

Policymaking under Influence^{*}

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Abstract

Policymaking is an arduous process and politicians often fail to change the status quo despite their best efforts. I introduce the notion of *influence players*, an umbrella term for political actors such as interest groups, bureaucrats, or legislators who can influence positively or negatively the odds of implementation of policy proposals by exerting costly effort. Analysing a parsimonious model of policymaking with an imperfectly effective politician and an influence player, I show how and when threats, opposition, or support can affect policymaking, depending on the influence player's cost and strength of effort. Subsequently, I discuss empirical implications of the model, show that the relationship between the influence player's ability to shape proposals and her cost of effort can be non-monotonic, and highlight the importance of status quo policies. I conclude by describing perspectives the model provides on legislative politics, special interest politics, and bureaucratic politics.

Keywords: policymaking, influence player, special interest politics, bureaucratic politics, legislative politics.

JEL codes: D72, D73, D74.

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1 Introduction

Policymaking is an arduous process, fraught with stumbling blocks and unexpected setbacks. As a consequence, politicians' proposals often fail to be implemented in the end. Such failure might result from some legislators' attempts to block a vote on a specific bill (Wawro and Schickler, 2007; Koger, 2010) or from the veto of a proposed policy (Cameron, 2000; Tsebelis, 2003). Interest groups can resort to information campaigns to shift the public opinion during the policymaking process, turning voters against a proposal and causing politicians to reevaluate their stance, effectively ending the chances of the proposal making it into law (Goldstein, 1998; Kollman, 1998; McKay, 2022). Judicial procedures can bog down the implementation of a new policy, eventually dooming it (Wolfe, 1994; Hirschl, 2004). Politicians might face reluctant bureaucracies that stall the implementation of new policies, possibly in anticipation of a later change in the political orientation of policymakers (Hill and Weissert, 1995; Brehm and Gates, 1997; Rudalevige, 2021). The competition for attention among the many problems politicians are called upon to address can make some policy proposals more likely to be implemented than others (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005; Burstein, 2013). Politicians are often ill-equipped to remedy these issues in advance, because they are only imperfectly effective (Volden and Wiseman, 2014) and can't prepare for any possible contingency that might arise.

In this paper I introduce the concept of *influence players*, political actors that can affect the fate of proposed policies.¹ By exerting costly effort, these influence players can make politicians' proposals more likely or less likely to be implemented. This concept is purposefully general, allowing me to provide insights into a wide range of distinct political interactions, while at the same time enabling me to show how common mechanisms can come into play in these diverse interactions. In what follows I focus specifically on three types of influence players: interest groups, legislators, and bureaucrats. Their efforts can take multiple forms, depending on their role in the policymaking process: interest groups might resort to legislative subsidies, legal drafting designed to help a proposal get through (Hall and Deardorff, 2006), or could fund judicial actions against a proposal to hamper its implementation (Collins, 2008). Party leaders can coax their parties' legislators into supporting a proposal (Kam, 2009) or might endorse publicly some proposal, thereby increasing support for it (Evans, 1991). Bureaucrats can drag their feet or enthusiastically work to implement a politician's proposal (Moe, 1990; Rudalevige, 2021).

Building on this concept, I then consider a one-period model of spatial policymaking on a single policy domain with a politician and an *influence player* and ask: how and when can influence players influence policymaking? What are the determinants of their influence? In the model, the politician and the influence player each have a distinct and unique preferred policy, which differs from the status quo. I vary the positions of these preferred policies with respect to the status quo, enabling me to consider various degrees of (mis)alignment between the influence player and the politician. In the first stage of the interaction, the politician proposes a policy as an alternative to the status quo. As the politician is imperfectly effective, he can't guarantee the successful implementation of his proposal, even absent any effort from the influence player. Subsequently, the influence player decides whether

¹Legislative influence players are closely related to *pivots* and *veto players*, but distinct from them. I provide more details on this relationship in sections 2, 3, and 5. A thorough analysis and comparison of these concepts can be found in Blumenthal (2023).

to affect, positively or negatively, the likelihood that the politician's proposal is enacted: she can exert costly effort to *support* or *oppose* the proposal, as well as remain inactive, at no effort cost. Following the influence player's effort decision, the final policy is stochastically determined and the game ends.

Solving the model, I characterise the influence player's effort decision with respect to the politician's proposal and show how it affects the politician's proposal. To do so, I exploit a simple taxonomy of influence players' preferences, characterising them as either *aligned*, *extremely misaligned*, or *moderately misaligned*.² I show how and when threats, support, and opposition can affect both the politician's policy proposal and the likelihood of successful policy implementation. I show that when the cost of effort is too high, the politician does not seek to compromise with the influence player and simply proposes his preferred policy. In contrast, when the cost of effort is not too high, the politician might seek to compromise, i.e. make a proposal closer to the influence player's preferred policy than his own preferred policy, to ensure a more pliant behaviour from her. I distinguish between *compromises for support*, destined to entice the influence player to support the politician's proposal, and *compromises for inactivity*, destined to thwart the threat of the influence player's opposition to the politician's preferred policy. Compromise being costly, policy-wise, the politician might not resort to this approach, even when feasible. In particular, I show that in some settings, the politician might *persevere despite the threat*, proposing his preferred policy and facing the influence player's opposition.

Building on the analysis of the model, I then explore some of its implications. I begin by discussing what can be inferred from the observation of policy compromises, arguing that the welfare consequences for politicians of such compromises can be hard to determine without a detailed knowledge of the policymaking process, because of the distinction between *compromises for support* and *compromises for inactivity*. I subsequently examine the consequences for influence players of changes in their cost of effort and show that, counterintuitively, a decrease in this cost can harm an influence player. This can happen when the influence player is *misaligned* and the decrease leads to a shift in equilibrium from one in which the politician *compromises for inactivity* to one in which the politician *perseveres despite the threat*. I argue that this possibility has implications for the incentives influence players have to reveal the extent to which they care about specific policies or the level of efficiency of their efforts. I also emphasise that divergent preferences do not imply divergent interests, because status quo policies can create a convergence of interests between political actors.

I then situate my findings within the contexts of special interest politics, legislative politics, and bureaucratic politics. On legislative politics, I argue that my model's results differ markedly from those of standard models of veto bargaining (Romer and Rosenthal, 1978; Cameron, 2000) and pivotal politics (Krehbiel, 1998), highlighting the substantive difference between *compromises for inactivity* and *compromises for support*, as well as the possibility of *perseverance despite the threat*. These differences stem from the different assumptions made regarding the strategy sets of influence players, pivots, and veto players, as well as my assumption of costly effort. I also explore some substantive implications of my analysis for the study of gridlock (Binder, 2004). Turning to special interest politics, I note that interest groups can affect policymaking without exerting effort, providing a partial explanation to the Tullock paradox (Tullock, 1989; Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder Jr., 2003).³ I also discuss

²This taxonomy was previously introduced by Matthews (1989) and has been used subsequently in the literature on veto bargaining by Cameron (2000) and Cameron and McCarty (2004), among others.

³The argument in itself is not new (see for example Fox and Rothenberg, 2011; Wolton, 2021; Judd, 2022)

the importance of status quo policies to determine whether interest groups might be willing to join forces with policymakers, possibly leading to mutually beneficial compromises. Finally, I discuss the relevance of my work for the study of bureaucratic politics, relating my results to the ally principle (Epstein and O'Halloran, 1999; Bendor, Glazer and Hammond, 2001); discussing the links between the strategy set of influence players and bureaucrats' sabotage efforts, shirking, and work efforts that have been proposed and studied in the literature (Brehm and Gates, 1997); and emphasising the similarity between *compromises for support* and the expertise-based rationale for delegation (Bendor, Glazer and Hammond, 2001; Gailmard and Patty, 2012a).

2 Conceptualising influence players

While policies can be proposed and implemented in various ways, policy implementation seldom depends solely on a single individual's actions and preferences. Cooperation and conflict between multiple players involved in the policymaking process are common. To categorise and analyse the role of some of these multiple players in such interactions I propose in this paper the concept of *influence players*. Influence players, as I define them, are political actors that can, by exerting costly effort, make policy proposals more likely or less likely to be implemented. Importantly, influence players do not have proposal power and can only affect the odds of success of proposals made by others. As I argue, and show formally in what follows, influence players can affect both which policies are proposed and the odds of successful policy change. The concept of *influence player* is purposefully general, because many different kinds of political actors can play such role, depending on the type of rule involved: interest groups and legislators can affect the odds of bills proposed by lawmakers making it into law, just as bureaucrats can influence the fate of executive orders. In the remainder of this section, I provide a detailed description of how the roles and strategies of legislators, interest groups, and bureaucrats can be mapped onto the concept of influence players.

Legislators as influence players. Legislative procedures, by design, provides legislators with numerous opportunities to affect policymaking, even when they are not endowed with formal agenda setting power or veto powers. Votes on proposals, which are usually studied in formal models of veto bargaining (Romer and Rosenthal, 1978; Cameron and McCarty, 2004) or pivotal politics (Krehbiel, 1998), are only part of the story, albeit an important one. Such models focus on the ability of specific political actors, pivots or veto players, to either block a proposal or allow it to go through. However, prior to the vote, legislators have a multitude of tools at their disposal to help or harm the chances of a given bill reaching the floor and successfully being approved by the legislature. In fact, even a final vote need not be the final word, since the implementation of laws passed by the legislature can also be delayed or sabotaged (Fong and Krehbiel, 2018; Gieczewski and Li, 2022; Hirsch and Kastellec, 2022).

