Gender diversity in corporate boards:

Evidence from quota-implied discontinuities *

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Abstract

We use data across European corporate boards to investigate the effects of quota-induced female representation, under minimal possible identification assumptions. We find that having more women in board causally increases Tobin's Q, despite some negative effects on operating performance and more likely employment downsizings. We interpret this evidence as firms scaling down inefficient operations. Our results highlight that gender quotas are not necessarily a costly way of promoting equality.

Keywords: Gender diversity, women in boards, gender quota, performance

JEL codes: D22, G32, J16

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1 Introduction

Gender equality, and its main business-world facet – promoting female representation in boards of directors, – has become the agenda of policy makers across the world. At the same time, the first seminal papers by Ahern and Dittmar (2012) and Matsa and Miller (2013), which explore the setting of Norway that was the first to introduce a quota in 2002, convincingly demonstrate that the effects of this gender-related quota are negative. These results have outlined a major policy dilemma of whether gender equality is actually to be imposed at the expense of shareholders. In this paper, we explore the universe of European countries that introduced quotas, using a novel discontinuity-based identification strategy, to show that gender quotas for corporate boards are on average value-enhancing for shareholders, suggesting that this dilemma might actually not be there.

Our results show that gender quotas for corporate boards are not necessarily a costly way of promoting gender equality. Specifically, we find a positive and large effect of the share of women in boards on Tobins' Q: a 10pp increase in the share of women increases Tobin's Q by 2.3, which is about 1.3 within-firm standard deviations of this variable. We decompose this effect into the marketvalue and book-value components, and observe that while market-value component increases, the book-value component goes down. As our further analysis shows, this is not an artefact of a change in capital structure, or an increase in dividend payout, but rather a result of reductions in labor, scaling down operations, and therefore lower operating profits (as a share of assets). Given that the long-run market reaction is not negative, the evidence suggests that these are the inefficient operations that are likely being scaled down, consistent with women being less prone to empire building. These changes cannot be attributed to general board quality, as boards with more women appear similar on observables, such as average age, number of qualifications, network size, and independence.

In order to identify these effects of female representation, we note that any percentage quota applied to a relatively small-sized group of individuals produces natural discontinuities in the actual minimum share of women that is to be achieved. This happens beause women come in whole numbers. For example, with a *de jure* quota of 25% a board of size 4 has to have at least 1 woman,

making it exactly a 25% as the minimum. However, a board with 5 members has to have at least two women, which *de facto* means having at least 40% of women, and this is a sizeable difference from what the quota prescribes. Since we consider board sizes as of before the actual percentage of the quota is announced, the sorting of firms into boards of these close sizes (such as 4 vs 5) is likely to be close to random. We therefore use the differential response of firms with boards of 4 vs 5 members to assess the effects of having to have a higher share of women, purely due to rounding. We further generalize this setting to multiple discontinuities within a country (e.g. also comparing 8- vs 9-member boards in case of a 25% quota), to multiple quotas, and, as a result, different boards sizes around discontinuity (e.g. comparing 5- to 6-member boards, and 7- to 8-member boards in case of a 40% quota), to multiple countries that introduced them in different years. In the most saturated specifications, we identify the effects even out of relative intensities, such as compare the difference in performance between firms with 5 and 4 members (which are prescribed to have a 15% difference in female share) to the difference in performance between firms with 9 and 8 members (which are prescribed to have only a 8.3% difference in female share), and all the results go through.

The main benefit of our approach is that we bring the counterfactual firms as close as it is at all possible in the setting of a universally-imposed quota. Specifically, we do not have to rely on the assumption of private firms being good comparables to public firms (such as in Matsa and Miller, 2013); instead we are able to compare within public firms within the same country and, most importantly, within very narrowly-defined ex ante board sizes (such as 4 vs 5). Neither we have to rely on any pre-existing heterogeneity in actual female presence across boards as part of the identifying variation (such as in Ahern and Dittmar, 2012, Bertrand et al, 2018, and Eckbo et al, 2019), which some authors (e.g. Ferreira, 2014) have considered to be problematic in terms of counterfactuals. Finally, unlike other studies we examine the whole universe of European countries that introduced percentage quotas.

The limitation of our study is that this ability to provide causal estimates under minimally possible identification assumptions comes at a cost of sample size requirements. As such, we might not be able to estimate every single effect for every single country separately (as in the end there are only a few dozens of listed firms headquartered in each of the countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, and Norway). However, we do show that the main effects are similar for all countries together, as well as for some larger individual countries, and subsamples of largest firms across groups of countries.

While our paper relates to a broad literature on gender and team performance in general (Hoogendoorn et al, 2013), board diversity (Adams and Ferreira, 2009), and gender differences across directors (Adams and Funk, 2012), it is most closely related to papes studying quota-imposed effects of gender diversity and firm performance. The contemporaneous evidence from Norway is more mixed (while Ahern and Dittmar, 2012, and Matsa and Miller, 2013, find negative effects on value and operating performance, respectively, Eckbo et al, 2019, find no effects, and Nygaard, 2011, finds heterogeneous effects depending on information asymmetry), and for Italy Ferrari et al, 2016, find no differences in performance, but some positive effects on stock price. At the same time, Hwang et al (2019) find negative market reaction to the introduction of gender quota in a sample of Californian firms.

Given that we show the way to investigate the effects of the effects of any universally-imposed percentage quota under minimally possible identification assumptions, we view our first contribution as methodological and hence policy-relevant. Our discontinuity-based approach is broadly inspired by Angrist and Lavy (1999) Maimonides rule. Our strategy has most power when a percentage quota applies to a small-sized group of people, which is the case with corporate boards. It is also the case with members of the Cabinet, members of the European parliament, etc; but not e.g. with members of Congress, which are too numerous to provide any meaningful discontinuities. As such, our identification strategy can also be applied to many political economy and other small-team settings, and not only in the context of gender. It is also easily adaptable to other setups, as long as close counterfactuals are of interest (such as e.g. event studies).

The second contribution is that we consider all European countries that introduced percentagebased regulation for public companies together, and as such attempt to generalize and unify all quota-based evidence. Finally, and relatedly, our results apply to both mandatory quotas and voluntary regulation, speaking again towards generalizability.

The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the empirical strategy; Section 3 discusses

the data and provides summary statistics; Section 4 shows the first-stage results and validates the instrument; Section 5 presents the main results on the effects of female representation on value, performance, and other variables; Section 6 concludes.

2 Empirical Strategy

To illustrate the idea behing our instrument, let's suppose that a firm faces a quota of 25% of women on board (the specific number is used for illustration purposes). Does it mean that every firm that is *compliant* to this quota will have to have at least 25% of women? Well, it turns out that most firms will actually have to have a percentage much higher than 25%, even if they want to only marginally comply with the 25%-quota. And the simple reason for that is that women (and men too) come in round numbers. So a board of 2 directors will have to have at least 1 woman, making it a 50% share of women overall), while a board of 5 members will have to have at least 2 women, making it a 40% share of women. Only a board that is an exact multiple of 4 (e.g. 4 members) will have to have exactly 25% as the minimum to comply with the quota. Given how reluctant firms may have been in becoming compliant, even the differences in these minimum requirements induced by the same quota will likely produce enough powerful variation for us to identify the effects of interest. Overall, a firm with board size b, facing a quota q would need to have a minimum of

$$\frac{int((b-1)\cdot q)+1}{b},$$

where int(a) is the integer part of a real number a, making this minimum a sawtooth-like pattern of a board size, such as the one in Figure 1 (drawn for the 25% case for concreteness).¹

This pattern produces some natural discontinuities in the minimum required share of women, which is what we will use in conjunction with our instrument. It is essential that we will never use the contemporaneous board size when constructing the instrument (since it is likely to be endogenous), but rather the original board size that existed before the quota was announced or implemented. Additionally, since firms in a cross-section would likely not choose their board sizes completely

¹This can be equally spelled as $\frac{roundup(bq)}{b}$, where roundup is the upward-rounding function.

randomly, and we want to isolate the closest possible comparisons, we explore only the upward parts of this sawtooth-like pattern (this is analogous to Angrist and Lavy, 1999, "discontinuity sample", highlighted in red in Figure 1), making this setting close to a regression discontinuity design.² Focusing on these very close comparisons will additionally allow us to flexibly control for the original board size effects using fixed effects without the need to rely on additional functional form assumptions and extrapolation on how female presence or our variables of interest would depend on the board size itself had there been no quota.

Our simplest possible instrument in this framework, $Right_i$, is then the dummy that takes the value 1 for firms that were located just to the right of the kink of the discontinuity sample (i.e. 5, 9, 13, etc in the case of 25% quota), in the year before the quota was announced, and the value of 0 for firms located to just to the left of this kink (i.e. 4, 8, 12, etc in the case of 25% quota):

$$Right_{i} = \begin{cases} 1 \text{ if } \frac{int((b_{i0}-2)\cdot q_{c})+1}{b_{i0}-1} < \frac{int((b_{i0}-1)\cdot q_{c})+1}{b_{i0}} \\ 0 \text{ if } \frac{int((b_{i0}-1)\cdot q_{c})+1}{b_{i0}} < \frac{int((b_{i0})\cdot q_{c})+1}{b_{i0}+1} \end{cases} \end{cases},$$

where b_{i0} is the board size of firm *i* in the year before the quota was announced (this year is country-specific), and q_c is the country-specific quota.

