War, Trade, and the Roots of Representative Governance[*]

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Abstract

This paper evaluates the historical roots of representative forms of governance. We argue that the two most important representative institutions invented in medieval Europe—communes and parliaments—emerged in a sequenced bargain over war and trade. Communes emerged first, when merchants offered attractive enough sums in exchange for rights of self-government. In the process, communes became important new actors in tax collection (given the absence of tax-collecting bureaucracies). Soon after, monarchs sought to reduce their costs of negotiating the "extraordinary" taxes that financed their wars. Rather than negotiate individually with each of their newly important towns, they summoned urban representatives to their pre-existing noble councils, creating parliaments. Exploiting two new panel datasets, our empirical analyses document how war and trade combined to motivate the formation first of communes and then of parliaments.

Keywords

Self-Governing Cities, Origins of Parliaments, State Formation, Representative Institutions

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Among historians, the single most common explanation for the birth of parliaments in medieval Europe is the monarch's need to finance warfare. Such ideas go back to the early 20th century (see the review by Dhondt 1950), are still prominent today (see Graves 2001), and can be viewed as a special case of Tilly's (1990) more general thesis that "war made the state."

In this paper, we seek to understand parliaments by considering their predecessors—the councils of nobles convened by rulers throughout Eurasia (Ahmed and Stasavage 2020). We aim to explain why European rulers summoned urban representatives to join their councils, transforming them into what are generally called parliaments, whereas nothing similar occurred elsewhere in Eurasia.

Our argument hinges on a strong empirical regularity that we dub the "no communes, no urban representatives" rule: rulers summoned urban representatives to their pre-existing noble councils *only after* they had fostered (or tolerated) the creation of self-governing cities (aka communes). Pirenne (1946) suggests that European monarchs wished to incorporate communes into their realms (p. 180) and therefore called "the burghers into the councils of prelates and nobles with whom they conferred upon their affairs" (p. 220). As van Zanden et al. (2012: 847) put it, the "key event…that lead to the formation of parliaments, was the communal movement."

But why did European rulers allow communes to form in the first place? Our answer centers on how war and trade affected the market for governance. Post-Carolingian Europe was unique among Eurasian regions in that many weak rulers sold rights of governance—initially just to nobles, but eventually to non-noble merchants as well. Urban elites valued the right to govern their own towns because this protected their trade profits against predatory monarchs and lords (as we explain below) and gave them the opportunity to extract rents (e.g., by restricting entry and levying tolls). During medieval Europe's Commercial Revolution (Lopez 1971), surging trade both enriched merchant elites and—for reasons we discuss below—caused them to value governance rights more than

nobles. Thus, merchants were increasingly able and willing to outbid their competitors for urban governance rights. At the same time, monarchs were increasingly willing to sell their rights of urban governance—partly because warfare increased their demand for immediate funds. Thus, communes (i.e., towns with rights of self-government) were born in a grand bargain over trade profits and war financing.

Once established, communes became key players in assenting to and collecting royal taxes, especially the "extraordinary" taxes that financed warfare. Thus, where monarchs had previously consulted only with their great feudatories—whose assistance in collecting extraordinary taxes was essential—they now expanded their councils by adding representatives of the Third Estate, giving rise to parliaments.

We empirically evaluate our argument in two parts. We first introduce a new dataset (building on Guiso et al. 2016) that covers 145 Italian towns from 1000 to 1599, documenting each town's exposure to nearby warfare, urban potential, and communal status. Italy is an appropriate setting because the communal revolution started there; it displays considerable North-South institutional variety; and it has systematic data availability. In our regression analysis, which controls for a battery of potential confounders, we show that communal births were systematically related to a town's recent exposure to war and to its trade potential.

To investigate the birth of parliaments, by which we mean the addition of urban representatives to pre-existing noble councils, we compile a new dataset covering 37 territorial monarchies in Europe from 1000 to 1599. We identify participation by these polities in nearly 850 unique conflicts, producing the most systematic data on medieval conflict participation available. After documenting that parliaments emerged only after communes did, we show that parliamentary births were

systematically related to each polity's participation in war and to the average trade potential of its major towns (and demonstrate that our results are robust).

Our main theoretical contributions are to shift from an exclusive focus on monarchs' incentives toward an analysis of how monarchs and merchants arrived at mutually beneficial exchanges in the market for governance rights; and to shift from an exclusive focus on the national level toward an analysis of how prior developments at the local level influenced when monarchs expanded their councils. Empirically, we offer what we believe to be the first quantitative analysis of how war and trade affected the emergence of representative institutions at *both* the local and national levels.

In the rest of the paper, we first examine the noble councils out of which parliaments grew, the incentives of monarchs and merchants, and how royal ask prices and mercantile bid prices were determined in the market for urban governance rights. We then empirically evaluate the acquisition of communal rights (the birth of communes) and the acquisition of rights to send urban representatives to conciliar meetings (the birth of parliaments).

1. Governance Rights in Medieval Europe

1.1 Noble Councils

When rulers faced elites with mobile wealth (Bates and Lien 1985; Congleton 2011) and/or informational advantages (Angelucci et al. 2017; Ahmed and Stasavage 2020), coercion yielded low revenue. Rulers thus preferred to negotiate, asking for voluntary contributions in exchange for promises that new revenues would be used wisely. Noble councils were the fora in which the necessary negotiations over "taxing and spending" were conducted. While such councils appeared throughout the world (Ahmed and Stasavage 2020), they evolved in Europe in a unique way.

Europe's feudal rulers lacked central tax-collecting bureaucracies and armies. To secure assistance in collecting taxes and waging wars, they offered packages of governance rights

(hereditary lordships) in exchange for military and tax-collecting services. In contrast, major rulers elsewhere in Eurasia had tax-collecting bureaucracies and armies, and never allowed hereditary nobilities to take root (Mitterauer 2009: ch. 4).

As Europe's economy monetized during the Commercial Revolution, actors increasingly offered money (rather than service) in exchange for the monarch's grant of governance rights (Sharma 2015: 159, 165; Nader 1990: ch. 4). Relatedly, non-noble merchants entered the market, purchasing rights to govern their towns. When self-governing cities became numerous and rich enough, European monarchs brought representatives from those cities into their councils—thereby putting their realms on a path where electoral (and other selection) processes, as well as notions of representation, had to be developed. In the rest of this section, we elaborate on the overview just given.

1.2 Merchants' Incentives

Given the importance we attach to the prior emergence of self-governing towns in the birth of parliaments, a key question concerns what merchant elites hoped to gain by purchasing rights to govern their towns. We argue that merchants sought to wrest the legal authority to regulate and tax trade within their towns from the hands of monarchs and lords (where it initially resided). Doing so both protected them from royal and lordly predation within their town and gave them the opportunity to extract rents themselves.

To explain the protective value of acquiring legal control over trade, consider three types of predation by monarchs and lords to which merchants were exposed. First, monarchs lacking tax-collecting bureaucracies sold rights of collection to tax farmers, who then had strong incentives to extract as much as they could. The notoriously predatory sheriffs in Robin Hood's England are a case in point (Angelucci et al. 2017). To escape the risks of having urban taxes farmed by external

actors, town charters typically included the right to farm the town's taxes or otherwise gave towns a say in levying and administering "extraordinary" taxes (Charbonnier 1985; Angelucci et al. 2017).

Second, another pan-European form of predation involved arbitrary tolls. A famous example involved the medieval "robber barons" who taxed goods shipped on the Rhine River (Pfeiffer 1977). More generally, the eminent historian Stephan Epstein (2000: 50) depicted excessive tolls as "the main obstacle to growth in the feudal economy…"

Third, lords (or their agents) frequently appropriated usage rights over their subjects' property (with no or below-market compensation). For example, the Archbishop of Cologne seized a merchant's vessel for personal use in 1074, whereupon the aggrieved merchant organized a revolt that led to the formation of a commune there (Kowaleski 2006: ch. 16). In Italy, several communes were born as revolts against the arbitrary or tyrannical rule of bishops (Scott 2012: 20-1).

Generalizing beyond these specific examples, it is important to note that merchants faced risks of predation both during manufacture and all along the route upon which they shipped their goods. Their own ruler might tax goods as they exited town or collect tolls at booths erected on the roads. Once their goods reached the next principality, merchants faced further tariffs and transport fees. This process continued until the goods reached their final market. Merchants' exposure to many kinds of taxation at different locations (and sometimes by different authorities) meant that all mechanisms protecting their goods against predation by monarchs and lords—including rights of self-government and representation in parliament—were complements.[1]

[1] Communal and parliamentary rights would be worthless if confiscation was certain at some other trade node. In practice, however, no monarch or lord wanted to predate so much that trade dried up. Thus, acquiring communal rights alone, or parliamentary rights alone, had value.

When merchant elites purchased a town charter—creating a town council and town courts which they would dominate—they protected themselves against “in town” predation by their own monarch (see Gelderblom 2013; Cox 2017). When a particular town gained representation in a national parliament, its merchants could lobby against “out of town” predation, such as currency debasement (Blockmans 1997: 60; van Zanden 2012: 846) and arbitrary transport fees (Blockmans 1997: 40-1; Lopez 1966: 265). Finally, merchants typically negotiated “safe passage” rights with the rulers of other domains through which their merchandise had to pass (e.g., *Geleitrecht* in the Holy Roman Empire). While foreign sovereigns might renege on safe passage agreements, communes could and did form leagues (e.g., the Hanseatic League) to bargain collectively for more favorable treatment of member cities’ merchants (Spruyt 1994).

In addition to protecting themselves from royal and lordly rent extraction, merchants valued regulatory and tax authority because it enabled them to extract rents for their own benefit. Examples of urban rent extraction included exploitative regulation of craft guilds (Pirenne 1910: 160-1), barriers to entry (Stasavage 2014), and local tolls (Epstein 2000).

1.3 Ask and Bid Prices for Governance Rights

We focus on exchanges in which monarchs offered urban governance rights in return for money. Bidders typically offered a lump sum initial payment, followed by annual payments to renew their rights (Angelucci et al. 2017). We envision communes as emerging when merchant elites’ bids in the market for urban governance rights exceeded both the monarch’s ask price and rival bids from local nobles.

The monarch’s ask price for the right to govern a particular town could be driven down by several considerations. First, when wars erupted, monarchs needed ready money. Lacking the power to levy taxes unilaterally, and often the creditworthiness to borrow, monarchs could raise money by

selling the right to farm taxes or dispense justice (thereby converting future streams of income into immediate payments). Second, when monarchs sought to populate newly conquered lands, they often gave governance rights to frontier towns in order to attract settlers (Downing 1989: 222). Third, monarchs might grant rights to urban elites in order to enlist their support in a broader struggle against the nobility (Downing 1989: 217). Fourth, if merchants could move to another principality, then the monarch might grant them rights in order to prevent his golden geese from fleeing (Gelderblom 2013; Cox 2017). In our empirical analyses, we place the most emphasis on the first, war-related, reason that monarchs sold governance rights.

On the bid side of the market were local nobles (offering military service and political support) and town merchants (offering money). As the Commercial Revolution progressed, the merchants' bid prices should have increased relative to the local nobility's, for four main reasons. First, as trade expanded, merchants became wealthier and their demand for governance rights accordingly increased (a standard income effect). Here, our argument is similar to Pirenne's (1946) classic thesis. Second, as the economy monetized, merchants' cash became increasingly valuable relative to the military labor offered by the landed nobility (Finer 1997, vol. II: 952). Third, merchants should have valued urban governance rights more than lords, because they could combine such rights with a wider array of complementary assets (e.g., trading networks, machinery) than the nobility. For example, Pirenne (1946: 202) stresses that merchants greatly valued (the right to build) town walls, since such walls protected their physical capital. In contrast, rural lords had a smaller share of their assets in town and were thus less concerned with the right to make decisions about town defense. Fourth, the medieval legal revolution—specifically, the re-purposing of the Roman corporation (see Berman 1983)—allowed urban elites to pool their capital in order to bid for governance rights.

We do not mean to imply that towns always obtained their rights via voluntary exchanges. Both monarchs and merchants could resort to violence. For example, the Northern Italian cities coerced the emperor's recognition of their communal rights (van Zanden 2009: 51), and rulers on rare occasions forcibly rescinded communal rights. Thus, "willingness to pay" included the willingness to bear the costs of fighting.

1.4 A Model of Towns Acquiring Communal Rights

Our discussion thus far suggests that town i will acquire communal rights in year t from the relevant monarch if the monarch's ask price for governance rights, ask_{it}, is less than the town's bid price, bid_{it}.[2] We model the ask price as $ask_{it} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 War_{it} + \varepsilon_{ask,it}$, where γ_0 is the expected price during peacetime, $\gamma_1 < 0$ (war increases the monarch's demand for immediate funds and thus lowers the ask price), and $\varepsilon_{ask,it}$ is a mean-zero error. Similarly, we model the bid price as $bid_{it} = \tau_0 + \tau_1 Trade_{it} + \varepsilon_{bid,it}$, where τ_0 is the expected bid of a non-trading town, $\tau_1 > 0$ (trade increases the town's demand for self-government for the reasons discussed above, and thus increases the bid), and $\varepsilon_{bid,it}$ is a mean-zero error assumed to be independent of $\varepsilon_{ask,it}$.