Legislators' support for their preferred proposals can take multiple forms: they might endorse publicly the proposal (a form of *position taking*, à la Mayhew, 1974) or cosponsor the bill (Koger, 2003), making the proposal more likely to stand out to fellow members or to agenda setters (Kessler and Krehbiel, 1996; Harbridge, 2015). They might provide arguments or cues (Kingdon, 1989) to their fellow legislators to convince them to vote in their preferred way, offering their welcome specialised expertise in an era in which policymaking has become increasingly complex (for empirical evidence

on cue-taking in legislative contexts see [Masket, 2008](#); [Zelizer, 2019](#); [Fong, 2020](#)). Such actions have weight because legislators have political capital which they can expend to persuade others ([Gratton, Holden and Lee, 2022](#)). Another option is for legislators to resort to a form of vote trading or logrolling ([Casella and Macé, 2021](#)), exchanging their own support for bills favoured by their counterparts for the support of fellow legislators on a bill they care about, thereby making the bill's passing more likely.

Legislators also have many different ways to try to prevent the passing of a bill they oppose (for a thorough overview of the negative powers of legislators in the context of the US Congress, see [Herzberg, 1986](#)): they might seek to delay a vote on the bill, engaging in filibustering ([Wawro and Schickler, 2007](#); [Koger, 2010](#)). They could also seek to influence the wording of the bill, to include "vague, inconsistent, or even unconstitutional provisions", in an attempt to get judicial authorities to strike down the law after its passing ([Maltzman and Shipan, 2012](#)). In the US Congress, committee leaders have considerable influence over what moves forward from their committees and can use their agenda power to delay the moment a given bill reaches the floor, thereby considerably affecting its odds of being passed ([Evans, 1991](#)).

Interest groups as influence players. Even though interest groups are often not formally involved in the implementation process (a noted exception is their role in providing comments during the rulemaking process [Furlong and Kerwin, 2005](#); [Yackee, 2006](#); [Yackee and Yackee, 2006](#)) and do not have the ability to unilaterally block a policy, they possess many tools to influence the fate of bills that affect them. These tools can be wielded at various points in the policymaking process and their efforts directed at various political actors. They can attempt to target legislators or judicial authorities, affect bureaucrats' incentives to exert effort, or try to influence the preferences and demands of the electorate.

To support their preferred proposals, interest groups can provide legislative subsidies or implementation subsidies to lawmakers ([Hall and Deardorff, 2006](#); [Hirsch and Shotts, 2018](#); [Ellis and Groll, 2020](#); [Blumenthal, 2022](#)), legal drafting destined to make a proposal more likely to be voted or to withstand the scrutiny of judicial authorities. Alternatively, they can support financially and materially a proposal challenged in court, in the form of amicus briefs for instance ([Collins, 2008](#); [Bils, Rothenberg and Smith, 2020](#)). Another possibility is for interest groups to collect information and disseminate it to lawmakers with the aim of convincing them and possibly get them to convince others of the desirability of a policy proposal ([Caillaud and Tirole, 2007](#); [Schnakenberg, 2017](#); [Awad, 2020](#); [Awad and Minaudier, 2022](#)).

To oppose proposals they wish to see defeated, interest groups have a similarly large set of instruments. Beyond the techniques mentioned above, which can also be used to prevent the implementation of opposed policies, they might attempt to bribe bureaucrats who are tasked with the enforcement of the proposal ([Rose-Akerman and Palifka, 2012](#); [Callander, Foarta and Sugaya, 2023](#)). In doing so interest groups can succeed in affecting policy implementation even after a bill's passing.⁴ Another option is for interest groups to resort to outside lobbying in an attempt to affect public support for politicians' proposals, in turn decreasing the incentive for re-election motivated politicians to move forward with their proposals (for examples of this form of outside lobbying on

⁴For a different perspective on the study of *ex post* lobbying focusing on the targeting of legislators by interest groups rather than the targeting of bureaucrats, see [You \(2017\)](#).

various policy proposals, see [Goldstein, 1998](#); [Kollman, 1998](#); [McKay, 2022](#))

Bureaucrats as influence players. The importance of large scale bureaucracies in policy implementation in modern democracies is hard to overstate ([Epstein and O'Halloran, 1999](#); [Carpenter, 2001](#); [Huber and Shipan, 2002](#); [Gailmard and Patty, 2012b](#)). Bureaucrats that staff these bureaucracies, whether at the higher levels or the street-level ([Lipsky, 1980](#)), often differ in their preferences and incentives, both between them and with elected officials ([Gailmard and Patty, 2007](#)). Despite the existence of mechanisms of political and judicial oversight ([Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991](#); [Epstein and O'Halloran, 1995](#); [Bawn, 1997](#)), this creates the possibility for bureaucratic *slack*, i.e. bureaucrats putting insufficient efforts in the implementation process, and bureaucratic *drift*, i.e. bureaucrats exerting efforts in ways that differ from what their political principals would prefer ([Bueno de Mesquita and Stephenson, 2007](#)).

As bureaucrats have to engage in a wide variety of tasks in the course of their implementation efforts, bureaucratic slack and bureaucratic drift can occur in numerous domains. Bureaucrats can selectively time their efforts to ensure that implementation occurs in a favourable political environment, or they can slow-roll the implementation of a new policy, hoping for a change in the orientation of their political principals ([Potter, 2017, 2019](#)). They could also select different levels of investment in "bureaucratic capacity" ([Carpenter, 2001](#)), affecting their ability to "effectively implement or enforce policies once they are crafted" ([Turner, 2017, 2019](#)). Given their expertise, they can also seek to undermine the chances of successful policy implementation by sharing with opposed interest groups arguments that could derail the process (for qualitative evidence on this form of *guerilla government* and others, see [O'Leary, 2019](#)).

3 Model set-up

Building on this concept, I now consider a simple formal model to study how policymaking can be influenced by an influence player. The model focuses on a single period interaction between a politician (he) and an influence player (she). The politician chooses which policy to propose as an alternative to the status quo, whilst the influence player decides whether to support the proposal, to oppose it, or to remain inactive. Exerting effort is costly to the influence player and her efforts affect the likelihood of enactment of the proposal.

Timing. The politician chooses which policy to propose. The influence player then decides whether to support the proposal, to oppose it, or to remain inactive. The outcome of the policymaking process is stochastic and depends on the influence player's support or opposition decision. Policy-specific payoffs are realised after the final policy is determined.

Actions and preferences. The policy space is the real line $\mathbb{R}$. There is a status quo $x_s \in \mathbb{R}$. The politician moves first and gets to propose a policy $x \in \mathbb{R}$.⁵ Subsequently, the influence player decides whether to support the proposal, to oppose it, or to remain inactive. The cost of effort for

⁵I thus assume that policy proposals are costless for the politician, as in standard models of veto bargaining or pivotal politics. Similar results would hold with costly proposals, with the caveat that for some ranges of parameter values no proposal would be made because of the cost.

the influence player is the same regardless of whether she supports or opposes the proposed policy and is denoted κ .⁶ If the influence player does not support nor opposes the proposal, it passes with probability $\pi \in (0, 1)$ and with complementary probability $1 - \pi$ the status quo remains in place. If the influence player supports the proposal, it passes with probability $\pi' \in (0, 1)$ and with probability $1 - \pi'$ the status quo remains in place, with $\pi' > \pi$. Finally, if the influence player opposes the proposal, it passes with probability $\pi'' \in (0, 1)$ and with probability $1 - \pi''$ the status quo remains in place, with $\pi > \pi''$. For notational convenience, I define $\pi := (\pi, \pi', \pi'')$

The politician and the influence player both have Euclidean preferences which depend on their preferred policies x_p and x_i , respectively, and the final policy, $\bar{x}$.⁷ The influence player's utility function is $U_i(x_i, \bar{x}) = -|x_i - \bar{x}| - e\kappa$ (where e takes value one when she exerts costly effort and value zero when she does not), whilst the politician's utility function is $U_p(x_p, \bar{x}) = -|x_p - \bar{x}|$. I assume that the preferred policies of the politician and the influence player are distinct from one another and from the status quo i.e. I assume that $x_i \neq x_p \neq x_s$. In addition I assume in the analysis that follows that $x_s < x_i$.⁸ For notational convenience, I define $x := (x_i, x_p, x_s)$.

Equilibrium concept. The relevant solution concept for this dynamic game of complete information⁹ is Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (referred to as equilibrium henceforth).

Modelling assumptions. The assumption that, even without opposition from the influence player, the politician can't guarantee that his proposal is implemented (i.e. the assumption that $\pi \in (0, 1)$) reflects the fact that even politicians' best efforts need not translate into success. The parameter π can be seen as a measure of *effectiveness* (for an analysis of *legislative effectiveness* in the US Congress, see [Volden and Wiseman, 2014](#)), which may depend on the design of institutions, the specific policy at stake, the politician's personal characteristics, or resource constraints. This *imperfect* effectiveness creates an opening for the influence player's support to be valuable to the politician.

