

Reverse Revolving Doors: The Influence of Interest Groups on Legislative Voting

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Abstract

Using the alphabetic allocation of seats in the European Parliament, we show that former employees of interest groups influence the voting behavior of their colleagues when sitting together. When the subject of the vote is relevant to the interest group, the probability of the nearby colleagues of casting the same vote increases by 2.4% and that of abstention decreases by 9%, while no effect is detected for other vote subjects. These probabilities increase for votes about budgetary allocations and they are comparable to those of sitting beside party motion leaders. Revolving doors are problematic for the political process also when working in reverse.

Keywords: Voting behavior, Interest groups, Social interaction, Revolving doors, European Parliament, Decision-making

JEL Classification: D72, D73, F53, N44, P16

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1 Introduction

Lobbying directed to European Union institutions by special interest groups has become a key issue in the EU decision-making process. As for 2018, there were more than 12.000 organizations registered as representing particular interests at the EU level policy making, spending a total of €2.38 billion on lobbying related activities. It represents the second largest lobbying industry in the world, only after the US, which encompasses 11.600 organizations and \$3.42 billion.¹ Interest groups engage in multiple activities to directly persuade legislators of their position, such as drafting reports with arguments in favor or against specific motions and requesting and conducting meetings with lawmakers, with the main goal of instructing them on how to vote on specific motions.

As a matter of fact, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) surveyed by [Hix et al. \(2016\)](#) report receiving on average at least 21 meeting requests from interest groups every week, to which 59% of them admit attending at least once a week. Moreover, 89% of the interviewed MEPs report receiving voting instructions directly from interest groups on specific motions. Notwithstanding the probable importance these tactics may have on the voting decision of some legislators, they can be easily perceived by many as providing partisan information and therefore might not achieve the expected adherence.

A more subtle approach available to interest groups is to rely on the so-called *reverse revolving doors*. This practice refers to the flow of individuals who were formerly employed by interest groups into politics. It may be considered a low-level form of lobbying since it can potentially place industry insiders with a hidden private agenda in democratically elected institutions. Indeed, according to [Hix et al. \(2016\)](#), 22% of the interviewed MEPs admitted having been encouraged to stand as a member of the European Parliament by an interest group representative.

In this paper we investigate to what extent the voting behavior of the members of the European Parliament is affected by the presence of fellow colleagues who worked for

¹EU figures computed using the information on the lobbying budget reported by Interest Groups in the European Transparency Register. US Figures come from [OpenSecrets.org](#) for 2018 referring to the US federal lobbying spending.

an interest group before being elected into office. To identify those MEPs, we rely on the list of organizations registered as exhibiting interest in the European Union policy making, known as the *Transparency Register*. We find that 28% of MEPs in our sample worked for an organization listed as an interest group at some point before taking office. The kind of positions held by MEPs in interest groups range from short working spells on regional NGOs to high level consulting jobs in lobbying firms.

The main empirical challenge to estimate the causal effect of reverse revolving doors on the legislative process is to obtain a relevant metric of connection between legislators that is also exogenous to the characteristics predicting their voting behavior. We address this issue by using the seating adjacency of legislators at the European Parliament, in which non-leader members of the main political groups sit in alphabetic order. First, lawmakers that sit next to each other during plenary sessions are more likely to interact and therefore potentially influence each other's views ([Masket, 2008](#); [Saia, 2018](#); [Harmon et al., 2019](#); [Jo and Lowe, 2019](#)). And second, the links between members, fostered by the alphabetic sitting rule, can be regarded as good as random after conditioning on specific observable characteristics as shown by [Harmon et al. \(2019\)](#), allowing us to obtain causal estimates on the influence that those MEPs who previously worked for an interest group have on their colleagues' voting behavior.

To provide clear evidence on the role of interest groups in legislative voting through the practice of reverse revolving doors, we follow a twofold approach. First, we control for an exhaustive set of observable characteristics regarding the MEPs whose voting behavior we are interested in, and that of his or her seating neighbors. These controls, which include measures of professional activity and the legislators' fields of expertise, minimize pre-existing relevant differences among our two types of MEPs, i.e. those who worked in an interest group and those who did not. This comprehensive set of controls allows us to isolate the effect of being seated next to colleagues that used to work for an interest group from other characteristics related to the professional experience of the seating neighbors that might also affect the MEPs' voting behavior.

Second, we link the subjects of each voted motion with the economic activity of the interest groups that formally employed legislators. To illustrate the process followed, let us use the following example: Suppose that from all the entries in a legislator’s résumé, we identify one related to a working spell in an international bank that appears in the EU Transparency Register. We would then label this MEP as one that used to work for an interest group, followed by assigning to that organization one of the subjects used to classify each voted motion in the European Parliament, for instance “Free movement of capital”. All motions containing that subject will be then labeled as being *relevant* to this particular interest group. Finally, all those other MEPs sitting next to our member during the parliamentary votes containing the subject “Free movement of capital” will appear as casting a ballot on a piece of legislation considered to be relevant to their neighbors’ interest group.

Our procedure allows us to distinguish between two potential factors affecting the voting behavior of MEPs who might be subject to the consequences of reverse revolving doors’ activity. First, it allows us to estimate the average causal effect on the compliers of seating next to colleagues formally employed by interest groups. Second, it allows us to obtain the additional causal effect of seating adjacently to such type of legislator whenever the subject of the motion being voted is related to their interest group’s economic activity. This allows us to disentangle the effect emanating from a legislator being influenced by a colleague who used to work for an interest group whose economic activity is unrelated to the motion being voted, from the same effect when the outcome of the vote may affect the interest group economic activity. Under our working assumption that former interest group employees will lean towards legislation that is more favourable to their past employers, our research hypothesis is that this type of MEPs will only affect how their seating neighbors vote in votes that are considered to be of relevance to their past employers.

We find that legislators sitting next to MEPs that used to work for an interest group are 2.4% more likely to coincide in their ballots when the voting subject is deemed to

be relevant to the interest group’s economic activity. This effect represents a 57% of the influence produced by being in close proximity to lead legislators in charge of designating the party’s voting position. We find no effect when the vote is not relevant for the interest group, which we interpret as providing evidence that any unobserved characteristics that may systematically differ between those MEPs with and without experience in an interest group are most likely not playing any role in how other MEPs vote.

Not all MEPs are affected in the same way by their colleagues’ past professional experience in an interest group. Specifically, we find that female and freshmen MEPs are more susceptible to cast the same ballot as their seating neighbours when they have worked for an interest group in the past and still only during motions related to the group’s economic activity.

Moreover, the effect is found to be about two times larger, up to 5%, when looking at votes containing big public expenditure decisions, such as those on the European Union budget. We further shed light on how former interest group members affect their connections by showing that they achieve an increase in their vote mobilization by reducing by 9% both their seat neighbors’ abstention ballots and absenteeism. Further results suggest, however, that legislators slowly learn from their connections’ leanings and preferences, and accordingly start accounting for them by progressively reducing the amount of ballots in which they agree. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper providing clear evidence of the distorting effects generated by reverse revolving doors on the legislative process.

This paper contributes to the literature by reconciling two long-standing areas of study within economics, namely the one on the voting behavior determinants, and the one studying the effects of lobbying on the decision-making process. First, our paper complements the literature on the determinants of legislators’ voting behavior which goes back to [Rice \(1927\)](#) and [Routt \(1938\)](#).² Despite that, existing evidence on how

²A growing literature has covered in recent years how legislators’ careers, prior to entering parliament, influenced their own committee assignment ([Adler and Lapinski, 1997](#); [McElroy, 2006](#); [Yordanova, 2009](#); [Martin and Mickler, 2019](#)), their leadership roles ([Daniel and Thierse, 2018](#)), and voting behavior ([Francis, 2014](#); [Van Geffen, 2016](#)).

legislators affect each other’s voting behavior is still limited. [Cohen and Malloy \(2014\)](#) and [Battaglini et al. \(2020\)](#) identify congresspeople graduating from the same institution as being socially connected to study how their network’s voting behavior affects their own individual voting behavior. [Masket \(2008\)](#) is the first one to use the seat of legislators as a determinant of their interactions and therefore potential voting influence on each other. He uses data from the Californian Assembly, from 1941 to 1975, to provide evidence that legislators seating next to each other share a common voting history.

Recent research has been devoted on approaching these peer effects among legislators from a causal perspective. [Saia \(2018\)](#) and [Jo and Lowe \(2019\)](#) use the Icelandic parliament random seating rule to examine voting and speeches’ similarities. Using the European Parliament setting, [Harmon et al. \(2019\)](#) estimate how peer effects affect voting coincidence and estimates heterogeneous effects across various shared personal characteristics such as sex and nationality, and for close votes. Using the same measure of social connection, we contribute to this literature by focusing on how legislators’ prior working experience in an interest group affects their seating peers’ voting behavior.

Second, this work relates to the literature on lobbying in politics which harks back to [Logan and Fellow \(1929\)](#). Some recent studies have provided compelling evidence in favour of the argument that lobbyist main asset is to hold a connection with policymakers. In [Blanes i Vidal et al. \(2012\)](#), the authors find that U.S. Senate ex-staffers experience a 24% drop in their lobbying revenue when the Senator they used to work for leaves office. [Bertrand et al. \(2014\)](#) show that lobbying at the U.S. Congress is based on political connections rather than expertise, as lobbyists stick more to politicians they are connected with than to policy areas. A blossoming literature using statistical models for network data has studied how co-sponsorship is influenced by interest groups’ campaign contributions ([Battaglini and Patacchini, 2018](#)) and by legislators’ connections with interest groups ([Fischer et al., 2019](#)).³ We contribute to this literature by studying a more subtle and overlooked practice used by interest groups to achieve their goals: placing in-

³Further information on the lobbying literature can be found in [De Figueiredo and Richter \(2014\)](#) and [Bombardini and Trebbi \(2019\)](#).

dustry insiders in democratically elected institutions. We do so by estimating the causal influence that those legislators who previously worked for an interest group have on their colleagues when voting on motions legislating on the interest group’s activity.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the institutional setting. In Section 3 and 4, we present our data and describe it, respectively. Section 5 exposes the empirical strategy followed. Section 6 presents the main results, and Section 7 concludes.

2 Institutional Setting

2.1 Legislative voting in the European Parliament

The European Parliament is the lower legislative branch of the European Union. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are chosen through elections held in each EU member state. Once elected, they join cross-national European Political Groups (EPGs) based on their national party’s ideology. EPGs comprise legislators from different nationalities but with akin political affiliations. These groups operate and perform similar actions as conventional political parties in national parliaments. Prior to every vote, each group discusses internally their position, however and crucially for our analysis, every MEP has always the right to unilaterally choose which ballot to cast in every single vote.

The group’s position is actively promoted through the appointment of *rapporteurs* and *shadow rapporteurs*. A rapporteur is the MEP in charge of drafting, and subsequently promoting during plenary sessions, a report on the legislative proposal at stake. Although, there is only one rapporteur per piece of legislation, the remaining groups can appoint their own shadow rapporteur to represent their political views in the proposal’s drafting process.⁴

We use the role of rapporteurs for two main purposes. First, given the wide variety of legislation voted upon at the European Parliament, ranging from non-binding opinions

⁴See the [European Parliament website](#) for further details on the roles taken on by MEPs.

to far-reaching regulations, we use the appointment of rapporteurs as the mean for discerning important motions from less prominent ones.⁵ Hence, in our analysis we restrict our attention to those motions in which, at least, a rapporteur was appointed. Second, rapporteurs are entrusted by their parties to increase the Parliament support for a specific motion, having to influence the vote of not only their party colleagues, but also of other groups' members. For this reason, we introduce a set of controls to account for the role and influence of rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs towards their colleagues. Table B1 in the Appendix displays of how motions with rapporteur compare to those without. It provides evidence on the higher relative importance of motions with rapporteur measured by the type of procedures being voted, as virtually all Budget of the Union and the Ordinary procedures are led by a rapporteur. Moreover, motions with a rapporteur are characterized by a lower proportion of non-binding parliamentary own resolutions and a lower absence rate.

