)	-0.0605 (0.0485)	0.0937 (0.0667)	0.194*** (0.0554)	-0.00419 (0.00608)	0.0000229 (0.00627)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912
R^2	0.6857	0.6171	0.5260	0.5096	0.6972	0.3509	0.4462
Wald $p(\text{War}=\text{War}+\text{Cost})$	0.5033	0.9113	0.6787	0.6932	0.0893	0.0584	0.3701
Panel B: Top 50% war support							
Treatment: War	0.0399 (0.0332)	-0.0138 (0.0617)	-0.0109 (0.0712)	0.206** (0.101)	0.105 (0.0787)	0.0168** (0.00853)	0.0137* (0.00830)
Treatment: War+Cost	0.0511 (0.0327)	-0.0128 (0.0607)	-0.0307 (0.0700)	0.244** (0.0989)	0.169** (0.0774)	-0.000317 (0.00839)	0.0143* (0.00817)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	1957	1957	1957	1957	1957	1957	1957
R^2	0.6328	0.5985	0.5201	0.4613	0.5997	0.3628	0.3120
Wald $p(\text{War}=\text{War}+\text{Cost})$	0.7334	0.9871	0.7786	0.6975	0.4067	0.0421	0.9408
Panel C: Bottom 50% war support							
Treatment: War	-0.0310 (0.0296)	-0.0885 (0.0574)	-0.155** (0.0676)	0.0390 (0.0896)	0.114 (0.0787)	-0.00128 (0.00883)	-0.0243** (0.00948)
Treatment: War+Cost	-0.0181 (0.0296)	-0.0816 (0.0573)	-0.0901 (0.0675)	-0.0671 (0.0895)	0.210*** (0.0786)	-0.00695 (0.00882)	-0.0133 (0.00947)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	1955	1955	1955	1955	1955	1955	1955
R^2	0.7299	0.6444	0.5368	0.5393	0.7554	0.3226	0.4163
Wald $p(\text{War}=\text{War}+\text{Cost})$	0.6618	0.9048	0.3310	0.2342	0.2200	0.5194	0.2432

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table OA16: The effect of treatment on prosocial preferences, separate effects of treatments

	Index	DG	DG belief	Willing to give	Log donation	Trust personal	Trust Russians
Panel A: All observations							
Treatment: War	0.00283 (0.0222)	-0.0533 (0.0422)	-0.0806 (0.0490)	0.120* (0.0672)	0.100* (0.0559)	0.00732 (0.00614)	-0.00560 (0.00633)
Treatment: War+Cost	0.0176 (0.0220)	-0.0486 (0.0418)	-0.0605 (0.0485)	0.0937 (0.0667)	0.194*** (0.0554)	-0.00419 (0.00608)	0.0000229 (0.00627)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912
R^2	0.6857	0.6171	0.5260	0.5096	0.6972	0.3509	0.4462
Wald $p(\text{War}=\text{War}+\text{Cost})$	0.5033	0.9113	0.6787	0.6932	0.0893	0.0584	0.3701
Panel B: Top 50% war support							
Treatment: War	0.0407 (0.0331)	-0.0278 (0.0618)	0.00431 (0.0712)	0.199* (0.103)	0.119 (0.0751)	0.0140 (0.00896)	0.0156* (0.00839)
Treatment: War+Cost	0.0483 (0.0327)	0.0389 (0.0611)	0.0202 (0.0704)	0.0858 (0.102)	0.154** (0.0743)	0.00451 (0.00885)	0.0138* (0.00829)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	1958	1958	1958	1958	1958	1958	1958
R^2	0.6353	0.6050	0.5373	0.4485	0.6104	0.3340	0.3116
Wald $p(\text{War}=\text{War}+\text{Cost})$	0.8120	0.2623	0.8170	0.2559	0.6334	0.2739	0.8288
Panel C: Bottom 50% war support							
Treatment: War	-0.0215 (0.0319)	-0.0511 (0.0613)	-0.142* (0.0722)	0.0130 (0.0932)	0.124 (0.0873)	0.00598 (0.00896)	-0.0215** (0.0100)
Treatment: War+Cost	0.00199 (0.0318)	-0.0922 (0.0611)	-0.121* (0.0720)	0.0670 (0.0930)	0.273*** (0.0870)	-0.00813 (0.00894)	-0.00811 (0.00998)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	1954	1954	1954	1954	1954	1954	1954
R^2	0.7174	0.6360	0.5170	0.5413	0.7347	0.3451	0.3938
Wald $p(\text{War}=\text{War}+\text{Cost})$	0.4409	0.4838	0.7684	0.5453	0.0739	0.1004	0.1627