I assume that the influence player decides whether to exert effort and, if she decides to exert effort, whether to oppose the proposal or to support it, without being able to guarantee a proposal's success or failure. There are two main points worth emphasising regarding this assumption. First, the influence player can affect the odds of successful implementation *both* positively and negatively, though not decisively. This is a crucial difference with models of veto bargaining and pivotal politics. In standard veto bargaining models ([Romer and Rosenthal, 1978](#); [Cameron, 2000](#)), veto players have a very blunt tool: they can either oppose a proposal, causing its failure, or not exert their veto power, letting it pass. In other words, the avoidance of a veto is a necessary condition for a proposal to pass. In a standard pivotal politics model ([Krehbiel, 1998](#)), pivots have a similarly blunt tool: they can either vote for a proposal, ensuring it passes, or not vote for a proposal, leading to its failure. Put differently, the support of a pivot is a necessary condition for a proposal to pass.

Second, this assumption means that I consider only the *extensive* margin of the influence player's effort. It simplifies the exposition of the results but it is not crucial to the mechanisms I highlight

⁶Qualitatively identical results hold with different costs for opposition and support.

⁷Euclidean preferences simplify the analysis. Similar results would hold with any single-peaked utility function.

⁸This assumption is without loss of generality and limits the number of cases. The analysis can be reversed to deal with the case where $x_s > x_i$ and, with the appropriate reversals, all results follow through.

⁹While I assume that all features of the game are common knowledge, I touch upon the issue of asymmetric information in section 5.

below. In particular, similar results would hold with a continuous measure of the influence player's effort (thus considering the *intensive* margin in addition to the extensive margin), provided that there is a minimal level of costly effort required to influence the policymaking process. Going back to the interpretations given above, such minimal level can reflect, in the case of an informational campaign, "the cost of sufficient issue advertising to reach and possibly influence the electorate" (Wolton, 2021). Alternatively, it could reflect the cost for a legislator of coming up with arguments that are likely to convince her fellow legislators.

4 Equilibrium characterisation

I first define two important quantities, $\hat{x}$ and $\bar{\kappa}$. The first one, $\hat{x} := 2x_i - x_s$, is symmetric to x_s with respect to x_i , i.e. the influence player's utility from a final policy x_s is equal to her utility from a final policy $\hat{x}$. The second one, $\bar{\kappa}$, corresponds to the value of κ for which the influence player is indifferent between supporting her preferred policy x_i and remaining inactive when x_i is proposed,

$$\begin{aligned} -\pi'|x_i - x_i| - (1 - \pi')|x_i - x_s| - \bar{\kappa} &= -\pi|x_i - x_i| - (1 - \pi)|x_i - x_s| \\ \iff \bar{\kappa} &:= (\pi' - \pi)(x_i - x_s). \end{aligned}$$

Equipped with $\hat{x}$ and $\bar{\kappa}$, I can derive the following lemmas which characterise the influence player's effort decision as a function of κ and x , depending on the relationship between κ and $\bar{\kappa}$.

Lemma 1. *If $\kappa > \bar{\kappa}$, for a proposed policy x :*

1. *The influence player opposes x when $x < x_s - \frac{\kappa}{\pi - \pi''}$ and when $x > \hat{x} + \frac{\kappa}{\pi - \pi''}$.*
2. *The influence player is indifferent between opposition and inactivity when $x = x_s - \frac{\kappa}{\pi - \pi''}$ and when $x = \hat{x} + \frac{\kappa}{\pi - \pi''}$.*
3. *The influence player is inactive when $x_s - \frac{\kappa}{\pi - \pi''} < x < \hat{x} + \frac{\kappa}{\pi - \pi''}$.*




Figure 1: Influence ranges with $\kappa > \bar{\kappa}$.

When the cost of effort is high ($\kappa > \bar{\kappa}$), there are three relevant intervals, as represented in Figure 1: two intervals of proposals which the influence player would oppose and an interval of proposals for which she would remain inactive. First, note that $\kappa > \bar{\kappa}$ ensures that she is unwilling to support any policy: as she is unwilling to support her preferred policy, she is *a fortiori* unwilling to support other policies. There are thus only two strategies to consider: inactivity or opposition. When the proposed policy is sufficiently distant from x_i , she is willing to incur the cost of effort to decrease the likelihood of implementation of the proposal. In contrast, when the proposal is close enough to

x_i , she is unwilling to oppose the proposed policy, as it wouldn't represent too big of a change with respect to the status quo. Finally, when the proposed policy is precisely $x_s - \frac{\kappa}{\pi - \pi''}$ or $\hat{x} + \frac{\kappa}{\pi - \pi''}$, she is indifferent between inactivity and opposition.

Lemma 2. *If $\kappa < \bar{\kappa}$, for a proposed policy x :*

1. *The influence player opposes x when $x < x_s - \frac{\kappa}{\pi - \pi''}$ and when $x > \hat{x} + \frac{\kappa}{\pi - \pi''}$.*
2. *The influence player is indifferent between opposition and inactivity when $x = x_s - \frac{\kappa}{\pi - \pi''}$ and when $x = \hat{x} + \frac{\kappa}{\pi - \pi''}$.*
3. *The influence player remains inactive when $x_s - \frac{\kappa}{\pi - \pi''} < x < x_s + \frac{\kappa}{\pi' - \pi}$ and when $\hat{x} - \frac{\kappa}{\pi' - \pi} < x < \hat{x} + \frac{\kappa}{\pi - \pi''}$.*
4. *The influence player is indifferent between inactivity and support when $x = x_s + \frac{\kappa}{\pi' - \pi}$ and when $x = \hat{x} - \frac{\kappa}{\pi' - \pi}$.*
5. *The influence player supports x when $x_s + \frac{\kappa}{\pi' - \pi} < x < \hat{x} - \frac{\kappa}{\pi' - \pi}$.*

When the cost of effort is low ($\kappa < \bar{\kappa}$), there are five relevant intervals, as represented in Figure 2: two intervals of proposals the influence player would oppose, an interval of proposals she would support, and two intervals of proposals for which she would remain inactive. The intuitions for the ranges for which she would oppose the proposed policy and for which she would remain inactive are the same as those described in the previous paragraph. In addition, since $\kappa < \bar{\kappa}$, she is willing to support her preferred policy and policies that are close enough to it. When the proposal is $x_s - \frac{\kappa}{\pi - \pi''}$ or $\hat{x} + \frac{\kappa}{\pi - \pi''}$, she is indifferent between inactivity and opposition. Finally, when the proposal is $x_s + \frac{\kappa}{\pi' - \pi}$ or $\hat{x} - \frac{\kappa}{\pi' - \pi}$, she is indifferent between inactivity and support.




Figure 2: Influence ranges with $\kappa < \bar{\kappa}$.

Building on these results regarding the behaviour of the influence player at the effort stage, I can derive the equilibrium behaviour of the politician in the first stage. To this end, I consider a simple taxonomy of the influence player's preferences, depending on the relationship between x_s , x_i , and x_p .¹⁰ I characterise the influence player as *aligned*, *moderately misaligned*, or *extremely misaligned*: if the bliss points of the players are such that $|x_i - x_p| < |x_i - x_s|$, I call the influence player *aligned*, since she strictly prefers the politician's preferred policy to the status quo. Conversely, if the bliss points of the players are such that $|x_i - x_p| > |x_i - x_s|$, I call the influence player *misaligned*, since she strictly prefers the status quo to the politician's preferred policy. I distinguish between two types of misalignment: when $|x_i - x_p| > |x_i - x_s|$ and $x_p < x_s$, the influence player is *extremely misaligned*, whilst when $|x_i - x_p| > |x_i - x_s|$ and $x_p > x_s$, the influence player is *moderately misaligned*. Figure 3 illustrates the taxonomy.

¹⁰I modify the terminology used in Matthews (1989) since the original one would lead to confusion with other terms used below.




Figure 3: x with various degrees of alignment and misalignment

An alternative way of seeing this taxonomy is to consider the set of policies which each player strictly prefers to the status quo and how these sets intersect – or don't. In all three cases, the influence player strictly prefers to the status quo all policies which belong to $(x_s, \hat{x})$, while the politician strictly prefers to the status quo all policies which belong to $(2x_p - x_s, x_s)$ when $x_p < x_s$, and strictly prefers to the status quo all policies which belong to $(x_s, 2x_p - x_s)$ when $x_p > x_s$. Consider first the case of an *extremely misaligned* influence player. In that case, the intersection of the two sets is the empty set: there isn't any policy which both the influence player and the politician prefer over the status quo. In contrast, when the influence player is either *moderately misaligned* or *aligned*, the intersection of the two sets is not empty: there are policies which both the influence player and the politician prefer over the status quo. The difference between the two cases lies in the size of the interval of policies which the influence player prefers to the status quo: for fixed x_p and x_s the interval of policies a *moderately misaligned* influence player prefers to the status quo is strictly smaller than the interval of policies an *aligned* influence player prefers to the status quo, thereby implying a similar relationship for the set of policies preferred to the status quo by both players.

The following propositions characterise the policy proposed by the politician and the influence player's effort decision in the cases of an *aligned*, *extremely misaligned*, or *moderately misaligned* influence player.

Proposition 1. *Suppose the influence player is aligned. For any (x, π) , there exist $\underline{\alpha}, \bar{\alpha} \in \mathbb{R}_+$, with $\underline{\alpha} < \bar{\alpha}$, such that in equilibrium:*

1. *When $\kappa > \bar{\alpha}$, the politician proposes x_p and the influence player remains inactive.*
2. *When $\bar{\alpha} > \kappa > \underline{\alpha}$, the politician compromises for support.*
3. *When $\underline{\alpha} > \kappa$, the politician proposes x_p and the influence player supports the proposal.*

When the cost of effort is greater than $\bar{\kappa}$, the politician proposes x_p and does not benefit from the support of the influence player. As $\kappa > \bar{\kappa}$, she is unwilling to support x_i and, *a fortiori*, any other policy (Lemma 1). In equilibrium, she does not influence the policymaking process as it is too costly for her.