The European Parliament meets once or twice a month, during the so-called plenary sessions, in one of its two venues, located in Brussels and in Strasbourg. These plenary sessions represent the final step of the legislative process, in which legislation is debated and voted. There are three different ways in which MEPs can cast their ballot, namely i) by show of hands, ii) by secret ballot, or iii) by electronic vote.⁶ In our analysis, we work with electronic votes, which represent around 2/5 of the total votes emitted during the studied period, as they identify the ballot cast by each individual MEP. To cast a vote, legislators need to get first identified in the system by inserting their unique ID card in their own voting device, and subsequently press the button with their preferred choice. Casting a ballot for a colleague is strictly forbidden and penalized by the Parliament's norms.

⁵The selection of a rapporteur is done through a sophisticated auction, in which EPGs bid "points", awarded in relation to their relative size in the chamber. Motions with no rapporteur correspond to those votes where no bid was placed. For further information, see [Ringe \(2010\)](#); [Daniel \(2015\)](#).

⁶Electronic voting substituted roll-call voting as the only voting procedure in which the MEPs' individual ballots are recorded. Electronic voting is the default practice at the European Parliament, as it encompasses all final legislative votes (since 2009), those in which a qualified majority is required, those in which there is no clear visual majority, and those for which any EPG or any group of at least 40 legislators previously requested it.

2.2 Alphabetical seating in the chamber

The seating arrangement in the European Parliament’s chambers is regulated by the rules of the Conference of Presidents. MEPs belonging to the different European political groups are clustered together in the chamber, and groups are allocated from left to right according to their political orientation. Figure 1 shows the seat distribution at the Strasbourg’s venue, highlighting the block seating allocation by the European political groups. Within these groups, leaders sit in the front rows while the remaining of the seats are “generally” allocated in alphabetical order by surname. The five largest groups, namely S&D, Verts/ALE, ALDE, PPE, and ECR, adhere to this sitting rule.⁷ In total, 55.7% of all MEPs sit alphabetically during our studied period.⁸ Throughout the studied period, the European Parliament had an average of 755 legislators, varying with the access of new member states. The compliance rate with the alphabetic seating rule might vary across groups and time.⁹ The explanation for a non-perfect adherence to the sitting rule within the “alphabetical groups” is explained by the fact that the rule itself allows for members to occupy another seat for “technical or organizational proposes”.

Similar to [Harmon et al. \(2019\)](#), we illustrate the predictive power of the alphabetical rank on the seating rank in Figure 2. It plots the within-EPG alphabetic rank and the within-EPG seating order for two different groups, one that adheres to the sitting rule (Panel A) and one that does not (Panel B). In addition, individuals with prior working experience in interest groups are identified. The sample used in our analysis is determined by the change in the seating pattern depicted in Panel A. The dots on the left hand side of Panel A, depict those MEPs that sit in the front rows of their group, who clearly do not adhere to the alphabetic seating rule. Those are the ones we identify as the EPG leaders. The dots on the right hand side represent those MEPs that do sit alphabetically

⁷The Greens (Verts/ALE) ceased to adhere to the alphabetic seating rule at the beginning of our last studied legislature.

⁸ALDE places part of its leaders in an alphabetic manner. We consider these alphabetically seated leaders as part of our sample of interest, pooling them with the rest of alphabetically seated non-leader members. For simplicity, we refer to them also as non-leaders MEPs.

⁹The compliance rate is the correlation between the within-EPG alphabetical and seating rank. The average correlation across all voting dates is 0.92 in our sample of non-leaders from alphabetically organized EPGs.

within the seats designated to their EPG. Those are the non-leader MEPs. Lastly, Panel B contains dots representing MEPs belonging to an EPG that does not adhere to the alphabetic sitting rule. Our analysis is restricted to non-leader MEPs belonging to alphabetically sitting EPGs. Furthermore, we can visually observe how the seating distribution of legislators with prior experience in an interest group is not spatially nor alphabetically clustered.

3 Data

3.1 Plenary sessions

We collect the complete record of electronic votes at the European Parliament between June 2004 and May 2019 from each plenary session summary report. This dataset contains all electronically cast ballots for each MEP together with information on the motion’s characteristics, such as the subjects covered and the committees involved. We combine this voting information with their corresponding plenary seating arrangement, published before each plenary session in the European Parliament’s website.¹⁰

3.2 MEPs background

The legislators’ biographical information comes from two different sources publicly provided by the European Parliament, namely the MEPs’ personal profiles and their résumés. First, we collect the legislators’ personal characteristics, such as age, sex, nationality and national party, and their roles in the internal organisation of the Parliament (e.g. working committees, EPG positions and procedure rapporteurships) from the European Parliament Directory.¹¹ Second, we put together the biographical records of all the MEPs that took office at any point in time during the 6th, 7th and 8th legislative terms, using

¹⁰In the rare event no seating plan was available for a particular plenary session, we take the preceding seating plan corresponding to the same venue as reference.

¹¹For further information, see <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/directory/all/all>

their submitted résumés upon the start of their mandates.¹² The information contained in the résumés, initially collected by the European Parliament, was retrieved from the watchdog *Parltrack*. Using the information contained in these résumés we identify the legislators’ educational and professional background.

On the one hand, we identify those MEPs that studied at a “Top 500” university, measured using the 2003 Academic Ranking of World Universities, as a proxy of education excellence as in [Fisman et al. \(2015\)](#). On the other hand, we characterize MEPs using their professional experience. We use three main measures to classify our legislators, namely their labor profile, skill level, and topic of expertise. Regarding the first measure, we start by classifying the legislators’ working spells with the same categories used by the European Parliament: political, professional or academic. We assign each parliamentarian to a category by selecting that of the most repeated type of work spell after weighing them linearly by the duration of each spell. We use a supervised Random Forest algorithm to fill working spells that were not classified by the European Parliament under any of these three categories.¹³ Regarding the legislator’s skill level, we use a keyword matching algorithm to capture those spells that reflect high levels of responsibility.¹⁴ We then define each parliamentarian as having or not managerial skills, following the same methodology used to assign a labor profile. Lastly, we assign each legislator the topics in which they gained expertise prior entering parliament, so as to be able to rule out any potential confounding effects coming through a better knowledge of the subjects voted upon. We do this in two stages, we first use the educational and professional background of all legislators, classifying each of them using the 14 different categories proposed in [Yordanova \(2009\)](#) and [Daniel and Thierse \(2018\)](#).¹⁵ Finally, using

¹²Despite the fact that the provision of such information to the European Parliament was voluntary, a vast majority of the MEPs (81%) submitted their résumé. We hand-collect the biographical information of the remaining MEPs.

¹³We use as training dataset the curricula submitted during the terms 8th and 9th, as they were classified by the European Parliament under these three categories. The algorithm has a 5% error rate.

¹⁴Examples of the keywords used are: CEO, board member, manager, founder, director, minister, secretary general, rector, dean, etc.

¹⁵We thank the authors of both studies for kindly providing their data, covering the 6th and 8th parliamentary terms. Following their directions, we hand-coded the same information for the 7th term.

all 48 different predefined subjects attached to each motion voted in parliament we select those that better map into each of the 14 expertise categories. Table B2 in the Appendix displays such mapping.

3.3 Interest Groups

The other fundamental source of information is provided by the EU Transparency Register. This voluntary register, created by the European Parliament and the European Commission in 2011, lists those organizations interested on influencing the EU decision-making process.¹⁶ As for 2018, the register encompasses around 12.000 entities, with a total lobbying budget of €2.38 billion and almost 30.000 employees. From this source, we build a dataset with more than 17.000 entities registered at any point in time between 2016 and 2019,¹⁷ including information on each organization’s lobbying budget, policy interests, and their sector of activity. We use this dataset to extract the list of all organizations that have expressed interest in EU policy making. We employ a keyword matching algorithm using a wide variety of patterns, such as stemmed words, the interest groups’ website and different versions and translations of their registered names. The overall matching rate is of 85%, computed using a hand-coded sample. A 28% of the MEPs in our sample is found to have worked for an interest group at some point before taking up office, ranging from short working spells on regional NGOs to high level consulting jobs in lobbying firms.

Lastly and crucial for our analysis, we are interested in identifying those motions that can be considered to be of importance for the economic activity of the interest groups identified in our sample. To do so, we rely on the 48 policy subjects classification that the European Parliament assigns to each motion, by linking them to each interest

¹⁶Despite being voluntary, both European Parliament and European Commission require any individual to be listed in the register to access its facilities and to participate in a diverse range of activities that they promote, i.e. public consultations and expert groups, or to contact high-level decision-makers. For further information, please refer to the [Annual Report on the operations of the Transparency Register \(2019\)](#) and to Rule 11 in the Rules of Procedures of the European Parliament.

¹⁷We implicitly assume that those organizations registered at least once in the register were always interested in EU policy-making.

group.¹⁸ The result of the hand-coded linkage between policy subjects and interest groups is the indicator variable *Relevant*, which allows us to distinguish which votes are of relevance to each interest group. To construct this variable we use information scattered over different sources, such as the revealed issues of interest reported in the EU Transparency Register, the issues covered during the meetings with high-level officials from the European Commission, and their activity description from their website, among others.

Table B3 in Appendix shows the share of interest groups that are assigned to each subject and their share over the total number of votes cast. While our main analysis is conducted using a sole subject of interest per interest group, in Table B6 in the Appendix, we provide evidence that our main result hold when providing each interest group with up to 3 relevant subjects.

4 Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 gives some descriptive evidence of how legislators in the sample used for our analysis, i.e. non-leaders affiliated to alphabetic seating groups, compare in a set of observable characteristics to their party leaders and to members of non-alphabetic groups. On our main sample, we identify 5 big groups, namely EPP, S&D, Greens, ECR, and ALDE, with 1,703 MEPs in their ranks.¹⁹ These MEPs cast 55.36% of all ballots at the European Parliament during the 6th, 7th and 8th legislatures.

Panel A displays information on legislators' individual characteristics. Compared to their leaders, our sample of MEPs is characterized by a higher share of women (37% of the votes cast), younger cohorts, and with a lower proportions of members having studied in a top ranked education institutions. While no big differences on this measures appear between MEPs in our sample and those affiliated to non-alphabetic seating groups.

¹⁸The aforementioned level of disaggregation was selected to correctly match the MEPs' curricula information. For further details on the policy topics classification, see the [EP Legislative Observatory](#).

¹⁹Comparatively, the non alphabetical sample is composed by the following EPGs: EFD, EFDD, ENF, GUE/NGL, IND/DEM, ITS, UEN. Additionally, the Greens changed their seating organization to non-alphabetical at the beginning of Term 8.

Panel B presents the roles held in Parliament for each subsample. MEPS that seat alphabetically, go marginally less often to vote compared to their party leaders but they do so more frequent than non-alphabetic members. They also hold less rapporteurships and positions in working committees than their leaders. This comes as a result of their novel status, with 57% of the votes cast by freshman legislature. Alternatively, we can observe how our sample of members are more actively involved in the parliament than those legislators from non-alphabetic groups.

Panel C reports information on the legislators previous working experience. The predominant career profile among European Parliament legislators in our sample of interest is a political one instead of a professional or academic profile (69%, 27% and 3%, respectively), with similar shares in each of those categories in the other two samples. Legislators in our sample are further defined by having median working profile, both in terms of experience and managerial status, when compared to their leaders and to members of non alphabetic groups. Similarly, their average number of prior employment spells, 12.19, represents a mid-ground between their party leaders and those legislators in non alphabetic groups. Key to our study is that MEPs' résumés are exhaustive, something that can be visually verified by comparing the legislators' mean age and years worked.

Panel D details the information about the legislators' prior interest group experience. We can realize how those legislators are not equally distributed across the three samples. In our main sample, 28% of the legislators have working experience with at least in an interest group. They are more prevalent among the party leaders of alphabetic seating groups, with a 31%, and less among non alphabetic EPGs, with a 19% of their members. Despite that, the share of votes that are considered to be relevant to the economic activity of the interest group that employed those legislators is similar across the three subsamples.

Table 2 provides some descriptive evidence on the type of interest groups represented in our sample of non-leaders in alphabetical seating groups. The average interest group is

a Belgium-based NGO, with on average 15 employees, 2 of which can access the European facilities and with an average lobbying budget of 500.000€. Furthermore, the sample used contains a wide variety of interest groups, ranging from small to really big interest groups, as highlighted by the large budget and employees' standard deviations.

5 Empirical Strategy

We are first interested in examining the extent to which MEPs voting behavior is influenced by being placed adjacent to a colleague with working experience in an interest group using the following model:

$$Agree_{iv} = \alpha + \beta_1 Peers IG_{iv} + \eta_{iv} \quad (1)$$

where $Agree_{iv}$ is a variable capturing the fraction of legislators seating to the left and to the right of the focal legislator i during vote v casting the same vote as i . $Peers IG_{iv}$ is the fraction of adjacent legislators to the focal legislator i during vote v who used to work for an interest group before joining Parliament.²⁰

To interpret β_1 as the causal effect of seating besides a colleague with previous interest group experience, we need legislators not to be able to choose where to sit; as otherwise, some of their unobserved characteristics might correlate both with their voting behavior and their previous professional experience, biasing our estimation of β_1 . We address this concern by restricting our attention to those members that sit in an alphabetical order. Despite the high compliance rate with the alphabetic seating rule as shown in Section 2, we estimate both the intent-to-treat (ITT) and the average treatment effect of the compliers (LATE) instrumenting the group of individuals that sit adjacently to the focal MEP using the individuals whose surname is adjacent in the group's alphabetic rank. Hence, $Name Peers IG_{iv}$ is the fraction of legislators who previously worked at an interest group, and whose surnames are adjacent to that of the focal MEP i in her

²⁰MEPs seated at the beginning or at the end of their rows, as well as those seated by an aisle, are coded as only having one seat next to them instead of two.

EPG’s alphabetic list in a given vote v .

A concern when using surname contiguity as an instrument for seat adjacency is that the former might be confounding other unobserved heterogeneous characteristics that cause legislators to vote in a similar way, such as having similar background. Using a dyadic approach, [Harmon et al. \(2019\)](#) assess such concern by showing that, after conditioning for party affiliation and surname similarity controls, surname adjacency between two MEPs does not predict their shared characteristics, such as shared nationality, similar education, freshman status, or gender. Following their work, in our preferred specification we control for surname similarity by using the fraction of adjacent legislators sharing the same surname as the focal MEP and the absolute alphabetic rank across EPGs and terms. These two controls help us mitigate unobservable characteristics shared by the focal and peer legislators.

Additionally to the name similarity controls, we further include a comprehensive set of controls to capture any other type of characteristic of the focal legislator and her group of peers that might affect their voting agreement, together with fixed effects by EPG-Term, by plenary sessions since the term started, procedure type and vote subject. Section [A](#) in the Appendix includes the list with all the controls introduced in our specifications and their descriptive statistics are reported in Table [B4](#) in the Appendix.

Next, we analyze whether the effect captured by β_1 depends on whether the subject of the motion being voted is related to the adjacent legislators’ former interest group. To that end we introduce a new variable that identifies whether any of the subjects of the proposal being voted are related to the interest group in which the adjacent colleagues used to work, *Relevant*. Importantly, we code this variable only for the interest groups identified in our sample, thus it only takes value 1 if any adjacent MEP worked for an interest group before taking office. Therefore, *Relevant* takes value 0 when no adjacent legislator has experience in an interest group, or when the voting subject is not related to their interest group’s sector of activity. Thus, we estimate the following fully saturated

model:

$$Agree_{iv} = \alpha + \gamma_1 Peers\ IG_{iv} + \gamma_2 Peers\ IG_{iv} \times Relevant_{iv} + \epsilon_{iv} \quad (2)$$

as in Equation 1, we instrument Equation 2 using *Name Peers IG_{iv}* and *Name Peers IG_{iv} × Relevant*, in a twin first stage regression setting. We cluster all standard errors at the legislator level.

6 Results

We present our first set of results in Table 3. Columns 1 to 5 display the ITT estimates from equation 1, using *Name Peers IG* instead of *Peers IG* and progressively including different fixed effects and individual and peer controls. Our first coefficient of interest, present in column 1, is estimated using a specification that does not include any fixed effect nor control variables. It indicates that there is a statistically significant increase of 3.5 percentage points in the probability of MEPs to cast the same ballot as their alphabetic adjacent peers when all of them have professional experience in an interest group. We then account for the possibility that those effects might come from a specific EPG at a given legislative term, from some sort of temporal trend, or from name similarity conditions, by including EPG-by-Term and plenary session fixed effects, and name similarity controls. The effect on the agreement probability is still statistically significant, while attenuated to an increase of 2.07 percentage points. In Column 3, we further control by some vote characteristics, namely by the procedure type and the vote subject, finding a similar effect of 2.06 percentage points.

In Column 4, we introduce focal legislators’ characteristics, reducing the average probability of casting the same ballot as those surname adjacent MEPs with prior experience in an interest group to 1.27 percentage points. Introducing peer related controls in Column 5 produces a considerable drop in the probability of co-voting to 0.6 percentage points, and the coefficient turns statistically insignificant.

Column 6 introduces our main regressor of interest, *Name Peers IG* \times *Relevant*. It captures the additional effect of voting on a motion deemed relevant to the former employer of alphabetically adjacent MEPs on their probability of co-voting. It can be interpreted as the additional effect of being adjacently in the alphabetic list to a legislator that used to work for an interest group when the subject of the motion is related to its economic activity. We can appreciate how when the motion subject is not of interest to the peers' former employers, *Name Peers IG*, the agreement rate is not significantly affected by the alphabetically adjacent peers. This is not the case when the subject at stake is relevant to the peers' former interest group. In that case, *Name Peers IG* \times *Relevant* significantly increases the probability of vote coincidence by 0.73 percentage points.

Compared to those MEPs with no adjacent former interest group's legislators, surname adjacency to legislators with prior interest group exposure when the vote is deemed to be relevant to their interest groups increases the probability of casting the same ballot by a 1.86%.²¹ The magnitude of this effect is 16% and 44% the size of those found for being adjacently to the rapporteur and shadow rapporteur of the motion, respectively.²² Given that the primal task of rapporteur and shadow rapporteurs is to convince other legislators to vote like them on the motion they represent, we argue that former interest group members have a sizable influence on their adjacent colleagues.

Finally Column 7 provides an estimate of the LATE using both regressors of interest. The high predictive power of the instrument is displayed in Table B5, which reports the results of the two first stages using the same controls and fixed effects as the specification in Column 7. Compared to Column 6, we can appreciate how both *Peers IG* and *Peers IG* \times *Relevant* are similar in magnitude to their surname counterparts, as a result of the strong first stages. We find an increase in the average probability of casting the same ballot as the adjacent MEPs when voting on a subject deemed of relevance

²¹Using the ITT approach, Table B7 shows that the introduction of focal and peer expertise doesn't alter the influence legislators have on their peers when the topic is relevant for their interest group.

²²Table B8 in the Appendix shows Table 3 with the coefficients for the rapporteur and shadow rapporteurs.

to their interest groups by 1.71 percentage points or 2.42% when compared to those legislators with no adjacent former interest group member. This effect corresponds to a 21% and 57% of the influence exert by adjacent rapporteur or shadow rapporteurs, respectively.^{23,24}

We are now interested in understanding the potential mechanisms that are at play when former interest group employees turned-politicians are able to persuade their colleagues into voting like them. To that end we shed light on which type of MEPs are more susceptible to follow their colleagues with a past experience in an interest group. We further explore the channels through which these legislators affect voting behavior, such as voting mobilization, the emphasis on high stake votes, the importance of the connection persistence and various interest group’s characteristics.

6.1 MEPs’ characteristics

We want to understand which MEPs’ personal characteristics define a more susceptible influence by former interest group members. To that end we first analyze whether the gender of the legislator plays a role. We reproduce columns 5 to 7 from Table 3 on two different samples depending on the gender of the legislator casting the ballot. Results reported in Table 4 highlight that the effect on the agreement probability is driven entirely by women being affected by their seating colleagues with experience in an interest group, while find no effect is found on male legislators.

Another group of legislators that may be more prone to the influence of their colleagues’ previous professional experience are freshmen MEPs. Several reasons might be behind such type of behaviour ranging from not being familiar enough with most subjects that are voted upon in the Parliament to their higher willingness to please more

²³Relevant for the consideration of the magnitude of our effects is the fact that seating adjacency increases the probability of *agreeing* in 0.6 percentage points (Harmon et al., 2019).

²⁴We show in Table B9 how legislators who previously worked in an interest group do not only affect their closest peers, but also those at higher distances, with a decaying influence as distance increases. In the same line, Table B10 shows that using row aggregated information produces consistent results with our main specification. In Table B11, we provide evidence that our benchmark results are not sensitive to different clustering choices.

tenured colleagues. This hypothesis is tested in Table 5 in which we followed the same approach and divide our sample into those MEPs that have being present in more than one legislative term, and those who just got elected in their first term, who we label as freshmen. While columns 1 to 3 indicate that the agreement rate of more tenured MEPs with their sitting neighbours is not affected by their previous professional experience in an interest group, nor by the motion subject type, that of freshman MEPs is. Focusing in the results of column 6, the agreement rate of freshmen MEPs with their seating colleagues when all of them have worked in an interest group increases by 2.2 percentage points. This estimate is statistically significant at 5% level and corresponds to a 3% increase of the average agreement rate.

Results of the previous two exercises indicate that not all MEPs are affected in the same way by their seating colleagues previous professional experience in an interest group. Specifically, we find that female and freshmen MEPs are more susceptible to cast the same ballot as their seating neighbours when they have worked for an interest group in the past and only during motions related to the group’s economic activity.

6.2 Voting mobilization

We turn now to analyze how the legislators’ ballots are actually influenced. Under the implicit assumption that legislators who previously worked for an interest group have a clear stance on those motions relevant to their previous employers,²⁵ their objective is to mobilize their network to vote in favour or against the relevant motions depending on their previous employer’s economic activity. Using the specification in Equation 2, we start by estimating whether being in close proximity to a legislator with prior experience in an interest group affects the legislator probability of abstaining on relevant votes. Columns 1-3 in Table 6 display the results from such specification. We can see how seat adjacency to one of these legislators does not have on average any effect on

²⁵In our sample, we can observe how those legislators have a clearer stance in those votes relevant for their former employer (they vote “clear”, namely yay or nay, in 86% of the votes when relevant and 85% when not relevant, as compared with the average baseline likelihood, 84%).

voting abstention, while it has an effect when the motion is relevant for interest group in which the neighbouring legislator used to work. The effect, small in absolute magnitude, predicts that legislators seating adjacently to a legislator with professional experience in an interest group related to any of the topics being voted are on average 9% less likely to abstain in a given vote.

We just showed how indeed those legislators who worked for an interest group before entering parliament affect their peers voting behavior out of abstention. This is possible as the limited party line enforcement at the European Parliament reduces the individual cost of casting a vote instead of actively abstaining. Our result seem to point that legislators with past professional experience in an interest group affect their peers when they are *de facto* in the chamber. In the same direction, we could expect that they would also mobilize their network to participate in the voting process, as that would increase their support for an specific motion. Columns 4-6 in Table 6 display the analogous analysis for MEPs' absenteeism. We can see how being designated to seat next to a legislator with prior interest group experience does indeed decrease the legislators' probability to be absent during the vote by 0.87 percentage points. Having in mind that MEPs in our sample are on average absent of 13% of the votes, the effect implies a decrease of the mean absenteeism rate by more than 6%.²⁶

6.3 High-stakes votes

We now want to understand whether the influence of those legislators with experience in interest groups is stronger in high-stakes situations. We rely on different vote characteristics to identify such type of situations.

First, we turn our attention to whether the motion concerns the budget of the Union or not to infer its relative importance. We consider this indicator to be a good proxy for high-stakes situations as these type of motions are part of the budgetary procedure

²⁶Table B12 shows how the influence of these MEPs is similar during voting amendments and final votes. Similarly, Table B13 shows that former interest group members do not influence legislators' voting corrections or intentions.

determining how the entire annual EU budget is to be spend. Indeed more than 16% of ballots in our sample refer to votes about the budget of the Union. Table 7 reproduces our preferred specifications for proposals concerning the budget of the Union and for those unrelated to it. We can perceive how both budget and non budget related votes are influenced by being in close proximity to legislators who worked for an interest group and the vote is relevant for her former employer. For instance, if we compare Columns 3 and 6, we can appreciate how the additional effect of having all seating neighbours with experience in an interest group when the topic is relevant for any prior employer, increases the probability of casting the same ballot by 1.6 percentage points in the case of non-budgetary votes and by 3.8 percentage points when deciding on budgetary matters. Both effects are statistically significant at the 5% level and when compared to their corresponding average agreement rates, the probabilities of voting like the seating peers increase by 2.3% for non-budget votes and a 5% in those budget related.

A second type of vote feature we explore is whether the effect of these legislators is larger depending on the motion passing margin. While using budget related motions to proxy high-stakes voting situations captures the relative importance of the motion with an intrinsic feature, the passing margin of a voted procedure attempts to measure high-stakes situations using ex-post measure of the acceptance of the procedure by the chamber. Table 8 reports the results of the estimation of our preferred specifications. We can see how being placed next to legislators who previously worked for an interest group does not have any effect on the probability of co-voting along the three winning margins considered, namely winning by a 1, 5 or 10%.

Overall, all these results suggest that legislators that worked for an interest group put significant effort in persuading their colleagues in close proximity during budget related votes, but do not appear to do so during highly contested votes.

6.4 Connection persistence

While the preceding section contained results providing evidence that MEPs voting behaviour is highly affected during high-stakes votes by their seating neighbours who worked in an interest group, we now explore whether these effects change as the group of legislators spend more time together. One could expect that the impact that those legislators with prior interest group experience have on their colleagues would evolve over time as the individuals in the group get to know each other. On the one hand, seating next to the same colleagues for long periods of time could facilitate the exchange of ideas, which in turn would make them more alike in their voting process. In our case, this would allow legislators with a prior experience in an interest group to bring closer to their views those adjacent legislators with whom they have shared many plenary sessions. On the other hand, theoretically the opposite effect could play a role too, by which legislators might learn about each others point of views and hidden interests, and as a result deviate in their voting behaviour. In our case, this would imply that the ability of those legislators who worked in an interest group to affect their peers ballot would decrease over time as their peers learn about their inclinations.

Table 9 shows the results of estimating equation 2 adding as regressors the number of previous voting days in which each MEP has been assigned to sit adjacently to the same two other legislators, as well as the interactions with *Peers IG* and *Peers IG * Relevant*.^{27,28} Column 3 presents us with the fully saturated ITT model. As in the benchmark analysis, we can appreciate how MEPs that used to work in an interest group only affect their peers voting behavior in those motions classified as relevant for their previous employer. Despite that, we can see how such effect decays as the group of MEPs get to know each other. Important to notice that all the regressions include time fixed effects, ruling out confounding effects with the parliamentary learning process. Column 4 introduces the fully saturated 2SLS model. Similar to the ITT case, we can appreciate

²⁷We construct the corresponding instrument variable using the number of voting days that each legislator's surname was adjacent to the same two surnames in the party alphabetic list.

²⁸Table B14 in the Appendix displays the results of using the number of plenary sessions that MEPs have been assigned together instead of voting dates and similar results are found.

how in the very first day together, these legislators affect their peers voting behavior into voting like them by 2.24 percentage points, which represents a 3.16% increase over the average vote coincidence among seating neighbours. As time passes, and legislators keep being seated next to the same colleagues, their voting agreement drops, at a rate of 0.02 percentage points per voting day that they sit together. This effect implies that MEPs would have to pass at least 138 voting days together for their agreement rate to be the same as that one of groups of MEPs without any of the peers having worked in an interest group. If we consider that the average legislature in our sample has 182 voting days, and the average group of peers lasts for 50 days, the results suggests that the effect is considerably persistent over time, yet providing suggestive evidence that legislators learn from their peers inclinations, and deviate from their voting behavior.

6.5 Interest group characteristics

In order to shed light on yet another potential mechanism behind our reported effects we explore whether the influence of those MEPs with prior ties to interest groups varies depending on various interest groups' characteristics. We begin to study whether the effects we previously saw in Table 3 depend on the general type of interest group. To that end, we define as private good interest group, those whose legal status is business-related (e.g. companies and corporations which are not state owned) and as public good interest group, those with a non-business-related legal status, such as NGOs, trade unions and alike. Table 10 reports the results of our preferred specifications. In Columns 1 to 3 (4 to 6), we use the baseline sample and drop those votes in which legislators sit adjacently to legislators with professional experience in a private good (public good) type interest group. Results point towards a marginally higher effect in magnitude and in statistical significance of legislators with experience in a public good type of interest group, with a 3.2% increase in the agreement rate. These results provide suggestive evidence of the level of influence different interest groups have on their network, and highlights the relative importance public good interest groups have in the European lobbying sphere.

Second, we explore whether the location of the interest group’s headquarters affect its relative influence. On the one hand, we could think that those interest groups located in Brussels, the city in which most EU bodies are based, might have a higher interest on EU policy and hence might mobilize their former employees turned politicians to exert a higher influence on their current colleagues. On the other hand, one could think that interest groups based in the European capital already have many other means to influence legislative voting and might not utilize all their network. Contrarily, those interest groups located in their respective home countries might not have such extensive network, relying on placing in Parliament their former employees to influence EU policy making. Results in Table 11 seem to provide evidence for the latter story. Only those legislators with prior experience in interest groups located somewhere else than in Brussels exert influence on their peers when the vote is deemed to be relevant for their former employers. Such effect amount to 2.8 percentage points, or to a 2.5% increase in the agreement rate. No significant effect is found for those MEPs seated adjacently colleagues that used to work in a Brussels based interest group.

Thirdly, we focus on whether the time that has past since leaving an interest group and the time spent in such interest group affects the influence that MEPs have on their peers. Figure 3 displays the average effect of having all seating neighbours having worked in an interest group and voting on a motion related to the group’s economic activity. More concretely, Subfigure 3a shows how the influence of these reverse revolving doors’ MEPs depends on how long ago they stopped working for their respective interest group. We can appreciate a generally positive effect, with higher statistical significance for those legislators that finished such employment in the previous 4 years before entering parliament. Similarly, Subfigure 3b shows that such influence is positive for any interest group tenure. Overall, both figures suggest that the influence legislators with prior interest group exposure have on their peers does not systematically depend on their interest group’s tenure or the period that has passed since they stopped working for the interest group.

7 Conclusion

This paper estimates and provides evidence of the causal influence that members of the European Parliament who used to work for an interest group have on the voting behavior of legislators in their close network during specific motions. We do so by first identifying those members of the European Parliament with working experience in an interest group using detailed individual résumé information. We rely on the list of organizations registered as exhibiting interest in the European Union policy-making to classify legislators' former employers as interest groups. In order to avoid any of the classical obstacles to identify causal effects stemming from social networks, we exploit the alphabetic seating rule imposed to most members of the European Parliament to construct an exogenous measure of network formation. Furthermore, we map each interest group's economic activity to one of the 48 subjects used to categorize each motion voted in the European Parliament. This allowed us to identify those motions that were of relevance to the interest groups that formerly employed legislators in our sample.

The results from our analysis show that legislators when seating besides colleagues who worked for an interest group before entering Parliament and voting on a topic deemed to be important for such interest group do indeed increase the probability of covoting with their peers. Such influence represents a 2.4% increase on the average agreement rate. These adjacent legislators do not exert any influence when the vote is not relevant for its previous employers. Those effects are found to be driven by female and by first-time legislators.

We shed light on how these legislators are influencing their peers' ballots by showing that they reduce by a 9% both their seat neighbors' abstention ballots and absenteeism. Additional insights are drawn in high-stakes votes, such as those referring to the Budget of the European Union, in which legislators with prior interest group ties are able to substantially increase the likelihood of their connections to cast their same ballot by 5%. Further results suggest however, that there might be some sort of learning from legislators connected to lobbyist legislators as the former progressively decide to deviate

from the latter's voting behavior.

To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first one providing a clear evidence of the distorting effects generated by reverse revolving door lobbyists on the legislative voting behavior of lawmakers.

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
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Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Strasbourg seating plan during the Plenary Session held on February 4th 2013



Strasbourg, 04.02.2013

Figure 2: (a): Seating and Alphabetical Rank - ECR group.
(b): Seating and Alphabetical Rank - GUE/NGL group.





Figure 3: Temporal distribution of the effect of relevant reverse revolving doors on vote coincidence



Notes: This figure tests whether the probability of casting the same ballot as the adjacent legislators depend on whether the vote is relevant for the adjacent legislators' prior interest group. Subfigure 3a studies how this influence evolves vis-à-vis their adjacent peers' cooling off years from their interest groups. Subfigure 3b focuses on how such effect depends on the years of experience adjacent legislators had in interest groups. The results shown in both subfigures correspond to the effect of seating adjacently to a legislator who previously worked for an interest group, when the topic is relevant for its former employer. A comprehensive set of controls at the focal and peer legislators is used in the analysis. See Appendix A for further information on the controls included. Standard errors are clustered at legislator level. Confidence intervals represent the 95% confidence level.

Table 1: European Parliament sample comparison

	Non-leaders at alphabetic seating EPGs		Leaders at alphabetic seating EPGs		EPGs with no alphabetic seating	
	Votes cast	MEPs	Votes cast	MEPs	Votes cast	MEPs
Panel A: Legislators' characteristics						
Share women	0.37	0.36	0.33	0.33	0.31	0.28
Mean age	53.41	53.22	56.33	55.58	53.14	53.62
Share top ranked education	0.30	0.31	0.39	0.37	0.30	0.28
Panel B: Roles in Parliament						
Share freshman	0.57	0.58	0.26	0.34	0.66	0.67
Mean tenure at the EP	3.21	3.09	6.05	5.41	2.22	2.20
Share absence	0.13	–	0.12	–	0.15	–
Share rapporteur	0.001	–	0.002	–	0.000	–
Share shadow rapporteur	0.003	–	0.003	–	0.01	–
Mean number committee membership	4.96	–	5.37	–	4.65	–
Panel C: Legislators' prior experience						
Mean number of working spells	12.19	11.90	14.32	13.33	7.94	8.04
Mean years of working experience	24.68	24.39	26.69	26.29	22.68	22.86
Share managerial profile	0.27	0.26	0.30	0.28	0.23	0.23
Share political	0.69	0.70	0.78	0.78	0.56	0.57
Share professional	0.27	0.25	0.17	0.18	0.37	0.37
Share university	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.07	0.06
Panel D: Legislators' prior interest group experience						
Share worked for an interest group	0.28	0.28	0.31	0.31	0.21	0.19
Years experience in interest group	9.40	9.05	9.19	8.86	9.14	8.90
Interest group's share of relevant subject	0.05	–	0.06	–	0.05	–
Total	6,770,336	1,703	3,056,927	828	2,400,508	527

Notes: The table shows counts and shares in three different subsamples representing all the members of the European Parliament. Every member is coded as part of one of these samples or blocks. This is why, samples will overlap and will not add up to our full sample. Columns 1, 3 and 5 represent shares computed using all the votes cast, while Columns 2, 4, and 6, show those same shares computed using individual legislators. The sample selection criterion used to construct each of these three blocks is the same applied to obtain the sample used in the baseline analysis: we use only votes with an assigned rapporteur and containing at least one subject. We use legislators or their ballots who are non-leaders affiliated to alphabetic seating groups (columns 1 and 2), leaders affiliated to alphabetic seating groups (columns 3 and 4), and all members affiliated to non-alphabetic seating groups (columns 5 and 6). Moreover, for all three categories we use only members who sit besides at least one other legislator belonging to the same category.

Table 2: Interest Group's characteristics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
<i>Panel A: Business type</i>					
NGOs	0.23	0.42	0	1	513
Academic institutions	0.19	0.39	0	1	513
Companies & Groups	0.18	0.39	0	1	513
Trade Unions	0.10	0.30	0	1	513
Other institutions	0.09	0.29	0	1	513
Trade and Business associations	0.06	0.24	0	1	513
Think Tanks	0.06	0.23	0	1	513
Transnational associations	0.04	0.19	0	1	513
Consultancies	0.03	0.17	0	1	513
Regional structures	0.03	0.17	0	1	513
<i>Panel B: Headquarter's location</i>					
Belgium	0.23	0.42	0	1	513
Germany	0.12	0.32	0	1	513
United Kingdom	0.11	0.32	0	1	513
Italy	0.07	0.26	0	1	513
France	0.07	0.25	0	1	513
Poland	0.04	0.21	0	1	513
Finland	0.04	0.20	0	1	513
Netherlands	0.04	0.20	0	1	513
Spain	0.04	0.20	0	1	513
Denmark	0.03	0.17	0	1	513
RoE	0.15	0.36	0	1	513
RoW	0.05	0.22	0	1	513
<i>Panel C: Other characteristics</i>					
Num. Employees	14.81	209.82	0	4750	513
Num. EP Accreditations	1.78	3.86	0	53	513
Lobbying Budget	512,445	1,131,297	0	10,000,000	513

Notes: The table displays the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values for a set of interest group's characteristics. The interest groups used correspond to those identified in the résumés of non-leader MEPs affiliated with an alphabetic seating group.

Table 3: Average effect of reverse revolving doors connections on vote coincidence

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	2SLS
	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree
Name Peers IG	0.0350*** (0.0076)	0.0207*** (0.0067)	0.0206*** (0.0067)	0.0127** (0.0053)	0.0066 (0.0049)	0.0059 (0.0050)	
Name Peers (IG * Relevant)						0.0073* (0.0039)	
Peers IG							0.0080 (0.0066)
Peers (IG * Relevant)							0.0091* (0.0049)
EPG x Term FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Name controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peers controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The table tests whether legislators seating beside peers with previous experience in Interest Groups affects their probability of voting alike. We denote as Joint p-value the test on the joint significance of the adjacency to a legislator with previous experience in an interest group, and when the topic is relevant for such interest group (both at the surname and seating level). A comprehensive set of controls at the focal and peer legislators is used in the analysis. See Appendix A for further information on the controls included. Standard errors are clustered at legislator level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 4: Average effect of reverse revolving doors connections on
vote coincidence by legislator's gender

	<u>Males</u>			<u>Females</u>		
	(1) OLS Agree	(2) OLS Agree	(3) 2SLS Agree	(4) OLS Agree	(5) OLS Agree	(6) 2SLS Agree
Name Peers IG	0.0041 (0.0061)	0.0040 (0.0062)		0.0074 (0.0081)	0.0056 (0.0082)	
Name Peers (IG * Relevant)		0.0016 (0.0051)			0.0180*** (0.0060)	
Peers IG			0.0053 (0.0081)			0.0079 (0.0112)
Peers (IG * Relevant)			0.0020 (0.0063)			0.0225*** (0.0076)
EPG x Term FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Name controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peers controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,248,656	4,248,656	4,248,656	2,521,680	2,521,680	2,521,680
Mean Agree	0.702	0.702	0.702	0.716	0.716	0.716
Joint p-value		0.440	0.437		0.0147	0.0185
F-stat 1			783.3			408.7
F-stat 2			820.9			587.5

Notes: The table tests whether legislators seating beside peers with previous experience in Interest Groups affects their probability of voting alike. Columns 1-3 use those votes corresponding to male MEPs, while Columns 4-6 use only those corresponding to female legislators. We denote as Joint p-value the test on the joint significance of the adjacency to a legislator with previous experience in an interest group, and when the topic is relevant for such interest group (both at the surname and seating level). A comprehensive set of controls at the focal and peer legislators is used in the analysis. See Appendix A for further information on the controls included. Standard errors are clustered at legislator level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 5: Average effect of reverse revolving doors connections on vote coincidence by legislator's freshman status

	<u>Non freshmen</u>			<u>Freshmen</u>		
	(1) OLS Agree	(2) OLS Agree	(3) 2SLS Agree	(4) OLS Agree	(5) OLS Agree	(6) 2SLS Agree
Name Peers IG	0.0064 (0.0075)	0.0059 (0.0075)		0.0072 (0.0067)	0.0063 (0.0067)	
Name Peers (IG * Relevant)		0.0052 (0.0063)			0.0103** (0.0048)	
Peers IG			0.0077 (0.0098)			0.0086 (0.0091)
Peers (IG * Relevant)			0.0063 (0.0076)			0.0131** (0.0062)
EPG x Term FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Name controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peers controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,871,766	2,871,766	2,871,766	3,898,570	3,898,570	3,898,570
Mean Agree	0.706	0.706	0.706	0.709	0.709	0.709
Joint p-value		0.223	0.224		0.0329	0.0367
F-stat 1			523.1			808.4
F-stat 2			711.8			919.9

Notes: The table tests whether legislators seating beside peers with previous experience in Interest Groups affects their probability of voting alike. Columns 1-3 use those votes corresponding to MEPs who are not in their first legislative term, while Columns 4-6 use only those corresponding to MEPs in their first legislative term. We denote as Joint p-value the test on the joint significance of the adjacency to a legislator with previous experience in an interest group, and when the topic is relevant for such interest group (both at the surname and seating level). A comprehensive set of controls at the focal and peer legislators is used in the analysis. See Appendix A for further information on the controls included. Standard errors are clustered at legislator level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 6: Average effect of reverse revolving doors connections on voting abstention and absenteeism

	(1) OLS Abstain	(2) OLS Abstain	(3) 2SLS Abstain	(4) OLS Absent	(5) OLS Absent	(6) 2SLS Absent
Name Peers IG	-0.0010 (0.0016)	-0.0009 (0.0016)		-0.0087* (0.0047)	-0.0087* (0.0047)	
Name Peers (IG * Relevant)		-0.0017** (0.0008)			-0.0000 (0.0038)	
Peers IG			-0.0012 (0.0021)			-0.0115* (0.0062)
Peers (IG * Relevant)			-0.0021** (0.0010)			-0.0000 (0.0047)
EPG x Term FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Name controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peers controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,881,658	5,881,658	5,881,658	6,770,336	6,770,336	6,770,336
Mean dep. variable	0.0229	0.0229	0.0229	0.131	0.131	0.131
Joint p-value		0.131	0.139		0.141	0.134
F-stat 1			1020			1056
F-stat 2			1236			1308

Notes: The table tests whether legislators seating beside peers with previous experience in Interest Groups affects their probability abstaining or absenting from voting. We denote as Joint p-value the test on the joint significance of the adjacency to a legislator with previous experience in an interest group, and when the topic is relevant for such interest group (both at the surname and seating level). A comprehensive set of controls at the focal and peer legislators is used in the analysis. See Appendix A for further information on the controls included. Standard errors are clustered at legislator level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 7: Average effect of reverse revolving doors connections on vote coincidence by vote type

	Non-Budget vote			Budget vote		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	OLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	OLS	2SLS
	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree
Name Peers IG	0.0062 (0.0049)	0.0054 (0.0049)		0.0072 (0.0076)	0.0068 (0.0076)	
Name Peers (IG * Relevant)		0.0070* (0.0040)			0.0222** (0.0102)	
Peers IG			0.0073 (0.0065)			0.0092 (0.0101)
Peers (IG * Relevant)			0.0087* (0.0050)			0.0271** (0.0124)
EPG x Term FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Name controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peers controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,651,802	5,651,802	5,651,802	1,118,534	1,118,534	1,118,534
Mean Agree	0.703	0.703	0.703	0.732	0.732	0.732
Joint p-value		0.0354	0.0376		0.0119	0.0119
F-stat 1			1055			977.1
F-stat 2			1290			598.1

Notes: The table tests whether legislators seating beside peers with previous experience in Interest Groups affects their probability of voting alike. We denote as Joint p-value the test on the joint significance of the adjacency to a legislator with previous experience in an interest group, and when the topic is relevant for such interest group (both at the surname and seating level). A comprehensive set of controls at the focal and peer legislators is used in the analysis. See Appendix A for further information on the controls included. Standard errors are clustered at legislator level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 8: Average effect of reverse revolving doors connections on vote coincidence by margin of victory

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	OLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	OLS	2SLS
	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree
Name Peers IG	-0.0013 (0.0082)	-0.0008 (0.0082)		0.0029 (0.0073)	0.0031 (0.0072)		0.0042 (0.0067)	0.0041 (0.0067)	
Name Peers (IG * Relevant)		-0.0042 (0.0090)			-0.0015 (0.0071)			0.0009 (0.0065)	
Peers IG			-0.0011 (0.0109)			0.0041 (0.0096)			0.0055 (0.0088)
Peers (IG * Relevant)			-0.0053 (0.0112)			-0.0019 (0.0089)			0.0011 (0.0081)
EPG x Term FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Name controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peers controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	135,195	135,195	135,195	643,715	643,715	643,715	1,226,807	1,226,807	1,226,807
Mean Agree	0.693	0.693	0.693	0.686	0.686	0.686	0.683	0.683	0.683
Joint p-value		0.675	0.679		0.877	0.869	0.586	0.586	0.582
F-stat 1			963.6			980.7			1075
F-stat 2			787.3			904.2			1045

Notes: The table tests whether legislators seating beside peers with previous experience in Interest Groups affects their probability of voting alike. The sample is divided into votes that were passed by a margin of 1% (Columns 1, 2, 3), 5% (Columns 4, 5, 6) and 10% (Columns 7, 8, 9). We denote as Joint p-value the test on the joint significance of the adjacency to a legislator with previous experience in an interest group, and when the topic is relevant for such interest group (both at the surname and seating level). A comprehensive set of controls at the focal and peer legislators is used in the analysis. See Appendix A for further information on the controls included. Standard errors are clustered at legislator level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 9: Average effect of reverse revolving doors connections on
vote coincidence persistence by voting days

	(1) OLS Agree	(2) OLS Agree	(3) OLS Agree	(4) 2SLS Agree
Name Peers IG	0.0060 (0.0050)	0.0046 (0.0068)	0.0037 (0.0068)	
Name Peers (IG * Relevant)	0.0073* (0.0039)	0.0073* (0.0039)	0.0163** (0.0065)	
Vote days name adjacent	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	
Name Peers IG * Vote days name adjacent		0.0000 (0.0001)	0.0000 (0.0001)	
Name Peers (IG * Relevant) * Vote days name adjacent			-0.0001 (0.0001)	
Peers IG				0.0052 (0.0093)
Peers (IG * Relevant)				0.0224** (0.0089)
Vote days seat adjacent				-0.0000 (0.0001)
Peers IG * Vote days seat adjacent				0.0000 (0.0001)
Peers (IG * Relevant) * Vote days seat adjacent				-0.0002* (0.0001)
EPG x Term FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Name controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peers controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,770,336	6,770,336	6,770,336	6,770,336
Mean Agree	0.707	0.707	0.707	0.707
Joint p-value		0.124	0.0310	0.0308
F-stat (KP)				172

Notes: The table tests whether legislators seating beside peers with previous experience in Interest Groups affects their probability of voting alike. We denote as Joint p-value the test on the joint significance of all the variables displayed in the table (both at the surname and seating level). A comprehensive set of controls at the focal and peer legislators is used in the analysis. See Appendix A for further information on the controls included. The reported F Statistics has been calculated following Kleibergen and Paap (2006). Standard errors are clustered at legislator level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 10: Average effect of reverse revolving doors connections on vote coincidence
Public vs Private good Interest Groups

	Public good			Private good		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	OLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	OLS	2SLS
	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree
Name Peers IG	0.0091* (0.0053)	0.0082 (0.0054)		0.0029 (0.0064)	0.0021 (0.0064)	
Name Peers (IG * Relevant)		0.0092* (0.0048)			0.0084 (0.0052)	
Peers IG			0.0110 (0.0072)			0.0031 (0.0094)
Peers (IG * Relevant)			0.0117* (0.0063)			0.0120 (0.0076)
EPG x Term FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Name controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peers controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,835,465	5,835,465	5,835,465	4,831,995	4,831,995	4,831,995
Mean Agree	0.708	0.708	0.708	0.702	0.702	0.702
Joint p-value		0.00788	0.00841		0.187	0.191
F-stat 1			880.9			320.6
F-stat 2			894.3			396.9

Notes: The table tests whether legislators seating beside peers with previous experience in interest groups affects their probability of voting alike. Estimates in presented in Columns 1, 2 and 3 were produced using the baseline sample and dropping all votes of legislators who sit adjacently legislators with prior private good interest group experience. Analogously, Columns 4, 5 and 6 use the baseline sample after having dropped all votes of legislators who sit adjacently to legislators with prior public good interest group experience. We define private good interest groups as those whose legal status is business-related (e.g. companies and corporations which are not state owned) and public good interest groups as those with a non-business-related legal status, such as NGOs, trade unions and so on. A comprehensive set of controls at the focal and peer legislators is used in the analysis. We denote as Joint p-value the test on the joint significance of the adjacency to a legislator with previous experience in an interest group, and when the topic is relevant for such interest group (both at the surname and seating level). See Appendix A for further information on the controls included. Standard errors are clustered at legislator level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 11: Average effect of reverse revolving doors connections on
vote coincidence - Brussels IG vs. No Brussels IG

	<u>Brussels IGs</u>			<u>No Brussels IGs</u>		
	(1) OLS Agree	(2) OLS Agree	(3) 2SLS Agree	(4) OLS Agree	(5) OLS Agree	(6) 2SLS Agree
Name Peers IG	0.0131 (0.0080)	0.0128 (0.0081)		0.0052 (0.0051)	0.0042 (0.0052)	
Name Peers (IG * Relevant)		0.0023 (0.0084)			0.0097** (0.0042)	
Peers IG			0.0259 (0.0166)			0.0057 (0.0069)
Peers (IG * Relevant)			0.0039 (0.0162)			0.0123** (0.0053)
EPG x Term FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Name controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peers controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,140,485	4,140,485	4,140,485	6,305,187	6,305,187	6,305,187
Mean Agree	0.702	0.702	0.702	0.706	0.706	0.706
Joint p-value		0.164	0.164		0.0233	0.0252
F-stat 1			81.87			948.9
F-stat 2			91.74			1051

Notes: The table tests whether legislators seating beside peers with previous experience in Interest Groups affects their probability of voting alike. Columns 1, 2 and 3 uses the sample of votes in which peer legislators did not worked at an interest group not based in Brussels. Columns 4, 5 and 6 use the sample of votes in which peer legislators did not work in a Brussels based interest group. We denote as Joint p-value the test on the joint significance of the adjacency to a legislator with previous experience in an interest group, and when the topic is relevant for such interest group (both at the surname and seating level). A comprehensive set of controls at the focal and peer legislators is used in the analysis. See Appendix A for further information on the controls included. Standard errors are clustered at legislator level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix

A Description of controls used for focal and peer legislators

This section presents the variables used as control in our main analysis, both for focal and peer legislators. We classify them into *Name controls*, *Focal MEP controls* and *Peers controls*.

- i) *Name controls*: Owing to the possibility that surnames may represent the individuals, observable and unobservable, characteristics, such as socioeconomic background or family ties, in the spirit of [Harmon et al. \(2019\)](#), we control by the fraction of focal and individuals in the same group of peers sharing the same surname, and by the absolute alphabetic rank across EPGs and terms.
- ii) *Focal MEP controls*: We characterize legislators using a wide set of controls. As for the legislators' personal characteristics, we control for their age, gender, national party, country of origin and whether they attended a top 500 university. As for the legislators' professional characteristics, we control for their years of professional experience before entering parliament, the total number of working positions, whether they have a managerial profile, whether their professional experience was conducted in the public, private, or academic sector, and their number of professional spells. We also control their topics of expertise, measured using [Yordanova \(2009\)](#)'s classification, and the number of such topics, as well as whether previously worked for an interest group and if the topic is relevant for such previous employers. Regarding their previous interest groups' characteristics, we control by whether they have their headquarters in Brussels, and by their average reported EU lobbying budget. As for the legislator's in parliament characteristics, we control for their freshman status, their share of previous dates absent, their role at their EPG, whether they are part of the alphabetically seated leader sector in ALDE, whether they are the

rapporteur or shadow rapporteur in the specific procedure voted, whether their EPG had one of these figures, whether such procedure refers to their own country, and whether they were at the responsible and opinion committees of the procedure voted on.

- iii) *Peers controls*: We characterize connections, i.e. adjacent (left and right) siting peers, by expanding the above mentioned variables. We include as controls the fraction of the adjacent peers in the same EPG as the focal, the fraction in the same national party as the focal, the fraction from the same country as the focal, the fraction with the same EPG role as the focal, the fraction with the same profession profile as the focal, the fraction with the same managerial profile as the focal, the fraction with the same freshman status as the focal, the fraction with the same gender as the focal, the fraction having the same “Top 500” education as the focal, and the fraction of the peers in the same committee as the focal. We also use peer controls that are irrespective of the focal characteristics such as the fraction of peers with freshman status, the fraction of female peers, the fraction of peers with a Top 500 education, the fraction of peers with a managerial profile, the fraction of rapporteur and shadow rapporteur peers, the fraction of peers in the committee responsible or committee of opinion for the procedure voted on, the fraction of peers with expertise in the topics voted on, the fraction of the peers for which the procedure voted on is of national relevance, the number of peers (from 1 to 2), the average absenteeism rate of the peers, the average number of topics of expertise of the peers, as well as, the fraction of peers with an interest group based in Brussels, and the average EU lobbying budget of these interest groups. Additionally, using information from peers and focal legislators, we control for the standard deviation in their age, professional experience, number of positions at the European Parliament, number of working positions, number of topics of expertise, and absenteeism rate.

B Additional tables

Table B1: Summary of Samples by Rapporteur presence

	Votes cast with rapporteur	Votes cast without rapporteur
Panel A: Voting distribution		
Electronically cast ballots	13,365,545	4,067,500
In favour	51.78	42.52
Abstained	3.49	3.84
Against	31.37	34.62
Absence	13.36	19.03
Panel B: Vote characteristics		
Average position on day voting order	40.10	35.52
Budget of the Union procedure	13.12	0.09
Legislative and Non-legislative procedure	38.32	2.13
Parliament resolutions and initiatives	48.56	97.78

Notes: The table shows counts and shares by whether a vote had a rapporteur assigned or not. It also displays the absolute frequency of electronic ballots cast with and without rapporteur during the terms 6, 7 and 8. The distributions by vote outcome and by vote characteristics are expressed in percentages. The three type of procedure categories shown in Panel B are based on the procedure description present at the European Parliament website.

Table B2: Mapping of expertise and vote subjects

Variable as in Yordanova (2009)	Vote subjects
Business/Industry	Common commercial policy in general; Competition; Enterprise policy, inter-company cooperation; Free movement of goods; Free movement of services, freedom to provide; Industrial policy; Taxation
Economics/Finance	Common commercial policy in general; Competition; Economic union; Enterprise policy, inter-company cooperation; European statistical legislation; Free movement of capital; Monetary union; Taxation
Education	Common cultural area, cultural diversity; Education, vocational training and youth; Research and technological development and space
Farming	Agricultural policy and economies; Fisheries policy
Green ties	Agricultural policy and economies; Environmental policy; Fisheries policy
International relations	Common foreign and security policy; Development cooperation; Emergency, food, humanitarian aid, aid to refugees, Emergency Aid Reserve; Enlargement of the Union; Relations with third countries
Legal	Citizen's rights; Consumers' protection in general; EU law; Free movement and integration of third-country nationals; Fundamental rights in the EU, Charter; Institutions of the Union; Judicial cooperation; Justice and home affairs; Police, judicial and customs cooperation in general; Revision of the Treaties, intergovernmental conferences; Treaties in general
Local government	Common cultural area, cultural diversity; Regional policy; Tourism
Media	Information and communications in general
Medicine	Public health
Science/Engineering	Energy policy; Environmental policy; Information and communications in general; Research and technological development and space
Social group	Citizen's rights; Free movement and integration of third-country nationals; Fundamental rights in the EU, Charter; Social policy, social charter and protocol
Trade Union	Employment policy, action to combat unemployment; Free movement of workers; Social policy, social charter and protocol
Transport/Telecommunications	Transport policy in general

Table B3: Vote and interest groups share by procedure subject

Vote Subjects	Share votes	Share IGs	Extra subjects
Budget of the Union	16.52	0	2.068
Environmental policy	12.08	3.824	2.558
Social policy, social charter and protocol	10.24	4.706	2.032
Employment policy, action to combat unemployment	8.815	10.29	2.366
Agricultural policy and economies	8.577	3.529	2.361
Industrial policy	7.753	3.235	2.767
Institutions of the Union	6.804	0.588	2
Consumers' protection in general	6.757	1.765	2.673
Common commercial policy in general	6.728	0.882	2.433
Transport policy in general	6.221	3.824	2.359
Common foreign and security policy	5.296	3.824	1.886
Energy policy	5.218	3.235	2.638
Police, judicial and customs cooperation in general	4.871	0.294	2.253
Relations with third countries	4.812	0	2.123
Research and technological development and space	4.120	5.588	2.394
Enterprise policy, inter-company cooperation	3.697	3.529	2.468
Fisheries policy	3.672	0.588	2.195
Public health	3.596	4.706	2.426
Free movement and integration of third-country nationals	3.497	1.471	1.821
Regional policy	3.346	8.529	2.311
Economic union	3.187	0	2.125
Free movement of capital	3.081	8.529	2.133
Free movement of services, freedom to provide	3.051	0.294	2.561
Information and communications in general	2.993	16.18	2.292
Free movement of goods	2.836	0	2.781
Development cooperation	2.719	1.176	2
Economic growth	2.660	0	2.417
Citizen's rights	2.657	0.588	2.441
Monetary union	2.300	0.294	1.833
Taxation	2.203	0.588	2.122
Judicial cooperation	1.917	0	2
Fundamental rights in the EU, Charter	1.867	1.471	2.148
Competition	1.661	0	2.308
Cooperation between administrations	1.489	0.294	2.532
Enlargement of the Union	1.409	0.294	1.375
Education, vocational training and youth	1.406	27.35	1.933
Revision of the Treaties, intergovernmental conferences	1.249	0	1.400
EU law	1.130	0	2.163
Common cultural area, cultural diversity	0.814	1.176	2.222
Global economy and globalisation	0.766	0.294	1.789
Treaties in general	0.672	0.294	1.222
Free movement of persons	0.338	0	2
Emergency, food, humanitarian aid, aid to refugees, Emergency Aid Reserve	0.281	1.471	1.786
Tourism	0.231	0.294	1.143
European statistical legislation	0.223	0	1.429
Free movement of workers	0.126	0	2.857
Justice and home affairs	0.0851	0	2
Civil protection	0.0774	0.294	1.250

Notes: The table displays the share of votes by procedure subject in Column 1, and the share of legislators who previously worked for an interest group, and for which the subject is considered to be relevant in Column 2. Column 3 displays the average number of subjects each procedure classified with a particular subject is accompanied by. The sample used is the same as in the main analysis, namely only votes with a rapporteur and cast by legislators identified as non leader in alphabetically organized groups with peers satisfying the same requirements.

Table B4: Summary Statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Agree	0.71	0.38	0	1	6770336
Absention	0.02	0.14	0	1	6770336
Lobbyist Legislator	0.28	0.45	0	1	6770336
Ratio Relevant Topic (not political) (main)	0.01	0.07	0	1	6770336
Peers IG	0.28	0.33	0	1	6770336
Peers (IG * Relevant)	0.03	0.16	0	1	6770336
Name Peers IG	0.28	0.33	0	1	6770336
Name Peers (IG * Relevant)	0.03	0.17	0	1	6770336
Expertise	0.28	0.45	0	1	6770336
Age	53.42	10.68	26	86	6770336
Rapporteur	0.00	0.04	0	1	6770336
Shadow Rapporteur	0.00	0.06	0	1	6770336
Part of the responsible committee	0.01	0.08	0	1	6770336
Part of the opinion committee	0.00	0.07	0	1	6770336
National law	0.00	0.01	0	1	6770336
National party	241.45	129.08	2	453	6770336
Country	16.07	7.85	1	28	6770336
EPG Role	4.87	0.50	2	5	6770336
Female	0.37	0.48	0	1	6770336
Part of the ALDE leader section	0.05	0.22	0	1	6770336
Freshman status	0.58	0.49	0	1	6770336
Number of professional positions	4.95	1.24	0	12	6770336
Rapporteur in the EPG	0.70	0.46	0	1	6770336
Top 500 education	0.31	0.46	0	1	6770336
Previous sector of activity	1.34	0.54	1	3	6770336
Professional experience	24.68	10.97	1	56	6770336
Managerial profile	0.27	0.45	0	1	6770336
Number of working spells	12.19	9.84	1	87	6770336
Share previous days absent	0.13	0.11	0	1	6770336
IG - Brussels HQ	0.05	0.20	0	1	6770336
IG - EU Lobbying budget	127203.57	447452.89	0	5002500	6770336
Number of expertise topics	11.01	5.95	0	31	6770336
National law (peers)	0.00	0.01	0	1	6770336
Freshman (peers)	0.58	0.37	0	1	6770336
Female (peers)	0.37	0.36	0	1	6770336
Managerial profile (peers)	0.27	0.33	0	1	6770336
Top 500 education (peers)	0.31	0.34	0	1	6770336
Rapporteur (peers)	0.00	0.03	0	1	6770336
Shadow Rapporteur (peers)	0.00	0.04	0	1	6770336
Part of the responsible committee (peers)	0.01	0.06	0	1	6770336
Part of the opinion committee (peers)	0.00	0.05	0	1	6770336
Number of peers	1.91	0.29	1	2	6770336
Expertise (peers)	0.28	0.36	0	1	6770336
Share previous days absent (peers)	0.13	0.08	0	1	6770336
IG - Brussels HQ (peers)	0.04	0.14	0	1	6770336
IG - EU Lobbying budget (peers)	129014.55	335746.82	0	5002500	6770336
Number of expertise topics (peers)	11.03	4.42	0	31	6770336
Same gender (peers)	0.53	0.38	0	1	6770336
Same EPG (peers)	0.96	0.14	0	1	6770336
Same national party (peers)	0.08	0.21	0	1	6770336
Same country (peers)	0.10	0.23	0	1	6770336
Same EPG role (peers)	0.93	0.21	0	1	6770336
Same freshman status (peers)	0.51	0.38	0	1	6770336
Same previous sector of activity (peers)	0.57	0.40	0	1	6770336
Same managerial profile (peers)	0.61	0.38	0	1	6770336
Same Top 500 education (peers)	0.57	0.39	0	1	6770336
Same position at the same committee (peers)	0.20	0.30	0	1	6770336
Age SD (peers)	9.43	4.98	0	34	6770336
Professional experience SD (peers)	9.73	5.14	0	33	6770336
Number of professional positions SD (peers)	1.03	0.65	0	6	6770336
Share previous days absent SD (peers)	0.08	0.06	0	1	6770336
Number of working spells SD (peers)	7.39	6.42	0	60	6770336
Number of Expertise Topics SD (peers)	5.29	2.81	0	20	6770336

Notes: The table displays the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum value for every variable used in the baseline regression. For further information, see Appendix A.

Table B5: First stage estimates of Name adjacency on Seating adjacency

	(1) OLS Peers IG	(2) OLS Peers (IG * Relevant)
Name Peers IG	0.7507*** (0.0164)	-0.0083*** (0.0020)
Name Peers (IG * Relevant)	0.0020 (0.0051)	0.8007*** (0.0157)
EPG x Term FEs	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	Yes	Yes
Name controls	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	Yes	Yes
Peers controls	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,770,336	6,770,336

Notes: The table presents the estimates for the baseline first stage regressions. A comprehensive set of controls at the focal and peer legislators is used in the analysis. See Appendix A for further information on the controls included. Standard errors are clustered at legislator level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B6: Average effect of reverse revolving doors connections on vote coincidence - Multiple topics of interest

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	2SLS
	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree
Name Peers IG	0.0350*** (0.0076)	0.0207*** (0.0067)	0.0206*** (0.0067)	0.0127*** (0.0053)	0.0066 (0.0049)	0.0056 (0.0050)	
Name Peers (IG * Relevant)						0.0049* (0.0029)	
Peers IG							0.0076 (0.0066)
Peers (IG * Relevant)							0.0061* (0.0036)
EPG x Term FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Name controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peers controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,770,336	6,770,336	6,770,336	6,770,336	6,770,336	6,770,336	6,770,336
Mean Agree	0.707	0.707	0.707	0.707	0.707	0.707	0.707
Joint p-value						0.0504	0.0540
F-stat 1							1052
F-stat 2							2023

Notes: The table tests whether legislators seating beside peers with previous experience in Interest Groups affects their probability of voting alike. We define interest groups to have up to three topics of interest. We denote as Joint p-value the test on the joint significance of the adjacency to a legislator with previous experience in an interest group, and when the topic is relevant for such interest group (both at the surname and seating level). A comprehensive set of controls at the focal and peer legislators is used in the analysis. See Appendix A for further information on the controls included. Standard errors are clustered at legislator level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B7: Average effect of reverse revolving doors connections on
vote coincidence - With expertise

	(1) OLS Agree	(2) OLS Agree	(3) OLS Agree	(4) OLS Agree	(5) OLS Agree	(6) OLS Agree
Name Peers Expert	0.0035 (0.0024)	0.0032 (0.0024)	0.0026 (0.0031)	0.0028 (0.0024)	0.0026 (0.0031)	0.0026 (0.0031)
Name Peers IG		0.0067 (0.0049)	0.0061 (0.0053)	0.0060 (0.0050)	0.0058 (0.0053)	0.0058 (0.0053)
Name Peers (IG * Expert)			0.0022 (0.0059)		0.0007 (0.0058)	0.0004 (0.0059)
Name Peers (IG * Relevant)				0.0074* (0.0039)	0.0073* (0.0039)	0.0065 (0.0050)
Name Peers (IG * Expert * Relevant)						0.0092 (0.0304)
EPG x Term FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Name controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peers controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,770,336	6,770,336	6,770,336	6,770,336	6,770,336	6,770,336
Mean Agree	0.707	0.707	0.707	0.707	0.707	0.707
Joint p-value			0.0530	0.0236	0.00984	0.359

Notes: The table tests whether legislators seating beside peers with previous experience in Interest Groups affects their probability of voting alike. We denote as Joint p-value the test on the joint significance of the adjacency to a legislator with previous interest group, and when the topic is relevant for such interest group (both at the surname and seating level). A comprehensive set of controls at the focal and peer legislators is used in the analysis. See Appendix A for further information on the controls included. Standard errors are clustered at legislator level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B8: Average effect of reverse revolving doors connections
on vote coincidence - Displaying rapporteurs' influence

	(1) OLS Agree	(2) OLS Agree	(3) 2SLS Agree
Name Peers IG	0.0066 (0.0049)	0.0059 (0.0050)	
Name Peers (IG * Relevant)		0.0073* (0.0039)	
Peers IG			0.0080 (0.0066)
Peers (IG * Relevant)			0.0091* (0.0049)
Rapporteur	0.0766*** (0.0132)	0.0765*** (0.0132)	0.0765*** (0.0132)
Shadow Rapporteur	0.0305*** (0.0085)	0.0305*** (0.0085)	0.0307*** (0.0085)
Peer Rapporteur	0.0832*** (0.0184)	0.0830*** (0.0184)	0.0830*** (0.0184)
Peer Shadow Rapporteur	0.0304** (0.0123)	0.0301** (0.0123)	0.0301** (0.0123)
EPG x Term FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Name controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peers controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,770,336	6,770,336	6,770,336
Mean Agree	0.707	0.707	0.707
Joint p-value		0.0239	0.0257
F-stat 1			1056
F-stat 2			1308

Notes: The table tests whether legislators seating beside peers with previous experience in Interest Groups affects their probability of voting alike. It is analogous to the Columns 5, 6, and 7, in Table 3, respectively. We denote as Joint p-value the test on the joint significance of the adjacency to a legislator with previous interest group, and when the topic is relevant for such interest group (both at the surname and seating level). A comprehensive set of controls at the focal and peer legislators is used in the analysis. See Appendix A for further information on the controls included. Standard errors are clustered at legislator level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B9: Average effect of reverse revolving doors connections on
vote coincidence by name distance

	(1) OLS Agree	(2) OLS Agree	(3) OLS Agree	(4) OLS Agree	(5) OLS Agree
Name Peers IG dist. 1	0.0058 (0.0049)	0.0051 (0.0048)	0.0049 (0.0048)	0.0041 (0.0047)	0.0039 (0.0047)
Name Peers IG * Relevant dist. 1	0.0071* (0.0039)	0.0071* (0.0039)	0.0071* (0.0039)	0.0073* (0.0039)	0.0073* (0.0039)
Name Peers IG dist. 2	0.0027 (0.0047)	0.0025 (0.0046)	0.0013 (0.0047)	0.0005 (0.0046)	-0.0001 (0.0046)
Name Peers IG * Relevant dist. 2	0.0078** (0.0039)	0.0073* (0.0039)	0.0072* (0.0039)	0.0072* (0.0039)	0.0075** (0.0038)
Name Peers IG dist. 3		0.0050 (0.0042)	0.0055 (0.0042)	0.0041 (0.0042)	0.0032 (0.0042)
Name Peers IG * Relevant dist. 3		0.0076** (0.0036)	0.0068* (0.0036)	0.0065* (0.0036)	0.0067* (0.0036)
Name Peers IG dist. 4			-0.0001 (0.0050)	-0.0005 (0.0050)	-0.0011 (0.0050)
Name Peers IG * Relevant dist. 4			0.0073* (0.0042)	0.0076* (0.0042)	0.0078* (0.0041)
Name Peers IG dist. 5				0.0019 (0.0040)	0.0014 (0.0040)
Name Peers IG * Relevant dist. 5				0.0017 (0.0037)	0.0014 (0.0037)
Name Peers IG dist. 6					0.0002 (0.0038)
Name Peers IG * Relevant dist. 6					0.0036 (0.0038)
EPG x Term FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,767,838	6,742,171	6,718,746	6,704,043	6,724,801
Mean Agree	0.707	0.707	0.706	0.706	0.705
p-value, coefficients zero	0.0206	0.0111	0.00695	0.0120	0.0135
p-value, coefficient dist. 1 equal to dist. 2	0.763	0.770	0.663	0.642	0.640
p-value, coefficient dist. 1 equal to dist. 3	-	0.958	0.981	0.908	0.866
p-value, coefficient dist. 1 equal to dist. 4	-	-	0.603	0.644	0.619
p-value, coefficient dist. 1 equal to dist. 5	-	-	-	0.302	0.260
p-value, coefficient dist. 1 equal to dist. 6	-	-	-	-	0.317

Notes: The table tests whether legislators named adjacently peers with previous experience in interest groups affects their probability of voting alike at different distance levels. A comprehensive set of controls at the focal and peer legislators is used in the analysis. See Appendix A for further information on the controls included. Standard errors are clustered at legislator level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B10: Average effect of reverse revolving doors connections on
vote coincidence - Row level analysis

	(1) OLS Agree	(2) OLS Agree	(3) OLS Agree	(4) OLS Agree
Num. IG members	0.0835** (0.0339)	0.0509** (0.0225)	0.0511** (0.0227)	0.0396 (0.0243)
Num. IG members * Relevant				0.0737*** (0.0209)
EPG x Term FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	No	No	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	No	No	Yes	Yes
MEP controls	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	638,461	638,455	638,455	638,455
Mean Agree	0.704	0.704	0.704	0.704
Joint p-value				0.000249

Notes: The table takes our main analysis to the row (by aisle) level. It tests whether having more legislators with previous experience in Interest Groups in a given chamber row affects the row voting agreement. We denote as Joint p-value the test on the joint significance of the number of legislators with previous interest group experience, and the number of those for whom the topic is relevant. We control by row size and by a comprehensive set of controls collapsed at the row level. See Appendix A for further information on the controls included. Standard errors are clustered both at the plenary session and at the row-by-aisle level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B11: Average effect of reverse revolving doors connections on
vote coincidence - Different clustering levels

	(1) OLS Agree	(2) OLS Agree	(3) OLS Agree	(4) OLS Agree
Name Peers IG	0.0059 (0.0050)	0.0059 (0.0050)	0.0059 (0.0047)	0.0059* (0.0034)
Name Peers (IG * Relevant)	0.0073* (0.0039)	0.0073* (0.0042)	0.0073* (0.0041)	0.0073** (0.0035)
EPG x Term FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Name controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peers controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,770,336	6,770,336	6,770,336	6,770,336
Mean of Dependent Var.	0.707	0.707	0.707	0.707
Joint p-value	0.0239	0.0456	0.0359	0.00612

Notes: The table tests whether legislators seating beside peers with previous experience in Interest Groups affects their probability of voting alike. All columns mimic Column 6 in Table 3, with differences in the clustering level, i) Column 1 clusters at the legislator level, ii) Column 2 clusters at the legislator and plenary session levels, iii) Column 3 clusters at the row and plenary session level, and iv) Column 4 clusters at the EPG and plenary session level. We denote as Joint p-value the test on the joint significance of the name adjacency to a legislator with previous interest group, and when the topic is relevant for such interest group. A comprehensive set of controls at the focal and peer legislators is used in the analysis. See Appendix A for further information on the controls included. Standard errors are clustered at legislator level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B12: Average effect of reverse revolving doors connections on
vote coincidence - Amendment vs Final vote

	<u>Amendments</u>			<u>Final votes</u>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	OLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	OLS	2SLS
	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree	Agree
Name Peers IG	0.0056 (0.0052)	0.0048 (0.0052)		0.0096* (0.0054)	0.0091* (0.0055)	
Name Peers (IG * Relevant)		0.0081* (0.0046)			0.0061** (0.0030)	
Peers IG			0.0065 (0.0069)			0.0122* (0.0073)
Peers (IG * Relevant)			0.0102* (0.0057)			0.0075** (0.0037)
EPG x Term FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Name controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peers controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,220,263	5,220,263	5,220,263	1,550,073	1,550,073	1,550,073
Mean Agree	0.703	0.703	0.703	0.722	0.722	0.722
Joint p-value		0.0466	0.0495		0.00497	0.00573
F-stat 1			1034			1048
F-stat 2			1180			1756

Notes: The table tests whether legislators seating beside peers with previous experience in Interest Groups affects their probability of voting alike. We denote as Joint p-value the test on the joint significance of the adjacency to a legislator with previous experience in an interest group, and when the topic is relevant for such interest group (both at the surname and seating level). A comprehensive set of controls at the focal and peer legislators is used in the analysis. See Appendix A for further information on the controls included. Standard errors are clustered at legislator level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B13: Average effect of reverse revolving doors connections on
vote correction and intention

	(1) OLS Correction	(2) OLS Correction	(3) 2SLS Correction	(4) OLS Intention	(5) OLS Intention	(6) 2SLS Intention
Name Peers IG	-0.0000 (0.0003)	-0.0000 (0.0003)		-0.0013 (0.0018)	-0.0013 (0.0018)	
Name Peers (IG * Relevant)		-0.0003* (0.0002)			0.0009 (0.0009)	
Peers IG			-0.0000 (0.0004)			-0.0018 (0.0025)
Peers (IG * Relevant)			-0.0004* (0.0002)			0.0011 (0.0012)
EPG x Term FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Name controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peers controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,881,658	5,881,658	5,881,658	888,675	888,675	888,675
Mean Agree	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0051	0.0051	0.0051
Joint p-value		0.290	0.304		0.841	0.810
F-stat 1			1020			771.4
F-stat 2			1236			860.1

Notes: The table tests whether legislators seating beside peers with previous experience in Interest Groups affects their probability of correcting their vote or showing their voting intention. Columns 1, 2 and 3 use the sample of votes in which legislators actually cast a vote, and check whether they correct it afterwards. Columns 4, 5 and 6 use the sample of votes in which legislators did not go to vote and test whether they announced what was their voting intention. We denote as Joint p-value the test on the joint significance of the adjacency to a legislator with previous experience in an interest group, and when the topic is relevant for such interest group (both at the surname and seating level). A comprehensive set of controls at the focal and peer legislators is used in the analysis. See Appendix A for further information on the controls included. Standard errors are clustered at legislator level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table B14: Average effect of reverse revolving doors connections on
vote coincidence persistence - By Plenary Sessions

	(1) OLS Agree	(2) OLS Agree	(3) OLS Agree	(4) 2SLS Agree
Name Peers IG	0.0059 (0.0050)	0.0044 (0.0069)	0.0035 (0.0068)	
Name Peers (IG * Relevant)	0.0073* (0.0039)	0.0073* (0.0039)	0.0163** (0.0064)	
Sessions name adjacent	-0.0000 (0.0001)	-0.0000 (0.0001)	-0.0000 (0.0001)	
Name Peers IG * Sessions name adjacent		0.0001 (0.0002)	0.0001 (0.0002)	
Name Peers (IG * Relevant) * Sessions name adjacent			-0.0003 (0.0002)	
Peers IG				0.0049 (0.0094)
Peers (IG * Relevant)				0.0225** (0.0089)
Sessions seat adjacent				-0.0001 (0.0002)
Peers IG * Sessions seat adjacent				0.0001 (0.0004)
Peers (IG * Relevant) * Sessions seat adjacent				-0.0006* (0.0004)
EPG x Term FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sessions since term started FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Procedure type FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vote subject FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Name controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Focal MEP controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peers controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,770,336	6,770,336	6,770,336	6,770,336
Mean Agree	0.707	0.707	0.707	0.707
Joint p-value		0.131	0.0323	0.0324
F-stat (KP)				188

Notes: The table tests whether legislators seating beside peers with previous experience in Interest Groups affects their probability of voting alike over time. We denote as Joint p-value the test on the joint significance of all the variables displayed in the table (both at the surname and seating level). A comprehensive set of controls at the focal and peer legislators is used in the analysis. See Appendix A for further information on the controls included. The reported F Statistics has been calculated following Kleibergen and Paap (2006). Standard errors are clustered at legislator level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.