To give example of the identifying variation, let's consider for simplicity just one country, e.g. the United Kingdom (which is where most of our observations will come anyway), which in 2011 published a recommendation by Lord Davies (2011) to incentivise the larger firms to have at least 25% of women on boards by 2015. Our discontinuity sample in the UK will thus consist of firms that in 2010 (a year before the announcement) had 4 or 5, 8 or 9, 12 or 13, etc board members (highlighted in red in Figure 1). We will be making all of our comparisons within each of these red pairs, and to do that, we use the kink-specific fixed effects, λ_{kc} , that capture separate intercepts for firms that have 4 and 5 board members, vs firms that have 8 or 9 board members, vs firms that have 12 or 13 board members, etc. Due to these fixed effects none of our results can be explained

 $^{^{2}}$ We choose not to focus on the downward parts (or the whole pattern) for several reasons. First, we would rather not involve any additional functional form assumptions and extrapolation as would be required if looking at the downward part. And second, the downward part is often much smoother and as such it is not clear which board size comparisons are more reasonable, and which are not, again calling for an additional extrapolation judgement from the econometrician.

by firms having very different board sizes and hence different values and other variables (see e.g. Yermack, 1996). This means that we will only be comparing e.g. firms with 8 to firms with 9 board members, out of which the former happened to have a multiple of 4 a year before the specific percentage quota was announced, and the latter happened to have one more board member. As we are employing multiple kinks, the kink-specific fixed effects also help us to very flexibly control for average cross-sectional differences between firms of different board sizes (e.g. 4 and 5 vs 8 and 9), so our results cannot be explained by firms with much larger boards having on average different proportions of women than firms with smaller boards. It is important, that firms have naturally sorted into these original board sizes before the actual percentage of the quota gets revealed, which even further reduces any concerns for selection of firms into specific board sizes (e.g. multiples of 4 vs one more member). Our main argument will thus be that this pre-existing sorting of firms within a kink, e.g. into whether to have 8 or 9 board members (and conditional on other things that we control for later), is likely to be close to random. This will be further weakened in the more saturated specifications.

While we will show below that the dynamics of the relationship between the share of women and Right is such that the instrument does not predict it in the period before the quota annoucement, and as such there is no direct effect of the original board size on the share of female directors, a similar exclusion restriction will have to be satisfied for all of our dependent variables, as well. Since one might argue that firms to the right of the kink mechanically have one more board member within each bin (as 5>4 and 9>8), and this might have its own effect on the dependent variables even in the absense of any quota (hence violating the exclusion restriction), we weaken the identification requirements further and move to a difference-in-differences setup, estimating the first stage specification as follows:

$$Share_{it} = \gamma Post_{ct}Right_i + \lambda_{kct} + \lambda_i + \omega_{it}, \tag{1}$$

where $Share_{it}$ is the proportion of women in the board of firm *i* in year *t*, $Post_{ct}$ is the countryspecific dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the years after compliance, and 0 for the years before announcement, $Right_i$ is the instrument as defined above, λ_{kct} are the kink-specific fixed effects (described above and kept country- and also year-specific, so as to absorb any country-year variation as well), λ_i are firm fixed effects, and ω_{it} is the error term.

This move to difference-in-differences helps to address potential pre-existing differences in the value of the company or other dependent variables for boards of different sizes. Additionally, it allows to absorb any non-linear relationship between *Share* and board size that may exist even in the absense of quota, under the assumption that the form of this non-linear relationship is similar before and after the reform. It is worth noting, that our setup is different from the usual use of DID in the quota setup (e.g. that in Ahern and Dittmar, 2012, and Matsa and Miler, 2013), not only in the way which firms we consider to be relevant counterfactuals to each other (firms with very close ex ante board sizes, rather than firms with different ex ante shares of women or public and private companies), but also in the way the timing of the shock is defined. In our setup we can actually first exlore the dynamics of the first stage and observe when firms start responding to the instrument, and then consider the second stage only where the instrument provides enough of powerful variation. As we will see further, the cross-sectional differences in *Share* start kicking in only after compliance years, so we set *Post* to be 1 during the years post-compliance, and to 0 – during the years before announcement. The middle years are not used in the main part of the analysis, since empirically the firms do not respond to the instrument during these years.³

The implicit assumption in the first-stage equation (1) above is that the effect on *Share* of being on the right of the kink is the same at different kinks. This is fine, as long as we believe that that the effect mostly comes from having one more woman (rather than the percentage share itself), and it is constant across kinks. But if not, then we also want to identify from intensities themselves, and use the minimum-implied share as the instrument. We hence proceed to defining our second instrument in the following way:⁴

³In reality this speed of compliance may be also specific to the country, but we don't have enough observations to estimate it for each country individually, so we choose to be as agnostic as possible. Our argument on "shopping" for the first stage mirrors optimal selection of instruments, as long as identification assumptions are maintained (see e.g. Paravisini et al, 2014).

⁴Our instrument is different from *Shortfall* instrument, introduced by Eckbo et al (2019) in that *Shortfall* uses the ex ante share of women on board as part of its construction.

$$MinShare_i = \frac{int((b_{i0} - 1) \cdot q_c) + 1}{b_{i0}},$$

This allows us to proceed to our fullest specifications, where we will estimate the first stage of our main equations of interest as follows:

$$Share_{it} = \gamma Post_{ct} MinShare_i + \lambda_{ct} Right_i + \lambda_{kct} + \lambda_i + \nu_{it}, \qquad (2)$$

where $Right_i$ can now be additionally included as a control variable (i.e. it is a separate intercept for having firms with 5, 9, 13, etc board members vs those with 4, 8, 12, etc, with exact numbers specific to the country) and its effect is allowed to vary over time. This allows to fully capture any effects of having one more board member (including that of having more effective odd vs less effective even boards, as in. Deng et al, 2012, even in trends), and identify γ out of relative intensities only.

The coefficient of interest, γ , is still identified, because there are multiple kinks for each quota. In essence, we now measure the relative increase in the minimum share of women in boards of original size when moving from 4 to 5 (i.e. from 25% to 40%) compared to the increase in this share when moving from 8 to 9 (i.e. from 25% to 33%), accounting for the fact that both are expected to see an increase of one more additional board member and one more women, but the minimum share $MinShare_i$ will rise disproportionally more in the former case relative to the latter and hence the final share $Share_{it}$ would also on average rise more. This presents a very tight identification, under the minimal assumptions that are ever possible in the setting of a universal percentage quota.

As we will be measuring the effects over time, we cluster errors at firm level to account for arbitrary autocorrelation within firms and heteroskedasticity. However, it is important to emphasize again that the identifying variation is mostly cross-sectional, which means that we do not have to explicitly rely on timings associated with the quota (speed of compliance, when to define pre vs post, etc), which some (e.g. Eckbo et al, 2019) have argued might present a problem in terms of coincidences with various macro events and the associated differential impact of these events across firms with different shares of women. This reinforces the importance of bringing the comparison firms as close to each other as possible and then let the data tell us when the change happens, which is precisely what we do – in the quota setting, and estimate (1) and (2) on the data 3 years before the quota announcement ($Post_{ct} = 0$) and 3 years after the quota compliance year ($Post_{ct} = 1$), skipping the intermediary years altogether.

3 Data and Summary Statistics

The results of our paper are based on two sets of data. We use an unbalanced panel of listed companies across European countries and the US (as a placebo country) from BoardEx to obtain the director-level information on gender, age, number of qualifications, network size, role (ED or SD), and other characteristics, to be averaged at the firm level, and then merge it with financial data on public companies from Thomson Reuters. The exact set of countries is comprised of the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands and Norway. It is defined by the countries that introduced formal (through quotas) or informal (through e.g. advisory recommendations) regulation on gender diversity that satisfies the following criteria: 1) this regulation contains a specific minimum percentage that has to be achieved (otherwise, we would not be able to exploit our instrument); 2) it applies to a vast majority or even all public firms (rather than some narrowlydefined group, such as only state companies, – otherwise the power of the first stage will be low in case we don't measure firms subjected to regulation very precisely); 3) it has compliance date no later than 2017 (otherwise we will not have enough observations to measure the outcomes); and 4) there are at least 20 firms in the discontinuity sample (otherwise, our multiple-fixed-effects specifications would not be estimated; however, effectively this is not a hard constraint, as it rules out only Iceland with its 3 firms in the discontinuity sample). The period of study varies depending on the country and the respective year when regulation was introduced, and covers all years from 4 years before quota/regulation first announcement to 4 years after and including the compliance year (or to 2018, whichever is earlier). The complete coverage of countries with a short description of regulation and the relevant years is presented in Table 1.

As expected due to BoardEx coverage, most of our sample (slightly less than 60%), comes from

the United Kingdom. We will therefore present all the analysis both for the UK alone, as well as for all countries together. The counts in Table 1 show the number of firms in the discontinuity sample as of the year before regulation announcement. For example, there were 458 public firms in the UK in 2010 that had board sizes that are either exact multiples of 4, or had one more board member. The second largest country is France with 137 firms in 2009 in the relevant discontinuity sample (which for a quota of 40% covers many more board sizes). On the other hand, there were only 22 firms in the relevant discontinuity sample in Norway or and 31 in Spain. Since we also perform our analysis for the UK alone, and our results are very similar, they are not driven by any of these countries having very small sets of firms.

