

Wars, Taxation and Representation: Evidence from Five Centuries of German History*

Sascha O. Becker

Monash University & University of Warwick

Eric Melander

University of Namur

Andreas Ferrara

University of Pittsburgh

Luigi Pascali

Universitat Pompeu Fabra & BGSE

This version: 7 January 2022 (First version: 19 December 2018)

Abstract

We provide causal evidence for the role of conflicts in the development of representative institutions in Europe. Using novel data on the universe of German cities between 1290 and 1710, we show that involvement in wars resulted in city councils that were larger, had a higher probability of being elected by citizens, and a higher probability of guild representation. Additionally, conflicts led to a substantial long-term increase in local fiscal and spending capacity through the development of more sophisticated systems of taxation. We use the gender of the firstborn child of the best-connected local noble to instrument for conflict: a firstborn daughter increases the likelihood of conflict relative to a firstborn son.

Keywords: WARS; MEDIEVAL CONSTITUTIONALISM; FISCAL CAPACITY; PUBLIC EXPENDITURE

JEL Classification: N13; P48; R11

**Acknowledgments:* We thank Carlo Altomonte, Jeanet Bentzen, Alberto Bisin, Dan Bogart, Raquel Fernandez, Oded Gador, Phil Hoffman, Mark Koyama, Stelios Michalopoulos, Jared Rubin, Shanker Satyanath, Mara Squicciarini, David Stasavage, Joachim Voth, and David Weil for helpful discussions and comments. Conference and seminar participants at Bayreuth, Bocconi, Brown, Université Libre de Bruxelles, HKU, U Javeriana Bogota, Namur, NYU Abu Dhabi, NYU New York City, Oxford, Southampton, UCLA, Warwick, York, Zurich, at the World Economic History Congress in Boston, the Workshop on ‘Growth, History and Development’ at the University of Southern Denmark, at ASREC Europe in Bologna, at the 27th CEPR European Summer Symposium in International Macroeconomics (ESSIM), at the GSU Spring Conference on Global and Economic History, at the Australian Political Economy Workshop, and at the Cambridge Workshop on the Political Economy of Wars and Political Transitions gave useful feedback. Dominik Bursy, Lander Elizondo, Pavel Filippov, Evgeniia Filippova, Sebastian Hager, Valentin Kecht, Dominique Lade, Felix Michalik, Melissa Özer, Jan Ringling, Aaron Schade, Federica Schneider, Stephanie Spahn, Miriam Venturini, Mirko Vintar, Ivan Yotzov and Simon Zeiser provided excellent research assistance. Support by the ESRC Centre for Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (ESRC grant ES/L011719/1) is gratefully acknowledged. Melander gratefully acknowledges financial support from Excellence of Science (EOS) research project FNRS 0020918F. Pascali gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563). All authors are affiliated with CAGE. Becker is also affiliated with CEPR, CESifo, CReAM, ifo, IZA, ROA and SoDa Labs. Pascali is also affiliated with CEPR. A previous version of this paper was circulated in December 2018 as CAGE WP No. 395 under the title: “Wars, Local Political Institutions, and Fiscal Capacity: Evidence from Six Centuries of German History”.

1 Introduction

*“The origins of the modern state are to be found in the Middle Ages”*¹

Starting in the thirteenth century, Europe experienced an extraordinary political divergence with respect to the other major contemporaneous world civilizations. Two new concepts emerged among Europeans that would inexorably change their fates: the spread of representative assemblies and the diffusion of the idea that rulers should govern with the consent of their subjects. A strip of land in Central Europe ranging from the Flemish and Dutch coast to Northern Italy witnessed the development of local centres of power – towns and cities – characterized by representative assemblies, rule of law, and substantial fiscal and spending capacity. This institutional framework is often referred to as “medieval constitutionalism” (see [Sabetti, 2004](#)).²

What are the origins of this political development? This is a fundamental question in the comparative development literature,³ as it has been argued that the experience of medieval constitutionalism provided Europeans with a series of ideological and administrative blueprints that later constituted the fundamental building blocks of the Western modern state – a state characterized by substantial fiscal capacity and bounded by the rule of law.

So far, scholarship on the origins of medieval constitutionalism has tended to favor different variations of a more general war-and-representation paradigm. The prevailing hypothesis, that we discuss in depth in section 2, is that a series of historical developments combined with crucial geographical factors divided Central Europe into a myriad of small states with weak rulers constantly at war with each other. Representative assemblies were a fundamental tool to raise the taxes and credit necessary to finance these wars. In this sense, external threats and wars were the ultimate drivers of the rise and spread of medieval constitutionalism.

While a large theoretical and qualitative literature has advocated the bellicose origins of the rise of medieval constitutionalism, there is, to the best of our knowledge, no systematic empirical evidence. In his survey, [Stasavage \(2016\)](#) writes: “So far, the evidence suggests some causal link between warfare and representative institutions, although we do not know in which direction causality runs. War might lead to institutional development, but institutional development would also make it easier to wage war” (p. 155). One key objective of our work is to provide evidence for one direction of causality, from wars to the spread of medieval constitutionalism.

Specifically, we collected data for the universe of German towns and cities from the late thirteenth to the early eighteenth century and test whether exogenous external threats and con-

¹Opening sentence of [Blickle \(1997\)](#).

²An alternative expression used in the literature is “medieval communalism” (see [Blickle, 1997](#)).

³Section 2.2 provides a discussion of this literature.

licts had a causal impact on the spread of local representative assemblies. To understand whether representative institutions were a means to raise fiscal capacity to finance wars, we also study the impact of conflicts on local fiscal and spending capacity. Finally, we analyze the long shadow that the sophisticated fiscal tools, developed within this context, produced on the territorial consolidation process that occurred in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (see [Gennaioli and Voth \(2015\)](#) for a theoretical motivation).

The history of the city of Dortmund illustrates our main hypothesis. During a twenty-month siege in 1388-89, the city incurred heavy war debts. Funds to pay off the debts were raised by levying war taxes, including exceptional wealth taxes in 1393, 1395 and 1396. Citizens responded by revolting and thereby secured increased participation on the city council in 1400 by gaining six citizens' representatives. Once the conflict was over, the city kept higher levels of taxation and the city's increased fiscal capacity translated into additional public spending, with church renovations and the construction of a new church tower. In the half-century before the siege, and hence before the introduction of wealth taxes and citizens' representation, there is no evidence of similar public expenditures. Dortmund's early steps towards medieval constitutionalism are therefore closely entwined with its historical experience of war.

Our first data set contains information on German towns over the period 1290-1710 from the *Deutsches Städtebuch* ([Keyser, 1939-1974](#)), a large encyclopedia covering the history of all German cities. We collected four different types of information. First, information on violent conflicts in which the cities were involved.⁴ Our conflict data for German cities significantly improves upon conflict data used in previous studies in terms of the number of conflicts and temporal coverage.⁵ Second, we collected information on elections and political representation, two key components of medieval constitutionalism. We focus on city councils as representative political institutions; in the words of ([Stasavage, 2016](#)), city councils were the “chief means of seeking consent [to tax]” where “representatives from different parts of a society would be able to express themselves” (p. 147). We collect three types of institutional information. We investigate whether the city council is elected by the citizens without the interference of the local nobility. To capture the representativeness of the city council, we both measure the size of city council and ask whether the guilds had a permanent representation in the council.⁶ Third, we collected detailed data on the tax system for the cities in our sample. We identify

⁴We also collected information on the occurrence of internal conflicts.

⁵To date, the most comprehensive and well-known sources of historical conflicts are [Clodfelter \(2008\)](#) and [Brecke \(1999\)](#). Clodfelter covers global conflicts from 1494 to 2007, while Brecke's data starts from 1400. Our data also cover conflicts from 1290 to 1390, a crucial period when studying the origin of medieval constitutionalism. Moreover, our focus is not only on battles, but on a broader set of conflict events. For more details see footnote 24.

⁶See [Kjaer and Elklit \(2014\)](#) on the relationship between assembly size and representativeness.

28 different types of taxes and categorize them into two levels of sophistication: from simple taxes that do not require any registry (such as mill or road taxes which could be charged on the spot) to sophisticated taxes that require a registry and a specialized class of bureaucrats (such as income or inheritance taxes). These tax data introduce an important novelty compared to previous studies on fiscal capacity, which are usually based on measures of public spending, as they are better able to capture the amount of resources that the local government could theoretically extract if it chose to. Fourth, to capture public spending, we collected detailed data on each public construction event with a civil, military or religious purpose.⁷

The second data set provides information about the European aristocracy. We start from the Peerage project (Lundy, 2020), which comprises 680,000 European nobles and provides information about their entire network, with links formed by parenthood or marriage. We complement this data set with hand-coded data on locations of births, deaths, and marriages, which allows us to link individual nobles to cities and territories. The main source of location data are the *Europäische Stammtafeln* (European Family Trees, Schwennicke (1998)), supplemented with additional information from the Peerage itself.

We combine these two novel data sets to study the impact of conflicts on the emergence of local representative institutions, fiscal capacity and public spending. Using an illustrative event study as well as regression evidence, we show that conflicts are associated with institutional changes of the cities involved: city councils become more representative, while the fiscal and spending capacity of the cities are greatly expanded. The question is whether this correlation has a causal interpretation.

To isolate an exogenous source of variation in conflicts and external threats we use the gender of the firstborn of the most prominent local noble in the previous decade. This is motivated by the frequent wars of succession, which are often fought about women's right to inherit as rulers.⁸ Figure 1 uses the War of the Succession of Landshut (1503-1505) to illustrate how succession wars led to the rise and spread of medieval constitutionalism. When the Duke of Bavaria-Landshut, George, did not have a male heir, he named his firstborn daughter Elisabeth as successor in 1496, thus breaching a previous agreement within the House of Wittelsbach. Duke Albert of Bavaria-Munich, who according to the house treaty would have been the legal successor, refused to concede which led to a destructive two-year war in the Landshut

⁷This is inspired by Cantoni, Dittmar and Yuchtman (2018) who coded construction events in German cities before and after the Protestant Reformation (1475-1600).

⁸The classical example, outside our own sample, is the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748), which involved all the great powers of Central Europe and was fought over Maria Theresa's succession to the Habsburg Monarchy, precluded to women by Salic Law.

lands. The figure plots the evolution of our key variables of interest for the cities belonging to Bavaria-Munich, compared to the rest of Bavaria and the other German regions over the period 1400-1600.⁹ Cities in Bavaria-Munich saw an immediate increase in the probability that citizens elect their city councils and in the size of the council. These changes persisted in the following decades. In addition, the fiscal system became increasingly more sophisticated starting a couple of decades after the conflict: this is consistent with temporary war taxes evolving into more sophisticated fiscal capacity, based on income and wealth taxes.

In our regression analysis, our first stage estimates confirm that the gender of the firstborn in the previous decade has a large impact on the probability that the city is involved in a conflict in the subsequent decade.¹⁰ Using the gender of nobles' firstborn children as an exogenous source of variation, we then find that wars led to more representative local institutions. Exposure to one additional conflict is associated with a 1.6 percentage point increase in the probability that citizens elect the council without interference of the local ruler, an expansion of the council by approximately two members and an increase in the probability of guild representation in the council by 13 percentage points.

Furthermore, we find that, in the short run, wars resulted in spending on military buildings, which provided an initial incentive for increased taxation. Over time, war-induced new taxation powers led to the adoption of (permanent) sophisticated taxes, such as taxes on income, wealth, and inheritances. Sophisticated taxes broadened the tax base but often required the development of additional administrative capacity and more complex registries in addition to the consent of the population to be taxed. Overall, the tax results are suggestive that political representation was used as a bargaining chip to raise local taxes in times of war, and that these bargains led to persistent changes to the structure of cities' tax systems.

Finally, we relate the experience of medieval constitutionalism with the process of territorial consolidation that, starting from the seventeenth century, eventually led to the rise of the modern Western states. We document two facts. First, we show that territories that included cities with more sophisticated tax systems in the sixteenth century were those that expanded the most in the following 250 years. Second, using data on 289 territorial changes from 1400 to 1750, we show that fiscal capacity became a crucial factor of territorial expansion only from the seventeenth century on. Specifically, from 1600 we observe that territories characterized by

⁹Notice, we follow the evolution of the Bavaria-Munich territory, rather than Bavaria-Landshut, because the sovereign of Bavaria-Landshut disappears following the war, and the majority of its cities enters Bavaria-Munich.

¹⁰Notice that our instrument does not capture the gender of the actual ruler; it captures, instead, the gender of a minor (as the minimum age to rule was 18 and, in some cases, up to 25), thus excluding the possibility that our results might be driven by the direct impact of the gender of the ruler on local institutions.

lower fiscal capacity became increasingly likely to lose cities in favor of territories characterized by more sophisticated tax systems. We do not find a similar pattern when looking at the years 1400-1590. These results suggest that the emergence of powerful and centralized states is a response to the increasing importance of money for war finance. Indeed, the breaking point in the 1600s coincides with the Military Revolution, a sequence of technological innovations that transformed armed conflicts and increased the importance of money for military success (see Tilly, 1975, 1990; Gennaioli and Voth, 2015). In a recent working paper, Cantoni, Mohr and Weigand (2021) highlight the importance of the new centralized territorial fiscal systems in fostering state consolidation in Europe in the Early Modern era.¹¹ We complement their findings by highlighting the parallel importance of the city-level tax systems until at least 1700. These results confirm the conjecture that the origins of the Western modern state lay in the administrative “technologies” developed within the framework of medieval constitutionalism.

Our paper contributes to several other strands of the literature in economics and political science. First, our findings relate to previous work on the bellicose origins of representative institutions, which has a long pedigree in the social sciences. The broad idea, championed by Downing (1993) and Hoffman and Norberg (1994), is that representation and some fundamental rights were given by medieval European rulers in exchange for an increased tax burden in times of war. Taxation was not the only part of the financial toolkit of European rulers. Other authors have emphasized the role of credit (Stasavage, 2011, 2016). Rulers had to borrow to meet the expenses of war. Representative assemblies were a solution to the commitment problem of rulers with their future creditors.¹² The literature on wars and representative institutions is largely theoretical and qualitative, while, to the best of our knowledge, there is no causal empirical evidence (Stasavage, 2016).^{13,14} One key contribution of our work is to provide evidence for one direction of causality, from wars to representation. Representation in German cities in

¹¹In related work, Schönholzer and Weese (2019) study the consolidation of the European state system from 1000-1850 as a result of wars and competition between states. Moreover, Ottinger and Voigtländer (2020) show a strong positive relationship between rulers’ intellectual capabilities and state-level outcomes.

¹²A recent literature also looks at the impact of wars on modern democratic liberal states. Ticchi and Vindigni (2008) argue that, in modern wars, democratic institutions were essential to keep high the morale of armies formed by conscripted citizens: they were a commitment device to promise future redistribution of income.

¹³An exception is the working paper by de Magalhaes and Giovannoni (2019) which uses data on European polities between 1350 and 1700 to argue that parliaments were more likely to be called by the rulers in periods of wars or external threat.

¹⁴Note, however, that there is a related growing empirical literature on the impact of democratic institutions on fiscal capacity, which usually makes the case that democratic institutions are able to gather more fiscal revenues. Angelucci, Meraglia and Voigtländer (2020) show that cities in England in which taxes were raised by local officials rather than external sheriffs in the twelfth century were the same cities that entered the English Parliament when it was created in 1295. The king had to negotiate directly with these cities to raise new taxes and the efficient place to do so was the Parliament. Dincecco, Federico and Vindigni (2011) look at Italian states before the unification and show that parliamentary regimes gathered more taxes and spent more on public goods compared to absolutist regimes. A similar result is obtained by Dincecco (2009) who studies Europe from 1650 to 1913 and shows that centralized and limited regimes were associated with significantly higher revenues than fragmented and absolutist ones.

the late Middle Ages and early modern period was by no means universal as in modern democracies. Still, medieval constitutionalism in German cities did encompass the basic elements of modern states: taxation and representation, which we link to the experience of wars.¹⁵

Second, our paper contributes to a newer empirical literature on the impact of wars on urban growth and development in Europe.¹⁶ Specifically, our results are suggestive of one particular channel through which wars might have fostered economic development in these cities: the development of representative institutions together with improvements in fiscal and spending capacity.¹⁷ This finding should be viewed against the backdrop of a long-standing literature in the social sciences which emphasizes the role of cities and their institutions in shaping European development. The classic works of Weber (1921) and Pirenne (1927/2014) trace the fledgling origins of democracy to Europe's medieval cities. These works were written before the democratic Weimar Republic ended in fascism, arguably as a result of continued resentment against democracy especially by the German right (Mommson, 1996). So, by no means is there a linear process leading from medieval constitutionalism to modern democracy. Yet, at a conceptual level, the trade-off between taxation and representation was embedded in German cities, partly as a result of wars that required financial resources.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the historical background. Section 3 introduces the city-level data and the genealogical data on the German nobility. We describe our empirical strategy and demonstrate the importance of conflict in transforming local political institutions and laying the foundations of medieval constitutionalism in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the implication of the rise of medieval constitutionalism for the development of local fiscal capacity and ultimately for the formation of modern states. Section 6 concludes.