When the cost of effort is lower than $\underline{\alpha}$, the politician proposes x_p and benefits from the influence player's support. $\underline{\alpha}$ is defined as the cost of effort for which she is indifferent between supporting x_p and remaining inactive for x_p . In other words, when κ is below $\underline{\alpha}$, the politician does




Figure 4: Policymaking with an aligned influence player

not need to make any policy concession to ensure the influence player's support, given that his preferred policy is in the set of policies which she is willing to support: in equilibrium, she exerts effort to support the politician's proposal, as it is sufficiently cheap for her, and the politician does not make any policy concession. Formally, $\underline{\alpha}$ is defined as:

$$\begin{aligned} -\pi'|\chi_i - \chi_p| - (1 - \pi')|\chi_i - \chi_s| - \underline{\alpha} &= -\pi|\chi_i - \chi_p| - (1 - \pi)|\chi_i - \chi_s| \\ \iff \underline{\alpha} &:= (\pi' - \pi)(|\chi_i - \chi_s| - |\chi_i - \chi_p|) \end{aligned}$$

When the cost of effort is intermediate ($\bar{\kappa} > \kappa > \underline{\alpha}$), there are policies which the politician can propose and which would earn the support of the influence player (this follows from Lemma 2). However, gaining her support requires the politician to offer a *compromise* to the influence player i.e. to propose a policy which is closer to χ_i than is χ_p . The politician is not always willing to make such policy concessions: the cost, policy-wise, has to be compensated by a sufficiently high increase in the likelihood of implementation.

Moreover, note that there are many policies which the politician could propose which the influence player could support (any $\chi \in [\chi_s + \frac{\kappa}{\pi' - \pi}, \hat{\chi} - \frac{\kappa}{\pi' - \pi}]$ would do). However, in equilibrium, the politician selects the policy for which the influence player is indifferent between support and inactivity. I call this strategy *compromising for support*. Intuitively, any other policy that the politician could propose would be strictly worse for him, by proposing an unnecessarily large policy concession. Summing up, the equilibrium features a politician *compromising for support* only if it is feasible ($\kappa < \bar{\kappa}$), necessary to ensure the influence player's support ($\kappa > \underline{\alpha}$), and not too costly policy-wise (which is the case whenever $\kappa < \alpha'$).¹¹ When the two first conditions hold but $\kappa > \alpha'$, the politician prefers not to *compromise for support* and proposes his preferred policy. The influence player then remains inactive.

There always exist a non-empty range of values of κ for which the politician *compromises for*

¹¹Formally, $\alpha' = \frac{(\pi' - \pi)}{\pi'} [(\pi' - \pi)(\chi_p - \chi_s) - \pi'(\chi_p - \hat{\chi})]$ if $\chi_p > \chi_i$, and $\alpha' = \frac{(2\pi' - \pi)(\pi' - \pi)}{\pi'} (\chi_p - \chi_s)$ if $\chi_p < \chi_i$.

support (this follows from the fact that $\bar{\alpha} > \underline{\alpha}$): provided that κ is greater than $\underline{\alpha}$ but sufficiently close to it, the cost, policy-wise, of *compromising for support* is smaller than the expected benefit in terms of likelihood of policy change. I illustrate Proposition 1 in Figure 4. The green area corresponds to ranges of values of κ for which the influence player supports the politician's proposal, whilst the blue area corresponds to ranges of values of κ for which she remains inactive. Note that the influence player's ability to affect the policy proposed is non-monotonic: for high and low values of κ , she doesn't extract any policy concession, whilst she extracts policy concessions for intermediate values of κ .

Proposition 2. *Suppose the influence player is extremely misaligned. For any $(\mathbf{x}, \pi)$, there exist $\underline{\varepsilon}, \bar{\varepsilon} \in \mathbb{R}_+$, with $\underline{\varepsilon} < \bar{\varepsilon}$, such that:*

1. *When $\kappa > \bar{\varepsilon}$, the politician proposes x_p and the influence player remains inactive.*
2. *When $\bar{\varepsilon} > \kappa > \underline{\varepsilon}$, the politician compromises for inactivity.*
3. *When $\kappa < \underline{\varepsilon}$, the politician perseveres despite the threat.*

When the cost of effort is high ($\kappa > \bar{\varepsilon}$), the politician proposes his preferred policy and does not face opposition from the influence player, as the politician's preferred policy is not extreme enough, given the cost of effort, to provoke her opposition. Formally, $\bar{\varepsilon}$ is defined as the value of κ for which the influence player is indifferent between opposing a proposal of x_p and remaining inactive:

$$\begin{aligned} -\pi''|x_i - x_p| - (1 - \pi'')|x_i - x_s| - \bar{\varepsilon} &= -\pi|x_i - x_p| - (1 - \pi)|x_i - x_s| \\ \iff \bar{\varepsilon} &:= (\pi - \pi'')(x_s - x_p) \end{aligned}$$

When the cost of effort is lower than $\bar{\varepsilon}$, the influence player is willing to oppose the politician's preferred policy. The politician then has two possible equilibrium strategies: he can *compromise for inactivity*, by proposing a policy which makes the influence player indifferent between opposing the proposal and remaining inactive,¹² or he can *persevere despite the threat*, by proposing his preferred policy and facing the influence player's opposition. For κ close enough to $\bar{\varepsilon}$, the politician is always willing to *compromise for inactivity*. For such values of κ , the cost of compromise, policy-wise, is negligible compared to the induced increase in the likelihood of implementation of the proposal. There thus always exist a range of values of κ for which the politician *compromises for inactivity*.

As κ further decreases, compromise becomes more costly for the politician. At some point, it becomes too costly for the politician to *compromise for inactivity*. This occurs when κ drops below $\underline{\varepsilon}$, the value of κ for which the politician is indifferent between *compromising for inactivity* and *persevering despite the threat*:

$$\begin{aligned} -\pi|x_p - (x_s - \frac{\underline{\varepsilon}}{\pi - \pi''})| - (1 - \pi)|x_p - x_s| &= -\pi''|x_p - x_p| - (1 - \pi'')|x_p - x_s| \\ \iff \underline{\varepsilon} &:= \frac{\pi''}{\pi}(\pi - \pi'')(x_s - x_p) \end{aligned}$$

¹²A similar argument to the one exposed above shows that the politician only needs to make the influence player indifferent between opposition and inactivity.




Figure 5: Policymaking with an extremely misaligned influence player

I illustrate Proposition 2 in Figure 5. The red area corresponds to ranges of values of κ for which the influence player opposes the politician's proposal, whilst the blue area corresponds to ranges of values of κ for which the influence player is inactive. Note that the influence player's ability to shape the policy proposed by the politician is non-monotonic: for an intermediate κ the influence player affects which policy the politician proposes. In contrast, when κ is either high or low, the influence player doesn't influence the nature of the policy proposed and the politician proposes x_p .

Proposition 3. *Suppose the influence player is moderately misaligned. For any (κ, π) , there exist $\bar{\epsilon} \in \mathbb{R}_+$, $\underline{\epsilon}, \alpha' \in \mathbb{R}$ such that in equilibrium:*

1. *The politician proposes x_p and the influence player remains inactive for $\kappa > \max(\bar{\kappa}, \bar{\epsilon})$; for $\kappa \in (\alpha', \bar{\kappa})$ if $\bar{\kappa} > \bar{\epsilon}$ and $\alpha' > \bar{\epsilon}$; and for $\kappa \in (\bar{\epsilon}, \bar{\kappa})$ if $\bar{\kappa} > \bar{\epsilon}$ and $\alpha' < \bar{\epsilon}$.*
2. *The politician compromises for support for $\kappa \in (\bar{\epsilon}, \alpha')$ if $\bar{\kappa} > \bar{\epsilon}$ and $\alpha' > \bar{\epsilon}$.*
3. *The politician compromises for inactivity for $\kappa \in (\underline{\epsilon}, \bar{\epsilon})$ if $\bar{\epsilon} > \bar{\kappa}$ and $\underline{\epsilon} > \bar{\kappa}$; and for $\kappa \in (\bar{\kappa}, \bar{\epsilon})$ if $\bar{\epsilon} > \bar{\kappa} > \underline{\epsilon}$.*
4. *The politician perseveres despite the threat for $\kappa \in (\bar{\kappa}, \underline{\epsilon})$ if $\bar{\epsilon} > \bar{\kappa}$ and $\underline{\epsilon} > \bar{\kappa}$.*

Moreover, if $\frac{\pi - \pi''}{\pi} \geq \frac{x_p - \hat{x}}{x_p - x_s}$, there exist a $\underline{\kappa}$ such that for any $\kappa \in (0, \underline{\kappa})$, the politician perseveres despite the threat in equilibrium. If $\frac{\pi - \pi''}{\pi} < \frac{x_p - \hat{x}}{x_p - x_s}$, there exist a $\underline{\kappa}$ such that for any $\kappa \in (0, \underline{\kappa})$, the politician compromises for support in equilibrium. In both cases, $\kappa \in (0, \max(\bar{\kappa}, \bar{\epsilon})]$.