In Figure 2 we further show the exact distribution of pre-announcement-year board sizes, by country, with red/dark bars representing the discontinuity sample, and the grey/light bars representing all other boards sizes not used in the analysis, across BoardEx-Thomson Reuters listed firms. We also do not consider (almost mechanically) very small boards of fewer that 4 members in the year before quota announcement. Since French quota is defined as of non-executive members, the relevant discontinuity samples are based on the ex ante number of non-executive directors, rather than total board size. Depending on the exact quota percentage, which defines the board sizes to be included in the discontinuity sample, and the distribution of firms across board sizes, our sample covers from 53% of these firms in the UK, to 72% in France, and above 75% in most other countries, for a total of about 60% of all BoardEx-Thomson Reuters public firms in these countries. In unreported results we also show that variable distributions in the pre-announcement year are similar in the discontinuity sample and out of it, in each country, which is something to be expected from the very way it is constructed. This also speaks to the generalizability of our results to boards of different sizes. In what follows we call the discontinuity sample as the sample.

Table 2 presents summary statistics on the main variables of interest, with all financial variables winsorized at 1% tails. For comparability reasons we present the statistics for the post-compliance sample only. Companies in our sample have on average 21 bln Euro total assets (0.5 bln in the log form) and an average market capitalization of 4 bln Euro (0.34 bln in the log form). The average board size is equal to 8, both before the announcement of regulation and also after, suggesting that

on average firms do not decrease these in order to avoid hiring an extra women and board sizes are generally sticky. Firms have about 19% females post-compliance, compared to less than 6% before the announcement. The former is somewhat smaller than any of the quotas considered, since not all regulation is mandatory, and not for all firms in the sample. The main instrument (predicted minimum share of women, $MinShare_i$) averages to 35% and summarizes the average quota-implied share of women in the discontinuity sample. As expected, about half of the firms are located to the right of the kink.

Following prior research on firm value and governance, we compute Tobin's Q as our main measure of firm value (Yermack, 1996; Ahern and Dittmar, 2012). It is defined as the sum of total assets and market equity less common book equity divided by total assets, and averages to 1.8 in the post-compliance period. This is comprised of 1.2 of the ratio of market equity to assets and about 0.5 of book equity to assets. About 18% of firms capital comes from debt (as normalized to assets). Average return on assets is slightly negative and amounts to -1.7%. There are slightly fewer observations available for other operating performance indicators. Among them, average asset turnover is 0.88 Euros of sales per 1 Euro of assets, and gross profit and operating expenses ratio to assets equal 0.39 and 0.49, respectively. Firms on average grow by 6.4pp per year in terms of employment, but there is a 23% chance of a large downsizing (above 3% of the labor force), and a 6.7% – of a very large downsizing (above 10% of the labor force). Given high and positive average employment growth, firms are much more likely to have similar-sized expansions. Specifically, there is a 47.5% chance of a large expansion (above 3% of the labor force), and a 24.3% chance of a very large one (above 10% of the labor force), on average.

Finally, the average age of a director in sample is 58 years, s/he has on average 1.7 qualifications, a network size of above 9 hundred people, has served in the company for about 8 years; and about half of directors are independent.

4 First-Stage Results

4.1 Effect of the instrument on actual share of women (First-Stage)

The first empirical test of interest is the one that shows that the instrument (being to the right of discontinuity, $Right_i$, or the predicted minimum share of women, $MinShare_i$) has a significant and direct impact on the actual share of women, $Share_{it}$. This is a necessary condition for further exploration of the effects of women on corporate outcomes in the IV-2SLS framework. It may, for example, happen that firms to the right of the discontinuity might simply choose not to hire an extra women director as the instrument suggests, but instead decide to reduce their board size by one member, thus being able to satisfy the quota exactly. This would of course in no way invalidate the identification strategy itself, but instead make the difference between firms to the left and right of the discontinuity negligible. In other words, in this case the first-stage coefficient would be zero. This ultimately becomes an empirical question, which we now explore. To summarize, we find that the instrument does predict differences in female shares, implying that the firms do not choose to change their board sizes to comply with the quota exactly, suggesting that the costs of adjusting board sizes are large enough.

The results of estimating (1) and (2) are presented in Table 3 (columns 1 to 4 an 5 to 6, respectively). Panel A shows the results for the United Kingdom that constitutes the majority of our observations, and Panel B tracks all countries together.⁵ Column 1 uses the simplest possible setup and estimates (1) using the data from the first kink only (i.e. boards of 4 and 5 in the UK), using post-compliance years only. There is a largest jump in the minimum share at this kink, so the effect on $Share_{it}$ is expected to be the largest. The coefficient of 0.05 implies that there is a 5pp difference in the share of women on average in the years post compliance, between firms that used to have 4 and 5 board members before announcement. If all firms complied exactly with this voluntary regulation in all years and did not change their board sizes, then this magnituded would be 0.15 (the difference between 40% and 25%). However, none of this is assumed in the identification, and it

⁵In all specifications throughout the paper we drop a few firms that already have a higher share of women than the quota, before the quota is announced. Dropping these few unaffected firms naturally increases the power of the first stage. The results are, however, similar if these few firms are kept, and available upon request.

is only important that this instrument does provide a significant explanatory power. The economic magnitude of the coefficient, however, suggests that firms do comply to a large extent even with a voluntary quota in the UK. Column 2 repeats the same exercise, but now in the full DID setup of (1), including firm fixed effects. The results are virtually identical, suggesting that there are no pre-existing differences in $Share_{it}$ between firms with 4 and 5 board members before the quota is announced, even in terms of the averages. Furthermore, this is a very strong instrument, with the first-stage F-statistic well above 10, despite not huge sample sizes. Columns 3 and 4 uses two largest kinks and all kinks, respectively, and the magnitude of the coefficient expectedly drops, since the jumps become smaller and smaller, while the instrument is still significant at the 1% level.

In column 5 to 6 we turn to using intensities, and estimate (2), again in the cross-section and in panel, where we can fully account for any potential effects of the extra board member of those firms to the right of the kink. The most interesting observation on the economic magnitude comes from the last column. One can think of it as a weighted average of how well firms comply with the instrument. If everybody would just satisfy just the minimum required share, as prescribed by the instrument, then the coefficient would have been exactly 1. However, arguably, some firms would prefer to change the board size in the opposite direction (driving the magnitude closer to zero, as discussed above), some would not comply because e.g. they are not required to (again, making the coefficient closer to zero), and some would react stronger and hire a higher percentage than minimum predicted by the instrument (increasing the magnitude). As such, the obtained coefficients represent a weighted average of these types of behavior in the same spirit as the probability of being a complier in the standard binary IV case. What we observe in column 6 is that after accounting for all timeinvariant firm heterogeneity, this coefficient is indeed very close to 1, suggesting that on average firms in the UK comply with the quota precisely.

While unfortunately, due to BoardEx much lower coverage in other countries, we do not have enough observations to replicate the analysis for each country separately, in Panel B we consider all firms in our sample together (appropriately accounting for all fixed effects that are now countryspecific as well, as explained in Section 2). As the dynamics of compliance (including the time between announcement and compliance) and the stickiness of boards are likely to be very different across countries, the economic magnitudes may naturally change, but they don't, and the coefficients remain very significant, all at least at 1% level. The first-stage F-statistics becomes a bit larger than in Panel A in most specifications. It is notable that after accounting for extra board members and firm heterogeneity, $MinShare_i$ can still predict the actual share of women quite precisely even across all countries. This is notable because higher quota percentages in other countries also imply that the kinks are located much closer to each other (e.g. 5 and 6 vs 7 and 8 in case of a 40% quota) and as such there is less variation left when these are compared relative to each other.

From the ex ante perspective, the tightest in terms of identification and the most powerful in expectation should be specifications 2 and 6 (these exactly correspond to equations (1) and (2) above). And empirically, these turn out to have both the highest economic magnitudes, and some of the strongest F-statistics. We will therefore use these two most saturated specifications in all of our second-stage results.

4.2 Validating the instrument

4.2.1 Placebo regressions

To check that our instrument is not picking up some pre-existing differences across firms that may relate to future shares of women and future outcomes, we run several placebo regressions in Table 4. Panels A and B estimate specifications similar to (2), for the UK and all countries, respectively, but for the years prior to quota announcement (from 4 years to 1 year before announcement in the cross-sectional specifications, and from 7 years to 1 year before announcement in the panel specifications). As expected, we see no significant effects, suggesting that there are no pre-existing differences, neither in averages, nor in trends, across firms with neighbour-sized boards (such as firms with 4 and 5-member boards) before the announcement of the quota.

Perhaps a more striking test comes when we fully replicate the UK setup (using same years and same discontinuity samples based on 25% quota), but on the US firms. These are reported in Panel C. As expected, we see that in a country that did not introduce a 25% regulation, our instrument has zero explanatory power, suggesting that the instrument is not accidentally picking some intrinsic differences across firms with close board sizes that for some reason differentially revealed themselves from 2015 onwards.