¹⁵The findings of Cox, Dincecco and Onorato (2021) are consistent with ours. They link the emergence of local communes and parliaments to bargaining between merchants and local rulers. They argue that fragmentation of polities and wars decreased the bargaining power of local rulers while the bargaining power of merchants rose in wake of the Commercial Revolution. As trade increased the profitability for merchants of being involved in the political process, this led to a shift in political power.

¹⁶See, for example, Dincecco and Onorato (2016) and Dincecco and Prado (2012).

¹⁷Recent empirical work confirms that city autonomy and participatory political institutions were important contributors to city growth and economic development (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005; Bosker, Buringh and van Zanden, 2013; Stasavage, 2014; Cox, 2017). Most closely related to our work, due to a shared historical setting, is Wahl (2019), who finds a robust association between participative institutions and population growth in a sample of 282 medieval German cities. Historical communal institutions in Italy have also received considerable attention in this literature (Coleman, 1999; DeLong and Shleifer, 1993; Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2016).

2 Historical Background

2.1 The Origins of Medieval Constitutionalism

A large literature in political science posits the origins of the main features of medieval constitutionalism in Central Europe in the first two centuries of the second millennium. This region was characterized by weak rulers constantly at war with each other. The origin of their weakness is often traced to the Treaty of Verdun (843), when the Carolingian Empire was divided into three parts: West Francia, Lotharingia (the Middle Kingdom), and East Francia. Lotharingia and East Francia were never fully consolidated due to a combination of large geographical obstacles and succession wars (Downing, 1993; Stasavage, 2011). The presence of mountains and rivers resulted in poor internal communications and gave the possibility to small insurgent polities to defend themselves from central armies,¹⁸ while the fact that succession did not follow primogeniture created continuous dynastic disputes. A few decades after the Treaty of Verdun, central Europe disintegrated into a myriad of small polities continuously at war with each other and under weak central rule by the Holy Roman Emperor. The Empire never achieved the extent of political unification of its western neighbor, France, evolving instead into a decentralized monarchy composed of hundreds of sub-units: kingdoms, principalities, duchies, prince-bishoprics, and other domains.¹⁹ The result was a precarious balance of power between the Emperors, the local aristocracy, and the Church. The rise in local representative institutions and the rule of law have been related to the interaction between this balance of power and, depending on the author, either the European military system or European financial markets.

Downing (1993) and Hoffman and Norberg (1994) emphasize the role of the European military system.²⁰ European armies were usually composed of a combination of knights and city

¹⁸Several scholars have emphasized the role of Europe's fractured physical geography in explaining its historical political fragmentation. A prominent example can be found in *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* by Kennedy (1987): "For this political diversity Europe had largely to thank its geography. There were no enormous plains over which an empire of horsemen could impose its swift dominion; nor were there any broad and fertile river zones like those around the Ganges, Nile, Tigris and Euphrates, Yellow, and Yangtze, providing food for masses of toiling and easily conquerable peasants. Europe's landscape was much more fractured, with mountain ranges and large forest separating the scattered population centres in the valleys; and its climate altered considerably from north to south and west to east. This had a number of important consequences. For a start, it both made difficult the establishment of unified control, even by a powerful and determined warlord, and minimized the possibility that the continent could be overrun by an external force like the Mongol hordes." (p. 17).

¹⁹Figure 2 illustrates the history of territorial borders in Europe during our sample period: no other region shows the same density of borders as Central Europe.

²⁰Hoffman and Norberg (1994) write: "Between the end of the Middle Ages and the outbreak of the French Revolution Western states sucked into a vortex of near permanent war, war that grew costly with every battle call. For rulers traditionally obliged to live on their own, the cost of fighting soon exceed their income from Crown lands and customary dues. Their pockets nearly empty, they were often forced to strike deals that meant sharing political power in return for higher taxes. In some instances, the eventual result was a representative government." (p. 1) They conclude that: "In the end, representative institutions, not absolute monarchy proved superior in revenue extraction. Where representative bodies held the ultimate authority as in the Netherlands or eighteenth-century England, they facilitated taxing. Representation in the English parliament created a willingness to pay; so did the older attitudes about contributing to the government. Where forceful representative institutions were absent, though, fiscal paralysis was almost inevitably the result." (p. 306).

militias. The war machine was expensive, especially for weak rulers that could not count on a centralized state and a centralized fiscal machine. Rulers were then compelled to distribute a series of privileges and immunities to convince knights and militias to join their armies. Originally, knights were military specialists that used to fight in exchange for land. These soldiers began to secure a system of hereditary rule over their allocated land together with a series of jurisdictional and administrative immunities. These immunities were then safeguarded by assemblies of knights: it is exactly from these assemblies that the first European Parliaments emerged. City militias were instead provided by towns. Usually town-dwellers exchanged military services for a set of privileges, the most important of which were voice in town assemblies, immunities and guarantees of legal access.

Stasavage (2011, 2016) emphasizes instead the role of credit to fight wars. The absence of a centralized fiscal system implied that rulers had to borrow to meet war expenses: only then these expenses could be spread into the future and paid with taxes or the spoils of war. Usually, the only group of individuals with enough liquidity to finance a war were rich merchants, typically located in large cities. When absolute rulers sought to borrow money, however, they faced a classical commitment problem. Limits to the power of the executive and the spread of local representative institutions were a solution to this problem: by conceding representation to citizens in towns and cities, the rulers were giving their creditors a degree of control over future policies and a series of jurisdictional and administrative immunities.

Whether the crown-aristocracy-Church balance led to the rise of medieval constitutionalism through the need to continuously raise armies of knights and city-militias or through the need of credit for the continuous financing of wars, the motors of this change were those towns located in a strip of land extending from present-day Belgium and the Netherlands to Northern Italy, passing through the German lands of Central Europe. These towns built their own government, separate from the administrative web of kings, nobles, and bishops. The German city of Worms, for example, was one of the first cities to receive a town charter (in 1074). For the first time, residents of the city were explicitly identified as citizens (*cives*), a term that recalled the privileged political and legal status of free individuals in ancient Rome with respect to laws, property and governance.²¹

It is important to stress that the development of city self-governance in the Holy Roman Empire (see Weber, 1921) is by no means limited to the so-called Free and Imperial Cities,

²¹The 1074 charter was conceded by the Holy Roman Emperor, Henry IV, in exchange for the economic and political support, provided by merchants and Jews from Worms, in the struggle against the Pope and his allies: “when every single city seemed to have been virtually closed against our approach [...] only Worms, in the common goodwill of its citizens, preserved itself for our coming” (Abulafia, 2014, p.45).

which held the status of ‘Imperial immediacy’ and were subordinate only to the Emperor. Also territorial cities and towns (*Landstädte*), which were subordinate to a territorial prince — be it an ecclesiastical lord (such as a prince-bishop) or a secular prince — were able to gain such rights. In his comprehensive work on German towns, Walker (1971) writes: “The ingenuity with which communities expanded almost any right or immunity in the direction of effective autonomy was boundless ...” (p. 20).²² In fact, a key aspect of our paper is to show that many cities were able to elect their own city councils.

The political life of the city was centred on the city councils. These bodies met frequently and played an active role in monitoring not only taxation but also public spending and borrowing. At the beginning councils were composed of a small number of individuals, but with time they became larger and were complemented by specialized committees. For instance, by 1450, Frankfurt am Main had eighteen specialized committees supervising the military, finance, and justice, which supported the council in the administration of the city. The local administration of these towns was unquestionably oligarchic, especially in their earlier days, with a governing elite composed mainly of merchants, military specialists, and legal experts. However, even the most oligarchic towns guaranteed some fundamental freedoms: citizens were free from feudal ties and services (“*Stadtluft macht frei*”: urban air makes you free) and had access to an efficient legal system. Citizenship was usually granted after residing within the town walls for a period of time, typically one year.

2.2 The Long Shadow of Medieval Constitutionalism on the Formation of the Modern State

The medieval constitutionalism framework started declining in the German lands from the second half of the seventeenth century (Downing, 1993). The formation of the Kingdom of Prussia (1701) highlights the development away from the fractionalization of the Holy Roman Empire (into hundreds of territorial units) towards fewer and more centralized political entities.²³ Our sample period, therefore, ends in this decade. This process of centralization in the seventeenth century is not unique to Central Europe. The Military Revolution, a series of radical changes in military strategy and technology due to the introduction of portable firearms and the rise of infantry had introduced large economies of scale in warfare. The result was a generalized process of centralization of power that concluded in the formation of the European modern states

²²His work (1648-1871) refers to the later part of our sample period, when consolidation into larger territorial units had already started. Towns were even more autonomous before.

²³Frederick William (1640-1688) established an absolute monarchy in Brandenburg-Prussia and created a professional centralized army. In 1701 his son, Frederick III upgraded Prussia from a duchy to a kingdom and crowned himself King Frederick I. His successor, Frederick William I created a centralized bureaucracy and fiscal system in the kingdom. This brought an end to the phase of medieval constitutionalism in German history.

(Tilly, 1975, 1990; Gennaioli and Voth, 2015).

The main peculiarities of the European modern state were their high levels of state (fiscal) capacity and the fact that the executive power was bounded by the rule of law. It is important to notice that an influential literature in political science, that goes back to Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill (for an exhaustive review see Møller, 2018), posits that this latter distinctive characteristic of European states is the result of the legacy of medieval constitutionalism. In the words of Dilcher (1997, p. 234f.): “The sovereigns had [...] successfully included within their states many aspects of that modernity on which the cities had been based for centuries [...] the enforcement of peace, legal security by strengthening jurisdiction and the creation of a fixed body of legislation, the introduction of Roman law and the learned jurist, rational administration and educated officials, the protection and promotion of trade and industry, order and social discipline by means of ordinances relating to law and order ...”.

3 Data

3.1 German City-Level Data

Our main data source is the *Deutsches Städtebuch* (Encyclopedia of German Cities), a series of volumes edited by Erich Keyser (1939-1974) that provide information on each city in the German Empire incorporated prior to the compilation of the *Städtebuch*. The book offers a systematic treatise of the history of German cities from their foundation until the twentieth century. A separate article is devoted to each city, following a consistent structure that divides the city history into twenty topics. These include sections on a city’s past names, its geographic location, its local economy, educational and church systems, and so on. Particularly relevant for our purposes are section 5 on buildings, section 9 on the administration of the city, section 10 on warfare and conflicts experienced by the city, and section 13 on its financial system (including its means of taxation). Excerpts from the *Städtebuch* are shown in Figure A1.

Conflicts

Our main explanatory variable is a measure of a city’s exposure to conflict. From the relevant section of the *Städtebuch*, we record for each city the dates of violent conflicts in which the city was involved. The conflict information in the *Städtebuch* is detailed, and we are able to classify each conflict according to its type. We capture involvements elsewhere (if the city engaged in raids or wars in other territories), battles fought in the vicinity of the city, sieges, sackings, partial destruction of the city, complete destruction of the city, and occupation. We therefore have a rich set of information both on the occurrence of conflicts as well as their nature. The

level of detail is significantly more comprehensive than other frequently used sources, such as Brecke (1999) and Clodfelter (2008). The latter sources begin in 1400 and 1494, respectively, while our data allows us to extend further back in history. More importantly, these sources focus primarily on battles. While battles are no doubt important considerations for local rulers, we are also able to capture other forms of conflict. Indeed, extensive sieges or occupations (which can last months, years, or even decades) plausibly exert greater pressure on rulers to tax than more short-lived battle events.²⁴

Internal Conflicts

Our data on conflict exposure allows us to measure external threats to cities. But internal conflict and unrest may also be important considerations for local rulers. In fact, the birth of a female child might weaken the ruler in other ways and this might increase the bargaining power of non-nobles and led to more council representation (independent of warfare). To this end – again drawing on information from the *Städtebuch* – we record for each city the dates of various forms of social unrest and internal conflict. The richness of our source provides us not only with information on radical or violent forms of conflict (such as uprisings or revolts), but also on more subtle, non-violent forms (such as formal grievances, popular movements, or legal action undertaken by citizens against political elites).

Political Institutions

To investigate the inclusiveness and representativeness of local institutions, we focus on characteristics of the city councils, which had legislative and administrative power in the local context. Using information from the *Städtebuch*, we record the year in which the council is first mentioned as well as (where applicable) its end date, its size and the identity of its members. We also collect data on who elects or appoints council members. We construct three main political institutional variables. To capture the opportunities for political participation by citizens, we define an indicator taking a value of one if the council is directly elected by citizens without the interference of the local lord. Second, to capture the strength and breadth of the council, we define a count variable of the number of council members. Third, for a subset of our cities we rely on data by Wahl (2019) which provides an indicator for whether the guilds are represented on the council. While Wahl’s data are on the city-century level, we collected additional

²⁴To illustrate the advantage of our data, consider two of the most widely used sources for historical battles in the literature, Brecke (1999) and Clodfelter (2008). Their focus is on Europe, Northern Africa and the Near East during the period 1400-1900, for which they record almost 3,000 battles. Our conflict data, which focuses on a much smaller geographical region (the German lands) records a total of 3,982 city-level conflict events for the same period. This is illustrative of the greater local detail we capture. Of course, our temporal focus is slightly different: our sample period consists of the years 1290-1710, during which we record a total of 3,245 city-level conflict events.

information on the exact timing of guild representation to build a city-decade panel.

Taxation

Cities enjoyed significant fiscal freedoms over our sample period. Even though they were an important source of revenue for kings and emperors, they mainly conducted fiscal policy for their own development and upkeep by taking on debt and raising taxes of their own accord (Kuske, 1904). This was by no means a privilege of free imperial cities alone, such as Nördlingen.²⁵ Also cities like Erfurt — which never enjoyed imperial status — were known to conduct independent fiscal policy and taxation.²⁶

We assemble information on the cities' fiscal capacity by collecting information on the taxes levied in the cities from the *Städtebuch*. We categorize individual taxes into 28 distinct types. We further aggregate these into two levels of sophistication according to whether or not a registry was required to collect the tax. We determine the level of complexity of each tax by the required knowledge or administrative structure that needed to exist in order to levy the tax, as well as the ease with which the taxable quantity could be observed. For example, an income tax requires knowledge of an easily concealed quantity and a correspondingly large administrative effort to observe and collect. On the other end of the spectrum are simple taxes that did not require a registry or specific knowledge of the quantity to be taxed. These include trade taxes that are levied on each travelling merchant who seeks entry into the city or at toll stations. Table A1 provides a detailed overview of our classification scheme including the assigned level of complexity, type of tax, and a brief description of the taxes and the ways in which they were raised with examples if appropriate.

Public Expenditure

Finally, we collect information on the construction of public buildings. Specifically, we record all major construction events that take place over the course of the city's history. These include religious buildings (such as churches, chapels and cathedrals), civil buildings (such as schools, town halls and other seats of administration), and military buildings (such as walls, towers and city gates). Our main outcome of interest is the presence of public construction in any given period, serving as a proxy for (new) public expenditure.

²⁵Dörner (1905, p. 10) describes Nördlingen as a closed and unified tax community, which levied and redistributed taxes according to its own will. He also provides several examples of the city's fiscal autonomy such the exemption from taxes by Emperor Konrad IV.

²⁶Erfurt had several departments that collected and redistributed taxes for specific purposes while remaining surpluses would be surrendered to the city's treasury, demonstrating that taxes were primarily raised and spent locally (Horn, 1904).

3.2 Data on the German Nobility

In our instrumental variables strategy, explained at greater length in Section 4 below, we use the gender of the firstborn children of important nobles as shocks to the likelihood that cities experience conflict. We combine two data sources to create a dataset of nobles which we then link to the German cities in the *Städtebuch*. The first is the *Peerage* project (Lundy, 2020) which compiles data on more than 680,000 European nobles.²⁷ The *Peerage* database contains information on nobles' dates of birth, death, and marriages. In addition, we collect basic information on gender and age.²⁸ Further, the *Peerage* contains information which allows us to link each noble to their parents, siblings, spouses and children. As an example, Figure A2 shows the *Peerage* entry for Wolfgang, Duke of Braunschweig-Grubenhagen. Based on this information, we are able to reconstruct the European nobility network at any given point in time.