When the cost of effort is high ($\kappa > \max(\bar{\kappa}, \bar{\epsilon})$), the politician proposes x_p and the influence player remains inactive. As $\kappa > \bar{\kappa}$, there isn't any policy which the politician could propose which would earn the support of the influence player. Moreover, as $\kappa > \bar{\epsilon}$, the politician's preferred policy is not extreme enough for opposition to be worth it for the influence player. In equilibrium, as effort is too costly for the influence player, the politician does not compromise and she remains inactive.

Consider next intermediate costs of effort ($\max(\bar{\kappa}, \bar{\epsilon}) > \kappa > \min(\bar{\kappa}, \bar{\epsilon})$). First, if $\bar{\kappa} > \bar{\epsilon}$, the influence player is willing to support policies that are located strictly between x_p and x_i , as $\kappa < \bar{\kappa}$, but is unwilling to oppose x_p , as $\kappa > \bar{\epsilon}$. The politician must then decide between proposing x_p and face an inactive influence player, or *compromising for support* to increase the likelihood of policy change, at some cost, policy-wise. The politician is only willing to *compromise for support* provided that there is a sufficient gain of doing so, which is the case whenever $\bar{\alpha} > \bar{\epsilon}$. Second, if $\bar{\epsilon} > \bar{\kappa}$, the influence player is willing to oppose x_p , as $\kappa < \bar{\epsilon}$, but she is unwilling to support any policy, as $\kappa > \bar{\kappa}$. The politician must then decide between *persevering despite the threat*, or *compromising for inactivity*, to increase the likelihood of policy change at some cost, policy-wise. As in Proposition 2, there always is a range of values of κ such that the politician *compromises for inactivity*.

When the cost of effort is low ($\kappa < \min(\bar{\kappa}, \bar{\epsilon})$), supporting, opposed and inactive influence players can all be observed in equilibrium, depending on the specific parameter values. This does not mean that anything goes with regard to the game's equilibrium. In particular, three features are worth noticing. First, if for some κ_s , *compromising for support* is an equilibrium strategy, then for all $\kappa < \kappa_s$, the unique equilibrium features the politician *compromising for support*: as κ decreases, it becomes cheaper, policy-wise, to *compromise for support*, which further increases the politician's expected payoff from that strategy. Second, if for some κ_i , *compromising for inactivity* is not an equilibrium strategy, then there is no $\kappa < \kappa_i$ for which the politician *compromises for inactivity* in equilibrium: as κ decreases, it becomes more costly, policy-wise, for the politician to *compromise for inactivity*, which further decreases the politician's expected payoff from that strategy.

Lastly, there exist some threshold on κ , which I denote by $\underline{\kappa}$ and is a function of (χ, π) , such that for all κ strictly below this threshold, the equilibrium features the politician *compromising for support* (when $\frac{\pi - \pi''}{\pi} < \frac{x_p - \hat{x}}{x_p - x_s}$) or the politician *persevering despite the threat* (when $\frac{\pi - \pi''}{\pi} \geq \frac{x_p - \hat{x}}{x_p - x_s}$). In other words, when κ is small enough, *compromising for inactivity* can't be an equilibrium strategy for the politician: fixing the politician's strategy, decreasing κ makes *compromising for inactivity* strictly worse for him, whereas it makes *compromising for support* strictly better for him, without affecting the payoff from proposing x_p and facing the influence player's opposition. It then follows that, in the limit, there always exist an $\underline{\kappa}$ for which the equilibrium is as described in the last item of Proposition 3.

5 Discussion

To compromise or not to compromise. The politician *compromises* whenever his proposal strictly differs from his preferred policy, x_p . Using the status quo x_s as a reference point, this compromise can take two forms: a proposal which is farther away from x_s than x_p or a proposal which is closer to x_s than x_p . While the former kind of proposal is necessarily the result of a *compromise for support*, the latter kind could be the result of either a *compromise for support* or a *compromise for inactivity*. In turn, this suggests that a detailed knowledge of the policymaking process is required for a proper inference of the welfare impact of politicians' policy compromises. Indeed, while *compromises for support* can be welfare improving for politicians, *compromises for inactivity* are necessarily harmful to them. Observing policy proposals and policy preferences might therefore not be sufficient to ascertain the welfare consequences of policy compromises and the observation of influence players' efforts can

be necessary to succeed in this endeavour.

Changes in the cost of effort. An influence player does not necessarily benefit from a decrease in κ . There are cases in which the influence player would benefit from such decrease, for instance when the influence player is *extremely misaligned* and κ decreases from some $\kappa < \underline{\varepsilon}$: in that case, she still gets the same policy, in expectation, but the cost of effort she incurs is lower. However, there are other cases in which a decrease in κ harms the influence player. This can occur because κ is also a determinant of the game's equilibrium qualitative nature : when the influence player is *misaligned*, a decrease in κ can lead to a shift in equilibrium from one in which the politician *compromises for inactivity* to an equilibrium in which the politician *perseveres despite the threat* and the influence player opposes the proposal. When this happens, she loses the ability to influence policymaking for free, simply by virtue of being able to threaten to oppose some policies, and has to actively oppose the proposal to ensure a more favourable outcome for herself.¹³

The cost of effort for an influence player can be seen as a measure of her effectiveness. A well organised, well connected, and well funded interest group, which benefits from economies of scale will have an easier time providing the minimal level of efforts needed to have an impact on the proposal's likelihood of implementation. The same argument holds for an experienced bureaucrat or a long serving legislator. Alternatively, the cost of effort can be seen as a measure of an influence player's resolve (to borrow a term from the international relations literature, e.g. [Fearon, 1995](#); [Fey and Ramsay, 2011](#)), the extent to which she cares about the matter at stake.

Bringing the previous argument slightly outside the scope of the model, this suggests that influence players might not necessarily benefit from being perceived as more resolved or more effective. As it is more costly, policy-wise, for a politician to ensure that an influence player of high effectiveness or of a higher resolve remains inactive instead of opposing the policy proposal, an influence player which is perceived as being of sufficiently high resolve or as sufficiently highly effective could face a breakdown of the possibility of compromise. This finding has implications for the incentives influence players have to reveal what could be private information about the extent to which they care about particular policy issues or their effectiveness in the influence process. In particular, this can preclude the possibility of costly signalling by influence players prior to policymakers' proposals (for analyses of costly signalling of their resolve by interest groups, see for instance [Ball, 1995](#); [Wolton, 2021](#)).

Divergent preferences. Since the politician is imperfectly effective and the influence player can help increase the likelihood of policy implementation, divergent preferences do not necessarily imply divergent interests. As both the politician and the influence player have bliss points which differ strictly from the status quo, there are policies which they strictly prefer over the status quo. A necessary condition for the politician to benefit from the influence player's efforts is that the set of policies which both players prefer to the status quo partially coincide. This is not the case with an *extremely misaligned* influence player, but is the case when she is either *aligned* or *moderately misaligned*. If, in addition, her support efforts are sufficiently effective and the influence player's and politician's bliss points are not too different, the politician can strictly benefit from her involvement. This implies

¹³Formally, consider two costs of influence κ' and κ'' , with $\kappa' \in (\underline{\varepsilon}, \bar{\varepsilon})$ and $\kappa'' \in (0, \underline{\varepsilon})$. The influence player's expected payoff under κ' is equal to $-\pi''|x_i - (x_s - \frac{\kappa'}{\pi - \pi''})| - (1 - \pi)|x_i - x_s| - \kappa'$, while it is equal to $-\pi''|x_i - x_p| - (1 - \pi)|x_i - x_s| - \kappa''$ under κ'' . Provided that κ' and κ'' are sufficiently close to $\underline{\varepsilon}$, the influence player's expected payoff is higher with κ' than with κ'' .

that knowing only that the politician's preferred policy is distant from the influence player's preferred policy by a given length does not allow us to make any inference about the benefits or harm the influence player can cause the politician. It is only with information about the status quo that we can begin to classify the influence player as potentially beneficial, harmful, or both. With further information, such as the cost and the effectiveness of her efforts, we can then compute precisely the welfare impact she has on the politician.

Perspectives on legislative politics. Since legislators often behave as *influence players* in the context of legislative policymaking, the model can provide insights into the world of legislative politics. The framework considered here is closely related to models of veto bargaining (Romer and Rosenthal, 1978; Cameron, 2000) and models of pivotal politics (Krehbiel, 1998).¹⁴ Given the aforementioned differences in assumptions (costly effort, the possibility of *both* imperfect support and imperfect opposition, and the policymaker's imperfect effectiveness), the analysis gives rise to substantively different results regarding the kind of compromises politicians can resort to and the possibility of observing actual legislative opposition.

The first major difference lies in the possibility of two different types of compromises for a politician facing an influence player, *compromises for support* and *compromises for inactivity*. By contrast, models of pivotal politics only feature *compromises for support* while models of veto bargaining only feature *compromises for inactivity*.¹⁵ This follows from the necessity of a pivot's support for the passage of a bill, while the inactivity of a veto player is sufficient for the passage of a bill. This difference is most consequential in the case of a *moderately misaligned* influence player, as a politician might then resort to different types of compromises depending on the specific parameter values. Moreover, the possibility of *compromise for support* paired with the politician's imperfect effectiveness gives rise to the possibility of compromise in the case of an *aligned* influence player, which is welfare improving for the politician. In contrast the politician simply proposes his preferred policy when facing aligned pivots or aligned veto players.

A second major difference with models of veto bargaining and pivotal politics is the possibility of *perseverance despite the threat* in a complete information setting. Traditionally, no opposition of a proposal is observed in equilibrium because a politician anticipates such opposition, through a veto or a pivot's refusal to support the proposal, and saves on the effort cost of making a doomed proposal by remaining inactive (see Cameron and McCarty, 2004, for instance).¹⁶ Things are different with an opposed influence player because her blocking efforts can fail, leaving room for an attempt by the politician to pass his proposal in spite of the influence player's opposition.

Gridlock, the failure of the political system to alter the existing status quo (Krehbiel, 1996; Binder, 1999; Callander and Krehbiel, 2014), appears mechanically in all equilibria of the model, as a consequence of the politician's assumed imperfect effectiveness and the influence player's inability to ensure the success of a proposal with her support. Moreover, in all equilibria, gridlock can only

¹⁴To see this more formally, observe that a standard veto bargaining model (as analysed in Cameron and McCarty, 2004) is the limit case of the model developed in this paper when $\pi \rightarrow 1$, $\pi'' \rightarrow 0$, and $\kappa \rightarrow 0$.

¹⁵As argued elsewhere (Blumenthal, 2023), this subtle distinction is usually obscured by the assumption of costless (pivotal) votes or vetoes in most models of veto bargaining and pivotal politics.

¹⁶A similar mechanism is at play in models of crisis bargaining in international relations (Fearon, 1995; Schultz, 1999; Powell, 2002).

occur as the result of the politician's proposal failure, rather than as the result of the politician's failure to make a proposal.¹⁷ However, not all equilibria result in the same *ex-ante* probabilities of gridlock. The probability of gridlock is highest when the influence player opposes the politician's proposal, intermediate when she remains inactive, and lowest when she supports the politician's proposal. All else equal, thus, gridlock is more likely to occur when the influence player is *aligned* than when she is *moderately misaligned* and more likely to occur when the influence player is *moderately misaligned* than when she is *extremely misaligned*.

Perspectives on special interest politics. As detailed above, interest groups act as *influence players* in many settings. The results of my analysis thus also have implications for the research and public discourse on special interest politics. First, the model suggests that one can't infer from the empirical observation of no effort on the part of an interest group that it had no impact on the policy enacted. An interest group's inactivity could result from a prohibitively high cost of effort or from a decision to refrain from opposing a proposal because the politician compromised *ex-ante* to avoid the threat of opposition. As such, this provides a plausible partial explanation to Tullock's paradox on the small size of lobbying expenditures relative to the value of public policies at stake (Tullock, 1989; Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder Jr., 2003).¹⁸

Second, a politician who compromises in the presence of an interest group need not be harmed by such compromise: if the politician is only imperfectly effective, compromising might allow him to harness the interest group's resources to increase the likelihood of successfully changing the status quo.¹⁹ Third, evaluating properly the impact of lobbying on policymaking and voters' welfare requires taking into account the existing legislative or regulatory framework. Indeed, as argued above, the status quo can create a convergence of interests between voters and interest groups with very divergent preferences, or a divergence of interests for seemingly close preferences. This suggests that paying attention only to the distance between voters' preferences and the preferences of interest groups could obscure, for instance, the fact that the interest groups would be willing to pull in the same direction as the one preferred by voters. This also suggests that the optimal regulation of the activities of interest groups, which can be seen as loosely represented by the cost parameter introduced above, depends on the preferences of political actors and status quo policies.

Perspectives on bureaucratic politics. Bureaucrats, when tasked with implementing policies devised by politicians, also act as *influence players*. As such, there are a number of interesting connections between some of my results and the literature on bureaucratic delegation. First, a form of *ally principle*, according to which "if the legislature has a choice of agencies to which it can delegate, then it prefers the agency whose preferences are most similar to its own" (Gehlbach, 2021),²⁰ holds here. *Ceteris paribus*, the politician is weakly better off with an influence player whose bliss point is closer to

¹⁷Such failure to make a proposal because of the threat of opposition by a veto player or a pivot is the source of gridlock in many models of legislative politics.

¹⁸I am not the first one to note this; see for instance the discussions in Fox and Rothenberg (2011), Wolton (2021), or Judd (2022). Cameron and McCarty (2004) make a similar point on veto players: "it is impossible to infer anything about the extent of veto power from the frequency of vetoes. [...] It would be incorrect to infer that the veto is impotent based solely on the infrequency of its use", since the threat of a veto might force a proposer to compromise.

¹⁹This result stands in contrast with Wolton (2021), who observes that in his setting with a perfectly effective politician, "compromise represents a success for the SIG [Special Interest Group] defending the status quo since it wants to avoid a comprehensive reform, but a failure for the pro-change SIG which seeks it."

²⁰Bendor and Meirowitz (2004) analyse variants of a simple model of delegation in which the ally principle need not hold.

his own bliss point, although he might not always benefit from having to contend with that influence player.

Second, a central rationale for delegation in policymaking is that it allows politicians to exploit the superior expertise of bureaucrats (Epstein and O'Halloran, 1994). Here, too, a plausible interpretation of the benefits that flow from the possibility of *compromise for support* is that, by forsaking the opportunity to propose their preferred policies, politicians can lean on bureaucrats' ability to get the job done, thereby increasing the likelihood of successful policy change. Of course, such expertise can also be harmful for politicians and force them to *compromise for inactivity*, to ensure that bureaucrats will not seek to exploit their expertise to prevent successful policy change. Third, as alluded to above, there is a straightforward link between the strategy set of influence players in the model and the "working, shirking, and sabotage" taxonomy of bureaucrats' actions proposed and analysed by Brehm and Gates (1997): working corresponds to support, shirking to inactivity, and sabotage to opposition. In contrast with their work, however, I do not focus my analysis on the deep determinants of bureaucrats' actions and the role that oversight mechanisms can have on them. Instead, seeing bureaucrats as influence players, I take as given the possibility of these various strategies for bureaucrats and consider how these features affect policymaking, providing a detailed characterisation of the strategies available to politicians in their interactions with bureaucracies.

6 Conclusion

In this paper I introduced the concept of *influence players*, an umbrella term to characterise political actors that can affect, positively or negatively, the odds of successful implementation of policy proposals by exerting costly effort. I argued that legislators, interest groups, and bureaucrats can be seen as influence players in diverse policymaking settings. Building on this concept, I considered a simple model of policymaking under influence to study the impact an influence player can have on policymaking. Analysing this model, I showed how and when threats, support, and opposition could affect policymaking, depending on the cost and effects of influence as well as the (mis)alignment of preferences between the influence player and the agenda-setting politician. Discussing the results of my analysis, I derived a number of empirical implications and emphasised the importance of status quo policies. I concluded the article by illustrating the relevance of this concept for the study of legislative politics, special interest politics, and bureaucratic politics.

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A Appendix

Proof of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. The influence player's expected payoff from supporting a proposal x is:

$$-\pi'|x_i - x| - (1 - \pi')|x_i - x_s| - \kappa.$$

The influence player's expected payoff from opposing a proposal x is:

$$-\pi''|x_i - x| - (1 - \pi'')|x_i - x_s| - \kappa.$$

The influence player's expected payoff from remaining inactive for a proposal x is:

$$-\pi|x_i - x| - (1 - \pi)|x_i - x_s|.$$

Recall that $\bar{\kappa}$ is the value of κ for which the influence player is indifferent between supporting her preferred policy x_i and remaining inactive for a proposal x_i :

$$\bar{\kappa} := (\pi' - \pi)|x_i - x_s|.$$

Whenever $\kappa > \bar{\kappa}$, there does not exist any policy the influence player is willing to support (if she is unwilling to support her favourite policy, she is *a fortiori* unwilling to support other policies). Whenever $\kappa < \bar{\kappa}$ there exist a non-trivial interval of policies which she is willing to support.

For a given κ , she is indifferent between opposing x and remaining inactive whenever:

$$x = x_s - \frac{\kappa}{\pi - \pi''} \quad \text{or} \quad x = \hat{x} + \frac{\kappa}{\pi - \pi''}$$

For a given $\kappa > \bar{\kappa}$, she is indifferent between supporting x and remaining inactive for a proposal x whenever:

$$x = x_s + \frac{\kappa}{\pi' - \pi} \quad \text{or} \quad x = \hat{x} - \frac{\kappa}{\pi' - \pi}$$

Putting these results together imply the results of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. □

Proof of Proposition 1. Consider first the case of $\kappa > \bar{\kappa}$. In that case there are no policies which the influence player is willing to support. The politician thus proposes x_p and the influence player remains inactive (by deviating, the politician can at best face an inactive influence player and pay a cost, policy-wise; at worst he can face an opposed influence player, and face both a cost, policy-wise, and a higher likelihood of the status quo remaining in place, thereby ensuring that x_p is proposed in equilibrium).

Next, recall that the influence player is indifferent between supporting x_p and remaining

inactive when the following holds:

$$\begin{aligned} -\pi'|\chi_i - \chi_p| - (1 - \pi')|\chi_i - \chi_s| - \kappa &= -\pi|\chi_i - \chi_p| - (1 - \pi)|\chi_i - \chi_s| \\ \iff \kappa &= (\pi' - \pi)(|\chi_i - \chi_s| - |\chi_i - \chi_p|) \end{aligned}$$

Defining $\underline{\alpha} := (\pi' - \pi)(|\chi_i - \chi_s| - |\chi_i - \chi_p|)$, it follows that when $\kappa < \underline{\alpha}$, the influence player strictly prefers supporting χ_p to remaining inactive when χ_p is proposed. In equilibrium, the politician thus proposes χ_p and the influence player supports the proposal (a similar argument to the one derived before can be made to show the optimality of such strategy for the politician; it follows from Lemma 2 that the strategy is optimal for the influence player).

Consider next the case of $\kappa \in (\underline{\alpha}, \bar{\kappa})$. We need to distinguish two cases, depending on the relationship between χ_i and χ_p :

1. $\chi_i > \chi_p$: Following the results of Lemma 1, the proposal x for which the influence player is indifferent between remaining inactive and supporting x is $x = \chi_s + \frac{\kappa}{\pi' - \pi}$. Consider next two alternatives for the politician: he can propose $x = \chi_s + \frac{\kappa}{\pi' - \pi}$ and benefit from the influence player's support (i.e. in the proposed equilibrium the influence player supports the policy with certainty when indifferent between support and inactivity) or propose χ_p and have the influence player remain inactive. He is indifferent between the two strategies when:

$$\begin{aligned} -\pi'|\chi_p - (\chi_s + \frac{\kappa}{\pi' - \pi})| - (1 - \pi')|\chi_p - \chi_s| &= -\pi|\chi_p - \chi_p| - (1 - \pi)|\chi_p - \chi_s| \\ \iff \kappa &= \frac{(2\pi' - \pi)(\pi' - \pi)}{\pi'}(\chi_p - \chi_s) \end{aligned}$$

Define $\alpha' := \frac{(2\pi' - \pi)(\pi' - \pi)}{\pi'}(\chi_p - \chi_s)$. Observe that, since $\pi' > \pi$, $\alpha' > \underline{\alpha}$. There are then two subcases:

- (a) If $\alpha' \geq \bar{\kappa}$, the politician *compromises for support* for any $\kappa \in (\underline{\alpha}, \bar{\kappa})$, as the cost for the politician of inducing indifference for the influence player is strictly lower than the gain stemming from the increased likelihood of successful implementation with her support.
 - (b) If $\alpha' < \bar{\kappa}$, the politician *compromises for support* for any $\kappa \in (\underline{\alpha}, \alpha')$ and proposes χ_p for any $\kappa \in (\alpha', \bar{\kappa})$. As in the preceding subcase, the gain stemming from the increased likelihood of successful implementation with the influence player's support trumps the cost for the politician of inducing indifference for her when $\kappa \in (\underline{\alpha}, \alpha')$. When $\kappa \in (\alpha', \bar{\kappa})$, the cost of *compromising for support* is too high compared to the induced gain stemming from the increased likelihood of successful implementation.
2. $\chi_i < \chi_p$: Following the results of Lemma 1, the proposal x for which the influence player is indifferent between remaining inactive and supporting x is $x = \hat{x} - \frac{\kappa}{\pi' - \pi}$. Consider next two alternatives for the politician: he can propose $x = \hat{x} - \frac{\kappa}{\pi' - \pi}$ and benefit from the influence player's support (i.e. in the proposed equilibrium she supports the policy with certainty when indifferent between support and inactivity) or propose χ_p and have the influence player remain

inactive. He is indifferent between the two strategies when:

$$\begin{aligned} -\pi'|\chi_p - (\chi = \hat{\chi} - \frac{\kappa}{\pi' - \pi})| - (1 - \pi')|\chi_p - \chi_s| &= -\pi|\chi_p - \chi_p| - (1 - \pi)|\chi_p - \chi_s| \\ \iff \kappa &= \frac{(\pi' - \pi)}{\pi'} [(\pi' - \pi)(\chi_p - \chi_s) - \pi'(\chi_p - \hat{\chi})] \end{aligned}$$

Define $\alpha' = \frac{(\pi' - \pi)}{\pi'} [(\pi' - \pi)(\chi_p - \chi_s) - \pi'(\chi_p - \hat{\chi})]$. Observe that, since $\chi_p > \chi_s$, $\alpha' > \underline{\alpha}$. There are the same two possible subcases as before: either $\alpha' \geq \bar{\kappa}$ or $\alpha' < \bar{\kappa}$, and the exposition is hence omitted.

Defining $\bar{\alpha} := \min(\bar{\kappa}, \alpha')$, we get that, when $\kappa \in (\underline{\alpha}, \bar{\alpha})$, the equilibrium characterised in Proposition 1 exists. However, to conclude the proof of the proposition, I need to show that there is no other equilibrium than the one I characterised. To do so, I need to focus on possible deviations by the influence player from the prescribed equilibrium strategy when the politician *compromises for support* (to support the proposal when indifferent between support and inactivity; when the politician proposes χ_p , it does not matter how the influence player's indifference is dealt with). Formally, I need to show that, when $\kappa < \alpha'$, there can't be an equilibrium in which the influence player mixes between supporting the politician's proposal and remaining inactive when indifferent between the two actions.

Suppose that the influence player supports the proposal with probability $\sigma \in [0, 1]$ when indifferent between supporting the proposal and remaining inactive. If the proposal is closer to χ_i than the indifference inducing proposal, it follows from Lemma 2 that she supports the proposal with probability 1, whilst if the proposal is farther away from χ_i than the indifference inducing proposal, it follows from Lemma 2 that she remains inactive with probability 1.

Under these conditions, there is no best response for the politician. To see why this is the case, consider the following exhaustive cases:

1. Consider a proposal of the politician which is strictly closer to χ_i than the indifference inducing proposal. Call such proposal $\tilde{\chi}$. Consider further a deviation to the midpoint between $\tilde{\chi}$ and the indifference inducing proposal. It follows that the influence player supports such proposal. Furthermore, this deviation to the midpoint is strictly better for the politician than $\tilde{\chi}$. Therefore there can't be an equilibrium in which the politician proposes a policy which is strictly closer to χ_i than the indifference inducing proposal.
2. Consider a proposal of the politician which is strictly closer to χ_p than the indifference inducing proposal and distinct from χ_p . Call such proposal $\tilde{\chi}$. The politician's expected payoff from such proposal is $-\pi|\chi_p - \tilde{\chi}| - (1 - \pi)|\chi_p - \chi_s|$. However, the politician can do better than this, by proposing χ_p . Thus there is no equilibrium in which the politician proposes a policy which is strictly closer to χ_p than the indifference inducing proposal and distinct from χ_p .
3. Consider now a proposal χ_p by the politician. The politician's expected payoff from such proposal is $-\pi|\chi_p - \chi_p| - (1 - \pi)|\chi_p - \chi_s|$. Given that $\kappa < \alpha'$, it follows by a standard continuity argument that there exist some proposal for the politician which induces the influence player's support which is strictly better for the politician than proposing χ_p . Thus it can't be an equilibrium for the politician to propose χ_p .

4. Consider now that the politician proposes the indifference inducing proposal. Since the influence player remains inactive with positive probability when indifferent, there exist a profitable deviation for the politician which induces the influence player's support, with such proposal being arbitrarily close to the indifference inducing proposal.

Thus, as there is no best response for the politician, no equilibrium exist where the influence player remains inactive with positive probability when indifferent between inactivity and support.

□

Proof of Proposition 2. Let me first recall the definition of $\bar{\varepsilon}$ and $\underline{\varepsilon}$. $\bar{\varepsilon}$ corresponds to the value of κ for which the influence player is indifferent between opposing a proposal x_p and remaining inactive for a proposal x_p :

$$-\pi''|x_i - x_p| - (1 - \pi'')|x_i - x_s| - \bar{\varepsilon} = -\pi|x_i - x_p| - (1 - \pi)|x_i - x_s|$$

Thus,

$$\bar{\varepsilon} := (\pi - \pi'')(x_s - x_p)$$

Observe that $\bar{\varepsilon} > 0$, given that the first term is strictly positive ($\pi > \pi''$ by assumption) and the second term is positive too (by definition of an *extremely misaligned* influence player).

$\underline{\varepsilon}$ corresponds to the value of κ for which the politician is indifferent between proposing the least costly compromise for inactivity (as derived in the proof of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2) and proposing x_p and facing the influence player's opposition:

$$-\pi|x_p - (x_s - \frac{\underline{\varepsilon}}{\pi - \pi''})| - (1 - \pi)|x_p - x_s| = -\pi''|x_p - x_p| - (1 - \pi'')|x_p - x_s|$$

Thus,

$$\underline{\varepsilon} := \frac{\pi''}{\pi}(\pi - \pi'')(x_s - x_p)$$

Observe that $\underline{\varepsilon} > 0$, given the definition of an extremely misaligned influence player and the fact that $\pi > \pi''$. Moreover, it follows that $\bar{\varepsilon} > \underline{\varepsilon}$ for any (x, π) .

Consider first the case where $\kappa > \bar{\varepsilon}$. If this holds, the influence player is unwilling to oppose x_p . I show that is optimal for the politician to propose x_p . The expected payoff of proposing x_p is:

$$-\pi|x_p - x_p| - (1 - \pi)|x_p - x_s|$$

The politician's expected payoff can be decomposed in two terms. The left term is the product of the likelihood of policy change and the politician's utility from a final policy x_p . The right term is the product of the likelihood of unsuccessful implementation and the politician's utility from a final policy x_s . This decomposition holds for any possible policy proposal (replacing the policy proposal and, possibly, the likelihood of policy change). Let me now consider the first term and deviations

from x_p . For any proposal $\tilde{x} \neq x_p$ the first term would be strictly lower than for a proposal x_p , as $-\pi|x_p - x_p| = 0$ and the likelihood of policy change is always strictly positive. Deviating from x_p would thus entail a loss in the first term.

Can this loss be compensated by a gain in the second term? The answer is negative: indeed, for there to be a gain in the second term, the politician would have to induce the influence player to support the policy, leading to a right term of $-(1 - \pi')|x_p - x_s| > -(1 - \pi)|x_p - x_s|$. However, given the result of Lemma 2, we know that the influence player is only ever willing to support proposals $\in (x_s, \hat{x})$. Comparing the politician's expected payoff from proposing x_p and the politician's expected payoff from a proposal $\tilde{x} \in (x_s, \hat{x})$ that induces the influence player's support, we get that the former is greater than the latter whenever: $\pi|x_p - x_s| > \pi'(|x_p - x_s| - |x_p - \tilde{x}|)$. The right hand side of the inequality is always positive, while the left hand side of the inequality is always negative: the politician would be worse off from deviating than from proposing x_p , even if the politician's deviation is support inducing for the influence player. Thus, when $\kappa > \bar{\varepsilon}$, the politician proposes x_p and the influence player remains inactive in equilibrium.

Next, consider the case where $\bar{\varepsilon} > \kappa > \underline{\varepsilon}$. If this holds, the influence player is willing to oppose x_p . The politician must then decide whether to *compromise for support*, to *compromise for inactivity* or to *persevere despite the threat*. As before, *compromising for support* can't be better for the politician than proposing x_p (indeed, the argument above only relies on the fact that the influence player is *extremely misaligned* to ensure that $|x_p - x_s| < |x_p - \tilde{x}|$). Thus the issue is to compare *compromising for inactivity* to *persevering despite the threat*. Consider the cheapest inactivity inducing compromise, which is $x_s - \frac{\kappa}{\pi - \pi''}$, following the proof of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 (making a different inactivity inducing compromise is strictly more costly for the politician). Assume further that when indifferent between inactivity and opposition, the influence player remains inactive with probability 1. As $\kappa < \bar{\varepsilon}$, the politician's expected payoff from *persevering despite the threat* is $-\pi''|x_p - x_p| - (1 - \pi'')|x_p - x_s|$ (as the influence player is willing to oppose x_p) while the politician's expected payoff from *compromising for inactivity* is $-\pi|x_p - (x_s - \frac{\kappa}{\pi - \pi''})| - (1 - \pi)|x_p - x_s|$. Since $\kappa > \underline{\varepsilon}$, it follows that the politician is better off *compromising for inactivity* than *persevering despite the threat* (by definition of $\underline{\varepsilon}$).

This then proves that, when $\bar{\varepsilon} > \kappa > \underline{\varepsilon}$, it is an equilibrium for the politician to *compromise for inactivity* and for the influence player to remain inactive. As before, I also need to prove that there is no other equilibrium than the one I characterised above when $\bar{\varepsilon} > \kappa > \underline{\varepsilon}$. As it is straightforward to show it using the same approach as the one used for intermediate values of κ when the influence player is *aligned*, the proof is omitted.

Finally, consider the case where $\underline{\varepsilon} > \kappa$. I argue that in that case, *the politician perseveres despite the threat*. To see why this is the case, observe first that the behaviour of the influence player follows directly from the results of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. Regarding the politician's decision, it follows from the same argument as the one used in the case of $\kappa > \bar{\varepsilon}$ that it can't be an equilibrium strategy for the politician to *compromise for support*. Moreover, given that $\kappa < \underline{\varepsilon}$, it follows that *compromising for inactivity* cannot be an equilibrium strategy either (as this implies that *compromising for inactivity* is strictly more costly than *persevering despite the threat*). $\square$

Proof of Proposition 3. Consider first the case of $\kappa > \max(\bar{\kappa}, \bar{\varepsilon})$. When this holds, there are no policies

which the influence player is willing to support and the influence player is unwilling to oppose x_p . It then follows straightforwardly that in equilibrium the politician proposes x_p and the influence player remains inactive.

Consider next the case of $\max(\bar{\kappa}, \bar{\varepsilon}) > \kappa > \min(\bar{\kappa}, \bar{\varepsilon})$. Assuming that the influence player supports the proposal when indifferent between supporting and remaining inactive, there are two possible cases:

1. $\bar{\kappa} > \bar{\varepsilon}$: if this holds, the influence player is willing to support policies which are strictly different from x_p but is unwilling to oppose x_p . The politician is indifferent between *compromising for support* and offering x_p and facing an inactive influence player when:

$$\begin{aligned} -\pi' |x_p - (\hat{x} - \frac{\kappa}{\pi' - \pi})| - (1 - \pi') |x_p - x_s| &= -\pi |x_p - x_p| - (1 - \pi) |x_p - x_s| \\ \iff \kappa &= \frac{(\pi' - \pi)}{\pi'} [(\pi' - \pi)(x_p - x_s) - \pi'(x_p - \hat{x})] \end{aligned}$$

Define $\alpha' := \frac{(\pi' - \pi)}{\pi'} [(\pi' - \pi)(x_p - x_s) - \pi'(x_p - \hat{x})]$. There are then two subcases:

- (a) If $\alpha' \geq \bar{\kappa}$, the politician *compromises for support* for any $\kappa \in (\bar{\varepsilon}, \bar{\kappa})$, as the cost for the politician of inducing indifference for the influence player is strictly lower than the gain stemming from the increased likelihood of successful implementation with the influence player's support.
 - (b) If $\alpha' < \bar{\kappa}$, the politician *compromises for support* for any $\kappa \in (\bar{\varepsilon}, \alpha')$ and proposes x_p for any $\kappa \in (\alpha', \bar{\kappa})$. As in the preceding subcase, the gain stemming from the increased likelihood of successful implementation with the influence player's support trumps the cost for the politician of inducing indifference for the influence player when $\kappa \in (\bar{\varepsilon}, \alpha')$. When $\kappa \in (\alpha', \bar{\kappa})$, the cost of *compromising for support* is too high compared to the induced gain stemming from the increased likelihood of successful implementation.
2. $\bar{\kappa} < \bar{\varepsilon}$: if this holds, the influence player is willing to oppose x_p but is unwilling to support any policy. For the politician to be indifferent between *compromising for inactivity* and *persevering despite the threat*, the following must hold:

$$-\pi |x_p - (x_s - \frac{\kappa}{\pi - \pi''})| - (1 - \pi) |x_p - x_s| = -\pi'' |x_p - x_p| - (1 - \pi'') |x_p - x_s|$$

Define $\underline{\varepsilon} = \pi''(x_p - x_s) - \pi(\hat{x} - x_s) \frac{\pi - \pi''}{\pi}$. Contrary to the case of an *extremely misaligned* influence player, this $\underline{\varepsilon}$ need not be positive. Assuming that the influence player remains inactive when indifferent between opposing the proposal and remaining inactive, there are two possible cases:

- (a) If $\underline{\varepsilon} > \bar{\kappa}$, the politician *perseveres despite the threat* for any $\kappa \in (\bar{\kappa}, \underline{\varepsilon})$ and the politician *compromises for inactivity* for any $\kappa \in (\underline{\varepsilon}, \bar{\varepsilon})$.
- (b) If $\underline{\varepsilon} < \bar{\kappa}$, the politician *compromises for inactivity* for all $\kappa \in (\bar{\kappa}, \bar{\varepsilon})$.

As for the intermediate cases of *extremely misaligned* and *aligned* influence player, to complete the proof it must be shown that there is no equilibrium in which, on the equilibrium path, the

influence player selects the least preferred action by the politician with positive probability when she is indifferent between two actions (i.e. when indifferent between inactivity and support, that she selects inactivity with positive probability; when indifferent between inactivity and opposition, that she selects opposition with positive probability). Since it can be done in the same way as in the proof of Proposition 1, the proof is omitted.

For the last item, observe first that if κ were equal to 0, the politician's expected payoff from *compromising for support* would be higher than his expected payoff from proposing x_p if:

$$\begin{aligned} -\pi'|x_p - \hat{x}| - (1 - \pi')|x_p - x_s| &> -\pi''|x_p - x_p| - (1 - \pi'')|x_p - x_s| \\ \iff \frac{\pi - \pi''}{\pi} &> \frac{x_p - \hat{x}}{x_p - x_s}. \end{aligned}$$

Since the politician's expected payoff from both strategies is continuous in κ (in particular, it is continuous for $\kappa < \min(\bar{\kappa}, \bar{\epsilon})$), and the politician's expected payoff from *compromising for support* is a decreasing function of κ , if $\frac{\pi - \pi''}{\pi} > \frac{x_p - \hat{x}}{x_p - x_s}$, there exists some threshold on κ such that for all κ below this threshold the politician prefers to *compromise for support* rather than *persevere despite the threat* (a similar reasoning for $\frac{\pi - \pi''}{\pi} \leq \frac{x_p - \hat{x}}{x_p - x_s}$, establishes that there is some threshold such that for all κ below it, the politician prefers to propose x_p rather than *compromise for support*). Second, consider the strategy of *compromising for inactivity*. For κ small enough, it can't be an equilibrium strategy : as κ decreases, *compromising for inactivity* becomes more costly to the politician and *compromising for support* becomes less costly to the politician, as the indifference inducing proposals converge to $\hat{x}$. At the same time, the benefit of a higher likelihood of implementation remains constant. In other words, for a sufficiently small κ , *compromising for support* is strictly better for the politician than *compromising for inactivity*. Putting these two results together, the claim follows. $\square$