NON-MARKET STRATEGY:
AN INTEGRATIVE REVIEW AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

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Abstract: We use a novel theoretical framework to synthesize ostensibly disparate streams of non-market strategy research. We argue that faced with weak institutions, firms can create and appropriate value by either adapting to, augmenting, or transforming the existing institutional environment, and can do so either independently or in collaboration with others. We use the resulting typology of six distinct non-market strategies to provide an integrative review of non-market strategy research. We then extend this framework to examine the choice between non-market strategies, arguing that this choice depends upon whether the existing institutional environment is incomplete or captured, and discussing other drivers of non-market strategy choice, the relationship between these strategies, and their social impact, so as to provide an agenda for future research.

INTRODUCTION

During its relatively brief history, the field of strategic management has broadened its scope of inquiry to consider not just the market interactions that firms undertake in the pursuit of economic rents, but also the non-market interactions in which they engage for this purpose. Yet, despite a shared focus on firms’ interactions with different elements of the institutional environment—the “rules of the game” governing economic interaction (North, 1990: 3; see also Ostrom, 1990: 51; Williamson, 1991: 287)—different streams of non-market strategy research have developed largely independently of each other. Research on firms’ strategies to adapt to different institutional environments (Delios and Henisz, 2000; Henisz, 2000b; Henisz and Delios, 2001; Henisz and Zelner, 2001; Peng, 2003) has developed separately from research on firms’ corporate political action to influence these environments (Bonardi, Holburn, and Vanden Bergh, 2006; Oliver and Holzinger, 2008), and both of these streams remain largely disconnected from research on “private politics” between activists and firms (Baron, 2001, 2003; Eesley and Lenox, 2006; Reid and Toffel, 2009), stakeholder relations (Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen, 2009; Henisz, Dorobantu, and Nartey, 2014), and related work within the domains of corporate social responsibility (Aguilera et al., 2007; Vogel, 2006) and industry self-regulation (Barnett and King, 2008; King and Lenox, 2000;
Lenox, 2006). As a result, while individual studies provide insight into different facets of firms’ non-market strategies, non-market research as a whole fails to deliver an integrated understanding of the costs, benefits, and corresponding trade-offs of different strategic options.

In this paper, we develop a novel, integrative theoretical framework to synthesize ostensibly disparate streams of non-market strategy research. We ground our review in the New Institutional Economics (NIE) (North, 1986; Williamson, 2000), arguing that the diverse activities under the umbrella of non-market strategy reflect different ways of addressing institutional contexts that make transactions costly (or impossible) to undertake through the market. The study of non-market strategy may thus be conceived as the study of the alternative strategies that firms employ to create and appropriate value in the face of such “institutional costs”. Building on this perspective, we argue that firms can deal with weak institutional contexts—those that do not adequately support market transactions—in three ways: by adapting to existing institutional structures, adding to such structures by establishing supplementary local institutional structures, or transforming the institutional context itself. Further, firms do so either independently or collaboratively with others. The resulting framework offers a typology of six distinct types of non-market strategies—internalization, partnership, proactive, collective, influence and coalition—based on the intent of the strategy (adaptive, additive, or transformative) and the governance mode selected for implementation (independent or collaborative).

We use this novel typology to briefly review prior literature on each type of non-market strategy, highlighting the connections among the different streams. Building on the idea that non-market strategies reflect alternative ways of dealing with weak institutions, we then explore the factors that drive the choice among the six strategy types. Specifically, we argue that this choice will

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1 We do not mean to suggest that all non-market strategy research is (or should be) grounded in the NIE, but rather that the NIE lens is useful for reexamining and integrating research on non-market strategy.
depend on whether existing institutional structures are incomplete (i.e., containing gaps that hinder all actors equally) or captured (i.e., asymmetrically favoring some actors over others) (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Ostrom, 1990), and we develop propositions linking the choice of non-market strategy to the nature of the institutional environment. We also consider how non-market strategy choice is driven by firm capabilities and the nature of institutional costs, the relationships among different non-market strategies, and their social impact. These extensions of our integrative framework point to future opportunities for research in this important and growing area.

Our review contributes to research on non-market strategy in several ways. First, our novel typology draws together various streams of prior work under a common framework, stressing that these streams, while often studied independently, represent a portfolio of options from among which firms choose to address weak institutional environments. We thus connect research on entry modes (e.g., Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Brouthers, 2002; Meyer et al., 2009) examining how firms adapt to institutional voids; with research on corporate social responsibility (CSR) (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2007; Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett, 2000) and industry self-regulation (e.g., King and Lenox, 2000; Lenox, 2006) considering how firms augment the existing context by establishing additional institutional structures at the local level; with research on corporate political action (e.g., Bonardi et al., 2006; De Figueiredo and Tiller, 2001; Hillman, Keim, and Schuler, 2004; Oliver and Holzinger, 2008) intended to transform existing institutional structures. Our review thus provides a holistic perspective on the range of non-market strategies that firms use to interact with the institutional environment, and the relationships among these strategies.

Second, we refine existing conceptions about the institutional environment by moving beyond the general concept of institutional weakness (Meyer et al., 2009; Peng, 2003) to emphasize the distinction between incomplete and captured institutions, which invite different strategic responses. We argue that this distinction provides a useful foundation for future research, and helps
to explain both the choice among the different types of non-market strategies and the relationships among them. In doing so, we highlight that the institutional constraints faced by firms are not merely given, but are susceptible to modification by deliberate strategic action, and that these strategies in turn have different consequences for the welfare of society at large.

Third, our integrative framework sheds new light on research on CSR and sustainable business practices, conceptualizing these activities as ways in which firms augment the existing institutional environment by establishing lower-level decentralized institutions (Ingram and Clay, 2000; King, Lenox, and Terlaak, 2005) either proactively, by voluntarily committing to share value with key stakeholders (Porter and Kramer, 2011); or collectively, by binding themselves and their rivals to a common set of rules. In doing so, we also connect non-market strategy research to work on polycentric institutions and the collective governance of common pool resources (Ostrom, 1990; 2005), highlighting the existence of an intermediate alternative for addressing weak institutional environments that involves neither accepting them as given, nor working to transform them directly.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 discusses the problem of institutional costs and develops a typology of non-market strategies to deal with such costs. Section 2 uses this typology to provide a brief integrative review of prior research across different but related areas. Section 3 then extends our framework to consider the choice of non-market strategies, arguing that this choice will be driven by the nature of the institutional environment—specifically, whether it is incomplete or captured—as well as the capabilities of the firm, and discussing the relationship between the six types of strategies and their social impact. Section 4 concludes with a brief summary of our contributions.

A TYPOLOGY OF NON-MARKET STRATEGIES

We begin by drawing on the New Institutional Economics (NIE) paradigm (Furubotn and Richter, 2010; North, 1986; Ostrom, 1990; Williamson, 2000) to define the domain of non-market strategy.
NIE scholarship highlights that institutions are “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally… the humanly devised constraints that shape human interactions” (North, 1990: 3). While purposefully designed to reduce uncertainty (North, 1990: 6), institutions are rarely complete. The rules embodied in the existing institutional environment do not cover all potential transactions, and they become less complete as changes in technologies and preferences create the potential for new transactions (North, 1986; 1990), spurring a need for new or different rules. At the same time, the process through which the institutional environment evolves is path-dependent and contentious, as “institutions are not necessarily or even usually created to be socially efficient; rather they, or at least the formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to devise new rules” (North, 1990: 16). Underlying the evolution of institutions are thus the activities of firms, interest groups, and coalitions competing to protect and further their own interests (Henisz and Zelner, 2005, 2006; King and Pearce, 2010; Rogowski, 1989; Weyland, 2004).

The inherent incompleteness of institutions implies that firms seeking to transact within a given institutional environment face substantial transaction costs—the costs of capturing and protecting value (Barzel, 1997; Foss, 2003)—in undertaking transactions through the market. These costs result from both the attributes of the transaction, as a substantial body of work in the transaction cost economics (TCE) tradition (Williamson, 1975; 1991; 2000) has argued, and the attributes of the institutional environment in which the firm operates. We emphasize the latter source of costs using the borrowed term “institutional costs” (Cheung, 1987: 2733), which represent a given institutional environment’s “fixed effect” on the transaction costs associated with each

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2 North’s characterization of institutions also hints at a boundary condition of our review, which excludes deeply-seated elements of the institutional environment—such as intransient norms, values, and belief systems—that undoubtedly influence organizational behavior, but are themselves relatively resistant to purposive change (Banfield, 1958; Brinton and Nee, 2002; Granovetter, 1985; Williamson, 2000). We focus our review on formal elements such as statutes, regulations, and various other formal covenants that can and do change more frequently.

3 In particular, firms transacting in weak institutional environments may face heightened ex post costs of monitoring, enforcement, and maladaptation, due to the greater potential for opportunism by transaction partners (Williamson, 1975)
governance form, holding transaction attributes constant (Henisz and Williamson, 1999; Leiblein, Larsen, and Pedersen, 2014; see also Williamson, 1991: 186–294). Faced with high institutional costs of undertaking a transaction through the market, firms are likely to look beyond the market not only to enable transactions that would otherwise be prohibitively costly to undertake, but also to increase the share of value they appropriate from a given transaction. We thus conceive of non-market strategies as the strategies that firms use to address high institutional costs of using the market, i.e., to create and appropriate value from transactions that are costly to undertake through the market on account of the weakness of the existing institutional environment (Marquis and Raynard, 2015).

We argue that firms can ameliorate high institutional costs of market transactions in three ways. To begin with, they may accept the institutional environment as given and adapt to it by organizing the focal transaction outside the market, using a governance mode (hierarchy or hybrid) with lower institutional costs (Williamson, 1975; 1991; 2000). Alternatively, they may intend to transform the institutional environment, reducing institutional costs by altering formal institutional structures and thus enabling greater value creation and appropriation through the market itself (North, 1990). In between these two extremes, they may also seek to augment the existing institutional context by creating local institutional structures within this context (Ostrom, 1990; 2005), reducing institutional costs for those that voluntarily commit to these new structures while leaving the institutional costs for all others unaffected. So, for example, a firm generating positive externalities in an institutional environment where such externalities are not rewarded might adapt to the environment either by internalizing the relevant transaction (Demsetz, 1967); transforming the environment through political action to demand a reward from the state for providing the externality (e.g., subsidies); or making an additional commitment to provide the externality in the expectation of

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4 Such rent-maximizing behavior is consistent with the TCE assumption that firms seek to minimize the sum of transaction and production costs (Riordan and Williamson: 1985; Williamson 1991a: 282).
being rewarded for doing so by relevant stakeholders (e.g. consumers, employees, etc.).

In pursuing its adaptive, additive, or transformative intent the firm must also choose whether to do so on its own, or in collaboration with others. Collaboration encompasses bilateral (Williamson, 1975, 1991) as well as multilateral governance arrangements (Ostrom, 1990, 2010; Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti, 1997), and includes alliances with other firms as well as collaborations with other stakeholders (Bridoux and Stoelhorst, 2014; Faccio, 2006; Henisz et al., 2014; Hillman and Keim, 2001). Such collaboration may be achieved through formal contracts that depend on the threat of legal penalties for enforcement (Dorobantu and Odziemkowska, 2016), or relational contracts that rely on the discipline of self-interest in repeated transactions (Baker et al., 2002; Gibbons, 2000; Poppo and Zenger, 2002).

Putting these two governance options—indepenent and collaborative—together with the three types of strategic intent results in the typology of non-market strategies shown in Table 1. Thus, firms seeking to adapt to the existing institutional environment may do so either through *internalization*, by placing the transaction within firm boundaries and seeking to independently create and appropriate value; or through *partnership*, by creating a hybrid governance form that lowers the risk of opportunism and allows two parties to collaborate to mutual benefit (Williamson, 1991). Similarly, firms seeking to augment the institutional environment may do so either *proactively*, volunteering to share value with others unilaterally in the expectation of being rewarded for doing so; or *collectively*, developing new rules and norms in collaboration with others to jointly create and manage common pool resources (Ostrom, 1990). Finally, firms seeking to transform the institutional environment may do so on their own (Hillman and Hitt, 1999) in order to *influence* the governing institutions to their exclusive advantage; or they may build *coalitions* with others to alter governing institutions in ways that benefit them all (Jia, 2014; Kaufman, Englander, and Marcus, 1993).

***Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here***
These six types of non-market strategies are shown in Table 2, which summarizes the sources of value creation and appropriation under each strategy, as well as each strategy’s effect on institutional costs. To develop the typology further, we undertake a brief review of prior research, using our novel typology as an organizing framework to provide a more integrated view of streams of research typically regarded as distinct from each other. We focus our discussion, therefore, on a few representative studies of each type of non-market strategy, without seeking to provide a comprehensive account of work in each area.

**AN INTEGRATIVE REVIEW OF THE NON-MARKET STRATEGY LITERATURE**

**Adaptive Strategies**

We begin our review by considering adaptive strategies, i.e. strategies in which firms accept the institutional environment as given, and use governance forms other than the market to create and appropriate value within the confines of existing institutions. As mentioned above, firms adapt to institutional environments that are not sufficiently supportive of market exchange by adopting alternative bilateral governance structures such as hierarchies or hybrids (Williamson, 1975; 1991) in order to ensure the appropriation of value from a transaction, while allowing for greater coordination in response to unforeseen contingencies (Williamson, 1991).

One such adaptive strategy is to internalize the transaction, placing it within a firm’s boundaries so as to reduce uncertainty about the share of the value that the firm expects to appropriate from the transaction. Thus, firms entering or operating in contexts where contract enforcement is weak (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Cull and Xu, 2005) prefer to vertically integrate their operations (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton, 2009; Antras and Helpman, 2004; Fabrizio, 2012b; Nunn, 2007) or establish wholly-owned units (Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar, 2009) so as to avoid expropriation by contract partners (Abdi and Aulakh, 2012). Similarly, firms operating in regimes with weak intellectual property protection also prefer greater integration (Lee and Mansfield, 1996;
Oxley, 1999) to protect against the expropriation of knowledge. In addition to promoting internalization, the institutional environment may also motivate firms to organize their activities so as to safeguard against the possibility of third-party appropriation, both by limiting the extent of value-creation in countries with weak institutions (Acemoglu, Antrás, and Helpman, 2007; Allred and Park, 2007; Branstetter, Fisman, and Foley, 2006), and by configuring their activities in such settings to depend heavily on their operations elsewhere, in order to limit the potential for expropriation (Di Minin and Bianchi, 2011; Feinberg and Gupta, 2009; Nandkumar and Srikanth, 2015; Zhao, 2006).

High institutional costs also induce firms to internalize multiple lines of business within the same organization. Firms operating in weak institutional environments diversify across a greater number of product lines (Kogut, Walker, and Anand, 2002; Wan and Hoskisson, 2003), creating internal structures that allow them to appropriate the value from key strategic resources and capabilities in ways that would be difficult to accomplish through existing factor markets (Chang and Hong, 2000; Ghemawat and Khanna, 1998; Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). So-called “business groups” thus bring together know-how and market access within a common organizational structure (Guillén, 2000; Kock and Guillén, 2001), permitting a firm to develop and leverage its social, reputational and political capital (Peng, Lee, and Wang, 2005), and providing it with preferential access to new growth opportunities (Manikandan and Ramachandran, 2014), with less risk of the value thus created being appropriated by exchange partners.

Weak institutional environments not only increase the costs of market transactions, they may also increase the costs of hierarchical governance, reducing the viability of internalization strategies.

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5 Firms may also choose not to operate in weak institutional environments entirely (Flores and Aguilera, 2007), including in contexts with high political hazards (Delios and Henisz, 2003; Henisz and Delios, 2001; Vaaler, 2008), weak contract enforcement (Cull and Xu, 2005; Fabrizio, 2012a; Markusen, 2001), and high levels of corruption (Brouthers, Gao, and McNicol, 2008; Globerman and Shapiro, 2003; Wei, 2000).
This is the case, for instance, in politically risky environments where firms face the hazard of state expropriation (Kobrin, 1979; Murtha and Lenway, 1994; Tallman, 1988; Uhlenbruck and Castro, 2000), either as a result of the political ideologies of those in power (Spencer, Murtha, and Lenway, 2005; Vaaler, 2008), or due to a lack of institutional checks and balances that limit executive discretion (Henisz, 2000a, 2000b; Henisz and Zelner, 2001). Firms operating in such environments prefer partnership strategies to internalization, using hybrid structures such as joint ventures and alliances (Brouthers, Brouthers, and Werner, 2003; Delios and Henisz, 2000; Henisz, 2000b; Meyer et al., 2009) to attain greater legitimacy and influence (Delios and Henisz, 2000; Vasudeva, Spencer, and Teegen, 2012) and superior information access (Delios and Henisz, 2003), while limiting their exposure to the hazard of expropriation (Chan and Makino, 2007; Hill, Hwang, and W. Chan Kim, 1990). Similarly, firms prefer partnership strategies in contexts where pervasive corruption pressures raise the costs of placing activities within a hierarchical structure (Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, and Eden, 2005; Smarzynska and Wei, 2000; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006), choosing instead to use local partners to manage these pressures (Spencer and Gomez, 2011).

In addition to joint ventures and alliances with other firms, partnership strategies also include collaborations with non-market stakeholders to access valuable resources, better understand the institutional environment, generate support for local operations, and ultimately protect firm investments. These include forming political connections to key institutional actors such as the ruling elite (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Facio, 2006; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Siegel, 2007) or the military (Hiatt and Sine, 2016) in order to appropriate greater value within the existing institutional context.6. Such connections enhance firm value (Ferguson and Voth, 2008; Fisman, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Khwaja and Mian, 2005) in a variety of ways, including by

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6 We discuss political strategies aimed at changing the existing institutional context in the section on transformative strategies below.
providing preferential access to government contracts and subsidies (Faccio, 2006; Johnson and Mitton, 2003) or capital (Boubakri, Cosset, and Saffar, 2008; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006), especially in times of distress (Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell, 2006); obtaining less stringent oversight from regulators (Cho, Patten, and Roberts, 2006; Faccio, 2006; Fisman and Wang, 2015) and the judiciary (Ang and Jia, 2014); and securing superior access to those in power, resulting in such firms’ being better informed (Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Bierman, 1999) and more attractive to potential partners (Siegel, 2007). Political ties are especially valuable in countries with higher levels of political corruption, lower protection of property rights, and a highly interventionist or non-democratic government (Faccio, 2006; Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann, 2003); and in industries that are subject to more stringent government regulations (Ang, Ding, and Thong, 2013). At the same time, political connections are vulnerable to regime change, so that the advantage from such ties is likely short-lived in institutional environments characterized by macroeconomic or political instability (Fan, Wong, and Zhang, 2007; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006).

In addition to ties with key political actors, firms also pursue partnerships with other influential and locally knowledgeable stakeholders (Baysinger, 1984; Keim and Zeithaml, 1986; O’Faircheallaigh, 2013, 2015), such as relationships with local communities (Dorobantu and Odziemkowska, 2016; Marquis and Battilana, 2009; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and cross-sector collaborations with non-profits and government organizations (Capron and Gatignon, 2015; McDermott, Corredoira, and Kruse, 2009; Rangan, Samii, and Wassenhove, 2006). Research to understand the formation of these relations and their benefits is in its early days (Dorobantu, Henisz, and Nartey, 2015; Henisz et al., 2014), and more work in this area is required.

The choice of adaptive strategies is influenced by several factors.7 First, firms with stronger

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7 As a vast body of work in the TCE tradition has pointed out, the choice of optimal governance mode is also influenced by transaction-level factors such as asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency (Macher and Richman, 2008; Williamson, 1975, 1985).
technological capabilities face a higher risk of appropriation from exchange partners (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Williamson, 1975), and may therefore continue to prefer internalization, even in contexts where high political risks increase the institutional costs of hierarchical governance (Delios and Henisz, 2000; Guillén, 2003; Henisz, 2000b). For the same reason, firms pursuing more technologically sophisticated activities in countries with weak contracting regimes will have a stronger preference for internalization (Acemoglu et al., 2009; Berry and Kaul, 2015). Second, a firm’s prior experience influences its choice of adaptive strategy. Thus, firms with experience in countries with high institutional costs are less sensitive to political hazards (Delios and Henisz, 2003; García-Canal and Guillén, 2008; Holburn and Zelner, 2010), corruption pressures (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Habib and Zurawicki, 2002), and other sources of institutional costs (Isobe, Makino, and Montgomery, 2000), as are those with prior contracting experience more generally (Fabrizio, 2012b), while those lacking such experience are especially susceptible to high institutional costs (Delios and Henisz, 2000; Guillén, 2003; Perkins, 2014). Finally, the rules and norms of the institutional environment itself selectively privileges some governance forms, with legal restrictions limiting the range of alternatives available to firms (Brouthers, 2002; Brouthers et al., 2003; Yiu and Makino, 2002), and making it harder for entrepreneurial startups (Brewer, 1993; Djankov et al., 2002; Globerman and Shapiro, 2003) or foreign subsidiaries (Chan, Isobe, and Makino, 2008) to appropriate value. Firms also prefer strategies that are more prevalent in a given environment due to these forms’ greater local legitimacy (Lu, 2002; Salomon and Wu, 2012; Wu and Salomon, 2016; Yiu and Makino, 2002).

**Additive Strategies**

While adaptive strategies leave the institutional costs of different governance structures unchanged, with firms choosing the optimal structure from among the existing options, additive strategies seek to lower institutional costs. They do so not by altering existing institutional structures, but by
supplementing these structures with new, decentralized ones (Ingram and Clay, 2000; King et al., 2005) to which participants commit voluntarily rather than in response to a mandate from the state, thus creating a polycentric institutional structure (Ostrom, 2005; Andersson and Ostrom, 2008). These new structures—which include both formal rules and informal norms—are local in that they only impact the institutional costs for those who voluntarily participate in these strategies, leaving the institutional costs for all others unaffected. In order to succeed, moreover, these additional institutional structures must still be consistent with the broader institutional environment (Ostrom, 1990).

Additive strategies are especially helpful in solving collective action problems, i.e., situations where interdependencies among actors create the potential for the creation of joint value, but this value is hard to realize in the absence of strong institutions (Olson, 1965). One important application of such strategies is to manage common pool resources through collective strategies (Ostrom, 1990), in which actors define and voluntarily bind themselves to a constitution of shared rules and actions, that enable them to realize mutual gains through collaboration⁸ (Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, 1994) while using mutual monitoring or third-party agents to detect violations and impose appropriate penalties (Ostrom, 1990). By undertaking self-regulation, firms not only obtain the means to create and appropriate value through collaboration, but also avoid being subject to government rules (Gupta and Lad, 1983; Ingram and Clay, 2000; Maitland, 1985), which may be more onerous/less efficient than the rules defined locally by the actors themselves (Ostrom, 1990, 2005). Examples of such collective strategies include trade associations with explicit standards of conduct (Barnett and King, 2008; King and Lenox, 2000), industry peer networks (Zuckerman and

⁸ In so far as they involve collaboration with actors beyond the firm’s dyadic relationships, and rely on the threat of collective sanctions to enforce cooperation, collective strategies are similar to network governance arrangements (Jones et al., 1997); the distinguishing characteristic of collective strategies being the explicit definition of, and self-enforced adherence to, a mutually agreed constitution of rules (Ostrom, 2010; Ostrom et al., 1994)
and certification by professional bodies (King et al., 2005; Maxwell et al., 2000). Market platforms that create the institutional infrastructure to enable cooperation and transactions among actors, such as crowdfunding or sharing economy platforms, represent collective strategies as well (Mair, Martí, and Ventresca, 2012). Collective strategies also include voluntary standard-setting organizations in technology-intensive industries (Chiao, Lerner, and Tirole, 2007; Leiponen, 2008; Rosenkopf and Tushman, 1998) that benefit the industry as a whole by creating consensus and managing fragmented intellectual property rights (Rysman and Simcoe, 2008).

In addition to forming collectives, firms may pursue additive strategies on their own by proactively sharing value with others in the expectation of being rewarded for doing so. Proactive strategies are valuable in the face of externalities: depending on the institutional environment, firms may be unable to appropriate value from the provision of positive externalities or the abatement of negative externalities, and consequently underinvest in the provision or abatement of these externalities. For example, a firm with a manufacturing plant that produces harmful effluents located on a river bank might potentially create value for downstream communities by adopting (costly) practices to reduce or eliminate pollution, but may be unable to appropriate the value thus created given the diffuse and non-excludable nature of the benefit.

Firms facing such circumstances adopt proactive strategies and visibly commit to the provision (abatement) of a positive (negative) externality, in the hope that they will be rewarded for establishing a norm of better behavior, either by those who benefit from their actions directly, or from those who value responsible behavior more generally (Kaul and Luo, 2016; Vogel, 2006). In pursuing such a strategy, firms behave as “conditional cooperators” (Frey and Meier, 2004; Ostrom, 2005), sending a one-sided signal of responsible behavior in the expectation that actors involved in
repeated transactions with the focal firm will reciprocate (Bosse, Phillips, and Harrison, 2009). So, for instance, the downstream communities in the river pollution example above are motivated to reward the focal firm because they recognize that not doing so will reduce the firm’s profitability, leading it to revert to its original polluting ways.

Many activities under the CSR rubric may be considered proactive strategies. Thus, firms adopt sustainable resource practices (Hart, 1995; Hart and Dowell, 2010), socially responsible activities (Vogel, 2006), “bottom of the pyramid” strategies (London and Hart, 2010; Prahalad, 2007), and other proactive strategies to share value with their key stakeholders (Porter and Kramer, 2011) in the hope that such behavior will be financially rewarded (Barnett and Salomon, 2012; Eichholtz, Kok, and Quigley, 2010; Flammer, 2013; Henisz et al., 2014; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996; Russo and Fouts, 1997; Waddock and Graves, 1997, 1997). The rewards for proactive behavior take a variety of forms, including price premia (Casadesus-Masanell et al., 2009; Elfenbein and McManus, 2010; Fosfuri, Giarratana, and Roca, 2014; Lev, Petrovits, and Radhakrishnan, 2010), reduced labor costs (Burbano, 2014; Flammer and Luo, 2016; Greening and Turban, 2000; Turban and Greening, 1997), lower capital costs (Eccles, Ioannou, and Serafeim, 2014; Mackey, Mackey, and Barney, 2007; Porter and Kramer, 2006), insurance against adverse events (Fombrun, Gardberg, and Barnett, 2000; Godfrey, 2005; Godfrey et al., 2009), cooperation by key stakeholder groups (Boutilier, 2009; Coff, 1999; Henisz et al., 2014), and better reputation (Minor and Morgan, 2011). Proactive strategies also help firms to be better prepared for anticipated regulation (Fremeth and Shaver, 2014), giving them a competitive advantage in the future.

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9 It is the unilateral nature of proactive strategies that chiefly distinguishes them from strategies of partnership with stakeholders. Unlike partnerships, proactive strategies involve no formal or informal contracts with specific stakeholders promising their cooperation; just the general expectation of reciprocity, often from diffuse or indirectly linked actors.

10 There may, of course, be ethical arguments for firms pursuing socially responsible activities, even if they do not result in value appropriation. In this review, however, we follow recent strategy literature in taking a more instrumental view of CSR activities (Aguilera et al., 2007; McWilliams and Siegel, 2010).
Several factors make additive strategies—both collective and proactive—more attractive. First, additive strategies are especially attractive in contexts where pressure from activist stakeholders (Hoffman, 1999; Lyon and Maxwell, 2004a; Marquis, Glynn, and Davis, 2007; Soule, 2009) increases the chance of stricter regulations (Maxwell et al., 2000) or threatens firm financial performance more generally (Bartley and Child, 2011; Davidson, Worrell, and El-Jelly, 1995; King and Soule, 2007; Vasi and King, 2012). Such strategies are thus preferred where firms face sustained grassroots opposition (Hiatt, Sine, and Tolbert, 2009; Soule, 2009; Soule, Swaminathan, and Tihanyi, 2014; Weber, Heinze, and DeSoucey, 2008; Weber, Rao, and Thomas, 2009b) from powerful stakeholders (Mitchell, Agle, and Wood, 1997) with urgent demands (Eesley and Lenox, 2006; King and Soule, 2007). These stakeholders include activists (Baron, 2001, 2009; Baron and Diermeier, 2007; den Hond and de Bakker, 2007; Sharma and Henriques, 2005), public interest groups (Greening and Gray, 1994), market stakeholders (Stevens et al., 2005), consumers (Christmann and Taylor, 2006; Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013) and local communities (Marquis et al., 2007). By the same logic, additive strategies are also especially attractive to firms that are highly vulnerable to institutional pressures (Bartley and Child, 2014; Briscoe, Chin, and Hambrick, 2014; Delmas and Toffel, 2008; King, 2008).

Second, additive strategies have a greater chance of success when they are supported by strong norms of reciprocity (Bosse et al., 2009; Ostrom, 2005) and an institutional environment that facilitates transparency and information diffusion. Firms operating in countries with strong civil society and press freedom (Dyck, Volchkova, and Zingales, 2008; Toffel, Short, and Ouellet, 2015) are thus more likely to pursue additive strategies. By the same logic, such strategies are also more attractive in countries with more stringent domestic laws and enforcement regimes (Locke, 2013; Locke, Qin, and Brause, 2007; Short and Toffel, 2010) and for multinational firms originating in or exporting to countries with stronger social norms (Harrison and Scorse, 2010; Vasudeva, 2013).
Third, additive strategies are more likely to succeed if the actors involved are structurally embedded in a network of prior ties (Granovetter, 1985), both because the trust associated with structural embeddedness makes it easier to recruit for and organize the collective governance arrangement in the first place (Yenkey, 2015), and because the network of existing relationships facilitates the collection and dissemination of information, as well as the coordination of collective sanctions to limit non-compliance (Jones et al., 1997). Thus, collective strategies in particular are more successful if they involve actors joined by prior common bonds (Seamans, Luo, and Chatterji, 2015), and proactive strategies yield greater rewards when strongly embedded within a local community (Marquis et al., 2007). Structural embeddedness may also prove harmful, however, if subsets of actors cluster together to try to co-opt the collective to their own ends (Yue, Luo, and Ingram, 2013), or if they engage in political conflicts with each other (Simcoe, 2012).

Finally, additive strategies are more likely to succeed where competitive conditions, information technologies, or the presence of third party monitors make signals about compliance with self-imposed rules widely available. Such arrangements are more successful when monitoring is in the hands of a private, independent body with relevant capabilities (King and Lenox, 2000; Lenox, 2006; Terlaak and King, 2006), where industry or general economic factors create competitive conditions that incentivize high-performing firms to differentiate themselves (Bagnoli and Watts, 2003; Campbell, 2007; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001), and where mechanisms exist to distinguish substantive efforts to act responsibly from symbolic actions (Bansal and Clelland, 2004; Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2010; Hawn and Ioannou, 2014; McDonnell and King, 2013).

**Transformative Strategies**

A third type of non-market strategy focuses on transforming the existing institutional environment, altering the institutional costs not just for those who voluntarily commit (as with additive strategies), but for all relevant parties. Importantly, such transformative strategies involve not only lowering the
institutional costs for those undertaking the strategy themselves, but may also involve raising the institutional costs for others, e.g., through lobbying for protective trade policies (Bonardi, 2004; Schuler, 1996) or regulatory barriers to competition (Dean and Brown, 1995; Maijoor and Witteloostuijn, 1996; McWilliams, Van Fleet, and Cory, 2002). Such strategies include influence strategies whereby firms seek to alter the institutional environment to their exclusive advantage (Hillman and Hitt, 1999), or coalition strategies whereby firms collaborate with each other to effect institutional changes that benefit them all (Jia, 2014; Kaufman et al., 1993). Coalition strategies work either to lower institutional costs for all relevant parties, or to provide an asymmetric advantage for members of the coalition by either lowering their institutional costs exclusively, or raising the institutional costs for non-members.

Firms pursuing transformative strategies undertake various forms of corporate political activity (Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Hillman, Keim, and Schuler, 2004; Ring, Lenway, and Govekar, 1990) intended to alter elements of the institutional environment (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994; Burris, 1987; Oliver, 1991; Stigler, 1971). Specific activities include lobbying (De Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006; De Figueiredo and Tiller, 2001) and making campaign contributions (Burris, 1987; De Figueiredo and Edwards, 2007; Hadani and Schuler, 2013). Such activities are targeted either at the legislators who formulate laws and policies or at the regulators who implement and enforce them (De Figueiredo and Tiller, 2001; De Figueiredo and Edwards, 2007), with the choice between the two driven by which is more pivotal for the firm (Holburn and Bergh, 2004, 2008). Transformative strategies include co-opting key institutional actors to the firm’s advantage, or convincing such actors of the need for new or modified rules by providing relevant information and evidence of grassroots support (Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Hillman and Wan, 2005; Keim and Zeithaml, 1986).

Because transformative strategies have the potential to negatively affect non-participants, they are inherently prone to political contestation by other firms and interest groups (Bonardi,
Hillman, and Keim, 2005; Laffont and Tirole, 1991; Peltzman, 1976; Stigler, 1971). As a result, research seeking to assess the average effect of such strategies on firm performance is inconclusive (Hadani and Schuler, 2013), and the success of a transformative strategy depends on the nature of the political context (Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Hillman and Wan, 2005; Hillman and Keim, 1995; Oliver and Holzinger, 2008; Schuler, Rehbein, and Cramer, 2002) as well as the firm’s resources and capabilities (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994; Henisz and Zelner, 2012, 2003; Sawant, 2012).

Consider the political context first. The costs of driving institutional change are typically lower in contexts with fewer effective checks and balances to limit the discretion of government actors (Bonardi et al., 2006; Henisz and Zelner, 2005, 2006; Sawant, 2012). Specific examples include environments with less powerful bureaucracies (Hillman and Keim, 1995), less economic freedom (Blumentritt, 2003), weaker or less autonomous agencies (Clougherty, 2005), greater political rivalry (Bonardi et al., 2006), less independent judiciaries (Boubakri et al., 2008), and greater corruption (Faccio, 2006). The cost of transforming the institutional environment is also lower when existing institutions diverge from a legitimate reference point (Henisz and Zelner, 2005) and when the issue being considered is narrower, less salient, or newer, imbuing government officials with greater discretion (Bonardi and Keim, 2005; Henisz and Zelner, 2005; Keim and Zeithaml, 1986). In addition, the cost of transforming the institutional environment is likely to be higher in the face of stronger competition from groups with opposed interests (Bonardi et al., 2006; Henisz and Zelner, 2006; Laffont and Tirole, 1991). In contrast, when a firm is able to seek institutional change in collaboration with others, as would be the case in concentrated industries (Grier, Munger, and Roberts, 1994; Schuler et al., 2002) or industries with strong inter-firm networks (Mizruchi, 1989; Mizruchi and Koenig, 1986), this cost is likely lower. Finally, transformative strategies are also more likely to be pursued in contexts where the impact of existing institutional structures on the firm’s business is greater (Hadani and Schuler, 2013; Hillman, 2005), as in more tightly regulated industries.
or those that rely more heavily on government contracts (Burris, 1987; Grier et al., 1994; Schuler et al., 2002).

In addition to being influenced by the political context, the success of transformative strategies also depends on the capabilities and experience of the firm itself. Firms with greater size, age, diversification and slack (Lenway and Rehbein, 1991; Meznar and Nigh, 1995; Schuler, 1996; Schuler et al., 2002) find it easier to influence political actors on account of their greater credibility and bargaining power (Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Hillman et al., 2004). Similarly, firms with a strong record of social performance may be seen as more legitimate by political actors, and therefore find it less costly to effect institutional change (McDonnell and Werner, 2014; Werner, 2015). The costs of such strategies are also lower for firms that have superior access through political representation (De Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006; Schuler et al., 2002) or offices near the seat of power (Ma and Delios, 2010; Rehbein and Schuler, 1999), and for firms with experience effecting regulatory change (Bonardi et al., 2006; Holburn and Zelner, 2010) and greater adaptability to different institutional environments (Oliver and Holzinger, 2008).

NON-MARKET STRATEGIES: CHOICE AND IMPLICATIONS

Having used our integrative framework to review prior work on non-market strategy, we now extend the framework to highlight new opportunities for future research. In particular, we focus on the choice among the six types of non-market strategies identified by the typology. In what follows, we therefore consider the various factors—the nature of the institutional environment, the capabilities of the firm, and the nature of the costs associated with the focal activity—that may drive firms to prefer one type of non-market strategy over the other. In addition, we also consider the relationship among the various strategies, and their implications for social performance. Our discussion of these implications is necessarily somewhat speculative, and is meant not so much to provide a definite theory of non-market strategy choice as to provoke further research and
exploration of these important questions.

**Incomplete vs. captured institutions**

As we move beyond the prior literature to consider the theoretical implications of our integrative framework, we start by considering how the six types of non-market strategies relate to the nature of the institutional environment. Specifically, we focus on a distinction between *incomplete institutions*, wherein the rules and structures governing value appropriation are either absent or insufficiently enforced to support value creation and appropriation, and *captured institutions*, wherein robust rules and structures exist, but have been captured by a narrow set of elite interests.\(^{11}\) This distinction reflects two alternate theories of the state: a “contract theory” wherein the state provides a legal framework that enables exchange partners to contract with each other; and a “predatory theory” in which state serves an instrument for transferring resources from one group to another (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; North, 1981). Under incomplete institutions, institutional costs are symmetric and high for all involved, while under captured institutions such costs are low for those who have captured the institutions (insiders) and high for all others (outsiders).\(^{12}\)

Contexts characterized by *incomplete* institutions thus include those where regulations are either absent (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Nunn, 2007) or too unpredictable or weakly enforced for transacting parties to rely on them (Henisz and Zelner, 2003; Jandhyala, 2013; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2008; Perkins, Morck, and Yeung, 2014), with the result that firms face high

\(^{11}\) Institutional diversity has been the focus of extensive research in both political science and political economy (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013; Hall and Soskice, 2001; North, 1981; North and Weingast, 1989; Olson, 1993; Ostrom, 2005) and sociology and organizational theory (e.g., Boisot and Child, 1996; Fligstein, 1996; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991), a full review of which is beyond our current scope.

\(^{12}\) An institutional environment may be both incomplete and captured, as it is the case in situations of “partial reform equilibrium,” where *de jure* formal regulations are insufficiently specified or contradictory, and *de facto* government policies serve merely to further the interests of a few elite actors (Hellman, 1998; Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann, 2003). In such cases, the incompleteness of the environment is reflected in the difference in average institutional costs between this environment and others, while the extent of capture is reflected in the difference in relative costs within the environment.
Ex ante uncertainty about their ability to appropriate value. Examples of incomplete institutions include weak rule of law (Kaufmann et al., 2009), weak IP protection (Zhao, 2006), underdeveloped stock exchanges (Weber, Davis, and Lounsbury, 2009a) and the lack of minority shareholder protection (Djankov et al., 2008; Guillén and Capron, 2016). Such situations are most likely to arise where changes in technologies or preferences create new market conditions for which rules do not yet exist (North, 1990), where the state lacks the information or the ability to design institutions that are conducive to economic exchange (Ostrom, 1990), or where sudden changes in the political and economic system (such as those in former communist countries) have de-legitimized the old institutions without replacing them with new ones. Firms operating in environments characterized by incomplete institutions face high institutional costs due to the risk of opportunistic action by their transaction partners (Cull and Xu, 2005; Lee and Mansfield, 1996; Markusen, 2001).

In contexts characterized by captured institutions, institutional costs are asymmetric because existing structures prioritize the interests of a narrow set of elite actors, impairing the ability of others to capture value from a transaction (Hellman, 1998; Holburn and Vanden Bergh, 2006; Laffont and Tirole, 1991). This would be the case where regulations are unduly burdensome or restrictive (Brewer, 1993; Djankov et al., 2002; Globerman and Shapiro, 2003), where autocratic regimes place few checks and balances on political actors (Bonardi et al., 2006; Henisz, 2000a, 2000b; Henisz and Zelner, 2001; Li and Resnick, 2003), or where high levels of corruption (Mauro, 1995; Weitzel and Berns, 2006) or ethnic polarization (Holburn and Zelner, 2010; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005) disproportionately favor insiders13. Firms seeking to operate in such environments face high institutional costs due to the risk of value expropriation by the state and its elites (Delios

13 Empirical measures of institutional capture used in the literature include Polity IV measures (Marshall and Jaggers, 2000), POLCON (Henisz, 2000a), measures of country risk for foreign investors (Knack and Keefer, 1995) and of corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2009), and various indicators of checks and balances from the World Bank Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001).
and Henisz, 2003; Henisz and Delios, 2001; Kobrin, 1984; Spiller, 2013). Captured institutions may begin as incomplete institutions that motivated, powerful actors shape to favor their own interests, becoming more entrenched over time (North, 1990). Table 3 summarizes the distinction between incomplete and captured institutions.

***Insert Table 3 about here***

**Non-market strategy choice**

This distinction between incomplete institutions and captured institutions has strong implications for firms’ choices of non-market strategy, with the appropriate strategy for the firm depending on whether the existing institutional environment is incomplete or captured and, in the case of captured institutions, whether the institutional costs that the firm faces are relatively low or high (i.e., whether the focal firm is part of the insider group that captured the institutions or not).

First consider adaptive strategies. In environments characterized by incomplete institutions, institutional costs are driven by the risk of opportunistic behavior by transaction partners, so that firms in such environments are likely to prefer *internalization* strategies (*Proposition 1*), placing key economic transactions within the firm in order to secure property rights and avoid hold-up (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Williamson, 1975). By vertically integrating critical transactions (Berry and Kaul, 2015; Lee and Mansfield, 1996; Nunn, 2007) or diversifying into multiple related product lines (Kogut *et al.*, 2002; Wan and Hoskisson, 2003) to share key resources and capabilities—possibly among business group affiliates (Chang and Hong, 2000; Ghemawat and Khanna, 1998; Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001)—firms are more likely to minimize the institutional costs associated with incomplete institutions.

In contrast, firms operating in captured institutional environments are more likely to choose *partnership* strategies (*Proposition 2a*). In such environments, firms will seek to forge connections with better connected actors through political ties (Chen *et al.*, 2011; Faccio, 2006), alliances with
politically connected firms (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Hiatt and Sine, 2014; Siegel, 2007; Vasudeva et al., 2012; Xin and Pearce, 1996), or links to influential or high status global actors (Hainz and Kleimeier, 2012; Woodhouse, 2005). Such connections will afford firms access to better local information (Delios and Henisz, 2003; Henisz and Delios, 2004) and opportunities to influence decisions on the appropriation of value and regulatory treatment (García-Canal and Guillén, 2008; Kock and Guillén, 2001; Peng et al., 2005), effectively lowering their institutional costs to the level of their partners. For insider firms, relatively low institutional costs reflect a source of competitive advantage that also increases their attractiveness as potential partners (Siegel, 2007). Thus, outsider firms are likely to pursue partnerships with insider firms when they operate under captured institutions (Proposition 2b).

Next consider additive strategies. Firms operating in environments characterized by incomplete institutions will be strongly motivated to adopt additive strategies (Proposition 3) to fill the void in higher level institutional structures, thereby securing the future cooperation of key stakeholders (Dorobantu et al., 2015), limiting the likelihood or reach of new regulations (Lyon and Maxwell, 2004b, 2011; Maxwell et al., 2000), or preparing for the future strengthening of institutional structures (Fremeth and Shaver, 2014). Such firms are likely to pursue both proactive strategies, differentiating themselves from the competition through corporate philanthropy (Marquis and Lee, 2013) or other CSR initiatives (Porter and Kramer, 2011), and collective strategies, collaborating with other firms and non-market stakeholders to establish new self-regulatory institutions (Barnett and King, 2008; King and Lenox, 2000; Lenox, 2006; Ostrom, 1990).

In contrast, firms operating in environments characterized by captured institutions may be less likely to pursue additive strategies (Proposition 4a), both because the perception of widespread corruption casts suspicion on attempts to create additional institutional structures (Montiel, Husted and Christmann 2012), and because insider firms who have little to gain from local institutions that
augment the existing environment may undermine attempts by outsiders to establish such institutions (Hellman, 1998; Ostrom, 1990). If firms do choose to pursue additive strategies, insider firms may prefer proactive strategies (Proposition 4b), sharing some of the value gained from institutional asymmetry with key stakeholders in order to maintain the legitimacy of their political connections and protect them from disruption (McDonnell and Werner, 2014), though such activities may be largely symbolic (Marquis and Qian, 2013). Conversely, if outsider firms under captured institutions choose to pursue additive strategies, they are more likely to do so collectively (Proposition 4c), working collaboratively to create new structures that might supplement the existing regulations, potentially as a precursor to transformative action.

Finally consider transformative strategies. Firms facing incomplete institutions are likely to pursue coalition strategies (Proposition 5) because high institutional costs affect all firms symmetrically, so that political action to lower these costs is in the mutual interest of all parties (Jia, 2014; Kaufmann et al., 1993; Schuler et al., 2002) and initiatives providing broad benefits are relatively easy to design (Oliver, 1991). In contrast, firms operating in captured institutional environments are more likely to pursue influence strategies (Proposition 6a) in the political contestation over favored status. They are more likely to pursue political action independently (Bonardi, 2004; Hansen, Mitchell, and Drope, 2005; Hillman and Hitt, 1999) to concentrate the benefits of such status, with this effect being stronger for firms who already enjoy favored status (Proposition 6b) and are therefore in a good position to further enhance their position (Hellman et al., 2003; Stigler, 1971). Conversely, outsider firms under captured institutions may be driven to pursue coalition strategies (Proposition 6c), collaborating with each other to overcome the disadvantage of their inferior status in an attempt either to lower their own institutional costs, or raise to those of the beneficiaries of existing institutional structures.

The propositions arising from this discussion are summarized in Table 4. Note that the logic
underlying these propositions is that the firm will choose the non-market strategy that best enables it to create and appropriate value in the given institutional environment. It follows that we would expect firms that conform to these predictions to exhibit stronger financial performance. In that sense, Table 4 does not simply predict non-market strategy choice, it also offers predictions about the effect of the existing institutional environment on the financial impact of non-market strategies.

***Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here***

**Other predictors of non-market strategy choice**

The choice of non-market strategy may also depend upon characteristics of the firm itself, as shown in Table 5. Thus, firms with strong intangible assets (e.g., innovative firms) may generally prefer to pursue non-market strategies independently (*Proposition 7a, 7d*). Such firms are likely to prefer strategies of internalization in order to protect their superior resources and capabilities (Delios and Henisz, 2000; Guillén, 2003), and may also be in a better position to pursue proactive strategies to the extent that they have more value to share with stakeholders and are able to undertake socially responsible actions more efficiently (Kaul and Luo, 2016). The greater capacity for value sharing may also prompt such firms to be more willing to pursue collective strategies (*Proposition 7e*). High-capability firms may also be better positioned to provide information and build consensus in the political arena (Jia and Mayer, 2015), and may thus prefer coalition strategies (*Proposition 7g*).

Conversely, partnership strategies may be more common among less innovative firms (*Proposition 7b*), that may perceive greater benefits from partnering with politically connected actors, even when the partnership comes with the risk of expropriation by the partner (Perkins *et al.*, 2014). Indeed, as mentioned above, entrenched incumbents may leverage their favored status under captured institutions to attract partners with greater technological and business expertise (*Proposition 7c*). Entrenched incumbents are also more likely to rely on regulatory barriers to protect themselves from competition, and may be well positioned to pursue influence strategies (Bonardi *et al.*, 2005;
Henisz and Zelner, 2004) under captured institutions (Proposition 7f), which are likely to be biased in favor of entrenched incumbents due to path dependence (Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Hillman et al., 2004; Schuler et al., 2002), making it easier to maintain the status quo (Oliver and Holzinger, 2008).

The choice of non-market strategy may further depend upon the extent to which institutional costs are specific to a given firm (Kaufman et al., 1993). In particular, firms facing institutional costs that are relatively specific to them are more likely to choose adaptive strategies. So, for instance, firms that introduce radical new technologies may be confronted with previously unrevealed gaps in the institutional environment (North, 1990), and may therefore prefer adaptive strategies (Langlois and Robertson, 1995; Kaul, 2013). Similarly, additive strategies are likely to be preferred only where there is a natural or well-defined bound to the local institutional structure, i.e., where the high institutional costs apply to a clearly bounded set of actors (e.g. firms in the same industry or the same country), and where the benefits from additive strategies are at least partially excludable (Ostrom, 1990). In the absence of such boundaries, additive strategies are likely to be subject to free-riding problems, and therefore unlikely to succeed. Thus, where institutional costs are general rather than bounded (or where the benefits from the local institution are non-excludable), transformative strategies may be most appropriate, because changes to the existing institutions are in the general interest, and may therefore prove less costly to undertake.

Complementary and substitute strategies

While our discussion thus far considers each of the six strategies in isolation, these strategies are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, some strategies may complement each other. For instance, in environments characterized by incomplete institutions, proactive and collective strategies will frequently complement each other (Proposition 8b), with firms using the former to differentiate themselves, while simultaneously pursuing the latter to create greater awareness and legitimacy for their actions. Collective strategies may also naturally complement coalition strategies (Proposition 8c),
with firms collaborating with each other to both create new local institutions and transform higher level institutions within a polycentric structure (Andersson and Ostrom, 2008; Ostrom, 2010). Similarly, strategies of partnership and influence may be natural complements (Proposition 8a), especially under captured institutions, with the same political ties that give a firm access to better information and preferential treatment under existing institutional structures proving useful when the firm tries to change those rules to its advantage.

Other non-market strategies may serve as substitutes for each other. For instance, firms that have successfully pursued internalization strategies to compensate for incomplete institutions may have little interest in working with others to lower institutional costs, while those that are unable to internalize the relevant transactions may be strongly motivated to do so. Thus, firms may either choose to pursue internalization strategies, or collective and coalition strategies, but are unlikely to pursue both (Proposition 9a). Similarly, firms operating under captured institutions may either choose to create and exploit asymmetries in institutional costs through influence and partnership strategies, or to reduce these asymmetries in collaboration with others through collective and coalition strategies (Propositions 9b and 9c).

Implications for social performance

Finally, it is worth noting that while the firm’s choice of non-market strategy is driven by its own interests, such strategies may have broader social performance consequences. For example, additive strategies are likely to have positive consequences (Proposition 10c and 10d): because participation in (and reciprocation of) these strategies is voluntary, and they only impact the institutional costs of the firms that pursue them, the success of such strategies requires that they be Pareto optimal. Positive social performance may be especially salient for proactive strategies, a central feature of which is that they enable firms to do well while doing good (Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Porter and Kramer, 2006; Russo and Fouts, 1997; Waddock and Graves, 1997).
On the other hand, influence strategies aim to create asymmetric institutional costs, benefiting the focal firm at the cost of others. Such strategies may be socially harmful (Proposition 10e), serving to restrict competition and limit innovation (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Luo and Chung, 2012), and helping to create and maintain institutional capture (Luo and Chung, 2012; Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung, 2005). Similarly, strategies of partnership with political or other elite actors may also be socially harmful (Proposition 10b) insofar as they serve to strengthen and perpetuate captured institutions, further harming those who are excluded or marginalized by captured institutions (Jong-sung and Khagram, 2005; Morck et al., 2005; Morck and Yeung, 2004).

In between these two extremes, internalization strategies are likely to be neutral in terms of social impact (Proposition 10a), since the essence of these strategies is that the value created by the firm’s action is captured internally. The effect of coalition strategies depends on whether the coalition seeks to lower institutional costs for all, possibly in the face of incomplete institutions, in which case such strategies are socially beneficial (Proposition 10f); or to lower the institutional costs for its members only, while potentially raising them for others, thus perpetuating socially harmful institutional capture (Proposition 10g).

Table 5 summarizes the various implications of the theoretical framework discussed above.

CONCLUSION
Using a novel, theoretically-motivated framework, we have provided an integrative review of multiple research streams under the umbrella of non-market strategy. Our review makes several specific contributions to the study of non-market strategy. First, we have used our novel framework to synthesize multiple streams of research that have hitherto been seen as largely distinct, highlighting the connections among these streams. Specifically, we have reconceptualized non-market strategy research as being fundamentally concerned with how best to organize activities subject to high transaction costs as the result of weak institutions. This reconceptualization is
especially novel in its incorporation of work on stakeholder relations and corporate social responsibility. While much research views these activities as being primarily concerned with firms' responsibility to their stakeholders or society at large, our alternative perspective views them as ways to create and appropriate value from externalities without internalizing the relevant transactions within the firm. Viewed through the theoretical lens that we offer, for example, CSR represents not just a way to “do good” (while possibly doing well), but is mainly a strategy through which firms may realize the value of their externalities by establishing and voluntarily committing to a new set of local institutional structures, with the expectation that they will be rewarded for such activities by stakeholders who find it in their own best interest to incentivize the firm to continue its CSR activities.

Second, our review not only highlights the links among diverse streams of non-market strategy research, but also draws attention to the strategic choice among them. By developing a set of propositions linking the choice among different types of non-market strategies to the nature of the existing institutional environment, and by discussing several other factors that may drive this choice, we offer an exciting new agenda for research in the non-market strategy domain. A stronger understanding of the factors driving the choice of non-market strategy is important not only because it may help us better predict and inform managerial decision-making in this increasingly important area, but also because a better accounting for the endogeneity of these choices may help to resolve some of the mixed findings about the financial benefits of pursuing these different strategies (Shaver, 1998). Attention to the antecedents of non-market strategy choice is critical to all areas of non-market research, and can provide important resolutions to enduring debates regarding the financial value of corporate political activities and the relationship between corporate financial performance and social performance. Further, by considering the complementary or substitutive
relationship among the different strategies, we have highlighted the need to conceive of non-market strategy choices in combination rather than in isolation from each other.

We have also contributed to research on an institution-based perspective on strategy more generally (Ahuja and Yayavaram, 2011; Henisz and Zelner, 2003; Peng et al., 2009). Specifically, we have emphasized the distinction between incomplete institutions and captured institutions, discussing how these two distinct types of weak institutions are associated with different sources of transaction costs, and may therefore demand distinct strategic responses. In doing so, we have also drawn attention to the implications of alternative strategies for social performance, suggesting that partnership and influence strategies—which have frequently been discussed as ways of addressing weak institutions—may have negative social consequences insofar as they create or perpetuate asymmetries in the distribution of institutional costs (Luo and Chung, 2012; Morek et al., 2005). Moreover, our review emphasizes that firm strategies in the face of weak institutions are not limited to adapting to such institutions, but may include attempts to augment or transform them, either independently or in collaboration with others.

Finally, we have contributed to work in institutional and organizational economics. Specifically, we have highlighted the need for greater attention by strategy scholars to the attributes of the institutional environment that drive transaction costs (Henisz and Williamson, 1999), beyond the attributes of the transaction that have been the traditional focus of TCE research. By conceptualizing non-market strategy as being concerned with the creation and appropriation of value in the face of high institutional costs, we have not only highlighted the strategic nature of non-market activities, we have paved the way for more research applying insights from transaction cost-based thinking to non-market strategy research, including research on how non-market initiatives are best organized and governed (Boddewyn and Doh, 2011; Kaul and Luo, 2016). In addition, we have extended work on collective governance and the creation of polycentric institutions (Ostrom, 1990;
into the non-market strategy domain, applying this perspective to an important area where it has received relatively limited attention.

Our decision to ground our review in the NIE also defines the boundary conditions of our review. In emphasizing the creation and appropriation of value through non-market strategies, we have chosen not to discuss the ethical, social, or institutional imperatives (Aguilera et al., 2007; Campbell, 2007) that may drive firms to pursue non-market activities, even when such activities do not lead to increased profit. Similarly, in discussing the nature of the institutional environment, we have chosen to focus on a distinction between incomplete and captured institutions that draws on work in the NIE tradition (North, 1981), rather than on other types of institutional variation, such as that emphasized in the varieties of capitalism tradition (Hall and Soskice, 2001) or in work on network capitalism (Boisot and Child, 1996, 1999). This is not to take issue with, or deny the importance of, these alternate perspectives, which we see as complementing the more economic perspective we take here. These limitations notwithstanding, we offer a fresh conceptualization of non-market strategy and bring together hitherto disparate streams of research, in the hope that doing so will inspire further research in this important and exciting area.
REFERENCES


Table 1. A typology of non-market strategies

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<td>Adaptive</td>
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<td><strong>GOVERNANCE</strong></td>
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<td>Independent</td>
<td>Internalization strategies</td>
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<td>Collaborative</td>
<td>Partnership strategies</td>
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Table 2. Six types of non-market strategy

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<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Value creation mechanism</th>
<th>Value appropriation mechanism</th>
<th>Impact on institutional costs</th>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Representative studies</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Internalization</strong></td>
<td>Coordination of activities within firm boundaries</td>
<td>Ownership / employment contracts</td>
<td>Unchanged</td>
<td>Vertical integration; wholly-owned subsidiaries; conglomerate diversification</td>
<td>Acmoglu, Johnson, and Mitton, 2009; Antras and Helpman, 2004; Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar, 2009; Fabrizio, 2012b; Nunn, 2007; Lee and Mansfield, 1996; Oxley, 1999</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Partnership</strong></td>
<td>Coordination between partners with complementary resources / capabilities</td>
<td>Formal or relational contracts between partners</td>
<td>Unchanged</td>
<td>Alliances; joint ventures; political connections; stakeholder relations</td>
<td>Baum and Oliver, 1991; Brouthers, Brouthers, and Werner, 2003; Capron and Gatignon, 2015; Delios and Henisz, 2000; Facio, 2006; Henisz, Dorobantu, and Narley 2014; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; McDermott, Corredoira, and Kruse, 2009; Meyer et al., 2009; Siegel, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proactive</strong></td>
<td>Realization of positive externalities / abatement of negative externalities</td>
<td>Rewards received from beneficiaries or other stakeholders for conditional cooperation</td>
<td>Lowered for focal actor; unchanged for others</td>
<td>CSR initiatives; sustainable business practices; bottom of the pyramid strategies</td>
<td>Barnett and Salomon, 2012; Eichholtz, Kok, and Quigley, 2010; Flammer, 2013; Hart, 1995; Hart and Dowell, 2010; Kaul and Luo, 2016; Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996; London and Hart, 2010; Porter and Kramer, 2011; Prahalad, 2007; Russo and Fouts, 1997; Vogel, 2006; Waddock and Graves, 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collective</strong></td>
<td>Creation and maintenance of common pool resources</td>
<td>Enforcement of voluntary rules through mutual / third party monitoring</td>
<td>Lowered for participating actors; unchanged for others</td>
<td>Industry self-regulation efforts; voluntary commitment to third-party disclosure or certification standards</td>
<td>Bansal, 2005; Barnett and King, 2008; Chiao, Lerner, and Tirole, 2007; King and Lenox, 2000; King et al., 2005; Leiponen, 2008; Mair, Marti, and Ventresca, 2012; Maxwell et al., 2000; Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, 1994; Reid and Toffel, 2009; Rosenkopf and Tushman, 1998; Rysman and Simcoe, 2008; Zuckerman and Gouveia, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Influence</strong></td>
<td>Competitive advantage from preferential regulation</td>
<td>Regulatory / legal fiat</td>
<td>Lowered for focal actor and/or raised for others</td>
<td>Political donations; firm lobbying</td>
<td>Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994; Burris, 1987; De Figueiredo and Tiller, 2001; De Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006; Hadani and Schuler, 2013; Hellman et al., 2003; Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Hillman, Keim, and Schuler, 2004; Holburn and Bergh, 2004, 2008; Oliver, 1991; Ring, Lenway, and Govekar, 1990; Stigler, 1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coalition</strong></td>
<td>Group advantage from preferential regulation</td>
<td>Regulatory / legal fiat</td>
<td>Lower for participating actors and/or raised for others</td>
<td>Industry lobbying for regulatory change</td>
<td>Bonardi, 2004; Hansen, Mitchell, and Drope, 2005; Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Jia, 2014; Kaufmann et al., 1993; Oliver, 1991; Schuler et al., 2002; Stigler, 1971</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: Incomplete vs. Captured Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Incomplete Institutions</th>
<th>Captured Institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Antecedents</strong></td>
<td>Emergence of new preferences and technologies; political and economic transition</td>
<td>Institutional path dependence; disproportionate control by insiders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Formal Regulation</strong></td>
<td>Non-existing or insufficient</td>
<td>Excessive or biased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source of institutional cost</strong></td>
<td>Uncertainty about value appropriation</td>
<td>Low probability of value appropriation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Affected actors</strong></td>
<td>All market actors</td>
<td>Outsiders to the system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Institutional costs are symmetric)</td>
<td>(Institutional costs are asymmetric: low for the insiders who captured the institutions and high for outsiders)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opportunistic actors</strong></td>
<td>Transaction partners</td>
<td>State / regulators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Empirical Measures</strong></td>
<td>Rule of law (Kaufmann et al., 2009); Minority shareholder protection (Djankov et al., 2008; Guillen and Capron, 2016); Establishment of stock exchanges (Weber, Davis and Lounsbury, 2009)</td>
<td>Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers, 2000); POLCON (Henisz, 2000); Political institutions checks and balances (Beck et al., 2001); Corruption (Kaufmann et al., 2009); Country risk for FDI (Knack and Keefer, 1995)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Table 4: The Choice of Non-market Strategy in Incomplete vs. Captured Institutions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Incomplete Institutions</th>
<th>Captured Institutions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adaptive strategies</strong></td>
<td><em>Proposition 1:</em> Firms operating under incomplete institutions are more likely to pursue internalization strategies.</td>
<td><em>Proposition 2a:</em> Firms operating under captured institutions are more likely to pursue partnership strategies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Proposition 2b:</em> Outsider firms operating under captured institutions are more likely to pursue partnership with insider firms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Additive strategies</strong></td>
<td><em>Proposition 3:</em> Firms operating under incomplete institutions are more likely to pursue both a) proactive strategies and b) collective strategies.</td>
<td><em>Proposition 4a:</em> Firms operating under captured institutions are less likely to pursue either proactive strategies or collective strategies.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Proposition 4b:</em> Insider firms operating under captured institutions are more likely to pursue proactive strategies than outsider firms.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Proposition 4c:</em> Outsider firms operating under captured institutions are more likely to pursue collective strategies than insider firms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transformative strategies</strong></td>
<td><em>Proposition 5:</em> Firms operating under incomplete institutions are more likely to pursue coalition strategies.</td>
<td><em>Proposition 6a:</em> Firms operating under captured institutions are more likely to pursue influence strategies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Proposition 6b:</em> Insider firms operating under captured institutions are more likely to pursue influence strategies than outsider firms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Proposition 6c:</em> Outsider firms operating under captured institutions are more likely to pursue coalition strategies than insider firms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy</td>
<td>Firm capability</td>
<td>Complementary strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Internalization</td>
<td><strong>P7a:</strong> High capability firms are more likely to pursue internalization strategies.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td><strong>P7b:</strong> Low capability firms are more likely to pursue partnership strategies; <strong>P7c:</strong> are more likely to partner with high capability firms.</td>
<td><strong>P8a:</strong> Firms pursuing partnership strategies are more likely to also pursue influence strategies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proactive</td>
<td><strong>P7d:</strong> High capability firms are more likely to pursue proactive strategies.</td>
<td><strong>P8b:</strong> Firms pursuing proactive strategies are more likely to also pursue collective strategies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective</td>
<td><strong>P7e:</strong> High capability firms are more likely to pursue collective strategies.</td>
<td><strong>P8b:</strong> Firms pursuing collective strategies are more likely to also pursue proactive strategies; and <strong>P8c:</strong> coalition strategies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence</td>
<td><strong>P7f:</strong> Low capability firms are more likely to pursue influence strategies.</td>
<td><strong>P8a:</strong> Firms pursuing influence strategies are more likely to also pursue partnership strategies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td><strong>P7g:</strong> High capability firms are more likely to pursue coalition strategies.</td>
<td><strong>P8c:</strong> Firms pursuing coalition strategies are more likely to also pursue collective strategies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>