To supplement this data, we digitize information from the *Europäische Stammtafeln* (European Family Trees, Schwennicke (1998)), in particular Volumes 1-1, 1-2 and 1-3. These volumes cover 379 family trees of ruling families in the German lands. Figure A3 shows an example of a family tree for the dukes of Braunschweig-Grubenhagen, and a detailed individual entry is shown in Figure A4. Note that this entry is the same individual, Wolfgang, as identified in the *Peerage* example above. The *Stammtafeln* provide additional valuable information on locations of births, deaths, marriages and other events, which allows us to link individual nobles to cities within the German lands. Additionally, where available, we supplement this information using data on locations from the *Peerage* itself.

We use the information on the locations and life events of nobles to link them spatially and temporally to the *Städtebuch* cities. The data on parental, sibling and marital ties between nobles allows us to reconstruct the network of the European nobility each decade, yielding a potentially disconnected, undirected, unweighted graph.²⁹ Finally, for each noble, we identify the year of birth and gender of their firstborn child.

Equipped with this information, we construct our instrument for conflict. For each city-decade, we assign a noble to cities using a grid cell approach.³⁰ Cities are grouped according to 1×1 degree grid cells. In each decade, we associate a noble with a grid cell if the noble is associated with any city in that grid cell. We then identify the best-connected noble in each

²⁷ Accessed 20 January 2020.

²⁸ In some instances, only the date of birth *or* death is available. In such cases, we impute the missing date using the median age of all nobles known for certain to be alive at the same time as the given noble.

²⁹ We consider each of the following relationships to constitute a direct link between nobles: parent, child, sibling, spouse.

³⁰ We discuss the relative merits of this approach when we describe our empirical strategy in Section 4 below.

grid cell by counting the number of direct links the noble has to other nobles in the European nobility network (their degree centrality). This measure of importance correlates closely with other possible measures of nobles' importance, such as the length of the nobles' entry in the *Peerage* database. Having identified for each grid-cell-decade observation a best-connected noble, we check whether that noble had their firstborn child in the given decade. If so, we create an indicator taking a value of one if the first child was female, zero if male. If the best-connected noble did not have their first child in the given decade, the instrument takes a missing value for the given grid-cell-decade. Finally, the instrument value (zero, one, or missing) is assigned to all cities in the given grid-cell-decade. The grid cell approach allows us to assign an instrument value to cities which are not directly linked to a noble (through the city being a noble's location of birth or death, for example), but which are in the vicinity of locations linked to nobles and therefore likely to be affected by these nobles' birth events.³¹

3.3 Other Data Sources

In our analysis, we make use of a range of city-level characteristics to construct control variables. We collected information on key trade routes passing through the German lands around the year 1500. These are hand-digitized from [Berthold \(1976\)](#) and shown in Figure A5 in the Appendix. We additionally create indicators for imperial cities, based on contributions to the imperial army in 1422.³² We identify cities that were part of the Hanseatic League,³³ as well as cities with river or coastal access. Indicators for cities with market rights before 1500 and university cities are constructed using data from [Cantoni and Yuchtman \(2014\)](#).³⁴ Finally, we make use of reconstructed historical temperature data by [Luterbacher, Dietrich, Xoplaki, Grosjean and Wanner \(2004\)](#), from which we construct average winter temperatures for each city-decade.

Lastly, for parts of our analysis we take a polity-level rather a city-level approach. To this end, we use the territorial histories of cities in the *Städtebuch* compiled by [Cantoni, Mohr and Weigand \(2020\)](#).³⁵ For each city, its ruling sovereign entity is provided for the year 1400 and for the period 1450-1850 in 100-year intervals. Given the decadal structure of our primary

³¹Of course, it may be the case that some cities in a given grid cell are completely unrelated to nobles assigned to that grid cell. Nobles may have a residence in a locality different to the one they are ruling over, for instance. Cities in that locality will therefore be unaffected by the first births of such nobles. This would go against finding an effect of nobles' firstborn children on subsequent conflict. As we show when discussing our first-stage estimates in Section 4 below, our instrument is strong even in the potential presence of such concerns.

³²Data accessed on 18 April 2015 from https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freie_und_Reichsstädte.

³³Data accessed on 20 July 2020 from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hanseatic_League#Lists_of_former_Hansa_cities.

³⁴We added information on market cities for East Prussia from the *Städtebuch* ourselves as these were not included in [Cantoni and Yuchtman \(2014\)](#).

³⁵We use version 3 (October 2020) of this dataset, which at the time of writing is the most recent.

dataset, we interpolate forward and backward from these snapshot years. Concretely, if a city belonged to a given territory in 1550, we assign the city to that territory for the entire sixteenth century. Moreover, the territory dataset includes information on cases where a city was ruled as a fiefdom by a lower-ranking feudal lord; in such cases, to retain this local level of detail, we assign the city to the fief.

3.4 Descriptive Statistics

We start from the universe of 2,340 cities detailed in [Keyser \(1939-1974\)](#). We are interested in outcomes related to the inclusiveness of local political institutions, proxied by various characteristics of city councils. We therefore restrict attention to those cities for which there is evidence of councils being in place before 1900. This guarantees a minimum of informational content in our outcomes of interest. We observe these cities at decadal intervals between 1290 and 1710, for a total of 1,461 cities and 61,077 city-decade observations.

Descriptive statistics for the cities in our full sample are reported in Panel A of Table 1. Our main treatment variable, an indicator for exposure to conflict, is defined at the 1×1 degree grid cell level. On average, a proportion of 0.319 city-decade observations are “treated” by conflict.

Turning to our measures of the inclusiveness of political institutions, around 26 percent of all city-decade observations have a council present. Notice that this is an average number over the entire sample period and it increases substantially over the final centuries. Of the cities that have a council, 8 percent were elected directly by citizens without the interference of the local lord (2 percent of all city-decade observations), and the average council consisted of 10 members (approximately 5 council members in all city-decade observations, including zeros). Members of the guilds are represented on councils in about 1 percent of city-decade observations (indicating the representation of commercial interests).³⁶

We are also interested in the development of fiscal and spending capacity, and create measures of the sophistication of the tax system as well as the presence of public buildings. In the average city-decade 0.268 complex taxes are raised (requiring a registry, and therefore considerable administrative and institutional architecture, to collect). Turning to our proxy for public construction, 93 percent of city-decade observations have any public building. Looking separately at different types of building, which may exist concurrently, 65 percent of city-decade observations have military, 86 percent have religious, and 63 percent have secular buildings.

Finally, we have a range of city-level controls at our disposal. These include the distance to the nearest trade route in 1500 and indicators for Imperial, market, and Hanse cities. We

³⁶This data was collected by [Wahl \(2019\)](#), originally at the century level, for the set of cities in [Bairoch, Batou and Chèvre \(1988\)](#). As previously noted, we coded it at the decade level for this subset of cities.

additionally observe whether a city had a university by 1500 and if it had river or coastal access. Finally, we create a measure of cities' article length in our main source of city-level information (Keyser, 1939-1974). Summary statistics for these city-level characteristics are reported in the second half of Panel A.

In our instrumental variables strategy, we use the gender of prominent nobles' firstborn children as a shock to conflict. As explained above, the instrument is only defined in grid-cell-decade combinations in which the best-connected noble has their first child. We report summary statistics for this subsample in Panel B of Table 1, and we show the distribution of first births across time and space in Figure 3. Across the board, variable averages are very similar between the full sample and the first child subsample.

4 Conflicts and Medieval Constitutionalism

4.1 Motivating Case Study: A Territory's First Conflict as an Event

Before formalizing the empirical analysis, we illustrate the relationship between conflicts and our main outcomes of interest in the raw data. We compare how our outcome variables deviate from their overall trend after the occurrence of the *first* conflict in a territory. Figure 4 plots the data as averages over time in the two decades before and after the first conflict of a given territory, together with the red-dashed pre-conflict trend line. The figure shows the disruptions in local political institutions brought about by the first conflict. The first conflict leads to a substantial jump from the underlying trend in the two variables to a higher level for two decades.^{37,38}

4.2 Empirical Strategy and Main Results

The motivating exercise above is, of course, only suggestive. We now turn to a formal empirical analysis to estimate the causal effect of conflicts on local political institutions, sophisticated means of taxation, and spending on public goods. We estimate equations of the following form:

$$y_{ict} = \alpha_i + \lambda_t + \beta \text{Conflict}_{ct} + X'_{ict}\pi + \epsilon_{ict} \quad (1)$$

³⁷In Figure A6, we show that these patterns hold also when restricting the exercise to conflicts before 1600. This serves to show that these patterns are not driven by the Thirty Years' War.

³⁸Additionally, in Figure A7 we repeat the same exercise, but weight cities by their entry length in the *Städtebuch* (Keyser, 1939-1974) when constructing the territory-level measures. This effectively gives higher importance to cities whose history is more extensively documented. Results confirm the broad qualitative patterns, and indeed become suggestive of stronger and longer-lasting effects of conflict on institutions.

where cities are indexed by subscripts i , 1×1 degree grid cells by c , and decades by t . The grid-cell approach is commonly used in the literature,³⁹ but we also show that results remain robust to assigning conflicts at the territorial level. For this we use a time-invariant territorial measure in which cities are grouped together if they belonged to the same territorial unit at each point throughout the sample period (“same territorial history”). Using the actual time-varying territories would be problematic since territorial boundaries themselves are an outcome of conflicts.

To capture the inclusiveness of political institutions, we consider three outcomes y_{ict} . The first is an indicator for whether citizens elect the council without interference from the local ruler. The second measures the size of the council in terms of the number of council members. Third, for a subset of cities, we also track whether members of the guilds are represented on the council. Together, these three measures capture the electoral power of citizens, as well as the size and representativeness of legislative institutions.

The treatment variable Conflict_{ct} is an indicator taking a value of one if any conflict took place in grid cell c in decade t . We adopt a grid cell approach for two reasons. First, the outcomes of a given city i may be affected by conflict not only in the city itself, but also in its vicinity. This may be due to collateral damage, where a city faces the possibility of becoming embroiled in nearby wars, or due to local rulers controlling multiple cities and mobilising their entire territory to deal with an external threat. Second, since borders change as a result of wars, borders are themselves endogenously determined. Our approach, which exogenously imposes a 1×1 degree grid cell structure, does not suffer from such endogeneity concerns.

Finally, we include city fixed effects α_i to capture time-invariant factors that lead to differences in outcomes across cities. Aggregate shocks over time that affect all cities are absorbed by the decade fixed effects λ_t . Additional time-varying city and institutional characteristics are included in the vector X_{ict} . We describe these controls in detail as we introduce them in the analysis below. All other variation in the outcome is left in the stochastic error term ϵ_{ict} . To account for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, we cluster standard errors at the grid cell level.

A concern with the baseline specifications in (1) is that conflicts are potentially endogenous. Not only is war potentially a choice of the local rulers, but the causality between conflicts and political institutions, taxation and public expenditure may run both ways (Stasavage, 2016). For instance, autocratic regimes are more prone to be involved in conflict (Bueno de Mesquita,

³⁹See Bosker, Buringh and van Zanden (2013), Iyigun, Nunn and Qian (2017) and Kitamura and Lagerlöf (2020), among others.

Morrow, Siverson and Smith, 1999; Jackson and Morelli, 2007). As such, a simple OLS regression of equation (1) would underestimate the true effect of wars on the development of inclusive political institutions and on the provision of public goods. We therefore attempt to resolve these potential issues via an instrumental variables strategy.

4.2.1 First-Stage Relationship between Gender of Nobles' Firstborn Children and Conflict

We use the gender of the firstborn children of important nobles as shocks to the likelihood that a particular region is involved in conflict. The key advantage of using the gender of the firstborn child as an instrument for conflict is the nature of the shock it gives rise to. Nobles have no control over the gender of their firstborn child; upon having their firstborn child, they enter into a lottery in which either realization (a male or a female child) is equally likely.⁴⁰ The impact of the birth on nobles' propensity to become involved in conflict, however, is not equivalent between the two realizations: a female firstborn is more likely to give rise to conflict. Table 2 provides evidence that the characteristics of nobles perfectly balance along observable dimensions when considering the firstborn gender lottery. While it may seem intuitive to consider nobles without a male heir, the gender of later births is a potentially endogenous choice as nobles might seek to conceive children until a male birth is realized. Table A2 shows a comparison between nobles with and without a male heir, which reveals significant differences between the two. In particular, nobles without a male heir are less likely to have any children, are slightly older when and if they do have a child (obviously, a girl, given the absence of a male heir), significantly younger when they die, and more central in the network of nobles – all of which are likely to have a direct influence on local political institutions.

Further, Figure A9 (reported in the Appendix) shows that our instrument not only balances on nobles' characteristics, but also on the characteristics of cities, including the distance to the nearest trade route, imperial city status, market rights, Hanse city status, access to a river or coast, the length (in pages) of the entry in Keyser (1939-1974), and the average winter temperature.

⁴⁰By considering the gender of a minor and not of the ruler, we are excluding the possibility that our results might be driven by a different way of governing between female and male rulers. This is important in light of the work of Dube and Harish (2020), who find that married queens are more aggressive compared to kings. Specifically, they write: "Queenly reigns may have had greater capacity than kingly reigns because of asymmetries in how they utilized their spouses. Queens often enlisted their husbands to help them rule, in ways that kings were less inclined to do with their wives. For example, queens often put their spouses in charge of the military or fiscal reforms. This greater spousal division of labor may have enhanced the capacity of queenly reigns, enabling queens to pursue more aggressive war policies." (p. 2582)

Gender of Nobles' Firstborn Children and Conflict: Historical Background

Female firstborn children are more problematic when it comes to inheritance. Wars of succession are often fought about women's right to inherit because rulers without sons might attempt to change succession laws to allow their daughter to succeed them.⁴¹ In our context – the Holy Roman Empire – succession among the upper nobility was governed by private family rules, the 'House Laws'.^{42,43} By virtue of being mainly family rules, there was no uniform succession rule applying to all dynasties across all centuries. However, the norm was male succession, which could result in challenges to the ruling family upon the birth of a firstborn girl. Recall, for example, the case of George, Duke of Bavaria-Landshut, who named his daughter Elisabeth as his heir. In 1503, this breach of the agreements of the House of Wittelsbach provoked a two-year succession war between Bavaria-Landshut and Bavaria-Munich. Elsewhere in the German lands, the city of Cologne – an important Holy Roman trading centre – can trace the origins of its communal institutions to the War of the Limburg Succession (1282-1288). Disputes arose when Waleran IV, Duke of Limburg, died without a male heir. Reginald I (the husband of Waleran's firstborn daughter and only child, Ermengarde) and Adolf VII (Waleran's nephew), both staked claims to the Duchy and conflict ensued involving a host of local powers. In exchange for their services during the war, the citizens of Cologne gained independence from the Archbishopric and the city later achieved Imperial City status.

Gender of Nobles' Firstborn Children and Conflict: Results

The corresponding first-stage equation in our instrumental variables strategy is:

$$\text{Conflict}_{ct} = \eta_i + \delta_t + \gamma \text{Daughter}_{c,t-1} + X'_{ict} \phi + \nu_{ct} \quad (2)$$

where $\text{Daughter}_{c,t-1}$ is an indicator taking a value of one if the best-connected noble in grid cell c has a firstborn daughter in decade $t - 1$, zero if the firstborn is a son.⁴⁴ Note, therefore,

⁴¹One might be tempted to say that the gender of the firstborn is bound to be a weak instrument as families would react by trying to have a son following a firstborn daughter. It turns out, however, that even with this limitation, our instrument is powerful.

⁴²Later, in the nineteenth century, the term 'private law of princes' was used.

⁴³The main source of law, for each family, was a collection of documents including testaments, family compacts, treaties with other families, treaties with the Emperor, and rules laid down by the patriarch. Only in the absence of specific family provisions, succession was decided by general principles that had been developing through the centuries and were based on a mixture of ancient German law, canon law, and medieval Roman law (Moser, 1737-53).