4.2.2 Dynamics

We also explore the dynamics of the first stage in Figures 3 and 4. We plot coefficients from a regression similar to (1) and (2), where instead of $Post_{ct}$ we use the full set of dummy variables for years (the year before announcement is excluded to avoid perfect multicollinearity, and all coefficient magnitudes are measured relative to this year). Since the period between announcement and compliance years is different by country, for illustrative purposes we plot the dynamics for the UK only, and highlight 2011 and 2015 on the graph as these are the announcement and compliance years, respectively. As we observe in Figure 4, the relative differences between firms with closelyheld board sizes get pronounced only at and after the compliance year. These are also the years for which one cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficient is 1 (which would be if firms complied on average to the minimum and did not change board sizes from their ex ante values). It does not however mean that firms do not respond to the policy after announcement, but rather that the relative response of firms with 5 vs 4 members is the same, as of those with 9 vs 8 members. This can be seen in Figure 3, where the difference between boards of 5 and 4 members is positive and increasing starting from announcement, and also from Appendix Figure 1, where we show that the average share of women in the UK gradually increases from 2011 onwards. Perhaps the most striking evidence comes when we compare boards of 5 and 4 in the UK to the US in Appendix Figure 2. We see that while on average the share of women in boards increases over time both in the UK and the US, there is no difference between boards of 4 and 5 in the US, but there is a striking difference between such boards in the UK, and it exists only after announcement. This is precisely what our simplest instrument captures.

It is also evident that there are no differences between firms with closely-held board sizes before the announcement, in any of the graphs. While this is reassuring and suggests that there is no preselection of firms into boards of different sizes on the basis of share of women, this is also expected from the way the instrument and the discontinuity sample is constructed.

5 The Effect of Gender Diversity on Firm Value, Operating Performance, and Board Characteristics

5.1 The effect of Gender Diversity on Tobin's Q

5.1.1 Average effect

We now employ our strategy to estimate the effects of gender diversity on firm performance and other variables. We start by considering Tobin's Q – the most common measure of firm value – as the dependent variable and report reduced-form results (and IV-2SLS where possible) in Table 5 Panel A. We additionally include industry-country-year fixed effects in all specifications, to make sure the differences in Q are not accidentally driven by non-random composition of board sizes across different industries and shocks to them. In columns 1 and 2 we use the simplest instrument, $Right_i$, and in columns 3 and 4 – the predicted minimum share of women, $MinShare_i$. The coefficient 1.514 in column 1 suggests that firms to the right of the discontinuity have on average 1.5 units higher Tobin's Q, that those to the left of the discontinuity, after quotas were introduced vs any potential difference before. Given the strong first-stage estimates, this coefficient can also be estimated as IV-2SLS, which additionally gives the magnitude of interest, rather than just the sign. Just below Panel A we report the respective coefficients with their standard errors. The coefficient of 23.86 means that for a one within-firm standard deviation in the share of women (which is about 10 pp in our data), Tobin's Q on average increases by 2.4 units (which is about 1.3 within-firm standard deviations of this variable). This suggests that women do have an economically large effect on Tobin's Q, across European listed firms.

In column 2 we redo the analysis for the UK only, and the results are similar. In columns 3 and 4 we move to the second instrument, which is based on intensities and thus can take care of any potential effects of an additional board member to the right of the discontinuity, also estimating the results for all firms in the sample, and for the UK separately. While the reduced-form coefficients are obviously different in magnitude, once we rescale them into the actual magnitudes of interest – the IV-2SLS effects of women on firm value, – we see the same magnitude as with the first

instrument. This is remarkable, given that they are based on slightly different samples (largest kink vs all kinks) and slightly different identification assumptions, suggesting that this average positive effect of women on Tobin's Q is very robust.

5.1.2 Timing of the effect

Since we are exploring Tobin's Q and this is based on market values, and given the fact that the predicted shares of women can be predicted already upon announcement (once the quota and the relevant discontinuity is revealed), it is possible that the change in Tobin's Q happens already after announcement, before any change in board composition takes place. In Panel B we therefore also look at the same reduced-form difference-in-difference results, but with the post-period defined as of announcement. As we see, the results are virtually identical, suggesting that the change in Tobin's Q happens already upon announcement and persists after compliance.

It is also important to note that there is no such difference before announcement: in Appendix Table 1 we consider placebo regressions, similar to those in Table 4, but now with Tobin's Q as the dependent variable, and show that there are no difference-in-difference changes between firms with these closely-held board sizes before the announcement (columns 1 to 4). Neither there are any contemporaneous differences among such firms in the US (columns 5 to 8), where we use the same years and the same discontinuity samples as in the UK.

5.1.3 Country-level analysis

It may be difficult to provide comparable results for each country separately, for several reasons. First, not only the regulation is different in terms of how obligatory compliance is on paper, but also de facto, whether the sanctions for non-compliance are significant enough in the specific country environment. Furthermore, the speed of compliance with the quota may be different, e.g. depending on how easy it is to change board members. As such, the timing of the effects on various dependent variables may also be quite different across countries. Given these many degrees of freedom, we want to be as agnostic as possible about such choises to minimize any data mining concerns. This is especially important given small samples of listed companies in each country, which are either way too small to credibly and robustly estimate the effect of interest for each single country separately.

Being agnostic about these choices has a necessary drawback of reducing the power to find any

results. We nevertheless attempt to decompose the overall average effect from Table 5, at least for countries with at least 50 firms in discontinuity sample, to see if it is driven entirely by the UK, or there is at least any evidence from other countries as well. Using the second instrument so that to keep as many observations as possible, we estimate the reduced-form results for all countries together, the UK (these two repeat what we've seen in Table 5 columns 3 and 4), and then for France (the second-largest in terms of the number of firms), for Italy (the third largest with 56 firms), and for all other countries – in Table 6 columns 1 to 5.⁶ We see that there is no effect of women share on Tobin's Q in France on average, but there is a large and positive effect in Italy (significant at 1% level), and slighly positive, but not statistically significant effect among all other countries together.

While it is entirely possible that there is no effect on Tobin's Q among French firms, at least 7 years post quota announcement, or that the small changes that the instrument induces in a 40%-quota setting are not powerful enough to bring real changes for the firms, it is also possible that there is some heterogeneity across firms, as well as that market reaction is not very strong for firms outside of the main indexes. To shed light on this, we redo this analysis for a subsample of the largest European firms (those above 5 bln Euro in market value in the year before announcement) in columns 5 to 8, again slicing by country (the UK, France, and now all other countries together, as we cannot separate Italy with only 10 large firms there).

We see that among these largest firms, the effect on Tobin's Q is also positive. It also has similar magnitudes for all largest firms on average (column 6) as compared to firms of all sizes (column 1), and the same for the UK (columns 7 vs 2). It is also interesting to see that despite a zero average effect for France (column 3), it is positive and statistically significant at 5% level for the largest French firms (column 7). Its economic magnitude is also similar to that in the UK, suggesting that this is not just a UK phenomenon. Finally, the effect for the largest firms from other countries is also positive and significant, although its magnitude is probably not reliable given a very small and heterogeneous sample of only 37 firms across 5 countries, so we only report it for completeness.

⁶Since the first stage is not strong in these much smaller samples, the IV-2SLS effects cannot be consistently estimated, so we do not report them in what follows. The reduced-form, however, can provide the comparable magnitudes across countres, since it does not rely on the strength of the first stage, and being an OLS it is always unbiased, as long as the identification assumptions are met.

To sum up, we find no evidence of women affecting firms values negatively, as some singlecountry studies based on Norway may suggest. If any, most of the evidence across European countries demonstrates a zero to positive effect on Tobin's Q.

5.2 The effect of Gender Diversity on Other Variables

5.2.1 Performance decomposition, Leverage, and Employment

In this most common definition, Tobin's can be decomposed into 1 + MV/TA - BV/TA, i.e. the difference between the ratios of market value of equity to total assets and book value of equity to total assets (plus 1). To see which of the two parts drives the main result, we redo the analysis with these two ratios as dependent variables in Table 7 for all countries (Panel A) and UK separately (Panel B). We observe that both parts contribute to an increase in Tobin's Q: market value of equity to assets rises by about 0.9, while book value of equity to assets drops by about 0.6, for every 10pp of women in boards. These coefficients are similar across panels.

So why do firms have higher market, but lower book values at the same time? This can be consistent with at least four (non-mutually exclusive) explanations: decrease of the scale (e.g. writing off some unproductive assets), higher leverage, higher dividends paid, and a temporary negative performance shock (that drills down retained earnings). In Table 7 we explore each of them. We observe that firms do not significantly decrease total assets (column 3), and neither they increase debt-to-assets ratios (column 4). Nor they increase dividends: neither in dividend yield (column 5), nor in probability of paying any dividend or dividend payout (unreported for brevity). This suggests that the first three explanations are not likely to be responsible for the observed effect on Tobin's Q. At the same time, there is evidence that return on assets falls a lot (column 6), by about 0.12-0.13 for each 10 pp increase in the predicted share of women. This means that there is a negative effect on operating performance, and it is worth exploring the operating side in more detail.

In columns 7, 8, and 9 we consider sales to assets ratio, gross profit to assets ratio, and operating expenses to assets ratio. As we see, it is sales that drop dramatically, by about 0.5 for each 10 pp increase in the predicted share of women, yielding a significant change in gross profits. At the same time the ratio of operating expenses to assets does not change (and neither do R&D or labor expenses, as a share of assets, unreported, though the number of observations is much smaller for these variables), suggesting that the change in ROA is mostly driven by a huge decrease in sales.