Given these assumptions, the probability that town i will acquire communal rights in year t can be expressed as $\Pr[CommuneStart_{it}] = \Pr[ask_{it} < bid_{it}]$, where $CommuneStart_{it}$ is an indicator for the birth of a commune. Letting $\varepsilon_{it} = \varepsilon_{ask,it} - \varepsilon_{bid,it}$, and assuming ε_{it} is independently and identically distributed according to the cumulative distribution function F, we can rewrite as:

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[2] As described in the previous subsection, the Commercial Revolution should have increased the merchants' bid prices relative to the local nobility's. Our model thus assumes that the town's bid exceeds that of local lords.

$$\Pr[CommuneStart_{it}] = F[(\tau_0 + \tau_1 Trade_{it}) - (\gamma_0 + \gamma_1 War_{it})]$$
$$= F[(\tau_0 - \gamma_0) + \tau_1 Trade_{it} + (-\gamma_1) War_{it}] \quad (1)$$

We seek to operationalize this model, in which communal birth depends positively on both trade ($\tau_1 > 0$) and war ($-\gamma_1 > 0$), in the next section.

Note that the same basic model emerges if war also affects bid prices. For example, war should raise the value of urban fortifications, which in turn should raise merchants' bids for the rights to build, maintain, and patrol them. Adding the linear term War_{it} to the bid price equation (with coefficient $\tau_2 > 0$), and substituting, one gets another probit model in which the coefficient on War_{it} is $(\tau_2 - g_1)$, reflecting war's overall effect on the bid-ask spread.

Note also that a similar model emerges if one views the interaction between crown and town as a bilateral Nash bargain. The element of monopoly on both sides of the market did not change the fundamental fact that bid prices had to exceed ask prices.

Why didn't monarchs simply renege on their agreements to respect local governance rights? Since towns often obtained rights to build urban fortifications and take on public debt, both of which made it more costly for the Crown to retake them by force, urban governance deals could be fairly credible. Even when a monarch thought reconquest was feasible, a town might still retain its independence by renegotiating (e.g., increasing the annual fee it paid to renew its rights).

1.5 Parliaments

The next step in institutional evolution was adding urban representatives to the pre-existing noble councils, thereby creating parliaments. To understand why European monarchs took this step, recall that many taxes outside the royal demesne were collected by feudatories. The Europe-wide precept that the monarch could levy extraordinary taxes only with consent was underpinned not just by the lords' military prowess but also by their essential role in administering taxation (Herb 2003;

Stasavage 2016: 155). Since only lords played this role in the early medieval period, councils convened for the purpose of approving extraordinary taxes only needed to include them. Once communes purchased tax farms, securing their cooperation in administering new taxes became just as important as securing the cooperation of princely farmers.

Another reason that monarchs created parliaments was to reduce bargaining costs. Because monitoring tax collectors was extremely difficult (if not impossible) in this age, monarchs needed the active cooperation of their tax collectors. As more towns began to farm their own taxes, rulers faced increasing costs of negotiation with them. Thus, urban representatives were brought into existing councils, where a single bargain could be struck (Bates and Lien 1985: 56; Angelucci et al. 2017).[3]

Rulers who never allowed their cities to become self-governing never faced tax-based incentives to add urban representatives to their noble councils. In contrast, rulers who sanctioned autonomous cities quickly faced tax-based incentives to bring urban representatives into their councils. Thus, one can view parliaments as path-dependent creations stemming mainly from earlier princely decisions to create self-governing towns.

Given their strong need for new revenues, most monarchs were eager to convene a parliament, and willing to offer inducements, or threaten punishments, to secure attendance. Burghers, meanwhile, viewed parliaments as double-edged swords—promising some redress of grievances but at the cost of new taxes. In other words, our model can cover cases in which monarchs *demanded* that towns send representatives to parliament (negative ask price), while towns resisted (negative

[3] We do not expect towns that secured charters from nobles to have been summoned to parliament because lords typically could not confer farms on royal taxes.

bid price). In most cases, the towns acquiesced to their monarch's demand. In the unusual case of the Duchy of Milan, however, the towns were strong enough to resist the Duke's efforts to set up a potentially centralizing assembly (Chittolini 1989).[4]

1.6 Summary

We have argued that one of medieval Europe's key political innovations, self-governing cities, emerged when merchants' bid prices for urban governance rights exceeded both the monarch's ask price and competing bids from local lords. The main factor driving ask prices down was warfare, increasing the monarch's demand for ready money.[5] The main factor driving merchants' bid prices up was the expansion of trade, increasing merchants' demand for governance rights that could protect their profits and afford them rent-seeking opportunities.

Europe's other major representative innovation, parliaments, emerged as a way of dealing with the powerful new urban actors on the political scene. We agree with van Zanden et al. (2012: 848) that "a parliament was a way to integrate the communal movement into the power structure of the feudal state," but we put special emphasis on tax administration. The rest of the paper provides

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[4] We agree with Boucoyannis (2015) that parliaments were unlikely to arise if monarchs were too weak vis-à-vis their towns and lords. In addition to the over-powerful towns of north Italy, which prevented integrating parliaments, one can also point to the over-powerful nobility (szlachta) of Poland, who ensured that the Polish Diet never had the right to make decisions by majority vote.

[5] Although money was not as crucial to winning wars as it was to become after 1500 (Gennaioli and Voth 2015), there are two clear indicators of its early and increasing importance: (i) the emergence and growing importance of mercenary companies; and (ii) the invention and growth of public debt by city-states.

evidence for our account by documenting the role of war and trade in the birth of communes and the subsequent summoning of urban representatives to parliament.

2. Birth of Communes in Europe

A central assumption of our analysis is that merchants possessed an array of assets that were complementary inputs in producing trade profits. In particular, each town's merchants possessed (i) a geographical endowment; (ii) human capital (e.g., a network of trading connections); (iii) physical capital (e.g., machinery); (iv) mechanisms to protect themselves against their own sovereign's predation (both "in town" and "out of town"); and (v) mechanisms to protect their goods-in-transit against "out of town" predation by other monarchs and lords. Whenever any one of these inputs improved in quality, the affected town's merchants should have increased their demand for improvements in all complementary inputs.

For example, towns with trade-favoring endowments should have been more likely to obtain communal rights. Consistent with this expectation, the communal movement began in the two most important trading regions of 11th- and 12th-century Europe—Northern Italy and the Low Countries. The Northern Italians trans-shipped goods coming from China and India via the Middle East (Abu-Lughod 1989). Flemish merchants trans-shipped Baltic grain and English wool (van Tielhof 2002; van Zanden 2009). A similar pattern was evident within polities. In England, for example, Angelucci et al. (2017: 3) find that rights of governance "were particularly likely to be granted to royal boroughs with geographic characteristics conducive to trade." In Europe more broadly, Blaydes and Paik (2016: 575-8) find that communal rights endured for longer periods in towns that acquired trading connections to the Middle East during the Crusades. In Appendix Table A.1, we offer additional pan-European evidence that trade suitability predicted the acquisition of communal rights.

3. War, Trade, and Commune Births in Italy

The results just cited usefully confirm the generalization, made by historians such as Lopez (1966), that trading towns were at the forefront of the communal movement. However, they do not provide a test of our model, since they focus solely on trade and ignore warfare. In this section, we construct a dataset that allows us to test our model.

Our dataset extends the work of Guiso et al. (2016), who provide the years in which a large sample of Italian towns acquired communal rights, to include time-varying assessments of each town's exposure to nearby warfare and urban potential. The result is an annual panel dataset covering 145 Italian towns over the period 1000-1599 that enables us to fully operationalize the model in Equation (1) above. Italy is a fitting setting because it is where the communal revolution started; it is characterized by considerable institutional variety from North to South; and systematic data are available for it.

For roughly two centuries, the pope and the emperor struggled for influence in North-Central Italy, with crescendos during the Investiture Conflict (1076-1122) and the period of the Lombard League (1167-1250). The pope wooed the emperor's towns as allies, and the towns sought to use the pope's support to leverage freedoms from their emperor (Hyde 1973: 49-53; Jones 1997: 134; Guiso et al. 2016: 5-6). For example, after the Lombard League defeated the emperor at the Battle of Legnano in 1176, the Peace of Constance stipulated that the League's cities would retain droit de régale over their own territories.

3.1 Data

Our dependent variable, $CommuneStart_{it}$, takes the value 1 for the year in which town i became a commune, the value 0 for years before this, and missing values thereafter.[6] We follow Belloc et al. (2016: 1896) by treating the birth of a commune as an absorbing state: once a town becomes a commune, it drops out of the sample.

Our first variable of interest is each town's conflict exposure. In particular, we coded a series of variables, $ConflictExposure_{i(t-p,t-1)}$, that equal the share of years between $t-p$ and $t-1$ in which town i was exposed to any recorded military conflict within 100 km. We use three different values for p—10, 20, or 25 years.

Whenever battles raged nearby, a town either entered as a combatant or became an armed neutral. If the town fought *against* its own sovereign, usually the emperor, then victory could bring greater local control. If the town fought *with* its own sovereign, it could demand local control as the price for its support. Finally, if a town remained neutral, it could exploit its possible entry into the conflict as leverage to bargain for local control. In addition to increasing their leverage, warfare increased each town's demand for local self-governance, so that it could better maintain its own walls and militia. All told, then, exposure to war should have increased the town's bid price. On the emperor's side, Italian wars increased his demand for military resources to continue quelling rebellious cities and counteract the pope, thereby lowering his ask price.

To identify specific conflict locations, we rely primarily on Jaques (2007). We describe this source in detail in Section 5. For now, we note simply that Jaques provides systematic information

[6] We treat missing observations for the commune variable in Guiso et al. (2016) as evidence that towns did not acquire communal rights.

on the locations of all major recorded conflicts in medieval Italy. We also draw on two alternative sources for historical conflict data, Bradbury (2004) and Clodfelter (2002), adding any non-overlapping conflicts in medieval Italy to the Jaques data.

To proxy for local trade, our second variable of interest, we added data on each town's urban potential, computed as the natural logarithm of the distance-weighted sum of the population of all other Christian towns in Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa per century. This variable, taken from Bosker et al. (2013), is the most systematic time-varying proxy of local trade available for the medieval era. We discuss this measure in detail in Section 5.

3.2 Methodology and Main Results

We have run the following linear probability model on our annual data (which we prefer to logistic regression due to the ease of interpretation):

$$CommuneStart_{it} = \beta_1 ConflictExposure_{i(t-p,t-1)} + \beta_2 Ln(UrbanPotential_{it}) + \alpha_i + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

We have described the dependent variable $CommuneStart_{it}$ and independent variables $ConflictExposure_{i(t-p,t-1)}$ and $Ln(UrbanPotential_{it})$ above. Here, α_i and λ_t represent town and year fixed effects. Town fixed effects account for time-invariant local geographical features (e.g., being a riverport, seaport, or Roman road hub, along with North-South regional location) and economic, cultural, institutional, and social conditions at the start of the sample period in the year 1000. Year fixed effects account for widespread shocks (e.g., population dynamics due to plague) over time. The standard errors are robust and clustered at the town level.

Our main results, displayed in Models 1 to 3 of Table 1, show that both warfare and trade were systematically related to the formation of communes in Italy. Specifically, we estimate that a town exposed to continuous local warfare during the previous quarter-century had a per-year probability

of a commune birth 3.1 percentage points higher than a town that experienced no local warfare (Model 3). To appreciate what this magnitude means, suppose that the peaceful town had no chance of becoming a commune. In this case, the war-exposed town's probability of becoming a commune at some time in its quarter-century of conflict exposure would have been 54 percent.[7]

Meanwhile, a one standard deviation increase in urban potential increased the chance of a commune birth by 0.4 percentage points (Model 3)—consistent with the "close correlation" Blockmans (1989: 752) observes in a series of case studies. This effect would also have compounded if applied continuously over a number of years.

Which of the three periods of time we use to calculate conflict exposure is best? Theoretically, we would like to use a value of p that corresponds to how long rulers suffered fiscal hangovers after warfare. Given the ever-expanding expense of conflicts, and the innovation of long-term debt financing by the Italian towns during the period we study, we think that the 25-year period is likely to be the best. Consistent with this conjecture, the coefficient on conflict exposure increases in value as we extend p from 10 to 20, and again from 20 to 25 (Models 1 to 3).

[7] The per-year probability of commune birth was 0.031, so the probability of surviving 25 years as a non-commune would have been $(1-0.031)^{25}=0.455$.

Table 1: War, Trade, and Commune Establishment: Town Level across Italy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Dependent variable					*CommuneStart*				
Conflict exposure (previous 10 years)	0.009**								
	(0.004)								
Conflict exposure (previous 20 years)		0.019***							
		(0.006)							
Conflict exposure (previous 25 years)			0.031***	0.023***	0.031***	0.030***	0.021***	0.032***	0.025***
			(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Ln(Urban potential)	0.004***	0.004***	0.004***	0.003***	0.004***	0.004***	0.004***	0.004***	0.008***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Bologna x 1100s				-0.002***					
				(0.000)					
Earthquake exposure					-0.000				
					(0.000)				
Earthquake x Bishop seat					-0.001				
					(0.001)				
Bishop seat x 1100s						0.003***			
						(0.001)			
Cluny x 1100s							-0.001***		
							(0.000)		
Crusader x 1200s								0.006	
								(0.005)	
Ln(Urban potential) (Muslim)									0.012***
									(0.002)
Town FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared (within)	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.040	0.037	0.038	0.040	0.037	0.038
Observations	62,289	60,839	60,114	60,114	60,114	60,114	60,114	60,114	60,114
Number of towns	145	145	145	145	145	145	145	145	145

Notes: Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is town-year. Sample period is 1000-1599. Dependent variable is year of commune establishment in town i. Robust standard errors clustered at town level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

3.3 Robustness

Belloc et al. (2017) argue that new university-level legal training in North-Central Italy starting in the late 11th century improved access to the knowledge needed to craft effective communal agreements. To control for this factor, we interact the distance from each town to Bologna with a century fixed effect for the 1100s in Model 4 of Table 1. Both $ConflictExposure_{it}$ and $Ln(UrbanPotential_{it})$ remain positively signed and statistically significant.

Belloc et al. (2016) argue that, as expressions of "God's outrage," earthquakes improved the legitimacy of bishops in medieval North-Central Italy, making communal births less likely. To account for such natural disasters, we interact the presence of an earthquake in a town with a binary variable for whether the town was a bishop's seat by the year 1000 in Model 5.[8] The main results are robust.

Schulz (2019) argues that the Catholic Church's major prohibition on cousin marriage in the 11th century reduced the importance of kin networks and promoted oath-based networks. To account for Church exposure, we interact the binary variable for whether a town was a bishop's seat with a century fixed effect for the 1100s in Model 6. The main results continue to hold.

Doucette and Møller (2021) argue that the Cluniac reform movement in the 11th century gave rise to a new coalition between clergy and townspeople that promoted communal development. To control for this movement, we interact the distance from each town to Cluny with a century fixed effect for the 1100s in Model 7. The main results remain robust.

[8] Following Belloc et al., we take earthquake data from the Italian National Institute for Geophysics and Volcanology. The data on bishop's seats are from Guiso et al. (2016).

Blaydes and Paik (2016) analyze the influence of the Holy Land Crusades on urban development in Europe. To control for exposure to the Crusades, we interact the number of crusaders in the First to Fourth Crusades (1096-1204) that came from within 100 km of each town with a century fixed effect for the 1200s in Model 8. The main results continue to be robust.

To account for Italian towns' Islamic trade (Findlay and O'Rourke 2007: 44-5), we include a variable for each town's Muslim urban potential (from Bosker et al. 2013) in Model 9. Our main results remain robust.

Finally, to show that our baseline choice of radius ($r = 100\ km$) does not drive our results, we employ both smaller ($r = 50\ km$) and larger ($r = 200\ km$) radii in Appendix Table A.2. Similarly, given the relative infrequency of commune births, we repeat the analysis using 10-year and 20-year data averages in Appendix Table A.3. The results are robust across both checks.

3.4 Related Work

The only previous quantitative studies of commune births that we know of are Belloc et al. (2016, 2017) and Doucette and Møller (2021). Blaydes and Paik (2016) and Schulz (2019) focus on the *durability* of communes (see above). Becker et al. (2018) focus on the *quality* of representation, showing that medieval German cities exposed to greater conflict were more likely to have elected independent town councils.

4. No Communes, No Urban Representatives

Across Eurasia, no urban representatives were ever summoned to join a monarch's councils absent pre-existing communes. This was of course true outside Europe, where neither self-governing cities nor parliaments ever emerged. But the "no communes, no urban representatives" rule also held true within Europe.

To document this claim, we identified all European polities that satisfied the following four criteria: (i) the polity became sovereign before 1200; (ii) it survived as a sovereign entity at least 200 years and disappeared (if it ever did) after 1200; (iii) it exceeded a minimum size threshold; and (iv) it was located in either Latin or Orthodox Christendom. Operationally, we first combined the polity lists from Stasavage (2010), van Zanden et al. (2012), and Wikipedia.[9] Using this master list, we determined whether each polity satisfied our four criteria. This yielded 44 polities—37 territorial monarchies and 7 city-states—as listed in Table 2. Since our argument centers on the addition of urban representatives to noble councils, we focus our main analysis on the territorial monarchies, including the city-states in a robustness check only.

To match towns to sample polities, we used two different methods—one based on NUTS territorial units (Eurostat 2015), and one on historical maps from Euratlas (Nussli 2010). Appendix B describes both matching methods. The main benefit of the NUTS method—which we use in the text—is that it always captures towns that lay within its historical territorial nucleus over time. Thus, we are able to produce a balanced panel of town-polity matches.

Column 2 of Table 2 displays the number of "large" towns within each sample polity that had acquired communal rights prior to the first convening of a national parliament. This represents a lower bound on the number of pre-parliamentary communes, many of which were not "large" enough (defined per Bosker et al. 2013 as having a population exceeding 5,000 at some point from 1000 to 1600) to be included here. For our current purposes, the important point is simply that the

[9] See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_states_during_the_Middle_Ages; Access date: November 26, 2017.

numbers in column 2 are positive for all parliamentary polities, consistent with the "no communes, no urban representatives" rule.

Our account also suggests that the towns represented in parliament should have been mostly self-governing. These were the towns whose cooperation would have been the most important in collecting taxes. Moreover, these towns should have valued the out-of-town protections that parliaments potentially afforded. Thus, monarchs should have been more motivated to bring self-governing towns into parliament, and those towns should have perceived a larger silver lining (i.e., the opportunity to lobby) to offset the costs of sending representatives to parliament.

For example, in Castile, Flanders, Hungary, Portugal, and Scotland, *only* self-governing towns were called to parliament.[10] In the Duchy of Brabant, roughly three quarters of urban areas represented in parliament in the 14th century were self-governing and the rest enjoyed "liberties" such as the right to hold markets (Damen 2018). In England, most towns represented in parliament were self-governing (Angelucci et al. 2017: 4), and the rest enjoyed important liberties. In the Lordship of Ireland, the pattern repeats: all but two of the thirteen towns gaining representation in parliament before 1500 had charters, and the other two had liberties.[11]

[10] Sources: Castile (Procter 1980: 161); Flanders (Dhondt 1950); Hungary (Encyclopedia Britannica 1911: 906); Portugal (Millán da Costa 2018: 28); Scotland (MacDonald 2007: 11).

[11] See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Irish_House_of_Commons; Access date: August 8, 2019.

Table 2: Parliamentary Start Years: Polity Level across Europe

Panel A: Main Sample: Territorial Monarchies				
Polity	# Communes	Start	End	Exit
Aragon	3	1348		
Austria	6	1402		
Bavaria	6	1347		
Bohemia	6	1435		
Brabant	1	1312		
Brittany	1	1352		
Burgundy	3	1352		
Byzantine	0	Never		
Castile	8	1250	1632	
Catalonia	2	1228		
Denmark	1	1468	1660	
England	4	1265		
Flanders	5	1304		1550
France	49	1302		
Guelders	1	1423		
Hesse	1	1387		
Holland	10	1542		
Hungary	3	1397		
Ireland	1	1299		
Leon	1	1188		
Lorraine	1	1251	1629	
Naples	3	1444	1642	
Navarre	1	1355		
Palatinate	3	1505		
Papal States	18	1357		
Piedmont	6	1328	1560	
Poland	7	1468	1652	
Pomerania	4	1295		
Portugal	4	1254		1581
Prussia	13	1324	1627	
Sardinia	1	1355		
Saxony	6	1438		
Scotland	8	1326	1707	
Sicily	1	1283		
Sweden	1	1468	1680	
Valencia	7	1283		
Wurttemberg	4	1457		
Panel B: Extended Sample: City-States				
Polity	# Communes	Start	End	Exit
Cologne	1	1259		
Florence	1	1284	1494	1494
Genoa	1	1099		
Lucca	1	1160		
Milan	10	Never		
Siena	1	1176	1399	1399
Venice	1	1172		

Notes: For construction methods and source materials, see text and Appendices B and C.

5. Birth of Parliaments

Having explored the birth of communes, and documented the "no communes, no urban representatives" rule, we turn now to explore the birth of parliaments. That is, we investigate when European rulers added urban representatives to their pre-existing councils.

5.1 Parliamentary Start Years

We define the start of a parliament as the first year in which a national parliament met that included urban representatives and wielded tax authority. We count a parliament as wielding tax authority if and only if it had the right to approve or reject at least some important forms of extraordinary taxation by majority vote.

To identify parliamentary start years, we examined the polity-specific secondary sources listed in Stasavage's (2010) and van Zanden et al.'s (2012) supplementary appendices and, when necessary, other sources. The results of these efforts are the start dates listed in Table 2 (which also provides parliamentary end years, if any, and the year in which the polity exits our sample due to lost sovereignty, if ever). We provide detailed justifications for our coding decisions in Appendix C.

Our core sample of territorial monarchies is a third larger than the sample of 24 polities studied by Stasavage (2010); and is also larger than the sample of 32 polities investigated by van Zanden et al. (2012). Thus, our sample is among the most comprehensive available to date.[12]

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[12] Abramson and Boix (2019) compile data for assemblies irrespective of the presence of urban representatives. They thus include some councils that pre-date "parliaments" as Stasavage (2010), van Zanden et al. (2012), and we define them.

5.2 Conflict Participation

Bellicists explain the emergence of representative institutions in terms of the monarch's need to secure war financing. Finer (1997, vol. II: 1026), for example, notes that "the one perennial, common factor" in parliamentary birth was that "the kings and princes wanted to make war, the customary feudal dues to which they were entitled did not suffice," and they were required to seek consent to extraordinary taxation.

To investigate war's role systematically, we code each polity's annual conflict participation. Jacques' (2007) comprehensive historical compilation covers all conflicts with written documentation from at least two independent sources, and a consensus among sources on the main conflict details. While these inclusion criteria may overlook historical conflicts only known via oral history, this potential bias appears less severe for Europe than for other world regions (Jaques 2007: xiii). For each conflict, Jaques provided a standardized paragraph-long description, including date, major participants, and conflict type (e.g., land battle, naval battle). We included all conflicts, regardless of type and whether they took place in Europe or elsewhere.

The resulting dataset includes 848 unique conflicts in which at least one sample polity participated in over the 1000-1599 period. This provides the most systematic coverage of conflict participation by medieval European polities available to date.

5.3 Urban Potential

To proxy for trade, we computed the natural logarithm of the average Christian urban potential for all major towns in polity i in century t (using Bosker et al. 2013). To calculate this variable, we matched towns to sample polities according to the NUTS territorial units (Eurostat 2015).[13]

[13] The main results continue to hold for the Euratlas matching method (Appendix Table A.4).

We interpret each polity's average urban potential as a proxy for "towns who want representation in parliament in order to increase their influence over the regulation and taxation of trade." However, urban potential could also proxy for "towns who want representation in parliament for any reason." There is no conflict between the narrower and broader interpretations unless there were important reasons, other than the control of trade, that (i) motivated towns to demand parliamentary representation; and (ii) were correlated with urban potential. The most plausible such reason would be the desire to exert influence over royal successions. Since such a desire was common in early parliaments, we cannot be sure that the effect of urban potential is driven exclusively by the trade mechanism we highlight.

5.4 Methodology and Main Results

We have run linear probability regressions to estimate how warfare and trade affected the establishment of parliaments, using an estimating equation analogous to that we used for communes:

$$ParliamentStart_{it} = \beta_1 ConflictParticipation_{i(t-p,t-1)} + \beta_2 Ln(UrbanPotential_{it}) + \alpha_i + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (3)$$

Our dependent variable, $ParliamentStart_{it}$, takes the value 1 for the year in which polity i established a national parliament, 0 before, and turns missing thereafter. $ConflictParticipation_{i(t-p,t-1)}$ equals the share of years in which polity i participated in a military conflict over the previous 10, 20, or 25 years. $Ln(UrbanPotential_{it})$ measures urban potential. All regressions include polity and year fixed effects. Polity fixed effects help control for the geographical features of each polity (e.g., waterway access, terrain ruggedness, island status, physical size), along with starting conditions (e.g., economic, cultural, institutional, social) in the year 1000. Year fixed effects help control for common time shocks (e.g., population dynamics due to plague). The robust standard errors are clustered at the polity level.

Models 1 to 3 of Table 3 presents our main results. Polities that had fought more wars in the preceding 10, 20, or 25 years (lowering the monarch's ask price for parliamentary representation) were significantly more likely to form parliaments. Specifically, we estimate that a polity that had waged war continuously during the previous quarter-century had a per-year probability of parliamentary birth 3.4 percentage points higher than a polity that engaged in no wars (Model 3). To appreciate what this magnitude means, suppose that the peaceful polity had no chance of convening a parliament. In this case, the belligerent polity's probability of convening a parliament at some time in its quarter-century of war participation would have been 58 percent.[14] Thus, conflict had an effect on parliamentary birth similar to its effect on communal birth in Italy (see Section 3). Consistent with the notion that persistent conflict created larger fiscal hangovers for rulers, thus making parliamentary establishment more likely, the coefficient values for conflict exposure increase as we extend the period over which exposure is measured from 10 to 25 years.

We also find that polities whose cities had better trade potential (raising their bid prices for representation) were significantly more likely to form parliaments. A one standard deviation increase in urban potential increased the annual chance of a parliamentary birth by 1.3 percentage points (Model 3). This effect would also have compounded if applied continuously over a number of years.

[14] The per-year probability of parliamentary birth was 0.033, so the probability of surviving 25 years as a non-parliamentary polity would have been $(1 - 0.034)^{25} = 0.421$.

Table 3: War, Trade, and Parliamentary Establishment: Polity Level across Europe

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dependent variable			$ParliamentaryStart$		
Conflict participation (previous 10 years)	0.011** (0.005)				
Conflict participation (previous 20 years)		0.031** (0.012)			
Conflict participation (previous 25 years)			0.034** (0.014)	0.036** (0.014)	0.027* (0.014)
Ln(Urban potential)	0.015*** (0.004)	0.013*** (0.004)	0.013*** (0.005)	0.010* (0.005)	0.012*** (0.004)
Polity FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region trends	No	No	No	Yes	No
Include city-states	No	No	No	No	Yes
R-squared (within)	0.123	0.124	0.124	0.125	0.095
Observations	13,058	12,688	12,503	12,503	14,084
Number of polities	37	37	37	37	44

Notes: Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is polity-year. Sample period is 1000-1599. We restrict sample to polity-years in which polity i was sovereign. Robust standard errors clustered at polity level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

5.5 Robustness

Polity fixed effects control for polity-specific features that did not vary over time, while year fixed effects control for widespread shocks in a specific year. However, there may still have been unobserved time-varying confounders across Europe that influenced warfare or trade as well as parliamentary births. To help control for such potential confounders, we have included region-specific linear trends for four European regions (North, South, East, and West) in Model 4 of Table 3. The results remain statistically significant.

In Model 5, we re-run the main specifications for our extended polity sample that includes city-states (as listed in Table 2). The results continue to hold.

There are seven cases in which historians disagree on the exact year in which urban elites first gained representation in the ruler’s councils. We have re-run our main specification after replacing

the benchmark start years (in Table 2) with suggested alternatives one at a time in Appendix Table A.5. The results are remarkably robust.

Finally, we repeat our main analyses using 10-year and 20-year data averages in Appendix Table A.6. Our results remain statistically significant in all cases, except for the point estimate for conflict participation in the specification with the 10-year data average, in which the coefficient value is still positive, but just misses statistical significance.

5.6 Related Work

Our analysis in this section has focused on parliamentary start years—when urban representatives were first added to noble councils. Three recent studies investigate the frequency of parliamentary sittings in European polities. For the most part, their findings complement ours.

First, Abramson and Boix (2019) trace the "deep roots" of parliamentarism to urban conditions in 1200, the midpoint of the Commercial Revolution (per Lopez 1971). Our analysis would place the roots even further back, in the early Commercial Revolution's communal movement.

Second, based on a sample of 24 polities observed between 1250 and 1750, Stasavage (2016: 155) finds that monarchs convened parliaments more often when they fought more. Abramson and Boix (2019) similarly report a positive and statistically significant correlation between local conflict intensity and meeting frequency for the medieval assemblies they study. Møller (2017), based on a finer-grained examination of every instance in which early parliaments were convened in the Crown of Aragon between 1100 and 1327, finds a similar pattern, but only during "the crucial periods of constitutional development" (p. 177) after the assembly's initial foundation.[15]

[15] Møller (2017) argues that early cortes revolved around dynastic succession and land allocation rather than wars. By contrast, historians such as Hoppenbrouwers (2018: 34) view "the great cortes held…in…1225 and…1228 to raise money for an invasion…as a milestone."

Third, Magalhaes and Giovannoni (2019) investigate parliamentary sittings from 1350 to 1700 in Spain, Portugal, France, and England. Their main findings are consistent with our argument. First, parliaments were more likely to sit after military defeats—when monarchs had a strong demand for funds. Second, parliaments were more likely to sit when agricultural output was lower, implying lower revenue for the Crown (and thus lower ask prices).

6. Conclusion

We have argued that medieval Europe's innovations in political representation—mainly town councils and national parliaments—took form via transactions in the market for governance rights that characterized feudal societies. As trade revived in medieval Europe, urban elites pooled their capital (using the new legal technique of incorporation) in order to compete for governance rights with landed nobles. Communes—self-governing towns with their own councils, courts of justice, and tax collectors—emerged when urban elites' bids exceeded both local lords' bids and the monarch's reservation price.

The most important factor driving merchant elites' bids up was the *complementarity* of the inputs underpinning their profits. Merchants could profit only to the extent that they could combine their skills with a chain of protections for their merchandise during production, shipment to market, and sale. The better their skills, and the more attractive the trading opportunities they saw, the more highly merchants valued governance rights that could protect their manufacturing operations against extortionary regulation, their shipping operations against confiscatory tariffs and tolls, and their marketing operations against currency inflations and coin debasements. Thus, during the great medieval revival of trade, more and more urban elites bid for urban governance rights.

The most important factor driving monarchs' ask prices down was war. Warfare increased their demand for troops, which they could secure either via feudal levies or by paying mercenaries. As the economy monetized, and warfare intensified, monarchs increasingly sought monetary rather

than in-kind contributions, and lowered their ask prices in proportion to the fiscal stress under which their wars had placed them. When combined with increasing bids from merchant elites, the result was the communal revolution, the process by which hundreds of large (and many more small) towns across Europe acquired rights of self-government.

The next step in institutional development was to bring the new class of urban tax farmers and justice administrators into the monarch's pre-existing noble councils. Separate negotiations with each town were expensive and invited foot-dragging and free-riding. Thus, many monarchs preferred to summon their new urban tax farmers to great councils that grew out of the noble councils they had already been convening (Ahmed and Stasavage 2020). Consistent with this account, parliaments formed only in polities where important communes had previously emerged.

Elsewhere in Eurasia, Africa, and the Americas, we do not expect either war or trade to have similar effects to those we document here. While other parts of the pre-modern world experienced "warring states" eras (e.g., Hui 2005), and while tributary relationships and alliances might be viewed as akin to a market in governance rights, the delegation of administrative and judicial rights to incorporated cities was uniquely Western (Weber [1921] 1958). The Western corporation differed significantly from corporate organizations in the Islamic World (Kuran 2010), as well as from kin-based collective action in Asia (Greif and Tabellini 2017), and the possibility of forming political institutions that resembled communes was typically not on the menu of possibilities anywhere outside Europe in the pre-modern era. Thus, warring-states periods exclusively involved competition between sovereigns and nobles, and ended with the emergence or re-establishment of imperial hegemony (Kang 2020).

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Online Appendix
War, Trade, and the Roots of Representative Governance

Contents

Appendix A: Additional Tables
Appendix B: Town-Polity Matching Methods
Appendix C: Parliamentary Start Years: Polity Level across Europe
References

Appendix A: Additional Tables

Table A.1: Trade Determinants of Commune Establishment: Town Level across Europe

	(1)	(2)
Dependent variable	$CommuneStart$	
Riverport	0.083***	0.059***
	(0.018)	(0.016)
Seaport	-0.012	-0.025
	(0.019)	(0.017)
Terrain ruggedness	-0.019**	-0.021**
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Ln(Urban potential)	0.117***	0.094***
	(0.021)	(0.019)
Population (IHS)		0.067***
		(0.007)
Roman road hub		-0.030
		(0.020)
Bishop seat		0.051***
		(0.018)
University seat		0.171
		(0.110)
Century FE	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.127	0.201
Observations	3,074	3,074
Number of towns	686	686

Notes: Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is town-century. Sample period is 1000-1600. Dependent variable is century of commune establishment in city ***i*.** Robust standard errors clustered at town level in parentheses. Data source for all variables is Bosker et al. (2013). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.2: Alternative Conflict Radii: Town Level across Italy

	(1)	(2)
Dependent variable	$CommuneStart$	
Conflict exposure (50 km cutoff)	0.028*** (0.008)	
Conflict exposure (200 km cutoff)		0.026*** (0.006)
Ln(Urban potential)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)
Town FE	Yes	Yes
Period FE	Yes	Yes
R-squared (within)	0.037	0.038
Observations	60,114	60,114
Number of towns	145	145

Notes: Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is town-year. Sample period is 1000-1599. Dependent variable is year of commune establishment in town i. Conflict exposure computes share of years in which town i was exposed to a military conflict within 50 km over the previous 25 years in Model 1, and within 200 km in Model 2. Robust standard errors clustered at town level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.3: Data Averages: Town Level across Italy

	(1)	(2)
Dependent variable	$CommuneStart$	
Conflict exposure (previous 25 years)	0.225*** (0.069)	0.485*** (0.139)
Ln(Urban potential)	0.037*** (0.010)	0.070*** (0.018)
Data granularity	Decadal	Bi-Decadal
Town FE	Yes	Yes
Period FE	Yes	Yes
R-squared (within)	0.062	0.084
Observations	6,409	3,212
Number of towns	147	147

Notes: Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is town-decade in Model 1 and town-bi-decade (i.e., 20 years) in Model 2. Sample period is 1000-1599. Dependent variable is year of commune establishment in town i. Robust standard errors clustered at town level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.4: Euratlas Matching Method: Polity Level across Europe

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dependent variable		*AssemblyStart*	
Conflict participation (previous 10 years)	0.008*		
	(0.004)		
Conflict participation (previous 20 years)		0.031**	
		(0.012)	
Conflict participation (previous 25 years)			0.034**
			(0.014)
Ln(Urban potential)	0.020***	0.017***	0.017***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Polity FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared (within)	0.137	0.139	0.138
Observations	8,045	7,875	7,790
Number of polities	35	35	35

Notes: Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is polity-year. Sample period is 1000-1599. We restrict sample to polity-years in which polity i was sovereign. Dependent variable is year of parliamentary establishment in polity i. Robust standard errors clustered at polity level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.5: Alternative Parliamentary Start Years: Polity Level across Europe

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Dependent variable				*AssemblyStart*			
Conflict participation	0.034**	0.033**	0.034**	0.020	0.033**	0.035**	0.032**
(previous 25 years)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Ln(Urban potential)	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.016***	0.014***	0.013***	0.013***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Alternative start year	Aragon	Castile	Catalonia	Hungary	Navarre	Piedmont	Sicily
Polity FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared (within)	0.124	0.124	0.124	0.120	0.121	0.124	0.122
Observations	12,402	12,465	12,489	12,610	12,448	12,550	12,452
Number of polities	37	37	37	37	37	37	37

Notes: Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is polity-year. Sample period is 1000-1599. We restrict sample to polity-years in which polity i was sovereign. Dependent variable is year of parliamentary establishment in polity i. Alternative start years (and sources) are: Aragon: 1247 (Payne 1973, vol. 1: 82); Castile: 1212 (Payne 1973, vol. 1: 82); Catalonia: 1214 (Payne 1973, vol. 1: 82); Hungary: 1504 (Szente 2005: 101); Navarre: 1300 (Payne 1973, vol. 1: 82); Piedmont: 1375 (Marongiu 1968: 196); Sicily: 1232 (Marongiu 1968: 112). Robust standard errors clustered at polity level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.6: Data Averages: Polity Level across Europe

	(1)	(2)
Dependent variable	$AssemblyStart$	
Conflict participation	0.112	0.379***
	(0.072)	(0.132)
Ln(Urban potential)	0.140***	0.239***
	(0.040)	(0.074)
Data granularity	Decadal	Bi-Decadal
Polity FE	Yes	Yes
Period FE	Yes	Yes
R-squared (within)	0.184	0.263
Observations	1,357	689
Number of polities	37	37

Notes: Estimation method is OLS. Unit of analysis is polity-decade in Model 1, and polity-bi-decade (i.e., 20 years) in Model 2. Sample period is 1000-1599. We restrict sample to polity-years in which polity i was sovereign. Dependent variable is year of parliamentary establishment in polity i. Conflict participation computes share of years in which polity i participated in a military conflict in each decadal interval in Model 1, and in each bi-decadal interval in Model 2. Robust standard errors clustered at polity level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix B: Town-Polity Matching Methods

In Table 2 of the main text, we display the number of towns in each polity that had acquired communal rights prior to the first convening of the national parliament and had a population exceeding 5,000 at some point over the period 1000-1600.

To match towns to sample polities, we have relied on two different methods. The main method employs NUTS territorial units from Eurostat (2015), while the alternative method employs historical maps from Euratlas (Nussli 2010).

The main benefit of the NUTS method is that it always captures towns that lay within its historical territorial nucleus over time. In turn, we are able to produce a balanced panel of town-polity matches across all European towns in Bosker et al. (2013) and years between 1000 and 1600. The main cost of the NUTS method is that it does not always account for towns that eventually fell within (or eventually fell outside) a sample polity due to border changes over time. To address this possibility, we employ an alternative method based on the Euratlas maps. The main cost of the Euratlas method is that we lose a great deal of observations. The basic reason is that the Euratlas maps are not fine-grained enough to identify all of our sample polities across the entire sample period. Due to greater data coverage, therefore, our main town-polity matching method uses the NUTS codes rather than the Euratlas maps. Still, both methods show support for the "no communes, no urban representatives" empirical regularity.

In what follows, we explain the details of each matching method.

B.1: NUTS Matching Method

First, we code each sample polity by the NUTS codes that form the main parts of its historical territorial nucleus. Appendix Table B.1 lists the polity-NUTS mappings. Next, we match each European town in Bosker et al. (2013) to the relevant sample polity by NUTS codes. Finally, we count the number of towns that had acquired communal rights according primarily to Bosker et al. (2013) prior to the first convening of the national parliament in each sample polity.

Since the Bosker et al. (2013) data only identify the communal status of European towns at century-long intervals, we sometimes supplement them with more precise years at which towns acquired communal rights, as described below:

- *Brittany*: See https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Histoire_de_la_Bretagne and Monnier and Cassard (2012: 178, 224-5). There was a short-lived commune in St-Malo in 1308. Furthermore: (1) Towns in Brittany were excused from the main form of taxation (*fouage*) and instead subject to a more favorable one (*aide de villes*), which they had the right to collect; and (2) towns elected their own town councils and could levy their own local taxes. Still, towns in Brittany remained subordinate to their seigneurs in non-trivial ways.
- *Leon*: See https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fuero_de_León.
- *Milan*: Chittolini (2009: 53-55). We take the number of communes in 1450.
- *Pomerania*: See Carsten (1954: 45-6, 50) for the following towns listed in Bosker et al.: Danzig, Stralsund, Stettin, Torun.
- *Scotland*: See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_burgh for the following towns listed in Bosker et al.: Aberdeen, Dundee, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Inverness, Perth, Renfrew, St Andrews.

- *Sardinia*:

See https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sassari#Le_origini_della_città_e_il_Libero_Comune for the following towns listed in Bosker et al.: Sassari.

- *Valencia*:

See https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alcoy#Historia;
https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alicante#Edad_Media;
https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liria#Historia;
https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orihuela#Edad_Media;
https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Requena_(España)#Reconquista_y_Edad_Media;
https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Valencia#Edad_Media;
https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vinaroz#Historia
for the following towns listed in Bosker et al.: Alcoy, Alicante, Liria, Orihuela, Requena, Valencia, Vinaroz.

(Access date for all internet sources listed above: October 8, 2019)

Finally, we take a conservative approach and code the capital city only for city-states on the Italian Peninsula. We have therefore excluded other towns that may have fallen with a city-state's domains at some point in time. This approach should bias downward the number of communes counted on the Italian Peninsula.

B.2: Euratlas Matching Method

First, we match each sample polity to the relevant polity unit of the stated effective chief executive according to the Euratlas map each century. We generally restrict ourselves to exact (or very near) name matches. For example, we do not code Spain for the sample polity of Castile. We follow this approach for two reasons: (1) we want to focus on independent polities; and (2) this approach is consistent with how we have coded conflict participation. For example, Castile was coded as a conflict participant only if the terms "Castile" or "Castilian" were mentioned in Jaques (2007), but not "Spain." We do make a few exceptions. For example, Austria never appears on the Euratlas maps between 1000 and 1600. In order to include this sample polity, we use the Habsburg Monarchy, which largely overlaps with modern Austrian borders.

Second, for observations that remain unmatched above, we match each sample polity to the relevant polity unit of the stated legal sovereign ruler according to the Euratlas map each century. We view this type of matching as a second-best to the more accurate matching to the effective chief executive.

Third, we match each European town in Bosker et al. (2013) to the relevant stated polity unit according to the Euratlas map each century. To help account for imprecision in the geocoding, we add measurement error of approximately 0.10 degrees to the latitudes and longitudes of the sample towns. If there are only a subset of centuries in which a town's match is missing, then we assign *temporally prior* missing observations to the sample polity that it was assigned to in the first century for which there was an observation. We assign *temporally posterior* missing observations to the sample polity that it was assigned to in the most recent previous century for which there was an observation. If a town's matches are missing for all centuries, then we make manual matches century by century, so long as the relevant sample polity appears on the Euratlas map.

Finally, we count the number of towns that had acquired communal rights according primarily to Bosker et al. (2013) prior to the first convening of the national parliament in each sample polity according to this method. Given that the Bosker et al. (2013) data only identify the communal

status of European towns at century-long intervals, we sometimes supplement them with more precise years at which towns acquired communal rights. Subsection C.1 provides the details.

Table B.1: Town-Polity Matching Method: NUTS

Polity	Mapping
Aragon	NUTS2=ES24
Austria	Country name in Bosker et al.=Austria
Bavaria	NUTS1=DE2
Bohemia	Country name in Bosker et al.=Czech Republic
Brabant	NUTS1=NL4; NUTS2=BE24, BE31
Brittany	NUTS2=FR52; Also see Appendix C note
Burgundy	NUTS2=FR21
Byzantine	Country name in Bosker et al.=Turkey
Castile	NUTS1=ES1, ES3; NUTS2=ES23, ES42, ES43, ES61, ES62; NUTS3=411, 412, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419
Catalonia	NUTS2=ES51
Cologne	NUTS3=DEA23
Denmark	Country name in Bosker et al.=Denmark
England	NUTS1=UKC, UKD, UKE, UKF, UKG, UKH, UKI, UKJ, UKK
Flanders	NUTS2=BE21, BE22, BE23, BE25
Florence	City name in Bosker et al.=Firenze
France	NUTS1=FR1, FR3, FR6, FR7, FR8; NUTS2=FR22, FR23, FR24, FR25, FR26
Genoa	City name in Bosker et al.=Genova
Guelders	NUTS2=NL22
Hesse	NUTS1=DE7
Holland	NUTS2=NL32, NL33
Hungary	Country name in Bosker et al.=Hungary
Ireland	Country name in Bosker et al.=Ireland
Leon	NUTS3=ES413; Also see Appendix C note
Lorraine	NUTS2=FR41
Lucca	City name in Bosker et al.=Lucca
Milan	City name in Bosker et al.=Milano; Also see Appendix C note
Naples	NUTS1=ITF
Navarre	NUTS2=ES22
Palatinate	NUTS2=DEB3
Papal States	NUTS2=ITH5, ITI2, ITI3, ITI4
Piedmont	NUTS2=ITC1
Poland	Country name in Bosker et al.=Poland
Pomerania	NUTS2=DE80, PL42, PL61, PL63; Also see Appendix C note
Portugal	Country name in Bosker et al.=Portugal
Prussia	NUTS1=DEC, DEG, DE3, DE4, DEE; NUTS2=DEA1, DEA3, DEA4, DEA5, DEB1, DEB2; NUTS3=DEA21, DEA22, DEA24, DEA25, DEA26, DEA27, DEA28, DEA29, DEA2A, DEA2B, DEA2C,
Sardinia	NUTS2=ITG2; Also see Appendix C note
Saxony	NUTS1=DE9
Scotland	NUTS1=UKM ; Also see Appendix C note
Sicily	NUTS2=ITG1
Siena	City name in Bosker et al.=Siena
Sweden	Country name in Bosker et al.=Sweden
Valencia	NUTS2=ES52 ; Also see Appendix C note
Venice	City name in Bosker et al.=Venezia
Wurttemberg	NUTS1=DE1

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Appendix C: Parliamentary Start Years: Polity Level across Europe

In Subsection C.1, we explain our general coding scheme for parliamentary start years at the polity level in Europe between 1000 and 1599. In Subsection C.2, we provide the details of our codings for each individual sample polity, first for the main sample of territorial monarchies and second for the extended sample that includes city-states.

C.1 General Coding Scheme

Our sample of polities consists of all European states that satisfied the following four criteria. First, the polity became sovereign before 1200. Second, the polity survived as a sovereign entity at least 200 years and disappeared (if it ever did) after 1200. Third, the polity exceeded a minimum size threshold. Fourth, the polity was located in either Latin or Orthodox Christendom.

To identify the states satisfying our inclusion criteria, we first combined the polity lists from two recent pan-European works on medieval parliaments, Stasavage (2010: 631) and van Zanden et al. (2012: 44-5), with a list of medieval European states taken from Wikipedia.[1] Using this master list, we analyzed each potential sample polity one by one to determine whether it satisfied our four criteria for sample inclusion. This process yielded 36 territorial monarchies and 8 city-states (listed in Table 2 of the main text).

We define the start of a parliament as the first year in which a national parliament met that included urban representatives and wielded tax authority. We count urban representatives as being included beginning when they were first present in parliament, according to the relevant group of historians. We count a parliament as wielding tax authority if and only if it had the right to approve or reject at least some important forms of extraordinary taxation.[2]

To identify parliamentary start years (along with end years and years of sovereign exit, if any), we looked first at the codings in Stasavage (2010). As these codings are at 50-year intervals, and we need specific start years for our analysis, we next examined the polity-specific secondary sources listed in Stasavage's (2010) and van Zanden et al.'s (2012) supplementary appendices. If those sources did not yield specific start years, then we looked to further polity-specific secondary sources. We document and justify the coding decisions for each polity in detail in Subsection C.2.

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[1] See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_states_during_the_Middle_Ages; Access date: November 26, 2017.

[2] Monarchs typically had the right to collect ordinary taxes for the duration of their reigns, but had to secure permission to levy and collect extraordinary taxes.

C.2 Coding by Individual Polity

To document and justify the coding decisions for each sample polity, we have transcribed key passages from secondary sources below. The italics are ours; we have used them to highlight key terms and/or years. Similarly, we have added the content in brackets to provide key contextual details. Please refer directly to the cited sources for further details.

C.2.1 Main Sample: Territorial Monarchies

Aragon

Graves (2001: 15): "In 1137 dynastic marriage united Aragon and the richer commercial Catalonia and in the 1230s King James I of Aragon-Catalonia conquered Valencia. In the federation of these three states [Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia], known as the Crown of Aragon, each one developed and retained its own parliament…As we shall see, their structure and organization varied, but they shared several common features: their relations with the king constituted a legal compact with mutual obligations; they had extensive powers, including legislation and *control of the grant of taxes*; they reinforced by a range of privileges…"

Graves (2001: 15-16): "Bisson concludes that, whilst the Cortes [of Catalonia] had 'achieved objective institutional identity' early in the next century [14th], they 'were still in gestation'. This is equally true in Aragon, where assemblies gradually assumed a parliamentary form, as *urban representatives joined meetings of nobles* during the 13th century. But the contractual relationship between king and subjects, 'upon which the basic principles of Aragonese parliamentarism were founded', *was not achieved until 1348.*"

Graves (2001: 16): "Although the Spanish Peninsula was to be united under Habsburg rule in the 16th century, the *component parts* of this 'composite monarchy' *would retain their political diversity, liberties, and law*….Particularism resulted in the emergence of separate medieval assemblies. *And it would ensure their continuation*, despite a growing sense of being Spanish, which was evident from the 16th century."

Austria

Stasavage (2010: 631) dates the presence of a parliament with tax authority in Austria to the period 1400-50. To identify a specific year within this period, we rely on MacHardy (2003: 31), who writes: "Furthermore, *in 1402*, the Crown called upon prelates, lords, knights, *and towns—who probably met for the first time in a common session*—to declare and enforce internal peace (*Landfrieden*) by ending feuds and civil strife."

Bavaria

van Zanden et al. (2012: 54: fn. 54): "Diets started in *1347* in Lower Bavaria and in 1363 in Upper Bavaria."

Graves (2001: 23-4): “In Upper and Lower Bavaria, a duchy in southern Germany, assemblies of nobles *and towns*, later afforced by the clergy, emerged between *1347* and the end of the century.”

Carsten (1959: 352): “”In Lower Bavaria the nobility united with the *towns in 1347*, and in Upper Bavaria in 1363, and the clergy joined them at the end of the century.”

Bohemia

Agnew (2004: 57): “The most important political institution of the Estates monarchy was the Land Diet. The diet *approved the ruler’s requests for taxes*, but it could also legislate, grant citizenship, permit local military forces to be used abroad, and generally seek the common good.”

Agnew (2004: 56): “By the end of the [early 15th century] Hussite revolution there were three Estates represented in the Bohemian diet: the lords, the knights, and the *free towns*.”

Janišová and Janiš (2016: 90): “The way to the Bohemian throne only opened to Sigmund…at the end of the Hussite revolution. In March *1435* at the Provincial Diet held in Prague the Bohemian Estates *stipulated conditions* for his inauguration…The requirements formulated the Estate of Boroughs even included *a provision stipulating [a] right of resistance*…Sigmund…in principle *accepted these conditions* in his ‘Great Privilege of Freedoms’, issued on 20 July 1436…”

Brabant

Brouwer (2016: 199): “He was succeeded by his son Jan II of Brabant, who continued the tradition of preparing his succession by signing the Charter of Kortenberg *in 1312*; 1 month before his death. The charter stated that *no new taxes could be imposed without the consent of nobles and cities*…The Charter of Kortenberg also prescribed that justice should be fair and that city rights should be recognized by the duke. The charter called for *the establishment of a council*; the Estates of Brabant. The Estates had 14 members; 4 nobles *and 10 representatives of the large cities* of the duchy.”

Brittany

Pocquet du Haut-Jussé (1925: 401-2): “En 1352, à Dinan, onze villes répondirent à son appel et prirent part aux véritables États qui nommèrent une ambassade pour aller négocier avec le roi d'Angleterre : « Parmy l'avisement, conseil et assentement des prélats, chapitres, barons et autres nobles et des bourgeois et habitans de nos bonnes villes de notre duché de Bretagne... Et nous, bourgeois et habitanz desdites citez et villes, à nostre requeste, avons fait apposer à ces lettres les sceaux des contracts desdites villes 3. » Cette date de 1352 enlève aux États de Bretagne leur précocité et les ramène au même rang que ceux des autres provinces : « Les États provinciaux apparaissent, en effet, ici un peu avant, là un peu après le milieu du xive siècle.”

Major (1980: 93-4): “…the provincial estates of Brittany developed more slowly than those in many other parts of France. Not until *1352* can it be definitively proven that the *towns* named deputies to these Parlements. The duties of the early parlements were essentially judicial and

political. Only rarely were they asked to *agree to a tax*, but taxes were sometimes levied on ducal orders without consent."

Graves (2001: 57): "As these provinces were acquired by the French Crown in the course of the 15th century they were allowed to retain their estates—so too were Burgundy, Brittany, and others."

Burgundy

Richard (1957: 68): "Dans le domaine monétaire, le roi n'a rien de plus pressé de mettre fin à l'activité des ateliers fonctionnant en terre d'Empire, et d'ouvrir à Dijon même un atelier ou l'on frappe de la monnaie royale. Mais, en substituent au système des négociations particulières destinées à obtenir des « aides » financières celui de la réunion des trois « états », Jean le Bon donne aux Bourguignons le moyen de se concerter pour résister à ses entreprises. C'est de son bail que date la naissance des Etats de Bourgogne, réunis des 1352."

Major (1980: 81): "The *first assemblies* that were indisputably meetings of the estates owed much to royal influence…John [at the time, Duke of Normandy] immediately assumed responsibility for the government and in *1352*, following what was becoming a more frequent practice in France, summoned the three estates to *consent to a tax*. Only five clergymen, four nobles, and the representatives of the thirteen towns attended, but this small group mustered the courage to reject his demands."

Graves (2001: 57): "As these provinces were acquired by the French Crown in the course of the 115th century they were allowed to retain their estates—so too were Burgundy, Brittany, and others."

Byzantine

van Zanden et al. (2012: 16-17): "The question remains to be answered why this institution became so popular in late Medieval Europe? And *why did it not spread to, for example, Byzantium* or the Ottoman Empire…"

Stasavage (2016: 148): "There was no equivalent to the European pattern of representation and consent in the other three world regions [China, Byzantium, Middle East] to which I have referred."

Castile

Stasavage (2010: 631) dates the presence of a parliament with tax authority in Castile to the period 1250-1300 at the latest (his sample period begins in 1250). To identify a specific year circa this period, we rely on Graves (2001: 14-15), who writes: "Then in the *mid-13th century* the kingdoms of Leon and Castile were united. Until that time there is no evidence that Castilian assemblies of secular lords and churchmen were afforced by elected and participating representatives of cities and towns. When, however, the union of the two kingdoms resulted in a single Cortes, it consisted of three estates, *including elected urban representatives*, the procuradores, whose role was to grown in importance."

According to Stasavage (2010: 631), there was no longer a parliament in Castile by 1650 (our sample period ends in 1599). Following Stasavage (2011: 149), we identify the specific year of the loss of this authority to 1632.

Stasavage (2011: 149): "The procuradores to the medieval Cortes had been elected by city councils, but in a response to the way in which this electoral competition bred underlying factional conflict within cities, by the sixteenth century all but one of the 18 towns that sent representatives to the Cortes had done away with election as a method of selection. They instead specified either a rotation of a set of individuals, or, more frequently, selection by lot. While selection by lot might limit internal conflict over choice of representatives, it also had a further effect of removing the ability of cities to select individuals who they thought would best represent their interests. The response of the cities was to attempt to constrain their procuradores by giving them strict mandates, a move that was also designed to reduce potential royal influence through corruption…Seeking a Cortes that would be both more compliant and that could arrive at decisions more efficiently, the Crown repeatedly sought instead to have the procuradores granted full powers to make decisions regarding taxation. After *1632* the Crown finally succeeded in obtaining the consent of the cities to this change."

Catalonia

Graves (2001: 15): "In 1137 dynastic marriage united Aragon and the richer commercial Catalonia and in the 1230s King James I of Aragon-Catalonia conquered Valencia. In the federation of these three states [Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia], known as the Crown of Aragon, each one developed and retained its own parliament…As we shall see, their structure and organization varied, but they shared several common features: their relations with the king constituted a legal compact with mutual obligations; they had extensive powers, including legislation and *control of the grant of taxes*; they reinforced by a range of privileges…"

Marongiu (1968: 67): "Explicit mentions of the *participation of representatives of the cities and towns* only occurred with the assembly of Barcelona of *1228*, which was attended by various bishops and abbots, the greater lords and 'many other knights and citizens and good men of the towns of Catalonia.'"

Graves (2001: 16): "Although the Spanish Peninsula was to be united under Habsburg rule in the 16th century, the *component parts* of this 'composite monarchy' *would retain their political diversity, liberties, and law*….Particularism resulted in the emergence of separate medieval assemblies. *And it would ensure their continuation*, despite a growing sense of being Spanish, which was evident from the 16th century."

Denmark

Graves (2001: 15): "In Denmark King Christian I, who like his predecessors was under constant pressure from his nobles, called the first representative parliament in *1468*. It consisted of *townsmen* and free peasantry as well as nobles, instead of the customary aristocratic assembly."

Graves (2001: 118): "A dramatic example of this is to be found in Denmark, which Sweden invaded in 1658 and 1659 and on which it imposed the humiliating peace of Oliva in *1660*. Blame was placed on the noble-dominated council (Rigsraad) and parliament (Ridsdag) for their resistance to the war. King Frederick III became an hereditary absolute monarch and the Rigsdag was *consigned to oblivion* until 1835."

England

Brand (2009: 10): "The period of just under a century which begins with the granting of the Magna Carta by King John in 1215 and ends with the death of Edward I in 1307 is a significant one in the early history of parliament. *It is the period when the term 'parliament' first comes to be used* for the special occasional meetings of the king's council to which a larger group of the king's subjects were summoned...The term 'parliament' (parliamentum in Latin, parlement in French) was not used before the 13th century for the occasional special meetings of the king's council to which a wider group of participants was summoned to provide general advice to the king and *to give consent on behalf of a wider national community to royal taxation* and legislation."

Brand (2009: 11): "The earliest evidence of knights being summoned to attend parliament as representatives of individual counties comes from 1254; the earliest evidence of burgesses being summoned to attend *as representatives of their towns or cities* only from *1265*."

Flanders

Dhondt (1950: 296): "…au moment où le comte ne se maintiendra que par l'appui des grandes villes, ces dernières accèdent, sans coup férir, au partage du pouvoir."

Dhondt (1950: 296, fn. 3): "Citons simplement le texte le plus éloquent : « Nous Philippes de Flandre...faisons savoir... ke de tant de tans qui peûst souvenir, toutes les besoignes ke K conte de Flandres qui par le tans on estei, touchant communaument Testât dou pays, li dit conte les ont traiteit et ordenei par les boines villes de le conteit. Et chouke par le seigneur et les dites boines villes a estei ordenei generaument, il convint ke che fuist tenu et wardei par toute le conteit... (Wanzkoenig-Gheldolf, Histoire de Flandre, V, p. 445). Acte de l'an 1304."

Dhondt (1950: 297): "Ainsi donc, au xive siècle, la situation est la suivante : le comte ne gouverne pas seul. Toutes les affaires importantes intéressant le pays sont délibérées par lui en commun avec une assemblée qui peut être soit le « commun pays de Flandre », soit les Trois Villes. Mais, dans le premier cas, les trois villes qui sont représentées au sein du commun pays se concertent au préalable et on a toute raison de croire que leur attitude commune pèse d'un poids très lourd dans la décision."

According to Stasavage (2010: 631), Flanders exits the sample (i.e., is no longer sovereign) by 1550.

France

Stasavage (2010: 631) dates the presence of a parliament with tax authority in France to the period 1300-50. To identify a specific year circa this period, we rely on Marongiu (1968: 98), who writes: "As relations with the Pope grew tense and bitter and Boniface VIII threatened the King with the gravest sanctions, Philip played his trump card and summoned the barons, prelates, and envoys of the cities to Paris on February 15, *1302*. The writ of summons informed them that the King wished to treat and deal with them about the grave problems of the moment…The terms were detailed, although in a sense they kept to generalities; but they were nevertheless coherent with, and expressed the substance of the great principle that quod 'omnes tangit ab omnibus approbari debet'. This assembly is traditionally described as the *first reunion* in France of the 'estates general', of a parliamentary assembly or institution."

Guelders

Brouwer (2016: 205): "The Estates of Guelders—like those of Holland—only arose in the 15th century. The *first meeting* of the Estates of Guelders took place in *1423*. The installation of the council emanated from a pact that was concluded in 1418; the Verbondsakte van Steden en Ridderschap (Union *of Cities* and Knighthood)."

Hesse

Carsten (1959: 149): "The landgraves of Hesse were descendants of the dukes of Brabant…The steady growth of their possessions was, however, interrupted in the 15th century by conflicts within the ruling family and the division of its domains between hostile brothers…These conflicts and the rule of minor landgraves favored the development of the Estates, which came into being in the later 14th century and were summoned to a diet for the first time in *1387*…the nobility remained throughout the leading group among the Hessian Estates; while the towns, led by Cassel and Marburg, were too weak to counterbalance its power…The *fifty or more towns usually represented in the diet of Hesse* were small and unimportant, and many were nothing else but little market towns."

Holland

Stasavage (2010: 631) dates the presence of a parliament with tax authority in Holland to the period 1500-50. To identify a specific year circa this period, we rely on Stasavage (2011: 154), who writes: "…all of the evidence suggests that the Estates General of the Netherlands and the *States of Holland* were already extremely active well before the revolt of 1572…For the States of Holland, Tracy (1990: 124) reports that there were 285 meetings between *1542* and 1562…" Here, the direct quotation from Tracy (1990: 124) reads: "Between *1542* and 1562 there were 285 dagvaarten or meetings of the States convened by the central government, and average of 13.5 per year."

Hungary

Szente (2005: 95): "Early consultative assemblies of a nationwide character were, on the other hand, no longer simply the occasional meetings of the ecclesiastic and secular aristocracy, but were instead assemblies summoned annually—pursuant to the provisions of the Golden Bull of *1222*—to discuss matters of common interest, or the 'affairs of the state', and to advise the king on such matters, or even to hand down decisions concerning various issues."

Szente (2005: 95, fn. 6): "Act I of 1222. The Golden Bull, quite similarly to the English Magna Carta Libertatum, was a letter of privileges devoted to provide guarantees for the nobility against arbitrary actions of the king and the barons. Its provisions were promulgated in several laws in 1222."

Encyclopedia Britannica (1911: 906): "It [the Diet] was still, however, essentially an assembly of notables, lay and clerical, at which the gentry, though technically eligible, do not seem to have been directly represented. At Sigismund's first diet (*1397*), it was declared that the King might choose his counsellors where he listed, and at the diet of *1397* he invited the *free and royal towns* to send their deputies to the parliament."

Ireland

Graves (2001: 19): "The great stimulus to the calling of Irish assemblies was royal financial need, especially during Edward I's wars with the Welsh, French, and Scots in the later 13th century. He looked to Ireland as one of the providers for his expensive policies and, as a consequence, the grant of parliamentary subsidies became an established practice…The practice of *parliamentary taxation* was 'based firmly on the principle of consent and the accepted obligation of every freeman to help the king in his necessity, with elected representatives having full power to bind their communities to whatever was agreed in parliament'…It is not certain that elected representatives from the counties were called before 1297 or members *from cities and towns* before *1299*-1300."

Leon

Payne (1973, vol. 1: 82) "In *1188* Alfonso IX of Leon faced major problems in consolidating his rule over an internally divided and disorderly kingdom, and also faced mounting financial demands. To deal with these issues he summoned *representatives of leading towns* to meet with aristocrats and church officials at a royal assembly. He proclaimed a brief royal charter promising justice and recognizing local laws as well as the need to establish greater order. At a subsequent meeting *he gained approval of a debasement of coinage* to increase royal purchasing power."

Marongiu (1968: 62): "This assembly, held by Alfonso IX in the first year of his reign [*1188*], is important because of the decisions taken there…There can be no doubt that the decisions taken in this curia were intended to create a new political constitution for the country…This is clearly demonstrated by two of the decisions: (1) the undertaking given by the King *to follow the counsels* of his bishops, nobles, and wise men in all circumstances *in matters of peace and war…*"

Graves (2001: 15): "“Then in the mid-13th century the kingdoms of Leon and Castile were united. Until that time there is no evidence that Castilian assemblies of secular lords and churchmen were afforced by elected and participating representatives of cities and towns. When, however, the union of the two kingdoms resulted in a single Cortes, it consisted of three estates, including elected urban representatives, the procuradores, whose role was to grown in importance.”"

Lorraine

Digot (1856, vol. 5: 59): "…la date précise de l'introduction de la bourgeoisie dans les États…Mory d'Elvange affirme qu'ils y étaient admis dès l'année 1425, et la chose est probable…"

https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duch%C3%A9_de_Lorraine (Access date: August 23, 2019): "La puissance des états généraux était très grande : succession au trône, tutelle du duché, lois et impôts, toutes les affaires importantes étaient soumises à leur décision. On voyait rarement le duc modifier ce qu'ils avaient résolu. C'était une garantie pour le peuple, mais une gêne pour la puissance ducale qui chercha à s'affranchir de ce contrôle. La réunion de 1629 fut la dernière, Charles IV remit toujours à plus tard la convocation des états généraux et l'occupation de la Lorraine par les Français favorisa son dessein."

Naples

Stasavage (2010: 631) dates the presence of a parliament in Naples to the period 1450-1500. To identify a specific year circa this period, we rely on Marongiu (1968).

Marongiu (1968: 151): "The first sign of this trend was the 'general parliament' of 'all the princes, dukes, marquises, counts, and barons of the said Kingdom' and of the procurators of the absentee barons, which began at Benevento and closed at Naples in 1443. Here for the *first time* in the history of the Kingdom of Naples a great national assembly acted as a single body and requested, granted, petitioned, and in practice negotiated with the sovereign and his government."

Marongiu (1968: 154): "Ecclesiastics appeared in the parliaments of 1480 and 1481 and perhaps a few others, but always for a specific reason. On the other hand, *the domanial cities appeared far more frequently* than has been generally noted – at least ten times between *1444* and 1497. In 1456, Alfonso stated that he wanted the sindaci to be provided with ample powers."

According to Stasavage (2010: 631), there was no longer a parliament in Naples by 1650 (our sample period ends in 1599). Following Marongiu (1968: 206), we identify the specific year of the loss of this authority to 1642.

Marongiu (1968: 206): "But in the South, the last parliamentary session of the Kingdom of Naples was held in *1642*…"

Palatinate

Carsten (1959: 343): "He [Philip, Elector of the Palatinate] began to request direct taxes in addition to the Rhine tolls, and this required *the consent of those to be taxed*, apparently for the first time in 1494. Yet it was again for political reasons that he decided to ask the advice of the bishops, prelates, counts, and noblemen, and *for the first time all of the towns*…Therefore in *1505* he assembled all the prelates, noblemen, and towns in Heidelberg."

Navarre

Major (1980: 131): "The Basque-speaking Kingdom of Navarre, like the Viscounty of Bearn, had its fors and its estates. The latter grew out of Cort Mayor to which prelates, nobles, and *townsmen* were summoned during the 12th and 13th centuries. By *1355* the Cortes, or estates, had emerged as a *tax-consenting institution* that was summoned by the monarch every few years."

Graves (2001: 16): "Although the Spanish Peninsula was to be united under Habsburg rule in the 16th century, the *component parts* of this 'composite monarchy' *would retain their political diversity, liberties, and law*….Particularism resulted in the emergence of separate medieval assemblies. *And it would ensure their continuation*, despite a growing sense of being Spanish, which was evident from the 16th century."

Piedmont

Stasavage (2010: 631) dates the presence of a parliament with tax authority in Piedmont to the period 1350-1400. To identify a specific year circa this period, we rely on Marongiu (1968).

Marongiu (1968: 196): "The *first parliamentary assembly* in Piedmont was apparently held in *1328*, when the *communes were summoned* to send ambassadors to Scalenghe to treat of matters of general interest with the prince."

Marongiu (1968: 196): "By 1375 the description of the assembly of nobles and communal representatives as a consilium—an enlargement of the permanent royal council—signified official recognition of the right of the assembly to participate as a consultative body in important decisions."

Graves (2001: 78): "In June *1560* Emmanuel Philibert met the estates and, having obtained an enormous salt tax, dissolved them. They did not meet again. The Duke used his army of 24,000 to ensure the collection of this tax and the imposition of further ones without reference to a parliament."

Poland

Malinowski (2019: 9): "The increasingly federal character of the state and the privileges given to the nobility *led to the formation of the Seym* [Great Diet of Poland], to which, from *1468* onwards, the Dietines elected delegates…After 1505, no law binding the whole country could be passed without the explicit unanimous approval of the three parts of the Seym. It marked the formation of

the system of Estate Monarchy, not dissimilar to the one built around the Parliament in England, the Estates General in France, the Cortes in Spain, and the Riksdag in Sweden…"

Malinowski (2019: 10): "In Poland, the King could only propose and veto legislation. Because he could not rule by decree, the ruler needed the Diet, of which he was an integral part, to exercise influence. The bills agreed on by the House of Delegates and Senate became legal acts only after the King gave the royal assent to all of them jointly at the end of the Seym's session."

Malinowski (2019: 12): "This legal change in the operation of the Seym was a result of a major *constitutional crisis*. In the mid-seventeenth century, Poland was struggling with a Kozak uprising, a war with Russia, a Swedish invasion, and Turkish incursions. To ensure more political stability, the progressive party associated with the King, and dominated by the mid-income nobility, proposed that the new kings would be elected before the death of the incumbent. This inspired opposition of the conservatives, primarily the magnates and their clients, who saw the proposal as a threat to the Golden Liberties. To block the possibility of a constitutional change, they insisted on *the right of a single deputy to discontinue the parliamentary proceedings* before the royal assent and effectively nullify its decisions—liberum veto. The first use of this practice took place in *1652* and inspired major political and constitutional conflict between the conservative republicans and progressive royalists…"

Pomerania

Carsten (1954: 89): "The 14th century was the period of the greatest wealth and the greatest political power of the *towns* of Pomerania and of Brandenburg. Frequently they succeeded in imposing their will upon their rulers and the country…Their power was a match for that of the nobility, and the rulers could only try to play off on Estate against another. When the Duchy of Pomerania was to be divided between two hostile brothers in *1295*, the two Estates carried through the partition; they used this opportunity *to have all of their rights and privileges confirmed and to be assured the right of resistance* in case the princes broke the treaty or wronged them in any other way."

Portugal

Stasavage (2010: 631) dates the presence of a parliament with tax authority in Portugal to the period 1250-1300 at the latest (his sample period begins in 1250). To identify a specific year circa this period, we rely on Payne (1973, vol. 1: 119-20), who writes: "…he [Sancho II" was eventually deposed by his younger brother Afonso III (1246-79), who was supported by the church, the crusading orders, the petty nobility, and the *towns*…Afonso III was a notably successful administrator, promoting resettlement and summoning the *first meeting of a three-estate Portuguese Cortes* at Leira in *1254*."

According to Stasavage (2010: 631), Portugal exits the sample (i.e., is no longer sovereign) by 1600. We refine this exit year to 1581, following the recognition by the Portuguese Cortes of Felipe II of Spain as the King of Portugal (Payne (1973, vol. 1: 243).

Prussia

Stasavage (2010: 631) dates the presence of a parliament with tax authority in Prussia to the period 1300-50. To identify a specific year circa this period, we rely on Carsten (1954: 91-2), who writes: "The greatest period of the Brandenburg *towns* came under the weak foreign rulers who succeeded after the death of the last Ascanian margrave, Woldemar, in *1319*. The internal troubles and disputed successions of the time provided many opportunities to *wring new concessions* from weak margraves…Frequently the towns renewed their 'unions' to assist each other if any of them were attacked…*Five years after Margrave Woldemar's death* the new margrave, Lewis of Wittlesbach, *had to recognize the validity of these 'unions'*; he also undertook to break, together with the towns, all the castles built after Woldemar's death, and warned the landlords not to exploit their judicial rights and their claims to labor services…The power of the Estates developed in parallel with the weakness of the rulers."

According to Stasavage (2010: 631), there was no longer a parliament in Prussia by 1650 (our sample period ends in 1599). Following Carsten (1954: 179-80), we identify the specific year of the loss of this authority to 1627, during the Thirty Years' War.

Carsten (1954: 179-80): "…from 1627 onwards the country was occupied by foreign troops…Yet the War at the same time weakened the political power of the Estates…He [Elector George William] levied contributions without consulting the Estates and used military force to extort taxes for the maintenance of the Brandenburg troops."

Sardinia

Marongiu (1968: 131): "The origins of the Sardinian parliament are traditionally traced back to the assembly of *1355*, whose sessions were described by contemporaries as 'general curias'…The King [Peter the Ceremonious] wanted to be recognized as the legitimate sovereign of all Sardinians. As a result *all inhabited centers*, however small, and almost all feudal territories—although they were already officially represented by their respective lords—were ordered to send their representatives. These representatives were elected in the *cities and towns* by popular assemblies called by the town-crier…"

Marongiu (1968: 132): "Once these 'general curias' [of 1355] had been convoked and assembled, the king asked them for a subsidy or financial grant and *a tax or customs duty must have been voted and accepted*."

Scheni (2012: 59): "The parliament, introduced into the island in the fourteenth century—in *1355* Peter IV *called and presided over the first parliament* of the kingdom of Sardinia—was perfected in the course of the fifteenth with the assembly of 1421, convoked and presided over by Alfonso V, and that of 1481–5—called by Ferdinand II but presided over by the viceroy Ximen Perez Escriva."

Scheni (2012: 59): "The Sardinian parliament, like those introduced by the crown in other Italian domains belonging to the Catalan-Aragonese confederation, was 'stamentale, iuxta lo still y pratica de Cathalunya [according to the style and the procedures of Catalonia]', and formed of three

Stamenti or branches: the ecclesiastic, which included the bishops, archbishops and abbots of the more important monasteries in the kingdom as well as the representatives of the dioceses' chapters; the military to which were called all the feudatories; and the royal which included the *representatives or agents of all the royal cities and the towns* which were not enfeoffed. The upper officials of the royal administration also participated in the parliament: the keeper of the royal chancery, the maestro razionale, the governors of the Capi of Cagliari and Sassari, and the *fiscal and patrimonial agents*."

Marongiu (1968: 133): "Thus it was logical that a parliament should have been called in Sardinia in 1421: its purpose was as much to end the civil war and reconcile the former rebels as to obtain financial aid."

Saxony

Stasavage (2010: 631) dates the presence of a parliament in Saxony with tax authority to the period 1450-1500. To identify a specific year circa this period, we rely on Carsten (1959: 197), who writes: "In *1437*, the two remaining brothers, Frederick and William [sons of deceased margrave Frederick IV], reached an agreement about the future administration of the country, which was to be revised three years later, with the participation of their counts, lords, knights, and *towns*: *evidence that such matters came within their competence*. In the *following year* the margraves were forced by their desperate financial situation, the decline of trade and industry and of their revenues on account of the continuous disturbances, *to summon to Leipzig the first diet in the proper sense of the term* from all their territories; it was attended by counts, knights, and *towns*, but again not by the clergy."

Scotland

Graves (2001: 19): "Although an institution styled 'Parliament' is recorded in Scotland as early as the 1230s, it was no more than a gathering of temporal and ecclesiastical lords. Until the fourteenth century they alone were regarded as comprising the community of the realm. Urban representatives had been present to ratify a treaty in 1296, but *only during the 14th century did 'commissioners' from royal boroughs become a constituent part* of what had been until then rather a curia or council of the king and is feudal vassals. Once again, *regular urban representation* was the consequence of royal financial necessity."

MacDonald (2007: 14-15): "Burgesses petitioned parliaments in the 1310s and may have sat in a parliament in *1326*, although there was considerable debate over this in the early 20th century. The grante of a tax of an annual tenth to Robert I (1306-28) listed the communities of the burghs as present 'while a parliament was being held': on this basis, Robert Rait argued that burgesses were not truly part of parliament. Balfour Melville countered that the phrase in question, 'tenente plenum parliamentum', had previously been used in other parliamentary contexts, so did not merit Rait's narrow interpretation. One of the earliest parliamentary summonses (from 1328) sought 'six suitable people from each of the communities of the burghs', a long-winded phrase suggesting that no customary form for summoning the burgesses was yet established. Robert I's parliament of 1328 was another false start, for no burghs were summoned in 1331. Their participation in 1326 and 1328 can be linked to *grants of taxation* and it was the *need to consent to further taxation*

which secured their place under David II (1328-71): burgh representatives are recorded at parliaments which granted taxes in 1340 and 1341."

We code the end year of the Scottish parliament to 1707, the year of the Act of Union with England, with a single combined parliament (https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Act_of_Union_1707; Access date: August 23, 2019).

Sicily

Marongiu (1968: 111): "The *first of these assemblies* [Kingdom of Sicily] was held in 1208 at San Germano (Cassino) in order to provide for and aid Frederick (who was still a minor) in the work of pacification carried out by Pope Innocent III as tutor to the young sovereign. The pope came in person to this 'general' curia and issued important measures with 'many of the prelates and magnates' of the Kingdom. A statement by the anonymous chronicler of Monte Cassino that *envoys of the cities took part* together with the lay and ecclesiastical lords *remains unproven*, for it is not confirmed by any other source."

Marongiu (1968: 113): "These facts are not sufficient to allow us to conclude that these [pre-1250] assemblies displayed any initiative, or that they corresponded to the concept of a parliamentary institution as we have defined it. In fact, we are of the opinion that…these assemblies *merely constituted pre-parliaments*, limited episodes, rather than real collective bodies with their part in the structure of the state."

Marongiu (1968: 113-14): "He [Charles of Anjou, 1266-85] created a *general curia* of giustizieri and other officials…to ask them for *an account of what they had exacted for the treasury*, and to 'treat what he had decreed'—a clear indication that these assemblies, which he called parliaments, were of exclusively administrative, bureaucratic, and *fiscal nature*. Only after the outbreak of the Vespers did his son, the prince of Salerno, lieutenant of the Kingdom, decide, with unexpected obedience, to call a general assembly of the region of San Martino in Citerione. The assembly, which met in *1283*, and was attended by prelates, nobles, and *envoys of the cities and towns*, aimed at and partially succeeded in giving a new and more equitable order to the affairs of the country. 47 legal decrees were approved…In fact, this completion of decrees only occurred in 1285 when an Edictalis Provisio ac Constitutio of Honorius IV defined the limits of royal authority in relation to the subjects in its most important points, *especially in matters of taxation*."

Graves (2001: 16): "In 1282 a Sicilian assembly, which *for the first time included urban representatives*, voluntarily offered the crown of Sicily to King Peter III of Aragon, in order to be rid of oppressive and *financially burdensome* Angevin rule."

Sweden

Graves (2001: 15): "In Denmark King Christian I, who like his predecessors was under constant pressure from his nobles, called the first representative parliament in *1468*. It consisted of *townsmen* and free peasantry as well as nobles, instead of the customary aristocratic assembly. At that time *Sweden was united to Denmark and Norway* in the Union of Kalmar, which lasted from 1397 to 1523. In the 1520s Sweden broke away from the Union, in which it occupied a subordinate

place, and in 1523 a national assembly (Riksdag) of nobles, clergy, representatives of towns, miners, and peasants recognized the Swedish rebel leader Gustav Vasa as King Gustav I. The Riksdag was *not a new institution*, but from this point it would develop as the national assembly of an independent state."

Graves (2001: 151): "By the mid-17th century it [the Swedish Riksdag] had grown into a powerful consultative, law-making, and taxing parliament with an unusual sense of community. Later in the century its promising future seemed to end with the *Swedish absolutism* of Karl XI and Karl XII, but it reemerged with greater power in 1720."

Rian (2000: 26): "…Karl XI (ruled 1660-97, came of age in 1972) allied himself with the lower estates at the meeting of the Diet (Riksdag) in *1680*, and rammed through radical strengthening of the royal power, politically at the expense of the Council of the Realm…From now on, the two Nordic states [Denmark and Sweden] were *absolute monarchies*."

Valencia

Graves (2001: 15): "In 1137 dynastic marriage united Aragon and the richer commercial Catalonia and in the 1230s King James I of Aragon-Catalonia conquered Valencia. In the federation of these three states [Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia], known as the Crown of Aragon, each one developed and retained its own parliament…As we shall see, their structure and organization varied, but they shared several common features: their relations with the king constituted a legal compact with mutual obligations; they had extensive powers, including legislation and *control of the grant of taxes*; they reinforced by a range of privileges…"

Payne (1973, vol. 1: 82): "The meeting of the first three-estate Cortes in Castile cannot be dated as precisely as in the case of Leon…The respective dates for other peninsular kingdoms are…*Valencia, 1283*…"

Graves (2001: 16): "Although the Spanish Peninsula was to be united under Habsburg rule in the 16th century, the *component parts* of this 'composite monarchy' *would retain their political diversity, liberties, and law*….Particularism resulted in the emergence of separate medieval assemblies. *And it would ensure their continuation*, despite a growing sense of being Spanish, which was evident from the 16th century."

Wurttemberg

Stasavage (2010: 631) dates the presence of a parliament in Wurttemberg to the period 1450-1500. To identify a specific year circa this period, we rely on Carsten (1959).

Carsten (1959: 6): "The first definitive evidence of a Wurttemberg diet dates from the year *1457*."

Carsten (1959: 6-7): "The year *1457* also saw the first diet in Wurttemberg-Urach…For him [Ulrich, guardian of child heir Eberhard] four noble councilors were to govern in ordinary matters; in more important affairs they were to be assisted by ten other councilors and seven representatives

of the *towns* of Urach. These were to have *full powers of government* and were to *decide by a majority* of those present: while Ulrich had the right to be present but had not vote."

Carsten (1959: 8): "Count Eberhard died in 1496 without leaving a son and was succeeded by his cousin Eberhard of the Stuttgart line, for Urach line had become extinct. Henceforth Wurttemberg remained one duchy under one prince."

C.2.2 Extended Sample: City-States

Cologne

Stasavage (2010: 631) dates the presence of a parliament with tax authority in Cologne to the period 1250-1300 at the latest (his sample period begins in 1250). To identify a specific year circa this period, we rely on Marongiu (1968: 107), who writes: "In fact, even though they were absent from the courts, *the representatives or envoys of the cities were present* at more than one colloquium. These colloquia possessed the same formal and practical characteristics of the other courts, except for the fact that they were also attended by the envoys of the cities. Typical examples were the colloquia called in…Cologne in *1259*…"

Florence

Stasavage (2010: 631) dates the presence of a parliament with tax authority in Florence to the period 1250-1300 at the latest (his sample period begins in 1250). To identify a specific year circa this period, we rely on Marongiu (1968: 36), who writes: "In Florence in *1284* the council of the *heads of the major guilds* and the savi declared that a decision over war or peace with Pisa could only be reached in agreement with the magnates, even though the latter had been excluded from the government, as 'what concerns all, should be approved by all'."

According to Stasavage (2010: 631), Florence exits the sample (i.e., is no longer sovereign) by 1500. We refine this exit year to 1494, following the invasion of Italy by Charles VIII (Rubinstein, 1966: 229-35).

Genoa

Epstein (1996: 33): "…a year and a half before the fleet that took Caesarea sailed, the Genoese established a compagna (commune or sworn association of citizens) to last for three years under the leadership of six consuls. As the fleet departed in August 1100, the Genoese must have set up their compagna early in *1099*…All earlier documents suggesting that a commune existed in Genoa before 1099 have been dismissed as forgeries…"

Stasavage (2011: 118): "The first record of a self-governing commune in Genoa dates from *1099*."

Epstein (1996: 36): "The consuls were not allowed to summon an army, or to begin a new war on land or sea, or to *devise a new tax*, without the consent of a majority of the council."

Lucca

Encyclopedia Britannica (1911: 95): "The dukes gradually extended their power over all Tuscany, but after the death of the famous Matilda the city began to constitute itself an independent community, and in 1160 it obtained from Welf VI, duke of Bavaria and marquis of Tuscany, the lordship of all the country for 5 m. round, on payment of an annual tribute."

https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Repubblica_di_Lucca (Access date: August 23, 2019): "Da questo primo nucleo si originò un Libero comune la cui esistenza è attestata nel 1119, poi riconosciuta dall'autorità imperiale nel 1161. Ed è proprio in questo secolo che il comune sostiene le sue lotte contro i feudatari vicini fino ad assicurarsi il dominio su vasti territori nel secolo XIII e a contendersi il primato militare in Toscana con il comune di Firenze."

Tanzini (2012: 111): "Participation, the rule of law, and good government were (again) medieval legacies, and cities such as Lucca or Siena continued to use this traditional language of freedom and Buon governo through the centuries."

Tanzini (2012: 103): "And outside the borders of the greatest Tuscan state, several independent territories remained: not only the little republic of Lucca, with its rural territory, but also..."

Milan

According to Stasavage (2010: 631), Milan never established a medieval parliament.

Papal States

Marongiu (1968: 170): "Although documents frequently mention 'general parliaments', general assemblies of the entire States of the Church…were extremely rare. The only well-documented meeting was that held at Fano in April-May *1357* by Cardinal Egidio d'Albornoz when he *promulgated his constitutions*. Other inter-provincial assemblies were held in 1371, 1372, 1373, 1374, or 1375, and probably in 1388."

Marongiu (1968: 171): "The general or 'state' assemblies were summoned by the Pope or his legate…They were precise and peremptory, naming the place and time of the meeting, ordering those convoked to appear, and specifying the details of the mandates to be brought by representatives."

Marongiu (1968: 172): "Until the late 14th century summons were sent to all bishops, prelates, abbots, priors, parish priests, cathedral chapters, *cities, communes*, castles, and terre…But sometime before the beginning of the 15th century the clergy and feudal lords ceased to be summoned."

Siena

Stasavage (2011: 128): "Ultimate political authority in Siena rested with the city council (the Council of the Bell), which existed from *1176*, and which intervened in all types of issues faced

by the commune. From 1287 to 155, while ultimate legitimacy remained with the Council of the Bell, the affairs of the commune were controlled by a committee of nine magistrates who held the title of the Nine Governors and Defenders of the Sienese Commune…The Nine was actually a body of officials each of whom served a two-month term. The election procedure for these officials was intricate and was modified on several occasions between 1287 and 1355. There were two constants to this procedure though. First, there was always significant formal weight given to Siena's *merchant guild* in selecting both the members of the Nine and the members of the Council of the Bell."

According to Stasavage (2010: 631), Siena exits the sample (i.e., is no longer sovereign) by 1400. We refine this exit year to 1399, following the fall of the government of the Priori (Stasasavage, 2011: 129).

Venice

Stasavage (2010: 631) dates the presence of a parliament with tax authority in Venice to the period 1250-1300 at the latest (his sample period begins in 1250). To identify a specific year circa this period, we rely on Lane (1973) and Puga and Trefler (2014).

Lane (1973: 92): "If any one constitutional reform was crucial it was the creation in *1172* of an official nominating committee to name the new doge. A body of wise men (sapientes) had functioned as ducal councilors at least as early as 1143 and presumably had consulted or maneuvered among themselves so that, when the people were summoned to choose a new doge, the leading men had nominations ready. But after 1172, there was just one official nominating committee and made a single nomination, which was *equivalent to an election*. Through this committee, the leaders of the Commune, placed in control by Michiel's debacle, made sure that the man named as doge would thereafter be one of their one members whom they thought they could trust to act as a member of the team, that is, to abide by the decisions of his councils."

Puga and Trefler (2014: 756): "The two key dates for improvements in institutions that constrained the power of the executive are 1032, which marks the end of a de facto hereditary dogeship, and 1172, which marks the establishment of a Venetian parliament that became the ultimate source of political legitimacy."

Puga and Trefler (2014: 766-7): "After the reign of four unrelated and long-lived Doges, the Michiel family held the Dogeship for 53 of the 75 years leading up to 1171.15 Toward the end of this period, Venetian–Byzantine relations had become increasingly acrimonious, and tensions came to a head on the night of March 12, 1171, when the Byzantine emperor rounded up 10,000 Venetians residing in the empire and announced that they were being held for ransom. In September 1171, Doge Vitale Michiel II launched a large armada that was to blockade and harass Constantinople until the hostages were released. The plan failed miserably, and in May *1172* the fleet returned in utter disarray. Venetian frustration was palpable, and much of it was directed against the Doge. At a gathering on May 27, he was mobbed and assassinated. It had been almost two centuries since a Doge had been murdered, and the unexpected assassination left a power vacuum which the dogal court and leading merchant families immediately filled…The first major change was the *introduction of a limited franchise elected parliament* known as the Great Council.

With this constitutional change in place, the new legislative body used its power to increasingly *constrain the power of the Doge* over the next few decades. Many of these constraints were formalized in the oath of office that the Doge now publicly swore to uphold. The oath explicitly listed what the Doge could not do, for example, expropriate state property or preside over cases against himself. The Great Council added to this list with the election of each new Doge (Hazlitt 1966, p. 437; Madden 2003, pp. 95–101). Furthermore, in all important decisions the Doge was required to consult with a strengthened six-member dogal council that was elected by and accountable to the Great Council. As Madden (2003, p. 98) notes: ''In short, by 1192 the doge could do almost nothing without approval of the council.''"

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