⁴⁴We pick the "best-connected" noble on the basis of degree centrality in the wider European network of aristocracy. That is, the best-connected noble is chosen based on the number of direct familial links they have to other nobles. This measure of centrality correlates closely with other measures of the importance of nobles, such as the length of their entry in the *Peerage* database. This gives us confidence that we are using the firstborn children of important nobles, who are likely to be key in determining war and peace in a region, to define our shocks. For further details on the data used to construct these shocks, see Section 3 above.

that the sample we use for the instrumental variables strategy includes only those cell-decade combinations in which the best-connected noble has their firstborn child. This comes at the cost of reducing the size of the sample we have at our disposal for the two-stage least squares estimation.⁴⁵ Reassuringly, as shown in Figure 6, the cities which enter our first child subsample are not systematically drawn from any particular region of Germany. Further, Figure 3 demonstrates that birth events are evenly distributed across grid cells and across decades. As expected, births are also equally likely to result in male and female firstborn children. For completeness, when describing our results below, we additionally show that OLS results are very similar between the full sample and the restricted first-child subsample.⁴⁶ In Appendix Figure A9, we additionally show that our instrument is perfectly balanced on observable city characteristics. For this exercise we regressed the instrument on city-level characteristics for which we plot coefficients in panel (a). All of these are insignificant and very small which becomes clear when relating them to summary statistics of the instrument as shown in panel (b). This implies that places that had female births are not systematically different, in terms of their observables, to places with male births, which strengthens our argument that the gender of the firstborn child is a true lottery.

In Table 3, we report estimations of the first-stage relationship between the gender of nobles' firstborn children and subsequent incidence of conflict. Throughout, our main estimation sample spans the years 1290 to 1710. Given the one-decade lag structure of our first-stage equation, this temporal restriction implies that we use shocks to conflict arising from a first-born daughter up until the year 1700.

The first column of Table 3 reports the first-stage relationship from a specification in which we include city and decade fixed effects. The first stage effect is strong and in the expected direction: when the best-connected noble in a given grid cell has a firstborn daughter (as opposed to a firstborn son), the cell is approximately 22.8 percentage points more likely to experience conflict in the following decade. In column two, we include linear city time trends. The coefficient becomes even larger with these trends that rule out that secular changes over time in cities' conflict potential are driving our effect. In column 3, we repeat the analysis from the previous column but assign conflicts at the territory rather than the cell level. While the effect

⁴⁵This approach follows the spirit of local average treatment effects, where a specific instrument picks a specific source of exogenous variation ('compliers') and where 'always-takers' or 'never-takers' do not provide identifying variation. Similarly, here we exploit only variation stemming from birth events. Of course, conflicts also happen independent of birth events, but those are not picked up by our instrument.

⁴⁶As an additional check, we regress an indicator for whether an observation enters the first-child subsample on observable city characteristics. This check is reported in Figure A8 in the Appendix. Reassuringly, entry into the sample used for our 2SLS estimation balances on these observables.

size of 10.5 percentage points is around one third of the specification in column 2, this is unsurprising as territories for the most part are smaller than grid cells. Hence not only the coefficient but also the unconditional probability of a territory-level conflict is lower. Yet, our instrument remains strong also in this specification. We prefer the grid cell approach for reasons discussed earlier, but we show that all our results are robust to assigning conflicts at the territory level.

In columns 4 to 6, we repeat the same regressions using the occurrence of internal conflicts as the outcome. A weakened ruler facing increased bargaining power from non-nobles (put differently: threat of internal conflict, as opposed to external threat of conflict) will also have an incentive to make concessions to their subjects. However, we only find evidence for a significant and positive impact on external conflicts but no significant effect on internal conflicts.

4.2.2 *Gender of Nobles' Firstborn Children and Political Institutions: Impulse Response*

Before turning to our instrumental variables estimation – in which we use the gender of nobles' firstborn children to instrument for conflict – we conduct an informative impulse response exercise using the reduced-form relationship between nobles' firstborn children and cities' political outcomes. We estimate specifications of the form:

$$Y_{ict} = \psi_i + \kappa_t + \sum_{\tau=t-1}^{t+3} \xi_{\tau} \text{Daughter}_{c,\tau} + X'_{ict} \theta + u_{ct} \quad (3)$$

City and decade fixed effects and controls X_{ict} are as before. We restrict this estimation to the sample of city-decade observations where the best-connected local noble in cities' grid cells had a firstborn child in decade t . This amounts to comparing the evolution of political outcomes in cities whose local noble had a female firstborn to those where the local noble's firstborn was male, from one decade before to three decades after the birth. The sequence of coefficients of the $\text{Daughter}_{c,\tau}$ variable, ξ_{τ} , captures this differential evolution.⁴⁷

The results of this exercise are plotted in Figure 5, separately for council elections and council sizes. In the decade of the birth of the firstborn and in the decade immediately preceding, there are no differences in political outcomes between cities that were to witness noble first births of different genders. In the three decades following the births, however, patterns begin to diverge. Cities whose local prominent nobles had female firstborn children begin to develop councils that are larger and more likely to be elected, compared to cities whose nobles' firstborn were male. We now turn to our full instrumental variables strategy to argue that wars were key drivers of this differential development.

⁴⁷Notice that since a city may enter the estimation more than once, we can estimate the entire sequence of estimates ξ_{τ} . That is, there is no omitted decade as in an event study specification.

4.2.3 Conflict and Local Political Institutions

Conflict and Council Elections

We use the first-stage relationship between nobles' firstborn children and conflict in the instrumental variables framework described above to explore the impact of wars on local political institutions. The first outcome we consider is whether a city's citizens were involved in electing local councils. Concretely, in equation (1) above, y_{ict} will be an indicator taking a value of one if citizens elected the council without the interference of the local lord.

Results from this exercise are reported in Table 4. Column 1 presents OLS estimates of equation (1), in which we regress an indicator for whether citizens elected the council on an indicator for whether any conflict took place in the grid cell associated with the city. In this parsimonious specification, we additionally include only city and decade fixed effects. We find a positive relationship between conflict and elected city councils: exposure to conflict is associated with a 0.3 percentage point increase in the probability that a city's council is elected by its citizens. This estimate should be interpreted with caution, however, due to the likely downward bias arising from the reverse and negative relationship between conflicts and political institutions (that is, autocratic rulers are also likely to be more belligerent).

We therefore turn to the instrumental variables strategy explained above, where we use the gender of nobles' firstborn children as a shock to generate exogenous variation in conflict in a first stage. The nature of this instrument reduces our sample to those grid cell-decade observations for which the best-connected noble has their firstborn child. In column 2 of Table 4 we therefore re-estimate the parsimonious OLS specification on this subsample. Reassuringly, we find the same coefficient as in the full sample albeit less precisely estimated.

In column 3, we report results from a two-stage least squares estimation. In the first stage, the birth of a firstborn daughter (as opposed to a firstborn son) constitutes a shock which increases the probability that a grid cell is involved in conflict in the following decade. We then use this exogenous variation in conflict to estimate its impact on council elections in the second stage. Concretely, a conflict induced by the birth of a firstborn daughter causes an increase of 2.9 percentage points in the probability that citizens elect the city council. Exposure to wars therefore plays an important role in the establishment of inclusive political institutions, a result which is in line with the theory on the roots of medieval constitutionalism. Furthermore, the difference in magnitude between our instrumental variables result and the coefficients reported in columns 1 and 2 highlights the dangers of causally interpreting downward-biased OLS estimates in this context.

In the following four columns, we introduce additional controls and sample restrictions. First, in column 4 we include a city-specific linear time trend, a demanding specification that constitutes our baseline throughout the rest of the analysis. Though the point estimate is slightly attenuated, it remains statistically and economically significant.

The presence of a elected council presumes the presence of a council to be elected. To ensure that results are not driven simply by the establishment of new councils, in column 5 we include an indicator for the presence of a council as a control. This does not substantially alter the estimated impact of conflicts on council elections.

A number of religious wars were fought in the German lands in the centuries following the Protestant Reformation. These wars were very different in nature from the conflicts arising from the shock that we exploit in our instrumental variables strategy. In addition, religious ideological competition was an important driver of cities' public goods provision (Dittmar and Meisenzahl, 2020). To ensure that our results are not picking up such dynamics, in column 6 we completely exclude all decades during which religious wars were fought. Results are very similar to the baseline.

In column 7, we control for cities' entry length in the *Städtebuch* interacted with century fixed effects. This captures any differential impact over time of some cities being more extensively documented in our main data source. In Table A3, we report specifications with additional controls.⁴⁸ Throughout, results are highly robust, which is unsurprising given the exogeneity of the shock that we are exploiting in our first stage.

Finally, we assign conflict at the level of common territorial histories (rather than at the grid cell level) in column 8. The estimated coefficient is slightly larger in this specification, which is to be expected given that this measure of conflict — by assigning it at the level of a much tighter geographical unit — captures external threats that are closer and more pressing to local rulers.

Did conflict lead to persistent institutional change? Or did rulers simply make concessions during times of war which were subsequently rolled back once the threat subsided? In Table 5 we explore such dynamic effects. First, we perform a placebo exercise in which we regress the council election indicator in $t - 20$ on conflict in t (that is, the outcome is measured twenty years

⁴⁸Columns 1 and 2 of Table A3 reproduce columns 4 and 7 of Table 4; in subsequent columns we add additional controls one by one, and all at once in the final column. These additional controls include a range of city characteristics interacted with century fixed effects (columns 3 to 10). In order of inclusion, we introduce controls for cities' proximity to trade routes, imperial and market city status, Hanse and university cities, river and coastal access, and broad region fixed effects. In column 11 we control for a measure of the mean winter temperature in each cell-decade to capture any impact of particularly harsh climatic conditions. Finally, in column 12, we include all of the controls together.

before treatment).⁴⁹ Reassuringly, there is no effect of future conflict on council elections. The contemporaneous effect in t is that of the baseline specification reported in Table 4, column 4, which shows that conflict causes a large increase in the probability that councils are elected. The remaining columns of Table 5 show that, in $t + 20$ (and, less strongly, in $t + 10$) the likelihood of council elections remained above trend (recall that we include a city-specific linear time trend in these specifications).⁵⁰ These results indicate that conflict brought about a lasting improvement in cities' local political institutions, by enabling the involvement of citizens in the election of their representatives several decades after exposure to conflict.

Conflict and Representativeness

Our second measure of the quality of political institutions is the size of the city council, where larger councils are taken to better represent the interests of the local citizenry. In our historical setting, council expansions are often associated with greater direct representation of citizens. The city of Braunschweig, for example, expanded its *gemeine Rat* ('common council') in 1386 to enable direct representation of citizens from Braunschweig's distinct municipal areas.⁵¹ We report results using council size as the outcome of equation (1) in Table 6. As before, OLS results (columns 1 and 2) are likely biased downwards, but the point estimates nevertheless suggest a positive impact of conflict exposure on council size. Turning to our instrumental variables specification in column 3, as expected we find a larger and statistically significant effect. Exogenous exposure to conflict increases the size of the council by approximately two members. Notice that, throughout, we include a city-specific linear time trend to account for the average tendency of councils to increase in size over time.

Results remain stable when we include a control for the presence of a council in column 4. By definition, council size is zero when no council is present. Including this control attenuates the estimated effect slightly, but it remains significantly positive. This indicates that a substantial portion of the effect of conflict on council sizes is on the intensive margin (that is, councils that already existed expanded as a result of conflict). Finally, results are robust to excluding times of religious conflict (column 5), controlling for cities' entry lengths in the *Städtebuch* (column 6),⁵² and assigning conflict at the level of territorial histories (column 7).

⁴⁹Notice that measuring the outcome in $t - 10$ would not constitute a pure placebo, since our instrument — the gender of the most important noble's firstborn — is measured in $t - 10$.

⁵⁰We obtain a very similar pattern when assigning conflict at the level of territorial histories. Results are reported in Appendix Table A4.

⁵¹For the modern era, see Kjaer and Elklit (2014) for an empirical test of the relationship between assembly size and representativeness.

⁵²In Table A5, we add additional controls. Columns 1 and 2 reproduce columns 3 and 6 of Table 6, subsequent columns add additional controls one by one, and in the final column all additional controls at once. Results remain robust.

As with council elections, we explore the dynamics of the impact of conflict on the size of the council. Exposure to conflict causes cities' councils to expand in size, above trend, for up to two decades after conflict, and we find no placebo effect of conflict in t on council size in $t - 20$. These patterns hold both when assigning conflict at the level of the grid cell (Table A6) and at the level of territorial histories (Table A7).

In the theory of medieval constitutionalism advanced by Stasavage (2011, 2016), wars bring more inclusive political institutions because rulers grant their creditors power over future policy as a commitment device. These creditors would often be wealthy merchants or guild members. To test this hypothesis, we use data on guild representation on city councils. As detailed in Section 3 above, this information is available only for a subset of cities in Bairoch, Batou and Chèvre (1988) and was originally collected by Wahl (2019). Results are reported with and without a control for the presence of a council in columns 7 and 8 of Table 6. We indeed find that, as predicted by the theory, conflict exposure increases the likelihood that guilds are represented on city councils, by approximately 13 percentage points. Recent scholarship has nuanced the view of guilds as efficient, inclusive institutions (see, for example, Ogilvie (2004, 2019) and Wahl (2019)), highlighting their potential for rent-seeking. Our finding in columns 7 and 8 should therefore be viewed as complementary to those on the impact on council elections and council size: wars shift political power away from cities' traditional elites.

Additional Checks

We conduct a number of additional checks to explore the heterogeneity and robustness of our results. We begin by showing which other city characteristics mattered for our council outcomes. In our regressions, such city-specific level effects are accounted for by city fixed effects, and in specifications including the full vector of controls we allow for a century-specific impact of these characteristics. But it is nevertheless interesting to descriptively document which types of cities tended to have, say, larger councils. To this end, we regress our council outcomes on city characteristics, grid cell fixed effects and decade fixed effects. Results from this exercise are reported in Figure A10, for the council elections and council size outcomes. Panel (a) shows that in a given grid cell in a given decade, Hanse cities are around 6 percentage points more likely to have elected councils. Universities, markets and river access are other, less strong, predictors of council elections. In panel (b), we show that Imperial cities and Hanse cities have significantly larger than average councils in a given cell-decade. It is important to bear in mind, however, that all such fixed between-city differences are accounted for in our regressions by the inclusion of city fixed effects. Further, to the extent that these differences are time-varying,

we flexibly control for them whenever we include our full vector of controls.

Was the relationship between conflicts and local political institutions particularly strong during particular centuries? While the “first child” subsample is not sufficiently large to estimate our main specification separately for each century, we can perform an informative jack-knife exercise, which we report in Figure A11. We re-estimate our main specifications six times, leaving out successive centuries in turn. If excluding a particular century gives rise to a coefficient that is significantly different from the baseline estimate, this would suggest that the relationship between conflict and institutions in that century is different from that of the full sample. We do not find such differences, either for elections (panel (a)) or council sizes (panel (b)), suggesting that the dynamics we document are not driven by any one century. This exercise is also of particular interest given the importance of the Protestant Reformation as a key development of the sixteenth century which led to a changes in public goods provisions (see Dittmar and Meisenzahl (2020)) and in public spending (Cantoni, Dittmar and Yuchtman, 2018).

To further assess the robustness of our results, we conduct a number of sensitivity checks which we report in Figure A12. First, we leave out in turn each of the five broad German regions in our sample. These correspond to the grouping of cities in our main source of city-level data (Keyser, 1939-1974), which we illustrate in Figure 6. Results are not driven by any particular region, with all coefficients very close to the estimated baseline, both for elections (panel (a)) and council sizes (panel (b)).

We then turn to city-level characteristics to redefine our sample. We exclude, in turn, imperial cities and cities that were part of the Hanseatic League. Such cities could plausibly have had peculiar unobserved institutional characteristics as suggested by the patterns in Figure A10, but reassuringly these do not appear to systematically drive the findings we document.

Cities near the boundary of what became the German Empire may have had a particular historical trajectory. While substantial conflicts took place in the interior of the German lands over the course of history, border regions may have been particularly vulnerable to foreign conflicts, for example. We therefore re-estimate our regressions by excluding border regions.⁵³ This leaves results unchanged when compared with baseline estimates.

Finally, we conduct sensitivity checks to two different weighting schemes. Cities’ entries in our main source of city-level data (Keyser, 1939-1974) are of different lengths, depending on the amount of archival material on the cities’ histories. We can therefore weight by entry

⁵³Concretely, we define a city as being in a border region if it is in a grid cell which is not fully surrounded by other grid cells with other German cities in them. See Figure 6 for a plot of the grid cells and the spatial distribution of cities.

length to give more weight to those cities whose history is more extensively documented. This leaves coefficients qualitatively and statistically unchanged. Lastly, we weight by the number of cities in a cell since some cells are more sparsely covered than others. Again, coefficients change marginally in size, but are practically unchanged.

Lastly, in Figure A13, we leave out one conflict type at a time when defining the treatment variable to show that no particular conflict type is driving the results. We can distinguish between conflicts involving the city but that are fought elsewhere, battles that were fought near the city, sieges, sackings, partial and complete destructions, as well as occupations of the city. In no case are the results statistically different from our baseline findings.

5 The Long Shadow of Medieval Constitutionalism

5.1 Medieval Constitutionalism and Local Fiscal Capacity

Fiscal capacity is central to theories of the link between conflict and the development of medieval constitutionalism. Naturally, the immediate fiscal need of a local ruler in the context of a conflict is for military expenditure. While we do not have information on expenditure on soldiers' pay or provision for troops, what we do have is data on expenditure on military buildings. In Table 7, we show that conflict has an immediate impact on the construction of military buildings, such as defensive walls and other fortifications. We regress an indicator for whether each of three broad types of construction (military, secular, religious) are present in a given city-decade. As expected, we find that conflict triggers immediate investment in military infrastructure. Conflict induced by the birth of a firstborn daughter makes the presence of military buildings 3.5 percentage points more likely. We do not find similar patterns for secular or religious buildings. If anything, the impact on secular buildings is negative (though not statistically significant).⁵⁴ This suggests that in periods of war, local spending went directly to the war effort, with no short-term spillovers into other public goods.

Obviously, these military expenditures had to be financed, which is why rulers drawn into conflicts had to extend fundamental political rights to citizens in exchange for their consent to increased taxation. The emphasis of Stasavage (2011, 2016) on the role of credit introduces interesting dynamics to this relationship. More precisely, since rulers financed wars by relying significantly on credit, conflict shaped future taxation levied to repay creditors.

We documented above that conflict led to the development of inclusive political institutions. Did the emergence of more sophisticated systems of taxation follow, as predicted by the theory? We now turn to this question. To capture the dynamic impact of conflict on taxes, we consider

⁵⁴ Similar patterns are obtained if we exclude religious wars (see Table A8 in the Appendix).

the effect of conflicts on forms of taxation not only in t but also in the following two decades when estimating equation (1). We again use the gender of nobles' firstborn children as an instrument for conflict in a first stage given by equation (2).

When looking at taxes, dynamic effects are of particular interest for a variety of reasons: first, in the short run, rulers may raise war taxes to satisfy the immediate need for liquidity, as documented by the increased presence of military buildings in Table 7. Even if all wars were tax-financed, increased taxation combined with increased participation may lead to a new equilibrium of higher taxation whereby, even when a conflict is over and war taxes stop, other forms of taxation replace them on a more permanent basis as fiscal capacity is built. Second, to the extent that rulers also borrow from creditors (as war taxes alone do not raise sufficient funds in the short run), those credits need to be paid back via taxes raised from citizens. While we have no direct evidence, in our data, about credit-financed wars, both reasons just stated suggest that complex taxes replacing war taxes are likely to kick in with some delay.

To test this, we now consider the effect of conflicts on the number of complex taxes levied in city i in decade t and in the following two decades. As described in Section 3, complex taxes are those which require a registry to collect. The ability to raise complex taxes is indicative of considerable sophistication of the tax system, since these require both the enumeration of the subjects to be taxed, as well as additional information to calculate the amount owed or the value of the quantity that is to be taxed (such as land, wealth or inheritances). We report results on the impact of conflict on complex taxes using our instrumental variables strategy in Table 8.

Conflicts that are triggered by the birth of a firstborn daughter cause a larger number of complex taxes to be raised in a city, but the effect is not immediate. Instead, it takes around two decades after the conflict for these taxes to be established. This is unsurprising, since the disruption caused by war makes large-scale, sophisticated tax reforms difficult during its duration and immediate aftermath.⁵⁵ In terms of magnitudes, the number of complex taxes increases by 0.08 (relative to a city-by-decade average of 0.26 in the 2SLS sample) in the second decade after the conflict, thus substantially increasing relative to baseline. As a placebo exercise, we additionally report the impact of conflict in t on complex taxes levied in $t - 20$. Reassuringly, complex taxes in the past are not predicted by future conflict.

In the Appendix, we show that these results on the evolution of complex forms of taxation following conflict are robust to assigning conflicts at the territory level, rather than at the level of the grid cell (Table A9), and when considering only non-religious wars (Table A10). Patterns

⁵⁵Note that we exclude explicit "war taxes" from our count of complex taxes, which were often levied on a per head basis to raise emergency funds in a state of war.

are very similar. If anything, results are stronger than in our baseline specification.

5.2 The Rise of Modern States

The Military Revolution in the seventeenth century marked the onset of a process of consolidation and centralization that eventually crystallized diffuse polities into modern European states. Figure A14 in the Appendix documents this trend; from the early 1600s on, average territory sizes grew as expanding states absorbed more and more cities.⁵⁶ In the previous section, we documented that — starting in an earlier period during the zenith of medieval constitutionalism — the near-constant conflict experienced by cities in the German lands gave rise to the adoption of administrative and institutional innovations that served as blueprints for the emerging centralized states. Conflict spurred rulers to trade off political power to their subjects to raise the funds needed to finance warfare. These representative institutions were coupled with the adoption of complex forms of taxation, allowing cities to develop substantial local fiscal and spending capacity.

Were cities and territories that were early to adopt the high-fiscal capacity paradigm more likely to come out on top in the consolidation process that followed? Figure 7 provides an answer in the affirmative. Here, we split our sample of territories into those of above- and below-median tax capacity in the sixteenth century, before the onset of the Military Revolution proper. The stark divergence between the two curves from the early seventeenth century onward indicates that the territories which had developed greater tax potential during the heyday of medieval constitutionalism were at a prime position to subsequently springboard into a rapid process of consolidation.

What role did wars play in the relationship between tax capacity and territorial expansion? To explore this dimension, we conduct an exercise in the spirit of [Gennaioli and Voth \(2015\)](#). We identify all instances where a city switches from one territory to another following a period of war. We then calculate the difference in tax capacity between the gaining territory and the losing territory, as measured by the difference in the number of complex taxes levied in the two territories. Positive differences therefore indicate that a city switches from a lower to a higher tax capacity territory. In Figure 8, we plot the average of these differences over time. The pattern that emerges goes some way towards explaining the divergence in centralization we see from the seventeenth century on. Consistently throughout the centuries, as a rule, higher tax capacity territories conquer cities from territories with lower tax capacity. But before the Military Revolution these differences were modest. From the year 1600 onwards, however,

⁵⁶This figure is in line with similar findings in [Cantoni, Mohr and Weigand \(2021\)](#), whose focus is on the process of fiscal centralization in the German lands up to the French Revolution.

there is a pronounced increase in the tax advantage of conquerors over the conquered. That is, following the Military Revolution, having superior taxation infrastructure in place becomes a strong predictor of wartime success.⁵⁷

6 Conclusion

What were the fundamental drivers of the development of medieval constitutionalism in Europe, ultimately providing the basis for modern states characterized by representative political institutions, substantial tax and spending capacity and the rule of law? A prominent theoretical hypothesis sees the fragmentation of the European states and constant warfare as a focal point in this development. With small states (and therefore generally weak rulers) and the requirement to finance wars and defence, representation and consent were fundamental tools for rulers to raise tax revenues, especially in the medieval and early modern periods.

In this paper, we provide causal evidence for this hypothesis by turning to Germany between 1290 and 1710. We introduce a novel panel data set for the universe of German cities, with information on cities' local political institutions, systems of taxation, and expenditure on new public buildings. Combining this data with information on cities' involvement in conflict and on the firstborn children of prominent nobles in the European network of nobility, we implement an instrumental variables strategy to isolate exogenous variation in conflict exposure. In a first stage, we show that cities in areas in which the most prominent noble has a firstborn daughter (as opposed to a firstborn son) are more likely to see conflict. Exploiting this quasi-random variation in conflict exposure, we document a direct causal link between violent conflicts and the rise of representative political institutions, the development of increasingly complex systems of taxation, and greater expenditure on public construction. In line with theoretical predictions from the literature, cities exogenously exposed to conflict developed councils which were more likely to be elected by the local citizenry, of larger size, and with greater guild participation.

The conflict-induced rise in political representation is accompanied by an increased sophistication of the local tax system. In the decades following conflict, affected cities introduce more complex taxes requiring substantial administrative architecture, both to calculate the amounts owed and to ultimately collect the levied taxes. We lastly present evidence that this increased

⁵⁷We also estimate this relationship formally using a regression framework and report the results in Table A11 in the Appendix. The same pattern emerges: the differences in tax capacity between gainers and losers of cities during wartime becomes significantly positive only from the half-century 1600-1649 onwards (column 1). This finding is robust to excluding religious wars (column 2), including territory fixed effects (column 3), and both at the same time (column 4). Further, we arrive at a similar result (columns 5 to 8) using the number of complex taxes levied in the city with the most complex tax system as our measure of tax capacity (that is, a maximum over all cities in a territory, rather than a sum). This finding is also robust to excluding religious wars and including territory fixed effects.

sophistication of the tax system – developed within the institutional framework of medieval constitutionalism – casts a long shadow on subsequent territorial consolidation. Taken together, these findings underscore the role played by wars in the emergence of crucial elements of the blueprints for modern states.

References


- Abulafia, Anna Sapir**, *Christian Jewish Relations 1000-1300: Jews in the Service of Medieval Christendom*, Routledge Press, 2014.
- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson**, “The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth,” *American Economic Review*, 2005, 95 (3), 546–579.
- Angelucci, Charles, Simone Meraglia, and Nico Voigtländer**, “How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments: From the Norman Conquest of England to the Great Reform Act,” *NBER Working Paper No. 23606*, 2020.
- Bairoch, Paul, Jean Batou, and Pierre Chèvre**, *La population des villes européennes, 800-1850: Banque de données et analyse sommaire des résultats*, Droz, 1988.
- Berthold, Lothar**, *Atlas zur Geschichte in zwei Bänden*, Vol. 1, VEB Hermann Haack, 1976.
- Blickle, Peter**, *Resistance, Representation, and Community*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
- Bosker, Maarten, Eltjo Buringh, and Jan L. van Zanden**, “From Baghdad to London: Unraveling Urban Development in Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa, 800-1800,” *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 2013, 95 (4), 1418–1437.
- Brecke, Peter**, “Violent Conflicts 1400 A.D. to the Present in Different Regions of the World,” *Paper presented at the 1999 meeting of the Peace Science Society*, 1999.
- Cantoni, Davide and Noam Yuchtman**, “Medieval Universities, Legal Institutions, and the Commercial Revolution,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 2014, 129 (2), 823–887.
- , **Cathrin Mohr, and Matthias Weigand**, *Princes and Townspeople: A Collection of Historical Statistics on German Territories and Cities. 2: Territorial Histories*, <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/GZPPVE>, 2020.
- , —, and —, “The Rise of Fiscal Capacity,” *Working Paper*, 2021.
- , **Jeremiah Dittmar, and Noam Yuchtman**, “Religious Competition and Reallocation: The Political Economy of Secularization in the Protestant Reformation,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 2018, 133 (4), 2037–2096.
- Clockwork Mapping**, *Centennia Historical Atlas: Research Edition*, <http://www.historicalatlas.com/>, 2018.
- Clodfelter, Michael**, *Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and other Figures, 1494-2007*, McFarland & Co., 2008.
- Coleman, Edward**, “The Italian Communes. Recent Work and Current Trends,” *Journal of Medieval History*, 1999, 25 (4), 373–397.
- Cox, Gary W.**, “Political Institutions, Economic Liberty, and the Great Divergence,” *Journal of Economic History*, 2017, 77 (3), 724–755.
- , **Mark Dincecco, and Massimiliano G. Onorato**, “War, Trade, and the Roots of Representative Governance,” *SSRN Working Paper No. 3616438*, 2021.
- de Magalhaes, Leandro and Francesco Giovannoni**, “War and the Rise of Parliaments,” *Working Paper*, 2019.
- de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith**, “An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace,” *American Political Science Review*, 1999, 93 (4), 791–807.
- DeLong, J. Bradford and Andrei Shleifer**, “Princes or Merchants? City Growth before the Industrial Revolution,” *Journal of Law and Economics*, 1993, 36 (2), 671–702.
- Dilcher, Gerhard**, “The Urban Belt and the Emerging Modern State,” in Peter Blickle, ed., *Resistance, Representation, and Community*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, chapter 2.2, pp. 229–235.
- Dincecco, Mark**, “Fiscal Centralization, Limited Government, and Public Revenues in Europe, 1650-1913,” *Journal of Economic History*, 2009, 69 (1), 48–103.

- **and Massimiliano Gaetano Onorato**, “Military Conflict and the Rise of Urban Europe,” *Journal of Economic Growth*, 2016, 21 (3), 259–282.
- **and Mauricio Prado**, “Warfare, Fiscal Capacity and Performance,” *Journal of Economic Growth*, 2012, 17 (3), 171–203.
- **, Giovanni Federico, and Andrea Vindigni**, “Warfare, Taxation and Political Change: Evidence from the Italian Risorgimento,” *Journal of Economic History*, 2011, 71 (4), 887–914.
- Dittmar, Jeremiah E and Ralf R Meisenzahl**, “Public Goods Institutions, Human Capital, and Growth: Evidence from German History,” *Review of Economic Studies*, 2020, 87 (2), 959–996.
- Dorner, Friedrich**, *Die Steuern Nördlingens zu Ausgang des Mittelalters*, H.E. Sebald, 1905.
- Downing, Brian M.**, *The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe*, Princeton University Press, 1993.
- Dube, Oeindrila and S.H. Harish**, “Queens,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 2020, 128 (7), 2579–2652.
- Gennaioli, Nicola and Hans-Joachim Voth**, “State Capacity and Military Conflict,” *Review of Economic Studies*, 2015, 82 (4), 1409–1448.
- Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales**, “Long-Term Persistence,” *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 2016, 14 (6), 1401–1436.
- Hoffman, Philip T. and Kathryn Norberg**, *Fiscal Crises and the Growth of Representative Institutions*, Stanford University Press, 1994.
- Horn, Wilhelm**, *Erfurts Stadtverfassung und Stadtwirtschaft in Ihrer Entwicklung bis zur Gegenwart*, Verlag von Gustav Fischer, 1904.
- Iyigun, Murat, Nathan Nunn, and Nancy Qian**, “Winter is Coming: The Long-Run Effects of Climate Change on Conflict, 1400-1900,” *NBER Working Paper No. 23033*, 2017.
- Jackson, Matthew O. and Massimo Morelli**, “Political Bias and War,” *American Economic Review*, 2007, 97 (4), 1353–1373.
- Kennedy, Paul**, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, Vintatge Books, 1987.
- Keyser, Erich**, *Deutsches Städtebuch*, 5 vols., Kohlhammer, 1939-1974.
- Kitamura, Shuhei and Nils-Petter Lagerlöf**, “Geography and State Fragmentation,” *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 2020, 18 (4), 1726–1769.
- Kjaer, Ulrik and Jørgen Elklit**, “The Impact of Assembly Size on Representativeness,” *Journal of Legislative Studies*, 2014, 20 (2), 156–173.
- Kuske, Bruno**, *Das Schuldenwesen der deutschen Städte im Mittelalter*, Druck von H. Laupp jr., 1904.
- Lundy, Darryl**, *The Peerage*, <http://www.thepeerage.com>, 2020.
- Luterbacher, Jürg, Daniel Dietrich, Elena Xoplaki, Martin Grosjean, and Heinz Wanner**, “European Seasonal and Annual Temperature Variability, Trends, and Extremes Since 1500,” *Science*, 2004, 303 (5663), 1499–1503.
- Møller, Jørgen**, “Medieval Roots of the Modern State: The Conditional Effects of Geopolitical Pressure on Early Modern State Building,” *Social Science History*, 2018, 42 (2), 295–316.
- Mommsen, Hans**, *The Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy*, University of North Carolina Press, 1996.
- Moser, Johann Jakob**, *Teutsches Staats-Recht*, Volume 19, Nurnberg : Stein, 1737-53.
- Ogilvie, Sheilagh**, “Guilds, Efficiency, and Social Capital: Evidence from German Proto-Industry,” *Economic History Review*, 2004, 57 (2), 286–333.
- **, The European Guilds**, Princeton University Press, 2019.
- Ottinger, Sebastian and Nico Voigtländer**, “History’s Masters: The Effect of European Monarchs on State Performance,” *NBER Working Paper No. 28297*, 2020.
- Pirenne, Henri**, *Medieval Cities: Their Origins and the Revival of Trade*, Princeton University Press, 1927/2014. Reprinted in 2014.
- Putnam, Robert D., Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Y. Nanetti**, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Princeton University Press, 1993.