While the general fall in ROA is consistent with evidence in Matsa and Miller (2013), the underlying reason is different (lower sales rather than higher labor expenses). To further see that we explore whether this fall in asset turnover happens together with any employment changes. In Table 8 we present results on labor productivity (log sales per worker, column 1), annual employment growth (column 2), as well as indicators for large labor decreases (columns 3 to 6) and increases (columns 7 to 9). We observe that this drop in sales and profits is not accompanied by a drop in labor productivity. This means that it is not the quality of workers that diminishes (similarly, there is no change in average wages, unreported). Instead, it is the amount of labor that falls, as can be seen from a significantly lower annual employment growth, of about 0.15-0.18 for each 10 pp increase in the predicted share of women. This is further supported by evidence on a higher probability of large downsizings (above 5 and 10 pp of the labor force). There is no similar increase in probability of large expansions, suggesting that labor does not overall become more volatile, and it is not just a turbulent time of changes when employee turnover increases following changes in management.

To sum up, the overall picture is consistent with the following story. Firms with more women in boards experience larger employment decreases and lower employment growth, that reflects in the fall in sales and profits per unit of assets. While we cannot distinguish whether it is women directors who actively fire these employees, or it is the employees who leave because they might not like the new board structure, thereby disrupting operations, it is important to note that this is not accompanied by a negative market reaction. If any it is positive, suggesting that these operating changes are viewed as positive by the market (which would be e.g. the case if firms were in fact scaling down inefficient operations).

5.2.2 Board Characteristics

The last piece of evidence comes from exploring the average characteristics of the board, such as age, number of qualifications, share of independent non-executive directors, network size, and time in company. The results are reported in Table 8, with Panel A for all countries and Panel B for the UK. As we see all results consistently indicate that the average characteristics of the boards do not change with female presence. If any, boards with more women appear to be slightly better on observables (consistent with evidence in Bertrand et al, 2019), but none of these effects is statistically significant.⁷ This supports the interpretation that employees do not leave the company because of worse characteristics of female directors.

6 Conclusion

In this paper we explore the effects of increased female presense in corporate boards on value, operating performance, leverage, and employment of firms, for a set of European countries that introduces soft or hard regulation with respect to the share of women. We use a novel identification strategy that allows estimating causal effects under the minimally possible assumptions in a setting with a universal quota. Unlike some of the studies based on Norway, we find no evidence of a negative effect on the value of the company (as measured by Tobin's Q), if any the evidence shows that it is positive, suggesting that Norway is perhaps too special to generalize the results for all countries. We further dig into possible causes of that and observe that market and book values of equity move in opposite directions, reinforcing the effects on Tobin's Q. Interestingly, we find evidence of disruptive operations, such as lower sales to assets ratios, that further reflect in lower operating performance. This is combined with lower employment growth and larger downsizings. However, since these operating performance decreases are not accompanied by lower market values (if any the effects are positive), this suggests that these firms might have in fact scaled down their inefficient operations, consistent with evidence on women being less prone to empire building.

Our results have important policy implications. With a general socially-based move towards gender equality, many countries have pushed quotas in corporate boards, yet the effects on shareholder value and firm policies have been debatable. We show that there is no negative effect on value, and

⁷Since our setup is a very close comparison of boards that end up having slightly different female shares post-quota (as a result of a quasi-random sorting into boards of close sizes), it is also possible that these small differences in female shares are not enough to significantly shift average characteristics of the boards.


boards do not become less competent with more women on boards. Having more women on boards, besides being socially important, therefore, does no appear to go against corporate interests.

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
Figures and Tables Figure 1




Note: This figure plots the minimum share of women that firms must have to comply with the 25% quota, as a function of board size. The discontinuity samples are highlighted in red.

Figure 2


Distribution of Board Size as of pre-announcement year













Appendix Figure 1



Note: This figure plots average shares of women in listed companies in the UK, by year.





Note: This figure plots average shares of women in listed companies in the UK and the US with board sizes of 4 and 5 (as of 2010), by year.

Solid line:	UK, 4
Dash line:	UK, 5
Dotted line:	US, 4
Dash-dot line:	US, 5

	Table 1. Summary of Quotas and Soft Regulation in European Countries in Sample	oft Regulatio	n in European Countrie	s in Sample			
			Pre-anouncement	Regulation			
		Minimum	placebo years in	announcement	Compliance	announcement Compliance Post-compliance	
Country	Quota or soft regulation in place	% required	sample	year	year	years in sample	Z
лк	Self-regulation – from 2012 on the basis of principles of UK CG Code (following the Lord Davies' recommendation). The recommended target for listed companies in FTSE 100: 25%, by 2015 is applicable to all board members. FTSE 350 companies recommended setting their own aspirational targets to be achieved.	25%	2008-2010	2011	2015	2015-2018	458
France	Quota of 40% applicable to non-executive directors in large listed and nonlisted companies.	40%*	2007-2009	2010	2017	2017-2018	137
Italy	Quota of one-third of each gender for listed companies and state- owned companies to be achieved by 2015.	33%	2008-2010	2011	2015	2015-2018	56
Belgium	Quota for executives and non-executives in state-owned and listed companies-by 2017 and in listed SMEs-by 2019.	33%	2008-2010	2011	2017	2017-2018	41
Netherlands		30%	2010-2012	2013	2016	2016-2018	32
Spain	A gender equality law obliging public companies and IBEX 35- quoted firms with more than 250 employees to attain a minimum 40% share of each gender by 2015.	40%	2004-2006	2007	2015	2015-2018	31
Norway	Quota: in February 2002, the government gave a deadline of July 2005 for private listed companies to raise the proportion of women on their boards to 40%. In January 2006 legislation was introduced giving companies a final deadline of January 2008.	40%**	1999-2001	2002	2005	2005-2008	22
						Total:	777

Sources: Davies (2012), European Commission (2016), Seierstad et al (2017)

Used as placebo

N

1041

2015-2018

2015

2011

2008-2010

25%

* As this quota is applicable to non-executive directors only, we consider discontinuity samples that are based on the ex ante number of non-executive directors, N is the number of companies in the discontinuity sample as of Pre-announcement year, that have at least one observation post-compliance rather than the total board size. ** For smaller boards the quota is stated in terms of the number of women, which we account in the analysis. Specifically, boards of less than 3 people should have at least 1 woman, boards of 4-5 people - at least 2 women, boards of 6-8 people - at least 3 women, and larger boards - at least 40% of women.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics

Note: The table reports the number of observations as of post-compliance years only.

Variable	Mean	STD	Ν
Financials:			
Total Assets	21 bln	116 bln	2,675
In (Total Assets)	20.010	2.909	2,675
Market Capitalization	3.9 bln	1.1 bln	2,692
In (Market Capitalization)	19.648	2.580	2,692
Board Structure and Instrumental Variables:			
Board Size	7.827	3.620	2,692
Board Size as of pre-announcement year (b _{i0})	7.965	3.944	2,692
Share of female directors	0.193	0.159	2,692
Share of female directors as of pre-announcement year	0.059	0.085	2,692
Predicted minimum required share of women (MinShare _i)	0.351	0.075	2,692
Dummy for being to the right of the kink (Right _i)	0.526	0.499	2,692
Dependent Varables: Value and Performance			
Tobin's Q	1.756	2.201	2,675
Market Capitalization to Total Assets	1.201	1.601	2,675
Book Equity to Total Assets	0.488	0.421	2,675
Total Debt to Total Assets	0.185	0.199	2,668
Total Dividend to Market Capitalization	0.027	0.135	1,947
ROA	-0.017	0.253	2,664
Sales to Total Assets	0.882	0.765	1,877
Gross Profit to Total Assets	0.389	0.319	1,247
Operating Expenses to Total Assets	0.487	0.684	1,696
Dependent Varables: Employment			
Annual Employment Growth	0.064	0.441	2,016
Dummy for Downsizing >3 pp	0.232	0.422	2,016
Dummy for Downsizing >5 pp	0.175	0.380	2,016
Dummy for Downsizing >10 pp	0.067	0.251	2,016
Dummy for Expansion >3 pp	0.475	0.500	2,016
Dummy for Expansion >5 pp	0.379	0.485	2,016
Dummy for Expansion >10 pp	0.243	0.429	2,016
Dependent Variables: Board Characteristics			
Average age	58.058	4.689	2,690
Average number of Qualifications	1.702	0.602	2,692
Average director network size	942.201	706.714	2,692
Average time in company	7.814	4.301	2,692
Share of independent directors	0.520	0.255	2,692

Table 3. Share of Women, Right and Predicted Minimum Share: First-Stage Results

This table reports the results of estimating the following specification using the OLS framework:

Share_{it}= γ Post_{ct}Right_i+ λ_{kct} + λ_i + v_{it} (columns 1 to 4) or

Share_{it}= γ Post_{ct}MinShare_i+ λ _{ct}Right_i+ λ _{kct}+ λ _i+v_{it} (columns 5 to 6),

where Share_{it} is the fraction of women directors of firm *i* in year *t*, Post_{ct} is the (country-specific) dummy variable that takes value of 1 from compliance year to up to three years afterwards, and zero -- for the year before announcement and up to three years before that , Right_i is the dummy for being to the right of the kink and MinShare_i is the predicted minimum share of firm *i* (the instruments, defined in Section 2), λ_{kct} are kink-year fixed effects (specific to the country), λ_i are firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported below the coefficients. All columns restrict sample to firms in the discontinuity sample, excluding the potentially non-affected firms (firms with Share_{i0} above the quota). The number of firms and observations excludes singletons. * indicates 10% significance; ** 5% significance; *** 1% significance.