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table OA17: The effect of treatment on prosocial preferences, separate effects of treatments

Panel A: All observations										
Index	Unemployed	Housing	Poor	Food	Budget	Income diff	Min wage	Work-luck	Perceived inc.	
Treatment: War	0.0304 (0.0381)	0.00883 (0.00953)	0.00679 (0.00852)	-0.00626 (0.00891)	0.353 (0.368)	0.00136 (0.00785)	0.00861 (0.00724)	0.0243 (0.0480)	-0.00691 (0.0613)	
Treatment: War+Cost	-0.00989 (0.0378)	-0.00503 (0.00945)	-0.00248 (0.00845)	-0.00408 (0.00883)	0.152 (0.365)	-0.00383 (0.00778)	0.000138 (0.00717)	0.0595 (0.0476)	0.157*** (0.0608)	
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912
R ²	0.0741	0.0593	0.0597	0.0523	0.0334	0.0955	0.0652	0.1192	0.4523	
Wald $p(\text{War}=\text{War}+\text{Cost})$	0.2868	0.1424	0.2726	0.8052	0.5808	0.5046	0.2375	0.4603	0.0068	
Panel B: Top 50% war support										
Treatment: War	0.108** (0.0509)	0.0258** (0.0129)	0.0222* (0.0114)	0.0115 (0.0123)	1.008* (0.526)	0.0100 (0.0113)	0.00427 (0.0102)	0.0582 (0.0651)	-0.0747 (0.0870)	
Treatment: War+Cost	0.0914* (0.0501)	0.00893 (0.0127)	0.0163 (0.0113)	0.0176 (0.0121)	1.034** (0.518)	0.00271 (0.0111)	0.00910 (0.0100)	0.0874 (0.0641)	0.0549 (0.0856)	
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	1957	1957	1957	1957	1957	1957	1957	1957	1957	1957
R ²	0.0849	0.0784	0.0624	0.0478	0.0297	0.1107	0.0777	0.0969	0.4277	
Wald $p(\text{War}=\text{War}+\text{Cost})$	0.7397	0.1868	0.6025	0.6155	0.9600	0.5146	0.6321	0.6506	0.1318	
Panel C: Bottom 50% war support										
Treatment: War	-0.0465 (0.0566)	-0.00732 (0.0140)	-0.00863 (0.0126)	-0.0246* (0.0129)	-0.294 (0.515)	-0.00761 (0.0108)	0.0128 (0.0103)	-0.0105 (0.0707)	0.0569 (0.0862)	
Treatment: War+Cost	-0.121** (0.0565)	-0.0200 (0.0140)	-0.0238* (0.0126)	-0.0279** (0.0129)	-0.800 (0.515)	-0.0116 (0.0108)	-0.0109 (0.0103)	0.0303 (0.0706)	0.242*** (0.0861)	
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	1955	1955	1955	1955	1955	1955	1955	1955	1955	1955
R ²	0.0763	0.0472	0.0592	0.0663	0.0355	0.0975	0.0669	0.0819	0.4861	
Wald $p(\text{War}=\text{War}+\text{Cost})$	0.1882	0.3627	0.2270	0.7919	0.3237	0.7082	0.0207	0.5622	0.0309	

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table OA18: The effect of treatment on redistribution preferences, separate effects of treatments

Panel A: All observations										
Index	Unemployed	Housing	Poor	Food	Budget	Income diff	Min wage	Work-luck	Perceived inc.	
Treatment: War	0.0304 (0.0381)	0.00883 (0.00953)	0.00679 (0.00852)	-0.00626 (0.00891)	0.353 (0.368)	0.00136 (0.00785)	0.00861 (0.00724)	0.0243 (0.0480)	-0.00691 (0.0613)	
Treatment: War+Cost	-0.00989 (0.0378)	-0.00503 (0.00945)	-0.00248 (0.00845)	-0.00408 (0.00883)	0.152 (0.365)	-0.00383 (0.00778)	0.000138 (0.00717)	0.0595 (0.0476)	0.157*** (0.0608)	
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912	3912
R ²	0.0741	0.0593	0.0597	0.0523	0.0334	0.0955	0.0652	0.1192	0.4523	
Wald $p(\text{War}=\text{War}+\text{Cost})$	0.2868	0.1424	0.2726	0.8052	0.5808	0.5046	0.2375	0.4603	0.0068	
Panel B: Top 50% war support										
Treatment: War	0.0600 (0.0519)	0.0161 (0.0133)	0.0140 (0.0117)	0.00377 (0.0124)	0.927* (0.525)	0.00939 (0.0118)	0.00610 (0.0108)	0.00600 (0.0670)	-0.0407 (0.0881)	
Treatment: War+Cost	0.0435 (0.0513)	-0.00365 (0.0131)	0.0125 (0.0116)	0.0124 (0.0122)	0.997* (0.519)	0.00906 (0.0116)	0.00731 (0.0107)	0.0701 (0.0662)	0.0929 (0.0871)	
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	1958	1958	1958	1958	1958	1958	1958	1958	1958	1958
R ²	0.0965	0.0852	0.0693	0.0617	0.0341	0.1027	0.0761	0.0803	0.4324	
Wald $p(\text{War}=\text{War}+\text{Cost})$	0.7421	0.1227	0.8973	0.4661	0.8887	0.9764	0.9070	0.3212	0.1158	
Panel C: Bottom 50% war support										
Treatment: War	-0.0221 (0.0591)	-0.00165 (0.0146)	-0.00381 (0.0131)	-0.0147 (0.0136)	-0.283 (0.550)	-0.00318 (0.0112)	0.00998 (0.0104)	0.0370 (0.0734)	0.0673 (0.0911)	
Treatment: War+Cost	-0.0967 (0.0590)	-0.0107 (0.0146)	-0.0236* (0.0131)	-0.0210 (0.0136)	-0.866 (0.548)	-0.0142 (0.0111)	-0.00925 (0.0103)	0.0349 (0.0732)	0.265*** (0.0908)	
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	1954	1954	1954	1954	1954	1954	1954	1954	1954	1954
R ²	0.0745	0.0465	0.0624	0.0622	0.0308	0.0997	0.0663	0.0872	0.4779	
Wald $p(\text{War}=\text{War}+\text{Cost})$	0.1879	0.5168	0.1145	0.6289	0.2682	0.3018	0.0528	0.9761	0.0236	

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table OA19: The effect of treatment on redistribution preferences, separate effects of treatments

C Survey instrument

Introduction [Part 1]

This study consists of two parts. We will send you the second-part questionnaire later. You will receive your reward based on two parts of the survey. Do you agree to take part in both parts of the survey? By replying “Yes” you confirm that you reside in Russia and are at least 18 years old. (Yes/No)

Demographics [Part 1]

Please indicate your age

What is the highest level of education or the highest degree you obtained? (Secondary/Vocational or technical/Incomplete higher/Higher/Multiple degrees or doctoral)

What is your gender (Male/Female)

Please mark everything that applies to you: [Full employment/Married/Retired/Student/State employee] (Mentioned/Not mentioned)

How would you best describe your family’s financial condition? (We do not have enough money even to buy food/We have enough to buy food, but not to buy clothing or footwear/We have enough for clothing and footwear, but not for small household appliances/We can afford small purchases, but larger ones (computer, washing machine, refrigerator) requires a loan/We can afford to purchase things for our home, but need to save or take a loan to buy a car, dacha, or apartment/We can anything we need without taking a loan)

Pre-treatment question [Part 2]

Do you agree that you earn more than most Russians? (1-Definitely disagree, 10 - Completely agree) (1-10)

War treatment [Part 2]

Let’s talk about the special military operation of Russian troops in Ukraine.

Do you follow the progress of the military operation? (Yes/Rather yes/Rather no/No)

Do you support the actions of Russian troops? (Definitely support/Rather support/Rather do not support/Definitely do not support)

Do you think that Russia will be able to obtain victory in the military operation? (Definitely will/Likely will/Likely will not/Definitely will not)

When do you think the military operation will end? (Less then in 1 month/In 1-2 months/In 3-6 months/In 7-12 months/More than in a year/It will never end)

Do you support the merging of LNR, DNR, Zaporozhie, and Kherson oblast with Russia? (Definitely support/Rather support/Rather do not support/Definitely do not support)

Do you agree that the West (Europe, US) is chiefly responsible for the current conflict? (Completely agree/Somewhat agree/Somewhat disagree/Completely disagree)

War+cost treatment [Part 2]

Please note how you feel about the following possible consequences of the special military operation in Ukraine? [You or someone close to you will be drafted into the army/Martial law will be declared in Russia/Russia will use nuclear weapons in int conflict with Ukraine/Conscripts will be used in the fighting/In some sectors of the economy output will fall sharply] (Positively/Rather positively/Rather negatively/Negatively)

The dictator game [Parts 1 and 2]

Part 1: The decision for the following task will have to be made twice - now and in the second part of the study. After the end of this study the computer will select every tenth participant and randomly choose one of two decisions. Based on this, a \$2 bonus will be paid. You will not know if you can receive a bonus until the moment when the answers of all participants have been processed by us. **WARNING:** This may take several business days!

Part 2: You should now make the second decision to divide the bonus. We remind you that after the end of this study the computer will select every tenth participant and randomly choose one of two decisions. Based on this, a \$2 bonus will be paid. You will not know if you can receive a bonus until the moment when the answers of all participants have been processed by us. **WARNING:** This may take up to 5 days!

Parts 1 and 2: If you receive a bonus, you can share it between yourself and your partner - the same randomly selected Toloka participant who answered this questionnaire. Choose how much each of you will receive. (You: \$2, partner: \$0/You: \$1.75, partner: \$0.25/You: \$1.5, partner: \$0.5/ You: \$1.25, partner: \$0.75/You: \$1, partner: \$1/You: \$0.75, partner: \$1.25/You: \$0.5, partner: \$1.5/You: \$0.25, partner: \$1.75/You: \$0, partner: \$2)

Parts 1 and 2: What decision about giving or taking money would most of the participants in this study make? (Self: \$2, partner: \$0/Self: \$1.75, partner: \$0.25/Self: \$1.5, partner: \$0.5/ Self: \$1.25, partner: \$0.75/Self: \$1, partner: \$1/Self: \$0.75, partner: \$1.25/Self: \$0.5, partner: \$1.5/Self: \$0.25, partner: \$1.75/Self: \$0, partner: \$2)

Other prosocial preferences [Parts 1 and 2]

How much do you trust [Russians/People you know personally] (Completely trust/Somewhat trust/Somewhat distrust/Completely distrust)

How much are you willing to give to good causes without expecting anything in return? Please give your answer on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means “Completely unwilling” and 10 means “Completely willing”? (1-10)

Suppose you unexpectedly received 30000 Roubles. How much of this sum would you donate to a good cause? (0-30000)

Subjective income [Parts 1 and 2]

There are 42 million families in Russia. How many of them, in your opinion, have income that is lower than yours? (Less than 10%/10%-20%/20%-30%/30%-40%/40%-50%/50%-60%/60%-70%/70%-80%/80%-90%/over 90%)

Trust in the government [Parts 1 and 2]

Do you agree that money from the state budget is spent efficiently? (Fully agree/Somewhat agree/Somewhat disagree/ Completely disagree)

How much do you trust [President of Russia/Governor (or head) of your region/The police] (Completely trust/Somewhat trust/Somewhat distrust/Completely distrust/Difficult to answer)

Outcome variables [Part 2]

Some people believe that the government has numerous obligations to its citizens. According to others, government resources and budget are limited. Please tell me, how much do you agree or disagree the government should [Provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed/ Provide housing to all everyone who needs it/ Provide income assistance to the poor/Provide food for those who need it] (Fully agree/Somewhat agree/ Somewhat disagree/ Completely disagree)

We want to ask you how to divide the Russian state budget. You should choose how to divide it between the following six categories (the sum should be equal to 100): [National defense/Social assistance, including pensions and various social transfers/Health care/Education/Security organs, law enforcement and interior forces/Public utilities, road infrastructure and public transportation] (0-100)

A part of Russian state spending is financed through the income tax. Please, let us know how large (in percentages, between 0 and 100) should the income tax be in Russia? A higher tax means lower disposable incomes of individuals, but higher state spending (0-100)

Do you agree with any of these statements? [Russian government spending is too high/Income differences in Russia are too high and should be less than now/I make more money than the majority of Russians/ The minimum wage should be increased/Russians should have the right to openly criticise the actions of the federal government/There are situations when all authority in

the country should be given to one person (Fully agree/Somewhat agree/ Somewhat disagree/ Completely disagree)

Now, generally speaking, would you say that things in the country are going in the right direction, or in the wrong direction? (In the right direction/In the wrong direction)

Where would you place your opinion on this scale? (1 Hard work usually leads to a better life/2/3/4/5 Hard work usually does not bring success, it is a matter of luck and connections/Difficult to answer)

Which of the things mentioned below worry you most? [Rising unemployment/Rising prices/Corruption/Poverty, impoverishment of the population/Armed conflict with Ukraine/Inaccessible health care/Other/None of the above] (Mentioned/Not mentioned)

Post-treatment questions [Part 2]

Does any of your friends or relatives who [take part in the special military operation/Live in Ukraine] (Yes/No)

D Ethics and competing interests statements

The research project was successfully certified by the expedited review procedure of GfeW. Data were anonymized prior to analysis. The survey itself was implemented using Qualtrics, while the Toloka platform was only used for subject recruitment and payment processing and did not have access to participant responses. The authors have no competing interests to declare.