- Sabetti, Filippo**, “Local Roots of Constitutionalism,” *Perspectives on Political Science*, 2004, 33 (2), 70–78.
- Schönholzer, David and Eric Weese**, “Creative Destruction in the European State System: 1000-1850,” *mimeo*, 2019.
- Schwennicke, Detlev**, *Europäische Stammtafeln, Neue Folge, Vol. I.1-I.3*, Vittorio Klostermann, 1998.
- Stasavage, David**, *States of Credit: Size, Power, and the Development of European Polities*, Princeton University Press, 2011.
- , “Was Weber Right? The Role of Urban Autonomy in Europe’s Rise,” *American Political Science Review*, 2014, 108 (2), 337–354.
- , “Representation and Consent: Why They Arose in Europe and Not Elsewhere,” *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2016, 19, 145–162.
- Ticchi, Davide and Andrea Vindigni**, “Wars and Endogenous Democracy,” *IZA Discussion Paper*, 2008, 3397.
- Tilly, Charles**, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Princeton University Press, 1975.
- , *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990*, Blackwell, 1990.
- Wahl, Fabian**, “Political Participation and Economic Development: Evidence from the Rise of Participative Political Institutions in the Late Medieval German Lands,” *European Review of Economic History*, 2019, 23 (2), 193–213.
- Walker, Mack**, *German Home Towns: Community, State, and the General Estate, 1648–1871*, Cornell University Press, 1971.
- Weber, Max**, “Die Stadt. Eine Soziologische Untersuchung,” *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, 1921, 47 (3), 621–772.

Figures

Figure 1: Territory Case Study – Bavaria-Munich and the Landshut Succession War




Note: Evolution of political and taxation outcomes for cities in the territory of Bavaria-Munich, other cities in Bavaria and other cities in the German lands in the century before and after the Landshut Succession War (indicated with vertical dashed lines). The probability of citizens electing their local city council equals one if citizens can hold such elections without the interference of the local ruler. Council size is the number of members on the city council. Complex taxes refer to those taxes that require a register or administrative infrastructure to levy them because the taxed items are not easily observed, which includes income, wealth or business taxes.

Figure 2: De Facto Territorial Boundaries in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, 1290-1710




Note: De facto territorial boundaries from the Centennia Historical Atlas (Clockwork Mapping, 2018) overlapped at decadal intervals for the period 1290-1710 (light grey). Modern state boundaries also shown (black).

Figure 3: Birth Events by Cell and Decade




Note: Male and female firstborn children of the most connected noble in a given 1×1 degree cell in the German lands between 1290 and 1710 by decade. The most connected noble is identified as the person with the most links in the family network of the German and European nobility.

Figure 4: Territory-Level Event Study




Note: Evolution of political outcomes for territories before and after the first conflict to which they are exposed. The probability of citizens electing their local city council equals one if citizens can hold such elections without the interference of the local ruler. Council size is the number of members on the city council.

Figure 5: Impulse Response to Female vs. Male Firstborn Children




Note: Impulse response regressions of an indicator for whether citizens in a city elect their own city councils without intervention of the local ruler and of the number of members of a city's council on an indicator for whether the most connected noble in the 1×1 degree cell had a female firstborn child in decade t . The unit of observation is a city-decade and the sample consists of German cities from 1290 to 1710 whose local most connected noble had a firstborn child in decade t . The most connected noble is identified as the person with the most links in the family network of the German and European nobility. All regressions include city and decade fixed effects and a city-level linear time trend, and control for cities' article page length in the Keyser books, interacted with century fixed effects. Error bars show 90% confidence intervals and standard errors are clustered at the 1×1 degree cell level.

Figure 6: Cities by Region and Sample



Note: Map of the 2,340 cities in the Keyser books by region for the full sample (panel a) and the sample of cities lying in cells that receive values for our firstborn-child gender instrument at any point in the sample period between 1290 and 1710. Regions are defined by the Keyser volume a city appears in. Latitude and longitude lines show the 1×1 degree grid cells.

Figure 7: Tax Capacity Before the Military Revolution and Subsequent Territory Growth



Note: Plots of the average number of cities in territories over time, separately for subgroups of territories which had high and low (above- and below-median) tax capacity in the sixteenth century, before the Military Revolution. Tax capacity is measured as the sum of all complex taxes levied in cities in the territory, in this case over the course of the period 1500-1590.

Figure 8: Differences in Tax Capacity and City Conquest



Note: Plot of the average difference in tax capacity between territories when cities switch from one territory to another during times of war. Positive differences indicate that a city switched from the territory with lower tax capacity in the decade before conflict (as measured by the number of complex taxes levied in the territory) to the territory with higher tax capacity.

Tables

Table 1: Summary Statistics for the City-Decade Panel

Panel A: Full Sample					
	count	mean	sd	min	max
Conflict (1x1 degree cell-level)	61077	0.319	0.466	0	1
Internal conflict (1x1 degree cell-level)	61077	0.231	0.422	0	1
City has a council	61077	0.258	0.438	0	1
Citizens elect council	61077	0.022	0.148	0	1
Council size	61077	5.216	11.489	0	341
Guilds on council	8518	0.009	0.093	0	1
Any construction present	61077	0.931	0.253	0	1
Any military construction present	61077	0.648	0.478	0	1
Any religious construction present	61077	0.860	0.347	0	1
Any secular construction present	61077	0.630	0.483	0	1
No. of complex taxes	61077	0.268	0.830	0	16
Dist. to nearest trade route (1500)	61077	171.994	96.796	24	514
Imperial city (pre 1422)	61077	0.033	0.179	0	1
Market city (pre 1500)	61077	0.376	0.484	0	1
Hanse city	61077	0.027	0.163	0	1
University city (pre 1500)	61077	0.005	0.069	0	1
River access	61077	0.070	0.256	0	1
Coastal access	61077	0.006	0.077	0	1
Entry length in Keyser	61077	2.693	3.718	0	51
Mean winter temperature	61077	-0.834	1.238	-6	3
Panel B: First Child Sample					
	count	mean	sd	min	max
Conflict (1x1 degree cell-level)	5091	0.355	0.479	0	1
Internal conflict (1x1 degree cell-level)	5091	0.232	0.422	0	1
Firstborn child is female (1x1 degree cell-level)	5091	0.469	0.499	0	1
City has a council	5091	0.284	0.451	0	1
Citizens elect council	5091	0.023	0.149	0	1
Council size	5091	5.274	11.173	0	341
Guilds on council	757	0.013	0.114	0	1
Any construction present	5091	0.922	0.269	0	1
Any military construction present	5091	0.623	0.485	0	1
Any religious construction present	5091	0.849	0.358	0	1
Any secular construction present	5091	0.614	0.487	0	1
No. of complex taxes	5091	0.256	0.813	0	10
Dist. to nearest trade route (1500)	5091	171.758	98.256	24	514
Imperial city (pre 1422)	5091	0.037	0.190	0	1
Market city (pre 1500)	5091	0.394	0.489	0	1
Hanse city	5091	0.023	0.150	0	1
University city (pre 1500)	5091	0.006	0.075	0	1
River access	5091	0.077	0.266	0	1
Coastal access	5091	0.006	0.077	0	1
Entry length in Keyser	5091	2.866	3.750	0	49
Mean winter temperature	5091	-0.624	1.121	-5	3

Note: The unit of observation is the city-decade and the sample consists of German cities from 1290 to 1710. The full sample includes all cities in all cells whereas the first child sample includes cities which lie in a cell to which an instrument value has been assigned in a given decade. The instrument equals one whether the most connected noble's firstborn child in the previous decade was a girl, which we use to predict conflicts in a given 1×1 degree cell.

Table 2: Balance on Noble Characteristics – Female Firstborn Instrument

	Mean (male firstborn)	Mean (female firstborn)	Difference	p-value
Dummy: any child	1.000	1.000	0.000	.
Age when had first child	27.889	28.428	-0.539	0.294
Age at death	55.508	54.645	0.863	0.308
Age at first marriage	23.911	24.348	-0.437	0.345
Centrality at age 10 (number of links)	3.907	4.062	-0.155	0.410
Centrality at age 10 (harmonic centrality)	27.650	30.224	-2.575	0.101
No. characters in Peerage entry	3,558.492	3,609.009	-50.517	0.547
No. footnotes in Peerage entry	5.087	4.754	0.333	0.222
No. references in Peerage entry	1.545	1.538	0.007	0.938
No. characters in Peerage entry (Father)	4,220.099	4,340.129	-120.030	0.306
No. footnotes in Peerage entry (Father)	6.654	6.659	-0.006	0.987
No. references in Peerage entry (Father)	2.192	2.298	-0.106	0.389

Note: Balance test on observable characteristics of the nobles used to construct the female firstborn instrument. Mean values are reported separately for nobles whose firstborn is male and for nobles whose firstborn is female. Differences in means and associated p-values are also reported.

Table 3: First Stage Regressions

	Pr(Conflict)=1			Pr(Internal Conflict)=1		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female child = 1	0.228*** (0.064)	0.335*** (0.087)	0.105*** (0.037)	-0.104 (0.068)	-0.071 (0.086)	-0.040 (0.027)
City FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Decade FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
City linear trend		yes	yes		yes	yes
Level of conf. ass.	cell	cell	territory	cell	cell	territory
Observations	5,091	5,091	5,085	5,091	5,091	5,085
Cells	56	56	56	56	56	56
Outcome mean	0.355	0.355	0.144	0.232	0.232	0.096

Note: First stage regressions of the conflict probability for cities in the 1×1 degree cell c in decade t on an indicator for whether the most connected noble in the cell had a female firstborn child in the previous decade (columns 1 and 2). In column 3, the conflict indicator is assigned at the level of territorial histories. Columns 4 to 6 repeat the same exercises, using an indicator for internal conflict as the outcome variable. The most connected noble is identified as the person with the most links in the family network of the German and European nobility. The comparison group are cities in cells where the most connected noble had a male firstborn child in the previous decade. The unit of observation is the city-decade observation for the sample of German cities between 1290 and 1710. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the 1×1 degree cell level. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 4: Conflicts and Council Elections

Outcome: Pr(Citizens elect council)=1								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Conflict	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003 (0.003)	0.029* (0.016)	0.016** (0.008)	0.015** (0.007)	0.023** (0.009)	0.016** (0.008)	
Has council					0.018 (0.015)			
Conflict (territory)								0.052** (0.023)
City FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Decade FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
City linear trend				yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Excl. relig. wars						yes		
Controls							yes	
Sample	full	first child	first child	first child	first child	first child	first child	first child
Estimator	OLS	OLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
Observations	61,077	5,091	5,091	5,091	5,091	3,713	5,091	5,085
Cells	89	56	56	56	56	46	56	56
Outcome mean	0.022	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.022	0.023	0.023
K-P F-Stat			12.570	14.771	14.794	10.864	14.945	7.904

Note: OLS and 2SLS regressions of an indicator for whether citizens in a city elect their own city councils without intervention of the local ruler on an indicator for whether a conflict occurred in the city's 1×1 degree cell in a given decade (columns 1 to 7). Column 8 reports results with the conflict indicator assigned at the level of territorial histories. The unit of observation is a city-decade and the sample consists of German cities from 1290 to 1710. The full sample includes all cities in all cells whereas the first child sample includes cities which lie in a cell to which an instrument value has been assigned. Conflicts are instrumented by an indicator for whether the most connected noble in the cell had a female firstborn child in the decade before the conflict. The most connected noble is identified as the person with the most links in the family network of the German and European nobility. All regressions include city and decade fixed effects. If included, the vector of controls consists of cities' article page length in the Keyser books, interacted with century fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the 1×1 degree cell level. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 5: Conflicts and Council Elections – Dynamic Effects

Outcome: Pr(Citizens elect council)=1				
	t-20	t	t+10	t+20
Conflict	0.005 (0.012)	0.016** (0.008)	0.007 (0.006)	0.021* (0.011)
City FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Decade FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
City linear trend	yes	yes	yes	yes
Sample	first child	first child	first child	first child
Estimator	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
Observations	5,065	5,091	5,091	5,091
Cells	56	56	56	56
Outcome mean	0.023	0.023	0.024	0.024
K-P F-Stat	14.896	14.771	14.771	14.771

Note: 2SLS regressions of an indicator for whether citizens in a city elect their own city councils without intervention of the local ruler on an indicator for whether a conflict occurred in the city's 1×1 degree cell in a given decade. Each column is a separate regression for a given timing of the outcome variable whereas conflict and instrument are always measured in t and $t - 10$, respectively. The unit of observation is a city-decade and the sample consists of German cities from 1290 to 1710. The first child sample includes cities which lie in a cell to which an instrument value has been assigned. Conflicts are instrumented by an indicator for whether the most connected noble in the cell had a female firstborn child in the decade before the conflict. The most connected noble is identified as the person with the most links in the family network of the German and European nobility. All regressions include city and decade fixed effects and a city-level linear time trend. Standard errors are clustered at the 1×1 degree cell level. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 6: Conflicts, Council Size, and Guild Representation

	Council Size							Guilds on Council	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Conflict	0.068 (0.064)	0.928*** (0.259)	2.135** (0.941)	1.678* (0.848)	2.177** (0.868)	2.112** (0.931)		0.127* (0.069)	0.127* (0.069)
Has council				7.553*** (0.548)					-0.006 (0.022)
Conflict (territory)							6.790** (3.184)		
City FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Decade FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
City linear trend	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Excl. relig. wars					yes				
Controls						yes			
Sample	full	first child	first child	first child	first child	first child	first child	first child	first child
Estimator	OLS	OLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
Observations	61,077	5,091	5,091	5,091	3,713	5,091	5,085	757	757
Cells	89	56	56	56	46	56	56	51	51
Outcome mean	5.216	5.274	5.274	5.274	4.658	5.274	5.277	0.013	0.013
K-P F-Stat			14.771	14.794	10.864	14.945	7.904	11.208	11.418

Note: OLS and 2SLS regressions of the number of members of a city's council on an indicator for whether a conflict occurred in the city's 1×1 degree cell in a given decade (columns 1 to 6). Column 7 reports results with the conflict indicator assigned at the level of territorial histories. Columns 8 and 9 report 2SLS regressions of an indicator for guild representation on the city council on the cell-level conflict variable. The unit of observation is the city-decade observation and the sample consists of German cities from 1290 to 1710. The full sample includes all cities in all cells whereas the first child sample includes cities which lie in a cell to which an instrument value has been assigned. Conflicts are instrumented by an indicator for whether the most connected noble in the cell had a female firstborn child in the decade before the conflict. The most connected noble is identified as the person with the most links in the family network of the German and European nobility. All regressions include city and decade fixed effects and a city-level linear time trend. If included, the vector of controls consists of cities' article page length in the Keyser books, interacted with century fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the 1×1 degree cell level. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 7: Conflicts and Types of Public Buildings

	Outcome: Pr(Building Type Present)=1		
	Military (1)	Secular (2)	Religious (3)
Conflict	0.035* (0.020)	-0.048 (0.041)	0.003 (0.020)
City FE	yes	yes	yes
Decade FE	yes	yes	yes
City linear trend	yes	yes	yes
Sample	first child	first child	first child
Estimator	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
Observations	5,091	5,091	5,091
Cells	56	56	56
Outcome mean	0.623	0.614	0.849
K-P F-Stat	14.771	14.771	14.771

Note: 2SLS regressions of an indicator for whether different types of public buildings are present on an indicator for whether a conflict occurred in the city's 1×1 degree cell in a given decade. The unit of observation is a city-decade and the sample consists of German cities from 1290 to 1710. The first child sample includes cities which lie in a cell to which an instrument value has been assigned. Conflicts are instrumented by an indicator for whether the most connected noble in the cell had a female firstborn child in the decade before the conflict. The most connected noble is identified as the person with the most links in the family network of the German and European nobility. All regressions include city and decade fixed effects and a city-level linear time trend. Standard errors are clustered at the 1×1 degree cell level. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 8: Conflicts and Complex Taxes – Dynamic Effects

Outcome: Number of Complex Taxes				
	t-20	t	t+10	t+20
Conflict	0.004 (0.030)	0.012 (0.055)	0.007 (0.036)	0.080* (0.044)
City FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Decade FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
City linear trend	yes	yes	yes	yes
Sample	first child	first child	first child	first child
Estimator	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
Observations	5,065	5,091	5,091	5,091
Cells	56	56	56	56
Outcome mean	0.241	0.256	0.271	0.269
K-P F-Stat	14.896	14.771	14.771	14.771

Note: 2SLS regressions of the number of complex taxes on an indicator for whether a conflict occurred in the city's 1×1 degree cell in a given decade. Each column is a separate regression for a given timing of the outcome variable whereas conflict and instrument are always measured in t and $t - 10$, respectively. The unit of observation is a city-decade and the sample consists of German cities from 1290 to 1710. The first child sample includes cities which lie in a cell to which an instrument value has been assigned. Conflicts are instrumented by an indicator for whether the most connected noble in the cell had a female firstborn child in the decade before the conflict. The most connected noble is identified as the person with the most links in the family network of the German and European nobility. All regressions include city and decade fixed effects and a city-level linear time trend. Standard errors are clustered at the 1×1 degree cell level. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Appendix: Additional Figures and Tables

Figure A1: Examples of Relevant *Deutsches Städtebuch* Entries for the City of Dortmund

(a) Paragraph 5b: Construction Events

noldikirche, Mittelpunkt des ehemaligen Archidiaconates D. Älteste Kirche (Stiftskirche bis um 1065) 1232 verbrannt; Neubau 1250–70 als dreischiffige Pfeilerbasilika im rom.-got. Übergangsstil; 1421–40 Neubau des Chores, 1444 Neubau des Turmes durch Meister Roseer; 1661 Turmein-
sturz, Verkleinerung des Langschiffes um 6 Joch,

(b) Paragraph 9a: Political Institutions

und „neuer Rat“ bzw. „sitzender Rat“ und „ge-
sessener Rat“. Infolge der Revolution von 1400
werden nur die 12 oberen Ratsstellen mit „Erb-
sassen“ (= Großbürgern) und die 6 unteren Rats-
stellen mit Vertretern der 6 Gilden besetzt. Der

(c) Paragraph 10b: Conflicts

burg und dem Erzbischof von Köln. Schlacht am
Wulveskamp bei D.-Brecht 1254. Um 1388 bis
1389 wurde D. 20 Monate lang belagert durch Erz-
bischof von Köln, Grafen von der Mark, viele
geistliche und weltliche Fürsten, 20 Städte, gegen
1200 Ritter usw. Es bewahrte seine Reichsfrei-
heit, geriet aber in große Kriegverschuldung.

(d) Paragraph 13b: Taxation

Ende 13. Jh. Kriegssteuern: die „opkome“
(1391 ff.), eine Umsatzsteuer von $\frac{1}{48}$ des Verkaufs-
wertes, die „puntinge“, eine 5%ige Steuer vom
Gesamtvermögen (3mal, 1393, 1395, 1396, er-
hoben). Reichssteuern (1241/42; gemeiner Pfen-
nig 1499; Türkensteuer usw.), Fremdensteuern

Note: Examples from the *Städtebuch* of the relevant paragraphs for our data collection. These particular excerpts correspond to the city of Dortmund and describe the siege and its aftermath described in the Introduction.

Figure A2: The Peerage Example

Wolfgang Herzog von Braunschweig-Grubenhagen

M, #7388, b. 6 April 1531, d. 14 March 1595



Last Edited=10 May 2003

Wolfgang Herzog von Braunschweig-Grubenhagen was born on 6 April 1531. He was the son of [Philip Herzog von Braunschweig-Grubenhagen](#) and [Catherine von Mansfeld](#). He married [Dorothea von Sachsen-Lauenburg](#), daughter of [Franz I Herzog von Sachsen-Lauenburg](#) and [Sybille von Sachsen-Freiburg](#), on 10 December 1570 at [Osterode, Germany](#)⁹. He died on 14 March 1595 at age 63. He gained the title of *Herzog von Braunschweig-Grubenhagen*.

Note: Example from Darryl Lundy's genealogical website *The Peerage* (<http://www.thepeerage.com/>, accessed 04/11/2017) for Wolfgang, Duke of Braunschweig-Grubenhagen. Wolfgang is one of the over 680,000 nobles we use to reconstruct the European nobility network each year (see text for details).

Figure A3: Family Tree Example - The Dukes of Braunschweig-Grubenhagen

Tafel 21 Die HERZÖGE von BRAUNSCHWEIG-GRUBENHAGEN 2

[illegible]


Note: Family tree example from the *Europäische Stammtafeln* (Schwennicke, 1998). Life events are represented by the following symbols for birth *, deaths †, marriage ♂, burial ☐, battle deaths are marked by two crossed swords. We use these family trees primarily to associate nobles to cities and territories within the German lands, but also to supplement the information from the *Peerage*.

Figure A4: Family Tree - Individual Entry

WOLFGANG † 1567 in KATLENBURG
u GRUBENHAGEN *Herzberg 6.1V
1531 †ibidem 14.11I 1595 ♂ Os-
terode Ägidienkirche; ∞ Oste-
rode 10.XII 1570 Dorothea von
Sachsen-Lauenburg (Askanier)
*Lüneburg 11.11I 1543 †Herz-
berg 5.1V 1586 ♂ ibid Ägidien-
kirche T v Hz Franz I


Note: Individual entry within a family tree (zoomed in) from the *Europäische Stammtafeln* (Schwennicke, 1998). The example shows Wolfgang, Duke of Braunschweig-Grubenhagen. The most relevant information of the entry include the cities of residences and death, year of birth, marriage, and death, the name and title of his wife and her family (Dorothea von Sachsen-Lauenburg).

Figure A5: Trade Routes




Note: Map showing trade routes in the German lands, circa 1500. Red lines indicate trade routes, black dots indicate the cities in our sample, triangles indicate main trading centres. Hand-digitised from the original, [Berthold \(1976\)](#).

Figure A6: Territory-Level Event Study – Excluding Conflicts After 1600




Note: Evolution of political outcomes for territories before and after the first conflict to which they are exposed. The probability of citizens electing their local city council equals one if citizens can hold such elections without the interference of the local ruler. Council size is the number of members on the city council.

Figure A7: Territory-Level Event Study – Weighting by *Städtebuch* Entry Length




Note: Evolution of political outcomes for territories before and after the first conflict to which they are exposed. The probability of citizens electing their local city council equals one if citizens can hold such elections without the interference of the local ruler. Council size is the number of members on the city council. In this figure, when constructing territory-level measures, we weight cities by their entry length in the *Städtebuch* (Keyser, 1939-1974).

Figure A8: Effect of City Characteristics on Entering First Child Sample




Note: Coefficients from a regression of an indicator for whether an observation enters the “first child” subsample (used for the 2SLS estimations) on observable city characteristics. The unit of observation is the city-decade observation for the sample of German cities between 1290 and 1710. The red dashed line marks zero. All regressions include 1×1 degree cell and decade fixed effects. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals and standard errors are clustered at the 1×1 degree cell level.

Figure A9: Instrumental Variable Balancing on Observables




Note: Coefficients from a regression of an indicator for whether the firstborn child of the most connected noble in a given 1×1 degree cell in the previous decade was female on observable city characteristics. The most connected noble is identified as the person with the most links in the family network of the German and European nobility. The comparison group are cities in cells where the most connected noble had a male firstborn child in the previous decade. Hence the regression tests whether cities with firstborn girls are significantly different from cities with firstborn boys for the most connected noble in terms of observable city characteristics. The unit of observation is the city-decade observation for the sample of German cities between 1290 and 1710. Panel (a) shows the coefficients only while panel (b) relates them to the mean and standard deviation of the instrument to put the coefficient sizes into perspective. The short dashed line marks zero, the solid line marks the average of the instrument, and the long dashed line marks its standard deviation. All regressions include 1×1 degree cell and decade fixed effects. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals and standard errors are clustered at the 1×1 degree cell level.

Figure A10: Council Outcomes and City Characteristics




Note: OLS regressions of an indicator for whether citizens in a city elect their own city councils without intervention of the local ruler (panel a) and council size (panel b) on city characteristics. The unit of observation is the city-decade and the sample consists of German cities from 1290 to 1710. All regressions include 1×1 degree cell and decade fixed effects. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals and standard errors are clustered at the 1×1 degree cell level.

Figure A11: Century Jackknife Exercises




Note: 2SLS regressions of an indicator for whether citizens in a city elect their own city councils without intervention of the local ruler (panel a) and council size (panel b) on an indicator for whether a conflict occurred in the city's 1×1 degree cell in a given decade. Each coefficient comes from a separate regression that omits a century as indicated. The dashed line marks the baseline estimate. The unit of observation is the city-decade observation and the sample consists of German cities from 1290 to 1710. Conflicts are instrumented by an indicator for whether the most connected noble in the cell had a female firstborn child in the decade before the conflict. The most connected noble is identified as the person with the most links in the family network of the German and European nobility. All regressions include city and decade fixed effects and a city-level linear time trend. Standard errors are clustered at the 1×1 degree cell level. Errors bars display 90% confidence intervals.

Figure A12: Sensitivity Checks




Note: 2SLS regressions of an indicator for whether citizens in a city elect their own city councils without intervention of the local ruler (panel a) and council size (panel b) on an indicator for whether a conflict occurred in the city's 1×1 degree cell in a given decade. Each coefficient comes from a separate regression that omits a subset of the sample or weights observations as indicated. The dashed line marks the baseline estimate. The unit of observation is the city-decade observation and the sample consists of German cities from 1290 to 1710. Conflicts are instrumented by an indicator for whether the most connected noble in the cell had a female firstborn child in the decade before the conflict. The most connected noble is identified as the person with the most links in the family network of the German and European nobility. All regressions include city and decade fixed effects and a city-level linear time trend. Standard errors are clustered at the 1×1 degree cell level. Errors bars display 90% confidence intervals.

Figure A13: Robustness to Different Types of Conflict



Note: 2SLS regressions of an indicator for whether citizens in a city elect their own city councils without intervention of the local ruler (panel a) and council size (panel b) on an indicator for whether a conflict occurred in the city's 1×1 degree cell in a given decade. Each coefficient comes from a separate regression that omits a certain type of conflict. The dashed line marks the baseline estimate. The unit of observation is the city-decade observation and the sample consists of German cities from 1290 to 1710. Conflicts are instrumented by an indicator for whether the most connected noble in the cell had a female firstborn child in the decade before the conflict. The most connected noble is identified as the person with the most links in the family network of the German and European nobility. All regressions include city and decade fixed effects and a city-level linear time trend. Standard errors are clustered at the 1×1 degree cell level. Errors bars display 90% confidence intervals.

Figure A14: Territory Size Over Time



Note: Plot of territories' average number of cities over time. Larger values indicate that territories are becoming larger.

Table A1: Tax Classifications by Tax Type and Complexity

Level of Complexity	Tax Type	Description
Simple	beverages (Getränkesteuer)	Taxes on production and consumption of beer. Easily observed by the number of transported barrels of a bulky and fairly homogeneous good. Requires little administrative effort.
Simple	church (Kirchensteuer)	Taxes levied on churchgoers and church-related services such as weddings, baptisms, or funerals. Requires little administrative effort.
Simple	consumption (Verbrauchssteuer)	Taxes on certain goods (Fleischakzise = meat tax, Brotakzise = bread tax) levied on businesses via adding them to the good prices. Easily observed since they affected mostly daily consumption goods. Requires little administrative effort.
Simple	entertainment (Vergnügungssteuer)	Taxes on entertainment such as dance venues (Tanzbodenzins = dance floor tax) or gambling (Spielkartensteuer = playing card tax). Usually levied as fixed fee on immobile businesses such as taverns and bars. Requires little administrative effort.
Simple	general tax (Steuer)	General taxation or taxes without specification. Since insufficient information is available from archival sources to give a more detailed classification, we assume that these require little administrative effort.
Simple	grazing (Weidegeld)	Taxes on usage of the meadows for grazing animals. Requires little administrative effort.
Simple	in kind (Naturalleistung)	Taxes levied as in kind contributions, such as clothes or tools. Requires little administrative effort.
Simple	lease (Pachtgeld)	Taxes on leased land for agricultural production (Ackerpacht = land lease) and hunting grounds (Jagdpacht = hunting lease). Requires little administrative effort.
Simple	mill (Mühlensteuer)	Taxes on mill usage. Easily observed as individual farmers would bring their corn and grain to the local mills which would grind them and place a fee on the quantity milled. Requires little administrative effort.
Simple	trade (Handelssteuer)	Taxes on trade and usage of toll roads and harbors by merchants. Usually levied as fee when a traveling merchant sought entrance to a city or at toll stations. Requires little administrative effort.
Complex	administration (Verwaltungssteuer)	Taxes to finance the local administration. Usually levied as head tax (Ratsgeld = council tax) or as fees on administrative services (Gerichtsgebühren = judicial court fees, Eichgeld = gauging fee). Requires some basic administrative structure and a registry.
Complex	animals (Viehsteuer)	Taxes on animals and livestock. Requires some knowledge of number and quality of livestock and their associated output (e.g. milk or wool). Requires some basic administrative structure and a registry.
Complex	business (Gewerbsteuer)	Taxes levied on businesses and shops in the city (excl. traveling merchants and market stands). Usually levied as fixed sum (e.g. as rent) or via guild fees. Requires some basic administrative structure and a registry.
Complex	citizen (Bürgersteuer)	Taxes and fees for obtaining citizen rights which include the right to vote, access to the legal system, certain professions, protection, and other benefits. Requires some basic administrative structure and a registry.
Complex	construction (Baugeld)	Taxes on construction of new dwellings and infrastructure. Usually taxed as fees when new constructions were applied for. Requires some basic administrative structure and a registry.
Complex	guard (Wächtergeld)	Taxes to finance the protection and policing of the city via the city guard (Nachtwächtergeld = night watch tax). Usually levied from citizens only via a fixed sum. Requires some basic administrative structure and a registry.
Complex	harvest (Erntesteuer)	Taxes on agricultural output. Easily observed during a fixed period in the year. Requires some basic administrative structure and a registry.
Complex	head (Kopfsteuer)	Taxes on each individual in the city. Requires knowledge of the city's population but usually levied as fixed sum. Requires some basic administrative structure and a registry.

Continued on next page

Level of Complexity	Tax Type	Description
Complex	income (Einkommensteuer)	Taxes on income. Often determined as percentage of a person's total income, e.g. 20. Pfennig (20th cent) or social rank in the city, e.g. Klassengeld (class tax) or Rangsteuer (rank tax). Requires significant administrative effort to gain knowledge of amount and regularity of individuals' incomes.
Complex	inheritance (Erbschaftsteuer)	Taxes on inheritances. Generally levied on all kinds of inheritances (Erbsteuer = inheritance tax), but sometimes levied from citizens only (Bürgererbenzins = citizen inheritance tax) or in case the inherited values were moved out of the city. Requires significant administrative effort to gain knowledge of the kind and value of the inheritance.
Complex	land (Landsteuer)	Taxes on farm land. Requires some basic knowledge of the size and quality of the plot which is usually observed by agricultural output. Requires some basic administrative structure and a registry.
Complex	property (Eigentumssteuer)	Taxes on owned property. Usually determined by the size of the property as measured by the number of windows or doors. Requires significant administrative effort to gain knowledge of the kind and value of the property.
Complex	protection (Schutzgeld)	Taxes on foreigners and certain groups to receive protection from the city. Most commonly levied on foreigners who entered the city (Fremdensteuer = foreigner tax) or Jews (Juden Zoll = Jew toll). Requires some basic administrative structure and a registry to know who enters and exits the city and to levy the respective fee.
Complex	real estate (Grundsteuer)	Taxes on real estate. Determined by the size, quality, and location of the plot of land and the structures built on it. Requires significant administrative effort to gain knowledge of size and quality of the real estate.
Complex	rental (Mietsteuer)	Taxes on rented properties. Requires significant administrative effort to gain knowledge of the kind and value of the property.
Complex	sales (Umsatzsteuer)	Taxes on sales by businesses and merchants with market rights. Requires knowledge of the businesses' or merchants' sales revenues. In the case of merchants this also involves knowledge of the number of days on which the merchant traded on the market and revenues made there (Marktumsatzakzise = market revenue tax) which requires significant administrative effort.
Complex	wealth (Vermögenssteuer)	Taxes on individual wealth. This includes capital value (Kapitalsteuer = capital tax), taxes on interest and other investment returns (Wertzuwachssteuer = tax on capital appreciation), and wealth in general (Vermögenssteuer = wealth tax). Requires significant administrative effort to gain knowledge of the amount of wealth and returns on investment and capital.

Note: Classification of taxes mentioned in the encyclopedia of German cities (*"Deutsches Städtebuch"*) by Keyser (1939-1974). We hand-coded and classified all taxes and assigned a level of complexity to each category in the first column. Simple taxes are easily observed without the need for having a more sophisticated administrative institution set up to oversee and collect such taxes, for instance taxes on using the local mill or church taxes. Complex taxes require a registry of the persons/quantities to be taxed as well as a non-trivial level of administrative infrastructure to collect. For instance, land can be observed but to levy a tax on it it must be surveyed which requires special knowledge. This category additionally includes, for example, income and wealth taxes where not only the tax-liable individuals need to be known but also the value of their income and wealth. The second column reports 28 broader tax categories into which we classified all taxes mentioned in the text. The final column provides a brief description of each tax class and provides some examples where appropriate.

Table A2: Balance on Noble Characteristics – No Male Heir Instrument

	Mean (no male heir)	Mean (male heir)	Difference	p-value
Dummy: any child	0.222	1.000	-0.778	0.000***
Age when had first child	30.436	27.357	3.079	0.000***
Age at death	45.729	57.286	-11.557	0.000***
Age at first marriage	26.575	23.913	2.662	0.000***
Centrality at age 10 (number of links)	4.694	4.127	0.567	0.000***
Centrality at age 10 (harmonic centrality)	31.698	29.705	1.993	0.103
No. characters in Peerage entry	1,895.127	3,838.924	-1943.797	0.000***
No. footnotes in Peerage entry	1.982	5.335	-3.353	0.000***
No. references in Peerage entry	0.566	1.688	-1.123	0.000***
No. characters in Peerage entry (Father)	4,574.480	4,331.949	242.531	0.004***
No. footnotes in Peerage entry (Father)	5.826	6.810	-0.984	0.000***
No. references in Peerage entry (Father)	1.797	2.283	-0.486	0.000***

Note: Balance test on observable characteristics of the nobles which would be used for an alternative instrument based on whether a noble has a male heir. Mean values are reported separately for nobles who have a male heir at death and nobles who do not. Differences in means and associated p-values are also reported.

Table A3: Conflicts and Council Elections – Additional Controls

Outcome: Pr(Citizens elect council)=1												
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Conflict	0.016** (0.008)	0.016** (0.008)	0.016** (0.007)	0.016** (0.007)	0.016** (0.008)	0.019** (0.009)	0.017** (0.008)	0.016** (0.008)	0.016** (0.008)	0.017** (0.007)	0.016** (0.008)	0.019** (0.009)
City FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Decade FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
City linear trend	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Controls	None	Main	Trade	Imperial	Market	Hansa	University	River	Coast	Region	Temperature	All
Sample	first child	first child	first child	first child	first child	first child	first child	first child	first child	first child	first child	first child
Estimator	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
Observations	5,091	5,091	5,091	5,091	5,091	5,091	5,091	5,091	5,091	5,091	5,091	5,091
Cells	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56
Outcome mean	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023
K-P F-Stat	14.771	14.945	15.907	15.017	15.091	14.596	14.968	14.863	14.690	12.860	14.464	12.326

Note: 2SLS regressions of an indicator for whether citizens in a city elect their own city councils without intervention of the local ruler on an indicator for whether a conflict occurred in the city's 1×1 degree cell in a given decade. The unit of observation is a city-decade and the sample consists of German cities from 1290 to 1710. The first child sample includes cities which lie in a cell to which an instrument value has been assigned. Conflicts are instrumented by an indicator for whether the most connected noble in the cell had a female firstborn child in the decade before the conflict. The most connected noble is identified as the person with the most links in the family network of the German and European nobility. All regressions include city and decade fixed effects and a city-level linear time trend. Column 2 controls for cities' article page length in the Keyser books, interacted with century fixed effects. Columns 3 to 10 add a range of city characteristics interacted with century fixed effects. In order of inclusion, these are: cities' proximity to trade routes, imperial and market city status, Hanse and university cities, river and coastal access, and broad region fixed effects. Column 11 controls for a measure of the mean winter temperature in each cell-decade. Column 12 includes all controls at once. Standard errors are clustered at the 1×1 degree cell level. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A4: Conflicts and Council Elections – Dynamic Effects, Territory Level

Outcome: Pr(Citizens elect council)=1				
	t-20	t	t+10	t+20
Conflict (territory)	0.016 (0.036)	0.051** (0.023)	0.023 (0.021)	0.067 (0.041)
City FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Decade FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
City linear trend	yes	yes	yes	yes
Sample	first child	first child	first child	first child
Estimator	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
Observations	5,065	5,091	5,091	5,091
Cells	56	56	56	56
Outcome mean	0.023	0.023	0.024	0.024
K-P F-Stat	8.005	7.932	7.932	7.932

Note: 2SLS regressions of an indicator for whether citizens in a city elect their own city councils without intervention of the local ruler on an indicator for whether a conflict occurred in the city's group of cities with common territorial histories. Each column is a separate regression for a given timing of the outcome variable whereas conflict and instrument are always measured in t and $t - 10$, respectively. The unit of observation is a city-decade and the sample consists of German cities from 1290 to 1710. The first child sample includes cities which lie in a cell to which an instrument value has been assigned. Conflicts are instrumented by an indicator for whether the most connected noble in the cell had a female firstborn child in the decade before the conflict. The most connected noble is identified as the person with the most links in the family network of the German and European nobility. All regressions include city and decade fixed effects and a city-level linear time trend. Standard errors are clustered at the 1×1 degree cell level. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A5: Conflicts and Council Size – Additional Controls

	Outcome: Council Size											
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Conflict	2.135** (0.941)	2.112** (0.931)	2.186** (0.964)	1.954* (1.006)	1.962** (0.874)	2.022** (0.907)	2.125** (0.933)	2.111** (0.934)	2.112** (0.933)	2.208** (1.087)	2.112** (0.933)	2.156* (1.128)
City FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Decade FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
City linear trend	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Controls	None	Main	Trade	Imperial	Market	Hansa	University	River	Coast	Region	Temperature	All
Sample	first child	first child	first child	first child	first child	first child	first child	first child	first child	first child	first child	first child
Estimator	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
Observations	5,091	5,091	5,091	5,091	5,091	5,091	5,091	5,091	5,091	5,091	5,091	5,091
Cells	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56
Outcome mean	5.274	5.274	5.274	5.274	5.274	5.274	5.274	5.274	5.274	5.274	5.274	5.274
K-P F-Stat	14.771	14.945	15.907	15.017	15.091	14.596	14.968	14.863	14.690	12.860	14.464	12.326

Note: 2SLS regressions of the number of members of a city's council on an indicator for whether a conflict occurred in the city's 1×1 degree cell in a given decade. The unit of observation is a city-decade and the sample consists of German cities from 1290 to 1710. The first child sample includes cities which lie in a cell to which an instrument value has been assigned. Conflicts are instrumented by an indicator for whether the most connected noble in the cell had a female firstborn child in the decade before the conflict. The most connected noble is identified as the person with the most links in the family network of the German and European nobility. All regressions include city and decade fixed effects and a city-level linear time trend. Column 2 controls for cities' article page length in the Keyser books, interacted with century fixed effects. Columns 3 to 10 add a range of city characteristics interacted with century fixed effects. In order of inclusion, these are: cities' proximity to trade routes, imperial and market city status, Hanse and university cities, river and coastal access, and broad region fixed effects. Column 11 controls for a measure of the mean winter temperature in each cell-decade. Column 12 includes all controls at once. Standard errors are clustered at the 1×1 degree cell level. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A6: Conflicts and Council Size – Dynamic Effects

Outcome: Council Size				
	t-20	t	t+10	t+20
Conflict	0.980 (0.847)	2.135** (0.941)	1.505* (0.772)	1.073 (0.664)
City FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Decade FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
City linear trend	yes	yes	yes	yes
Sample	first child	first child	first child	first child
Estimator	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
Observations	5,065	5,091	5,091	5,091
Cells	56	56	56	56
Outcome mean	4.989	5.274	5.551	5.724
K-P F-Stat	14.896	14.771	14.771	14.771

Note: 2SLS regressions of the number of members of a city's council on an indicator for whether a conflict occurred in the city's 1×1 degree cell in a given decade. Each column is a separate regression for a given timing of the outcome variable whereas conflict and instrument are always measured in t and $t - 10$, respectively. The unit of observation is a city-decade and the sample consists of German cities from 1290 to 1710. The first child sample includes cities which lie in a cell to which an instrument value has been assigned. Conflicts are instrumented by an indicator for whether the most connected noble in the cell had a female firstborn child in the decade before the conflict. The most connected noble is identified as the person with the most links in the family network of the German and European nobility. All regressions include city and decade fixed effects and a city-level linear time trend. Standard errors are clustered at the 1×1 degree cell level. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A7: Conflicts and Council Size – Dynamic Effects, Territory Level

Outcome: Council Size				
	t-20	t	t+10	t+20
Conflict (territory)	3.112 (2.520)	6.792** (3.191)	4.788** (2.166)	3.414 (2.068)
City FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Decade FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
City linear trend	yes	yes	yes	yes
Sample	first child	first child	first child	first child
Estimator	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
Observations	5,065	5,091	5,091	5,091
Cells	56	56	56	56
Outcome mean	4.989	5.274	5.551	5.724
K-P F-Stat	8.005	7.932	7.932	7.932

Note: 2SLS regressions of the number of members of a city's council on an indicator for whether a conflict occurred in the city's group of cities with common territorial histories. Each column is a separate regression for a given timing of the outcome variable whereas conflict and instrument are always measured in t and $t - 10$, respectively. The unit of observation is a city-decade and the sample consists of German cities from 1290 to 1710. The first child sample includes cities which lie in a cell to which an instrument value has been assigned. Conflicts are instrumented by an indicator for whether the most connected noble in the cell had a female firstborn child in the decade before the conflict. The most connected noble is identified as the person with the most links in the family network of the German and European nobility. All regressions include city and decade fixed effects and a city-level linear time trend. Standard errors are clustered at the 1×1 degree cell level. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A8: Conflicts and Types of Public Buildings – Excluding Religious Wars

	Outcome: Pr(Building Type Present)=1		
	Military (1)	Secular (2)	Religious (3)
Conflict	0.027* (0.015)	-0.043 (0.044)	-0.011 (0.019)
City FE	yes	yes	yes
Decade FE	yes	yes	yes
City linear trend	yes	yes	yes
Sample	first child	first child	first child
Estimator	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
Observations	3,713	3,713	3,713
Cells	46	46	46
Outcome mean	0.599	0.568	0.825
K-P F-Stat	10.864	10.864	10.864

Note: 2SLS regressions of an indicator for whether different types of public buildings are present on an indicator for whether a conflict occurred in the city's 1×1 degree cell in a given decade. The unit of observation is a city-decade and the sample consists of German cities from 1290 to 1710. The first child sample includes cities which lie in a cell to which an instrument value has been assigned. Conflicts are instrumented by an indicator for whether the most connected noble in the cell had a female firstborn child in the decade before the conflict. The most connected noble is identified as the person with the most links in the family network of the German and European nobility. All regressions include city and decade fixed effects and a city-level linear time trend. Standard errors are clustered at the 1×1 degree cell level. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A9: Conflicts and Complex Taxes – Dynamic Effects, Territory Level

Outcome: Number of Complex Taxes				
	t-20	t	t+10	t+20
Conflict (territory)	0.014 (0.098)	0.037 (0.174)	0.024 (0.114)	0.255* (0.131)
City FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Decade FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
City linear trend	yes	yes	yes	yes
Sample	first child	first child	first child	first child
Estimator	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
Observations	5,065	5,091	5,091	5,091
Cells	56	56	56	56
Outcome mean	0.241	0.256	0.271	0.269
K-P F-Stat	8.005	7.932	7.932	7.932

Note: 2SLS regressions of the number of complex taxes on an indicator for whether a conflict occurred in the city's group of cities with common territorial histories. Each column is a separate regression for a given timing of the outcome variable whereas conflict and instrument are always measured in t and $t - 10$, respectively. The unit of observation is a city-decade and the sample consists of German cities from 1290 to 1710. The first child sample includes cities which lie in a cell to which an instrument value has been assigned. Conflicts are instrumented by an indicator for whether the most connected noble in the cell had a female firstborn child in the decade before the conflict. The most connected noble is identified as the person with the most links in the family network of the German and European nobility. All regressions include city and decade fixed effects and a city-level linear time trend. Standard errors are clustered at the 1×1 degree cell level. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A10: Conflicts and Complex Taxes – Dynamic Effects, Excluding Religious Wars

Outcome: Number of Complex Taxes				
	t-20	t	t+10	t+20
Conflict	0.009 (0.032)	0.037 (0.055)	0.019 (0.025)	0.148*** (0.051)
City FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Decade FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
City linear trend	yes	yes	yes	yes
Sample	first child	first child	first child	first child
Estimator	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
Observations	3,684	3,713	3,713	3,713
Cells	46	46	46	46
Outcome mean	0.229	0.247	0.263	0.256
K-P F-Stat	10.922	10.864	10.864	10.864

Note: 2SLS regressions of the number of complex taxes on an indicator for whether a conflict occurred in the city's 1×1 degree cell in a given decade (excluding religious wars). Each column is a separate regression for a given timing of the outcome variable whereas conflict and instrument are always measured in t and $t - 10$, respectively. The unit of observation is a city-decade and the sample consists of German cities from 1290 to 1710. The first child sample includes cities which lie in a cell to which an instrument value has been assigned. Conflicts are instrumented by an indicator for whether the most connected noble in the cell had a female firstborn child in the decade before the conflict. The most connected noble is identified as the person with the most links in the family network of the German and European nobility. All regressions include city and decade fixed effects and a city-level linear time trend. Standard errors are clustered at the 1×1 degree cell level. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A11: The Long Shadow of Medieval Constitutionalism

Outcome: Difference in Tax Capacity Between Winner and Loser								
	Sum of all complex taxes				No. complex taxes in most complex city			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
1450-1499	1.908 (2.458)	1.908 (2.460)	5.045*** (1.093)	4.990*** (1.050)	0.104 (0.471)	0.104 (0.471)	0.017 (0.193)	0.036 (0.189)
1500-1549	-6.257 (6.875)	0.056 (5.874)	12.249* (7.195)	21.568*** (6.897)	-1.236 (1.015)	-0.236 (1.009)	1.299 (0.787)	1.710** (0.767)
1550-1599	-14.909*** (5.320)	-14.909*** (5.322)	9.231* (5.279)	9.952* (5.398)	-3.343*** (0.796)	-3.343*** (0.796)	0.485 (1.129)	0.339 (1.190)
1600-1649	23.948** (12.124)	36.556*** (1.910)	16.399** (8.093)	5.898 (10.238)	1.514 (1.179)	2.639*** (0.426)	0.691 (0.830)	-1.123 (1.003)
1650-1699	34.520*** (11.298)	34.520*** (11.303)	22.444*** (7.280)	22.039** (9.525)	4.228*** (1.629)	4.228** (1.630)	3.582*** (0.955)	2.896*** (1.017)
1700-1749	91.507*** (3.628)	91.507*** (3.629)	73.661*** (7.722)	73.891*** (10.192)	5.686*** (0.340)	5.686*** (0.341)	3.490*** (0.794)	2.800*** (0.940)
Excl. relig. wars		yes		yes		yes		yes
Territory FE			yes	yes			yes	yes
Observations	289	279	275	268	289	279	275	268
Outcome mean	63.170	64.953	66.927	67.552	6.163	6.319	6.531	6.571

Note: Regressions using the subsample of cities that switch from one territory to another during times of war. The outcome variable is the difference in tax capacity between the territory which gains a city and that of the territory which loses a city. In columns 1 to 4, tax capacity is measured using the sum of all complex taxes levied in cities in the territory. In columns 5 to 8, it is measured using the number of complex taxes in the city with the largest number of such taxes in the territory. Each row reports the coefficient from an indicator that the city switched territory in the given time period (half century). The omitted period is 1400-1449. Standard errors are clustered by city. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.