	mineariee, 5	/o significance,	1/0 515111160			
Bin * Country * Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FE		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Right * Country * Year FE					Yes	Yes
Post-compliance years only Post-compliance vs pre-	Yes					
announcement years		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample: Largest kink only	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Sample: Two largest kinks o Sample: All kinks	uny		res	Yes	Yes	Yes
Panel A:			UK firı	ms		
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Post _{ct} * Right _i	0.0508***	0.0594***	0.0296**	0.0302***		
	(0.0147)	(0.0148)	(0.0118)	(0.0113)		
Post _{ct} * MinShare _i					0.301***	0.952***
					(0.0901)	(0.302)
Number of firms	289	289	430	458	458	458
Observations	1,147	1,989	2,959	3,152	3,152	3,152
Adjusted R ²	0.0369					
Within R ²		0.158	0.260	0.287	0.290	0.296
1st stage F-statistic	12.04	16.09	6.31	7.19	11.13	9.91
Panel B:			All firr	ns		
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Post _{ct} * Right _i	0.0474***	0.0584***	0.0259***	0.0248***		
	(0.0130)	(0.0132)	(0.0100)	(0.00853)		
Post _{ct} * MinShare _i					0.284***	0.789***
					(0.0821)	(0.266)
Number of firms	362	362	585	777	777	777
Observations	1,334	2,375	3,801	4,928	4,928	4,928
Adjusted R ²	0.239					
Within R ²		0.322	0.443	0.562	0.564	0.567
1st stage F-statistic	13.34	19.45	6.65	8.47	11.98	8.83

Table 4. Share of Women, Right and Predicted Minimum Share: Placebo Results

This table reports the results of estimating the following specification using the OLS framework:

Share_{it}= γ Post_{ct}Right_i+ λ_{kct} + λ_i + v_{it} (columns 1 to 4) or

Share_{it}= γ Post_{ct}MinShare_i+ λ _{ct}Right_i+ λ _{kct}+ λ _i+v_{it} (columns 5 to 6),

where Share_{it} is the fraction of women directors of firm *i* in year *t*, PseudoPost_{ct} is the (country-specific) dummy variable that takes value of 1 from three years to one year before announcement, and zero -- from seven to five years before announcement, Right_i is the dummy for being to the right of the kink and MinShare_i is the predicted minimum share of firm *i* (the instruments, defined in Section 2), as of base year, λ_{kct} are kink-year fixed effects (specific to the country), λ_i are firm fixed effects. The base year is four years before announcement. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported below the coefficients. All columns restrict sample to firms in the discontinuity sample, excluding the potentially non-affected firms (firms with Share_{i0} above the quota). The number of firms and observations excludes singletons. * indicates 10% significance; ** 5% significance; *** 1% significance.

Bin * Country * Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FE		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Right * Country * Year FE					Yes	Yes
Pseudo Post-announcement ye	Yes					
vs pseudo pre-announcement						
years		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample: Largest kink only	Yes	Yes				
Sample: Two largest kinks only			Yes			
Sample: All kinks				Yes	Yes	Yes
Panel A:		UK	firms before a	nnouncement		
	1	2	3	4	5	6
PseudoPost _{ct} * Right _i	0.0168	-0.00759	-0.00185	-0.00211		
	(0.0107)	(0.0104)	(0.00770)	(0.00729)		
PseudoPost _{ct} * MinShare _i					-0.0291	-0.134
					(0.0615)	(0.195)
Number of firms	272	272	412	440	440	440
Observations	813	1,388	2,172	2,336	2,336	2,336
Adjusted R ²	0.000877					
Within R ²		0.0136	0.0155	0.0280	0.0281	0.0295
1st stage F-statistic	2.45	0.53	0.06	0.08	0.22	0.47
Panel B:	_			nnouncement		_
	1	2	3	4	5	6
PseudoPost _{ct} * Right _i	0.0124	-0.0119	-0.00586	-0.00432		
	(0.0102)	(0.00974)	(0.00685)	(0.00574)		
PseudoPost _{ct} * MinShare _i					-0.0491	-0.205
					(0.0572)	(0.185)
Number of firms	334	334	547	708	708	708
Observations	999	1,732	2,905	3,791	3,791	3,791
Adjusted R ²	0.0367	-		-		
Within R ²		0.0361	0.0431	0.0838	0.0832	0.0904
1st stage F-statistic	1.48	1.49	0.73	0.57	0.74	1.22

Table 4 continued. Share of Women, Right and Predicted Minimum Share: Placebo Results

This table reports the results of estimating the following specification using the OLS framework:

Share_{it}= γ Post_{ct}Right_i+ λ_{kct} + λ_i + v_{it} (columns 1 to 4) or

Share_{it}= γ Post_{ct}MinShare_i+ λ _{ct}Right_i+ λ _{kct}+ λ _i+v_{it} (columns 5 to 6),

where Share_{it} is the fraction of women directors of firm *i* in year *t*, Post_{ct} is the (country-specific) dummy variable that takes value of 1 from compliance year to up to three years afterwards, and zero -- for the year before announcement and up to three years before that , Right_i is the dummy for being to the right of the kink and MinShare_i is the predicted minimum share of firm *i* (the instruments, defined in Section 2), λ_{kct} are kink-year fixed effects (specific to the country), λ_i are firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported below the coefficients. All columns restrict sample to firms in the discontinuity sample, excluding the potentially non-affected firms (firms with Share_{i0} above the quota). The number of firms and observations excludes singletons. * indicates 10% significance; ** 5% significance; *** 1% significance.

Bin * Country * Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FE		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Right * Country * Year FE					Yes	Yes
Post-compliance years only	Yes					
Post-compliance vs pre-						
announcement years		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample: Largest kink only	Yes	Yes				
Sample: Two largest kinks or	nly		Yes			
Sample: All kinks				Yes	Yes	Yes
Panel C:		US	firms with UK-	defined years		
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Post _{ct} * Right _i	-0.0103	-0.00131	-0.00232	-0.000845		
	(0.0129)	(0.0105)	(0.00662)	(0.00612)		
Post _{ct} * MinShare _i					-0.0113	-0.0421
					(0.0566)	(0.171)
	400	124		1011		
Number of firms Observations	406 1,561	421 2,752	930 6,249	1041 7,015	1041 7,015	1041 7,015
		2,752	0,249	7,015	7,015	7,015
Adjusted R ²	0.00538					
Within R ²		0.0412	0.0501	0.0508	0.0509	0.0527
1st stage F-statistic	0.64	0.02	0.12	0.02	0.04	0.06

where Y _{it} is Tobin's Q of firm <i>i</i> in year <i>t</i> , Post _{ct} is the (country-specific) dummy variable that takes value of 1 from compliance year to up to three years afterwards (columns 1 to 4), or from announcement year to three years afterwards (columns 5 to 8), and zero for the year before announcement and up to three years before that , Right _i is the dummy for being to the right ofthe kink and MinShare _i is the predicted minimum share of firm <i>i</i> (the instruments, defined in Section 2), measured in the base year, λ_{sct} are kink-year fixed effects (specific to the country), λ_i are firm fixed effects. The base year is the year before announcement. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported below the coefficients. All columns restrict sample to firms in the discontinuity sample, excluding the potentially non-affected firms (firms with Share ₁₀ above the quota). The number of firms and observations excludes singletons. * indicates 10% significance; ** 5% significance; ** 1% significance.	ear <i>t</i> , Post _d is the (:ement year to thre the right ofthe kink effects (specific to t lard errors are clust e potentially non-ai significance; *** 1%	country-specific e years afterwar and MinShare _i i he country), λ _{sct} ered at the firm ffected firms (fir ś significance.) dummy variable 1 ds (columns 5 to 8 s the predicted mi are industry-year 1 level and are repo ms with Share _{i0} ab	chat takes value), and zero fc nimum share of ixed effects (sp ixed below the ove the quota)	: of 1 from compli or the year before f firm <i>i</i> (the instru- lecific to the coun coefficients. All c . The number of f	iance year to up t announcement a uments, defined i ttry), λ _i are firm f olumns restrict s firms and observa	pecific) dummy variable that takes value of 1 from compliance year to up to three years afterwiterwards (columns 5 to 8), and zero for the year before announcement and up to three years hare, is the predicted minimum share of firm <i>i</i> (the instruments, defined in Section 2), measure y), λ_{sct} are industry-year fixed effects (specific to the country), λ_i are firm fixed effects. The base in firm level and are reported below the coefficients. All columns restrict sample to firms in the ms (firms with Share ₁₀ above the quota). The number of firms and observations excludes single nce.	wards ars before that ared in the ase year is the ne gletons. *
Bin * Country * Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FE Right * Country * Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes
Industry * Country * Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample: Largest kink only Sample: All kinks	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
		Panel A: Pos vs pre-annoui	Panel A: Post-compliance vs pre-announcement years			Panel B: Post- vs pre-annou	Panel B: Post-announcement vs pre-announcement years	
	All countries 1	2 UK	All countries 3	AU 4	All countries 5	0 UK	All countries 7	NK %
Post _{ct} * Right _i	1.514*** (0.542)	1.621*** (0.588)			1.378*** (0.497)	1.527*** (0.548)		
Post _{ct} * MinShare _i			18.61^{***} (6.894)	20.10*** (7.548)			18.67*** (6.243)	20.87*** (7.023)
Number of firms Observations	361 2,359	288 1,974	775 4,900	456 3,128	291 2,474	354 1,984	775 5,307	456 3,136
Implied IV-2SLS coefficient (standard error)	23.86** (9.522)	24.65** (9.990)	22.98** (11.00)	23.23** (11.18)				

Table 5. Tobin's Q and the Share of Women: Reduced-form and Second-stage Results

This table reports the results of estimating the following specification using the OLS framework:

 $Y_{it} = vPost_{ct}Right_i + \lambda_{kct} + \lambda_{sct} + \lambda_{i} + v_{it} \text{ (columns 1, 2, 5, 6) or }$

$Y_{it} = \gamma Post_{ct} MinShare_i + \lambda_{ct} Right_i + \lambda_{kct} + \lambda_{sct} + \lambda_i + v_{it} (columns \ 3, \ 4, \ 7, \ 8),$

hard war ftandard array are alwatered at th	MinShare _i is th γ), λ _{sct} are indu ms (in columns	dummy for being to the right ofthe kink and MinShare _i is the predicted minimum share of firm <i>i</i> (the instruments, defined in Section 2), measured in the base year, λ_{kct} are kink-year fixed effects (specific to the country), λ_i are firm fixed effects. The base year is the year before announcement. The sample consists of all firms (in columns 1 to 5) or only largest firms (in columns 6 to 9, defined as those with market capitalization above 5bln Euro in the base with market capitalization above 5bln Euro in the base with market capitalization above 5bln Euro in the base with market capitalization above 5bln Euro in the base with market capitalization above 5bln Euro in the base with market capitalization above 5bln Euro in the base with market capitalization above 5bln Euro in the base with market capitalization above 5bln Euro in the base with market capitalization above 5bln Euro in the base with market capitalization above 5bln Euro in the base with market capitalization above 5bln Euro in the base with market capitalization above 5bln Euro in the base with market capitalization above 5bln Euro in the base with market capitalization above 5bln Euro in the base case of the base for the base for the base of the base of the base for the base of the base for the base of th	to 4), or from announcement year to three years afterwards (columns 5 to 8), and zero for the year before announcement and up to three years before that , Right _i is the dummy for being to the right of the kink and MinShare _i is the predicted minimum share of firm <i>i</i> (the instruments, defined in Section 2), measured in the base year, λ_{kct} are kink-year fixed effects (specific to the country), λ_i are firm fixed effects. The base year is the year before announcement. The sample consists of all firms (in columns 1 to 5) or only largest firms (in columns 6 to 9, defined as those with market capitalization above 5bln Euro in the base with market capitalization above 5bln Euro in the base with market capitalization above 5bln Euro in the base with market capitalization above 5bln Euro in the base with market capitalization above 5bln Euro in the base with market capitalization above 5bln Euro in the base with market capitalization above 5bln Euro in the base below to the counter of the	year before an (the instrumer country), λ_i ar ins 6 to 9, defii	inouncement and its, defined in Sec e firm fixed effect ned as those with	up to three yea tion 2), measur ts. The base yea market capitali	Irs berore that , ed in the base y r is the year bef zation above 5b	Kight _i is the sar, λ _{kct} are ore n Euro in the
base year). Standard errors are custered at the firm level and are reported below the coefficients. All columns restrict sample to firms in the discontinuity sample, excluding the potentially non-affected firms with Share ₁₀ above the quota). The number of firms and observations excludes singletons. * indicates 10% significance; ** 5%	ne nirm level al Share _{i0} above	id are reported pero the quota). The nui	w the coefficient	a observations	restrict sample to excludes singletor	irms in the disur- states 1	continuity samp 0% significance;	le, exciuairig ** 5%
significance; *** 1% significance. Bin * Country * Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FE Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Right * Country * Year FE Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry * Country * Year FE Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample: All kinks	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
		All firms				Largest firms	t firms	
				BE+NE				IT+BE+NE
All countries	ies UK	France	Italy	+SP+NO	All countries	Х	France	+SP+NO
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	6
Post _{ct} * MinShare _i 18.61***	* 20.10***	·* 0.827	13.69***	1.115	16.74**	16.09^{*}	21.10**	374.8***
(6.894)	(7.548)) (4.245)	(3.518)	(3.493)	(8.393)	(6.469)	(8.921)	(8.034)
Number of firms 775	456	137	56	126	100	27	36	37
Observations 4,900	3,128	666	384	722	606	186	179	241

Table 6. Tobin's Q and the Share of Women: Country-Level Analysis

This table reports the results of estimating the following specification using the OLS framework:

 $Y_{it} = \gamma Post_{ct} MinShare_i + \lambda_{ct} Right_i + \lambda_{kct} + \lambda_{sct} + \lambda_{i+} v_{it},$

where Y _{it} is the dependent variable of firm <i>i</i> in year <i>t</i> , Post _{ct} is the (country-specific) dummy variable that takes value of 1 from compliance year to up to three years after wards, and zero for the year before announcement and up to three years before that , Right ₁ is the dummy for being to the right of the kink and MinShare ₁ is the predicted minimum share of firm <i>i</i> (the instruments, defined in Section 2), measured in the base year, λ _{kct} are kink-year fixed effects (specific to the country), λ _{set} are industry-year fixed effects (specific to the country), λ _{set} are firm level and are reported below the coefficients. All columns restrict sample to firms in the discontinuity sample, excluding the potentially non-affected firms with Share ₁₀ above the quota). The number of firms and observations excludes singletons. * indicates 10% significance; ** 5% significance; *** 1% significance.	e of firm <i>i</i> in ye. Ir before annoul <i>i</i> (the instrumer country), λ_i are f country, restr abservations exit	ar <i>t</i> , Post _a is the ncement and up its, defined in Se 'irm fixed effects ict sample to firr cludes singletons	(country-speci to three years .ction 2), measu The base year ns in the discor * indicates 10	untry-specific) dummy variable that takes value of 1 from compliance year to up to three years three years before that , Right ₁ is the dummy for being to the right ofthe kink and MinShare ₁ is the on 2), measured in the base year, λ_{ket} are kink-year fixed effects (specific to the country), λ_{set} are induste base year is the year before announcement. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are not the discontinuity sample, excluding the potentially non-affected firms (firms with Share ₁₀ above the indicates 10% significance; ** 5% significance; ** 1% significance.	ole that takes ν. t _i is the dumm ear, λ _{ket} are kin e announceme xcluding the po * 5% significanc	alue of 1 from cc / for being to th k-year fixed effe nt. Standard err tentially non-aff :e; *** 1% signifi	ompliance year to e right ofthe kink cts (specific to th ors are clustered ected firms (firm: icance.	o up to three ye and MinShare _i e country), λ _{sct} at the firm leve s with Share _{io} a	ars is the are industry- l and are bove the
Bin * Country * Year FE Firm FE Right * Country * Year FE Industry * Country * Year FE	Yes Yes Yes	Yes Yes Yes	Yes Yes Yes	Yes Yes Yes	Yes Yes Yes	Yes Yes Yes	Yes Yes Yes	Yes Yes Yes	Yes Yes Yes
Sample: All kinks	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Panel A: All countries Dependent variable: =	ME/TA 1	BE/TA 2	InTA 3	TDEBT/TA 4	DIV/ME 5	ROA 6	Sales/TA 7	GP/TA 8	ОРЕХ/ТА 9
Post _{ct} * MinShare _i	8.714* (4.525)	-6.113** (2.633)	-1.995 (2.197)	-0.233 (0.397)	0.110 (0.112)	-1.182*** (0.443)	-4.863*** (1.725)	-1.545** (0.714)	1.781 (1.766)
Number of firms Observations	775 4,900	775 4,901	775 4,901	775 4,891	738 3,975	775 4,872	586 2,765	411 1,822	516 2,490
Panel B: UK Dependent variable: 	ME/TA 1	BE/TA 2	InTA 3	TDEBT/TA 4	DIV/ME 5	ROA 6	Sales/TA 7	GP/TA 8	ОРЕХ/ТА 9
Post _{ct} * MinShare _i	9.231* (4.949)	-6.724** (2.883)	-2.795 (2.376)	-0.250 (0.431)	0.016 (0.058)	-1.349*** (0.484)	-5.230*** (1.874)	-1.684** (0.767)	1.987 (1.876)
Number of firms Observations	456 3,128	456 3,128	456 3,128	456 3,119	438 2,635	456 3,102	336 1,793	262 1,350	348 1,920

Table 7. Q Decompositon, Leverage, and Operating Performance: Reduced-form Results

This table reports the results of estimating the following specification using the OLS framework:

 $Y_{it} = \gamma Post_{ct} MinShare_i + \lambda_{ct} Right_i + \lambda_{kct} + \lambda_{sct} + \lambda_i + v_{it} ,$

where Y _{it} is Tobin's Q of firm <i>i</i> in year <i>t</i> , Post _{ct} is the (country-specific) dummy variable that takes value of 1 from compliance year to up to three years afterwards, and zero for the year before announcement and up to three years before that , Right _i is the dummy for being to the right of the kink and MinShare _i is the predicted minimum share of firm <i>i</i> (the instruments, defined in Section 2), measured in the base year, λ_{kct} are kink-year fixed effects (specific to the country), λ_i are firm fixed effects. The base year is the year before announcement. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported below the coefficients. All columns restrict sample to firms in the discontinuity sample, excluding the potentially non-affected firms (firms with Share ₁₀ above the quota). The number of firms and observations excludes singletons. * indicates 10% significance; ** 5% significance; *** 1% significance.	year <i>t</i> , Post _d is the (count and up to three years n Section 2), measured dard errors are clustere non-affected firms (firr *** 1% significance.	Intry-specific) dum s before that , Righi in the base year, λ_i id at the firm level ins with Share _{io} abo	my variable that take t _i is the dummy for b _{cet} are kink-year fixed and are reported bel we the quota). The i	es value of 1 from co neing to the right oftl effects (specific to 1 ow the coefficients. number of firms and	mpliance year to up ne kink and MinShaı he country), λ _i are All columns restrict observations excluc	o to three years afte re _i is the predicted r firm fixed effects. Th sample to firms in t des singletons. * ind	rwards, and zero ninimum share of ne base year is the he discontinuity icates 10%
Bin * Country * Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Right * Country * Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample: All kinks	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Panel A: All countries Dependent variable:	Employment growth 1	Downsizing: # > 3 pp 2	Downsizing: Annual Decrease in Employment > 3 pp > 10 pp 2 3 4	i Employment >10 pp 4	Expansion: A > 3 pp 5	Expansion: Annual Increase in Employment > 3 pp >5 pp >10 pp 5 7	Employment >10 pp 7
Post _{ct} * MinShare _i	-1.482*	1.793	2.362**	1.260*	-1.273	-1.117	-1.290
	(0.788)	(1.188)	(1.028)	(0.717)	(1.293)	(1.284)	(1.082)
Number of firms	697	697	697	697	697	697	697
Observations	3,967	3,967	3,967	3,967	3,967	3,967	3,967
Panel B: UK Dependent variable:	Employment growth 1	Downsizing: A > 3 pp 2	Downsizing: Annual Decrease in Employment > 3 pp > 10 pp 2 3 4	i Employment >10 pp 4	Expansion: A > 3 pp 5	Expansion: Annual Increase in Employment > 3 pp >5 pp >10 pp 5 6 7	Employment >10 pp 7
Post _{ct} * MinShare _i	-1.824**	2.256	2.650**	1.208	-1.888	-1.713	-1.295
	(0.747)	(1.456)	(1.275)	(0.875)	(1.579)	(1.570)	(1.300)
Number of firms	381	381	381	381	381	381	381
Observations	2,277	2,277	2,277	2,277	2,277	2,277	2,277

Table 8. Employment and the Share of Women: Reduced-form Results

This table reports the results of estimating the following specification using the OLS framework:

 $Y_{it} = \gamma Post_{ct} MinShare_i + \lambda_{ct} Right_i + \lambda_{kct} + \lambda_i + v_{it}$

Table 9. Board Characteristics and the Share of Women: Reduced-form Results

This table reports the results of estimating the following specification using the OLS framework:

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Y _{it} =YPO	st _{ct} MinShare _i +λ _c	$Y_{it} = \gamma Post_{ct} MinShare_i + \lambda_{ct} Right_i + \lambda_{kct} + \lambda_{sct} + \lambda_i + v_{it} (columns 3, 4, 7, 8),$	/ _{it} (columns 3, 4,	, 7, 8),	
where Y_{it} is the dependent variable of firm <i>i</i> in year <i>t</i> , Post _{ct} is the (country-specific) dummy variable that takes value	of firm <i>i</i> in year	t, Post _{ct} is the (co	Intry-specific) d	ummy variable tl	nat takes value
or 1 from compliance year to up to three years afterwards, and zero for the year before announcement and up to three years before that , Right, is the dummy for being to the right ofthe kink and MinShare, is the predicted minimum	three years arte le dummy for be	rwaras, and zero ing to the right oft	ror the year per ne kink and Min	rore announceme Share _i is the prec	ent and up to dicted minimum
share of firm i (the instruments, defined in Section 2), measured in the base year, $\lambda_{ m kct}$ are kink-year fixed effects	fined in Section	2), measured in the	e base year, λ _{kct}	are kink-year fixe	ed effects
(specific to the country), λ_{sct} are industry-year fixed effects (specific to the country), λ_i are firm fixed effects. The base	lustry-year fixed	effects (specific to	the country), λ	_i are firm fixed ef	fects. The base
year is the year before announcement. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported below the	ent. Standard er	rors are clustered a	it the firm level	and are reported	l below the
coefficients. All columns restrict sample to firms in the discontinuity sample, excluding the potentially non-affected	mple to firms in	the discontinuity sa	imple, excluding	g the potentially i	non-affected
Bin * Country * Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Right * Country * Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry * Country * Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample: All kinks	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Average	Average	Average	Time in	Share of
	age	number of	network	company	independent
		qualifications	size		directors
Panel A: All countries					
	1	2	3	4	5
Post _{ct} * MinShare _i	6.353	0.661	1,448	3.578	-0.00332
	(10.07)	(1.244)	(1,511)	(9.046)	(0.411)
Number of firms	777	777	777	777	777
Observations	4,926	4,928	4,928	4,928	4,928
Panel B: UK					
	1	2	3	4	S
Post _{ct} * MinShare _i	9.737	0.758	1,385	3.099	-0.00464

(0.434)

(9.686)

(1,642)

(1.342)

(10.76)

3,152 458

3,152 458

3,152 458

3,152 458

3,152 458

Number of firms Observations

ו הוא נמטופ רפסטרא. Y _{it} =γPseudoPost _{dt} Right _i +λ _{kct} +λ _{sct} +λ _{ist} +λ _i , (c	esumating the follow	ng specification Y _{it} =γPseudoPi	g specification using the OLS framework: Y _{it} =γPseudoPost _{ct} Right _i +λ _{kct} +λ _{sct} +λ _i +ν _{it} (columns 1, 2, 5, 7) or	nework: +λ _i +v _{it} (columns	1, 2, 5, 7) or			
	Y _{it} =1	/PseudoPost _{ct} N	$Y_{it}=\gamma PseudoPost_{ct}MinShare_{i}+\lambda_{ct}Right_{i}+\lambda_{kct}+\lambda_{sct}+\lambda_{i}+\nu_{it}$ (columns 3, 4, 6, 8),	·λ _{kct} +λ _{sct} +λ _i +ν _{it} (c	olumns 3, 4, 6, 8)	,		
where $Y_{ m it}$ is Tobin's Q of firm i in year t , PseudoPost $_{ m ct}$ is the (country-specific) dummy variable that takes value of 1 from three years to one year before announcement	year t , PseudoPost $_{ m ct}$	is the (country-	-specific) dummy v	ariable that take	es value of 1 from	ו three years to סו	ne year before an	nouncement
(columns 1 to 4), compliance year to up to three years afterwards (columns 5 and 6), announcement year to up to three years afterwards (columns 7 and 8), and zero	ir to up to three year	s afterwards (co	olumns 5 and 6), an	inouncement ye	ar to up to three	years afterwards	(columns 7 and 8), and zero
being to the right of the kink and MinShare, is the predicted minimum share of firm <i>i</i> (the instruments, defined in Section 2), as of base year, λ_{ket} are kink-year fixed effects	MinShare, is the pred	dicted minimum	ee years to one yea n share of firm <i>i</i> (th	n verore annour ne instruments, i	defined in Section	n 2), as of base ye	very, nigitu _i is trie ar, λ _{ket} are kink-γι	aunning ioi ear fixed effects
(specific to the country), λ_{sct} are industry-year fixed effects (specific to the country), λ_i are firm fixed effects. The base year is four years before announcement (columns 1	industry-year fixed e	ffects (specific t	to the country), λ_i	are firm fixed ef	fects. The base y	ear is four years b	oefore announcen	ient (columns 1
to 4) and the year before announcement (columns 5 to 8), respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported below the coefficients. All columns restrict sample to firms with Share,, above the quota). The number of firm	ncement (columns 5 t in the discontinuity s	o 8), respective ample, excludir	spectively. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported below the coefficients. All excluding the potentially non-affected firms with Share, above the guota). The number of firms and	s are clustered a	t the firm level ar as (firms with She	nd are reported b are above the du	elow the coefficie tota). The numbe	ints. All r of firms and
observations excludes singletons. * indicates 10% significance; ** 5% significance; *** 1% significance.	* indicates 10% sigr	nificance; ** 5%	significance; *** 1	1% significance.				
Bin * Country * Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Right * Country * Year FE			Yes	Yes		Yes		Yes
Industry * Country * Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample: Largest kink only	Yes	Yes			Yes		Yes	
Sample: All kinks			Yes	Yes		Yes		Yes
	Pane vs p	el A: Pseudo-P Seudo-pre-an	Panel A: Pseudo-Post-announcement vs pseudo-pre-announcement years	ent ars	_	Panel B: US firm	Panel B: US firms with UK years	
					Post-com	Post-compliance vs	Post-announcement vs	ncement vs
	All countries	Ϋ́	All countries	N.	pre-annound	pre-announcement years	pre-announcement years	ement years
	1	7	Y.	4	Ъ	9	/	×
PseudoPost _{ct} * Right _i	-0.423 (0.474)	-0.469 (0.519)			0.0726 (0.136)		-0.0633 (0.0869)	
PseudoPost _{ct} * MinShare _i			-5.115 (6.739)	-5.702 (7.357)		2.032 (2.029)		-0.104 (1.279)
Number of firms Observations	335 1,725	273 1,386	705 3,755	441 2,330	396 2,575	1,017 6,831	398 2,658	1,018 6,923

Appendix Table 1. Tobin's Q and the Share of Women: Placebo Results

This table reports the results of estimating the following specification using the OLS framework: