

Fighting Against Democracy. Military Factions in the Second Spanish Republic and Civil War (1931-1939)*

Álvaro La Parra-Pérez[†]
University of Maryland

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Abstract

The breakdown of the Second Spanish Republic after the military coup of July 1936 plunged Spain in a three-year civil war that ended in Franco's dictatorship. The war marked the end of the first serious attempt to establish democracy in Spain and retarded the economic and political development of the country by at least twenty years. This paper establishes the relevance of the Army as a pertinent political player in understanding the dynamics of the Second Republic and shows that, contrary to traditional views, the military was a non-monolithic organization which was divided in different factions with conflicting interests. The empirical section explores the impact that republican military policies and factional military interests had on officers' side (rebel or loyal) during the Spanish Civil War. The econometric analysis uses a new data set that identifies officers' side and uses information from military yearbooks to follow officers' individual history between 1910 and 1936. The results confirm that the Army was a non-monolithic organization where factions behave differently and responded to the impact that republican military reforms had on them. Officers in favored corps and those that enjoyed greater promotions between 1931 and 1936 were more likely to support the republican regime. Finally, the paper explores the effect of hierarchy on officers' choice. Results show that subordinates tended to follow the side chosen by their senior officer.

Keywords: Army, Civil War, Cliometrics, Conflict, Elites, Factions, Institutional Development, Second Spanish Republic

JEL Classification: B52, C25, D74, N01, N24, N44, P48.

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[†] Department of Economics, 3114 Tydings Hall, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, 20742 (e-mail: laparraperez@econ.umd.edu).

1 Introduction

The Second Spanish Republic, established in 1931, is usually seen as the first serious attempt to establish and consolidate democracy in Spain. During the Second Republic, women were enfranchised for the first time in Spanish history, the country held the freest elections to that date, and important efforts to extend education to all levels of society were made. But democracy and the initial reforms proved insufficient to warrant the hope that the Republic would provide a stable social order for Spain. Violence during the republican period took many forms: military coups (1932 and 1936), attacks on Catholic symbols or institutions, rural conflict between security forces and labor organizations, revolutionary strikes organized by anarchists or radical factions of the Socialist party after 1933, and political murders carried out by fascist and radical organizations in the spring of 1936. The Second Republic ended with a military coup in July, 1936 that started a three-year civil war. More than half a million died as a result of combats and Franco's political repression during the post-war period. The failure of the Second Republic to provide a stable framework for Spain had important consequences for Spanish development. After the war, Franco's dictatorship closed the Spanish economy and did not show any sign of openness and modernization until the 1960s. The legalization of political parties, competitive elections and the path to the consolidation of democracy did not materialize until 1978, three years after Franco's death.

The failure of the Second Republic to consolidate democracy, the resulting Civil War, and the long period of repression under Franco's regime have had a profound effect on Spanish society that is still visible today. The Second Republic is an iconic event in the Spanish political imaginary against which the current social order that emerged after Franco's death is compared. For some, the Second Spanish Republic embodied an idea of secular liberal democracy that should have been pursued after the dictatorial parenthesis. For others, the Republic was a radical partisan regime that prevented pacific coexistence. The consequences of Spanish Civil War and Franco's repression endure. The claims of associations fighting to recover the bodies of relatives who died during the war, the recognition of republican clandestine opposition to Franco's dictatorship or the investigation of Franco's crimes against humanity are subjects of debate in today's Spanish political and judicial arena.

At the heart of the current debate lie different interpretations of the Second Republic. One side argues that the sources of instability and the failure of the republican regime to consolidate democracy came from conservative elites (Preston, 2007; and Casanova, 2010 are two useful synthesis of this approach). Conservative elites blocked the reformist efforts of republican governments and worked to overthrow the republican regime because it threatened their control over the Spanish political and economic systems. In this view, the military coup of July 1936 was the ultimate proof of powerful conservative groups' lack of loyalty towards the Second Republic. A second alternative view argues that leftist organizations and the partisan political framework set by the ruling republican-socialist coalition between 1931 and 1933 were the main factors that paved the way to political polarization and conflict in Spain (Payne, 2006; Álvarez and Villa, 2010). According to this view, the Constitution approved by a republican-socialist coalition in 1931 was a partisan and alienated conservative groups. The radicalization of Socialist faction and their abandonment of the parliamentary game after the victory of the center-right in the 1933 elections together with anarchist political violence and activism were the final sources of the political polarization that ended in the Spanish Civil War. These two views come to opposite explanations for the failure of the Second Republic and relate to contemporary political passions and divisions when evoking the failure of the regime that Payne named "Spain's first democracy".

The paper develops a view of the Second Spanish Republic that challenges a basic assumption of the existing historical approaches. Rather than assuming that blocks of power existed, and that interaction between the blocks explains the arc of the Republic, my approach focuses on Spanish internal dynamics and the sources of violence and tension in Spanish politics. It departs from the traditional accounts in two ways. First, it emphasizes the need to focus on the elite dynamics during the Second Republic. In this sense, the new view of the Second Republic delves into the main idea suggested by Tuñón de Lara (1967) that the internal dynamics of Spanish social orders predating the Second Republic were dominated by intra-elite relationships between different groups that made up the "blocks" of power. Second, Spanish elites are taken as non-monolithic organizations formed by several factions with different and conflicting interests which are traced through the history of the Republic. The idea that elite groups should not be represented as a representative agent having a unique objective function and its importance to understand political and economic development is developed by North, Wallis and Weingast (2009, hereafter NWW; see also, North, Wallis, Webb and

Weingast, 2013, for case studies of developing countries). The importance of factionalism to understand elite dynamics has also been studied by Rivero (2013), who derives the analytical implications of factionalism in the civil control of the military and the formation of military juntas and dictatorships.

The paper focuses on particular elite: the Army. Despite canonical views of the Second Republic that often present the Army as the agents of elites and neglect independent interests of military actors; the Army was a major player in Spanish politics. The military had used its power to hold and promote its own interests as an organization and the diverse interests of its members. When studying General Mola's motivations to lead the plot that produced the 1936 military coup against the Republic, Payne points out that "Mola was determined that the revolt would be basically an army movement, not obligated to any special interests. (...) Like most officers, he was uninterested in political parties and political ideologies." (1971:94). Understanding the interests of the military is important in itself to shed light on officers' motivations during the Spanish Republic and Civil War. But it is also important because it challenges the idea that the Army had a single, monolithic, and homogenous interest in bringing down the Republic. The paper studies the different groups and interests that coexisted within the Army and the impact that republican military reforms had on these. In the empirical part, the paper uses a newly constructed dataset to explore the impact of republican military reforms on officers' careers and uses that information to explain and predict why individual officers' chose to side with the Republic or the rebels during the Spanish Civil War.

Concerning the role of the Army in the Second Spanish Republic, there are two main contributions. First, I build a new dataset for active officers in 1936. The dataset combines data in Engel (2008) and the Spanish military yearbooks to provide information on the side officers' chose during the civil war as well as their individual history between 1910 and 1936. The paper uses the dataset to develop the first quantitative measurement of officers' identification with Spanish military factions, their rank, their corps, and professional trajectory during the Second Republic. Second, the paper offers the first quantitative study of the impact that republican military policies had on officers' careers and how it relates to officers' likelihood of supporting or rebelling against the Second Republic in 1936. In other words, were officers and factions

harmed (benefited) by republican military reforms more (less) likely to revolt against the Republic?

A probit regression is used to estimate officers' probability of rebelling against the Second Republic in July 1936. The results confirm that the Army was a non-monolithic organization. Military factions behaved differently and responded to republican military reforms. Aviation and the Assault Guard (two of the most favored corps during the Second Republic) showed greater loyalty towards the Republican regime. The impact that republican reforms of the promotions system had on military factions also appear as significant determinants of the side an officer chose. In particular, the results show that promoted officers were more likely to support the republican regime. Revisions to promotion procedures in 1931 and 1933 harmed the prospects of officers belonging to the *africanista* faction, therefore increasing their likelihood to rebel. As we might expect, because rebel authorities imposed a much more coercive regime than republican ones, the effect of individual characteristics on officer choices varied between areas controlled by the Republic and areas controlled by the rebels. Finally, the paper explores the effect of hierarchy. Results show that subordinates with a rebel senior officer were more likely to rebel. Given that members of the *africanista* faction held higher ranks in 1936, the hierarchical effect offers another indirect channel through which republican reforms could have affected military factions and the number of rebel officers in July 1936.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the view adopted in this paper and explains the main differences with respect to both the two traditional accounts of the Second Spanish Republic and mainstream theories of economic and political development in institutional economics. Section III shows the political relevance of the Spanish Army in Spanish history and identifies the military factions and the conflicting interests that coexisted within the military. The section also studies the impact that republican military reforms had on each faction between 1931 and 1933. Section IV explains how the dataset was built and presents the variables that are used to measure officers' individual history between 1910 and 1936 and their identification with each faction. Section V presents the main regression and results for the whole country and for areas under rebel and republican control taken separately. Section VI tests the importance that hierarchy had on officers' choice of side. Section VII calculates the impact that alternative military policies would have had on officers' side during the Civil War. Finally Section VIII concludes.

2 Traditional Theories of the Spanish Republic and Theoretical Framework

Despite the fact that the end of the Second Spanish Republic was triggered by a military coup and that studies on the Spanish Army are abundant, there has been little systematic research on officers' behavior during the Second Spanish Republic and the influence that republican military reforms had on officers' side during the Civil War. The study of the Army and its political importance in Spanish history is documented in Payne (1967), Boyd (1979), Ballbé (1983), Cardona (1983), Seco (1984), Lleixà (1986), Busquets and Losada (2003), and Puell de la Villa (2009). There are also many studies focusing on the army and the military reforms during the Second Spanish Republic (Aguilar Olivencia, 1986; Ruiz Vidondo, 2004; Alpert, 2006; Navajas, 2011). The main events during the military coup of July 1936 are described in detail in Salas (1940). Puell de la Villa (2012) is one of the most recent attempts to quantify the divisions of the Army in July 1936. None of these provide a quantitative multivariate analysis to understand the importance that republican military reforms and military factions had on the military coup that started the Spanish Civil War. This paper adds to the recent literature that studies the influence that institutional and legal rearrangements had on the behavior of political and economic actors during the second Spanish Republic. Domènech (2012) and Domènech and Miley (2013) represent the two most recent efforts in that direction. These authors study how labor conflict and mobilization in rural Spain during the Second Republic followed legal and structural reforms in the labor market that favored the actions of labor unions. The focus of this paper also complements the evidence of politicization and use of clientelistic networks and political appointments in the Spanish bureaucracy during the Second Republic as shown in Lapuente and Rothstein (2014) Finally, the view and institutional framework established in this paper relates to the literature on political and economic development for which Tilly (1992); Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, 2012); and North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) represent some of the most important recent contributions.

When explaining the sources of instability during the Second Spanish Republic and its failure to establish democracy in Spain, two approaches that can be named “the polarization view” and “the block of power view” have traditionally dominated the debate.

The “block of power view” recognizes the importance of elites and the Army and frames the life and instability of the Second Republic in an “elites vs. masses” conflict.

According to this view, the attempts of the republican-socialist coalition in power between 1931 and 1933 to redistribute land or laicize Spain alienated industrialists, landowners, the Catholic Church and other elites that had dominated Spanish politics and economics before the Republic. The military coup and the Civil War were the ultimate proof of conservative elites' disloyalty to a republican regime that had been a "source of hope to the left and of fear to the right" (Preston, 2007:38, also see, Casanova, 2010, *passim*).

In this view, the military is usually depicted as an organization that defended the interests of landowners, industrialists, bankers and the privileged conservative groups that organized the 1936 coup to regain power, and ended with the unconsolidated Spanish democracy. In Preston's words, "the masters of social and economic power were united with the Church and the army in being determined to prevent any attacks on property, religion or national unity" (2007: 40). The army is viewed as little more than the elites' military arm. The military alliance with Spanish elites is often explained by arguing that the Army grew increasingly conservative after 1874 (Navajas, 2011) and could not accept the regionalist concessions to Catalonia during the Republic because they attacked the unity of Spain (Preston, 2007: 47, 58).

In summary, the "block of power view" considers that the Second Republic and the Spanish Civil War are examples of an unconsolidated process of democratization that could not resist the re-organization of old conservative elites and their attempt to regain power. The republican regime represented a conflict between conservative elites and the masses in which "the Spanish Civil War was to grow out of the efforts of progressive leaders of the Republic to carry out reforms against the wishes of the most powerful sections of society" (Preston, 2007: 40).

In some important aspects, the "block of power view" can be taken as an application *avant la lettre* of Acemoğlu and Robinson's model of democratization and institutional change (2006). In Acemoğlu and Robinson's model, elites (the initial holders of political and economic power) only accept the redistribution of power that happens in democracy whenever the masses are able to organize and pose a credible threat to elites' survival. Transition to democracy is the long-term credible commitment that elites can offer to avoid being eliminated by better organized masses. However, Acemoğlu and Robinson also consider the possibility of having an unconsolidated democracy in which the

balance of power can quickly shift back in favor of elites. The reversion usually takes place through a coup that brings economic and political power back to elites and ends with democratization (2006: 224-246).

The “polarization view” of the Second Spanish Republic emerged as a reaction to the emphasis that the “block of power view” puts on conservative elites’ obstruction Spanish democratization. This second view emphasizes political polarization and tensions provoked by leftist parties and unions as the main obstacles to consolidate democracy in Spain and avoid Civil War. Tenants of “the polarization view” argue that the Constitution approved by the republican-socialist coalition in 1931 lacked the necessary consensus and pushed a partisan view that alienated center-right and conservative parties (Linz, 1994; Payne, 2006; Álvarez Tardío and Villa García, 2010). The radicalization and abandonment of the parliamentary game by some factions of the Socialist Party after their defeat in the 1933 elections or the frequent anarchist revolts (revolutionary strike in Asturias in 1934 being a case in point) are also mentioned as key factors on the road towards confrontation and war (Payne, 2006).

The view in this paper agrees with the two previous views in important aspects like the emphasis on internal Spanish dynamics in understanding the life of the Second Republic or the focus on the sources of political violence and conflict. But it also differs in two significant points: the emphasis on elites and the need to understand the factions and conflicts of interests that coexisted within elite organizations.

Contrary to the “polarization view”, this paper emphasizes the importance of elites (in this case the Army) to understand the life of the Second Republic. Despite the fact that Socialists and anarchists posed important challenges to public order, they were not a real threat for the stability of the republican regime. Using Acemoğlu and Robinson’s terminology, the “revolutionary constraint” was not binding in Spain as shown by the relative easiness with which the Army controlled the best organized revolutionary strike in Asturias (Cardona, 1983: 209; Casanova, 2010: 167). The elite-driven focus is also consistent with Acemoğlu and Robinson’s remark that “the greatest threat against democracy comes from the elites” (2006: 224). The key to understanding the sources of (in) stability during the Second Spanish Republic is the interests and incentives that the elites had to bring to support or conspire against the Second Spanish Republic, not

socialist revolutionary strikes or anarchist outbursts of “libertarian communism” in Spanish villages.

This paper also differs from the “block of power view” in two important aspects. First, the Army is taken as a relevant political player in its own right and, consequently, its behavior is studied separately from other elites. Second, I show that the military was a non-monolithic organization composed by different factions and conflicting interests.

Besides landowners or industrialists’ support, Spanish regimes needed the backing of relevant sectors of the Army to ensure its stability. The Army was part of the elite coalition that could sustain or hinder the consolidation of different regimes and governments¹, and his role in the political system went beyond being “an instrument at the service of political blocks or currents of thought”² (Lleixà, 1984: 86). The Spanish Army was a relevant political player in its own right and its interests are important in understanding the Spanish development path.

The role of the military as a relevant player in the process of political and economic development in developing countries is not new. In his theory of the emergence and consolidation of national states, Tilly (1992) distinguishes four stages in warfare and state organization that he terms patrimonialism, brokerage, nationalization, and specialization. The stage that best characterizes Spain in the 1930s is *nationalization*: “a period (...) when states created mass armies and navies drawn increasingly from their own national populations, while sovereigns absorbed armed forces directly into the state’s administrative structure, and similarly took over the direct operation of the fiscal apparatus, drastically curtailing the involvement of independent contractors” (1992: 29). The Spanish Army in the 1930s, however, was still far from Tilly’s stage of specialization in which the Army specializes in military operations and the government takes over the economic control and management of the Army. Tilly’s specialization stage is close to NWW’s notion of political control of the army (2009: 169-181). In their view, political control of the military is a complex idea that encompasses the selection of military leadership by civil authorities, the control of military force through nonmilitary means, and the separation of decisions about when to fight and how to spend on

¹ In other words, the Army was part of what Tuñón de Lara (1967) termed “block of power” and NWW (2009) denominate “dominant coalition”.

² “[La actuación del Ejército en los últimos cien años de la historia de España] ha sido propia de un instrumento puesto al servicio de un bloque de partidos y corrientes de opinión”

fighting from the direction of military activity. The Spanish Army began experiencing effective political control in the 1980s (Serra, 2010). The Second Republic operated in an institutional environment in which the Army was a relevant political player and its interests were relevant for the stability of the ruling coalitions.

A second important difference between this paper and the “block of power” view is that the Spanish Army is not taken as a monolithic organization. The notion of an Army as an organization with a unique goal is reminiscent of the single agent view that characterizes Marxist sociology or neoclassical theories of the state (Tilly, 1992; North, 1981; Acemoğlu and Robinson, 2006 and 2012; Bates, 2008). In these views, elites or social classes are modeled as single agents whose goals are given by their objective function or class consciousness. Under this perspective, the Army is either subsumed under the single “elite agent” or is taken as elites’ coercive agent to prevent democratization (Acemoğlu, Ticchi, and Vindigni; 2006).

Single agent theories are useful theoretical artifacts, but elite organizations differ from this paradigm in crucial ways. The Spanish Army provides a good example because it contained many factions with conflicting interests. This was not a particularity of the Spanish military because, as Rivero points out, “internal dissensions within the armed forces are the rule rather than the exception” (2013:5). The plurality of interests within the military meant that, when deciding over a specific military policy, Spanish governments attracted some military factions but alienated others. This is particularly relevant in understanding the political dynamics of Spain in the 1930s because, as NWW explain, developing societies lack a Weberian state: violence is dispersed among different groups, and the state is unable to get a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. These societies try to preserve order by creating elite coalitions that reflect a *double balance*³ between economic and political power, but threats from other elites that are not part of the coalition persist. As a result, developing societies are more unstable and more likely to suffer coups and civil wars than developed countries. The single agent theory of the state puts the cart before the horse by assuming that the result of political and economic development (i.e. the concentration of coercion in the state) already exists. Weberian states or sufficiently centralized states (Acemoğlu and Robinson, 2012), characterize developed societies, not developing ones. In a framework

³ NWW define the double balance as “a correspondence between the distribution and organization of violence potential and political power on the one hand, and the distribution and organization of economic power on the other hand” (2009: 20).

with dispersed violence, the Army is more than a simple agent of political and economic elites: it is *part of* the elites that dominate politics and economics in developing societies.⁴

In the particular case of the Spanish Army and its relationship with the republican government, important changes occurred in the months that followed the declaration of the Second Republic. Between 1931 and 1933, Manuel Azaña approved a series of military reforms that had different impacts on many groups within the military, particularly on officers. This paper studies how these reforms reconfigured the relationship between the Spanish government and the military factions and how they influenced officers' likelihood to revolt against the Second Spanish Republic when the military coup that started the Civil War broke out in July 1936.

The importance of Azaña's military reforms in influencing officers' side in July 1936 is explained by political changes during the Second Spanish Republic. The military coup happened five months after the *Frente Popular* won the elections held in February 1936. The *Frente Popular* was a liberal-socialist coalition similar to the one that had attempted a series of reforms on distribution of land or the relationships between the State and the Church between 1931 and 1933. Azaña's military reforms were part of the 1931-1933 reformist programs. After center-right governments had paralyzed and partly reversed the reforms between 1933 and 1935, the return of liberal forces to power in 1936 (with Azaña as President of the Government and converted to the main political figure of the Spanish republican government) was interpreted as the return of the reformist programs of the first two years of the Republic. The military factions that lost with Azaña's reforms between 1931 and 1933 had good reasons to worry about their prospects with the comeback of liberals in 1936.

3 The Army in Spanish History: Political Relevance, Factions, and Republican Military Reforms

3.1. The Army in Spanish History: a Relevant Political Player

“For a whole century, the greater share of Spain's political worries centered around the military!”

⁴ The URSS and its control of the Army probably represents the most important exception to what otherwise is a (rather) general rule for developing countries: the army is not under political control and appears as a major political player in its own right.

Manuel Azaña (quoted in Payne, 1967: 272)

“It is now obvious that the Army is much more than the arm of the Fatherland. (...) It is the spinal column –and if it breaks, bends, or cracks, it is Spain that is bent or broken”

José Calvo Sotelo⁵

Violence and military interventions were a constant in Spanish political history well before the Second Spanish Republic. During Isabella II's reign (1843-1868) Spain had one civil war, two successful military *pronunciamientos* (military coups) that led to change of government, several failed mutinies, and a final military coup that overthrew Isabella II. The brief reign of Amadeo I (1870-1873) and the chaotic First Spanish Republic (1873-1874) were also dominated by military unrest that ultimately led to the fall of the first republican experiment in Spain.

Between 1874 and 1923 Spain had a political regime known as *Restauración* (the Restoration) that brought the Bourbon monarchy back to Spain.⁶ Despite officially being a parliamentary monarchy, the Army was still a key player in the dominant coalitions during the *Restauración*. As Puell de la Villa points out, “the Army was considered an autonomous class with its own structures of power that run parallel to the ones of the civil administration (...) and that directly depended on the monarch” (2009:114). Military officers sat in the Senate and the Parliament and the Minister of the War between 1874 and 1917 was always an officer from the Army. The political relevance of the Spanish military was embodied in laws that increased its political power. In March 1906, for example, the Law of Jurisdictions gave the military courts control over all the “crimes against the Fatherland and the Army”. The law of Jurisdictions was another step in the process whereby “the officer corps came to consider itself the ultimate arbiter in politics” (Preston, 2007: 28). Another significant law reflecting the political power of the Army was the Royal order of January 15 1914, which allowed direct communication between the King and the officers. This Order was particularly significant for two reasons. First, it confirmed that, despite being a

⁵ “El ejército se ha visto ahora que es mucho más que el brazo de la Patria. (...) [E]s la columna vertebral, y si se quiebra, si se dobla, si cruje, se quiebra, se dobla y cruje España” (quoted in Arrarás, 1940:192).

⁶ Vilar (1977) dates the *Restauración* between 1874 and 1917. Other authors use the 1874-1931 period because they associate the *Restauración* with the restoration of the King as the highest political authority in the country. I have chosen the period 1874-1923 in order to associate the term “*Restauración*” with a very concrete political order characterized by a parliamentary monarchy and a highly manipulated democracy. Primo de Rivera's dictatorship (1923-1930) marks the beginning of a new political regime for Spain and therefore is considered separately.

parliamentary monarchy *de jure*, during the *Restauración* the Army enjoyed a *de facto* political power not subject to parliamentary control. Second, the law was symptomatic of the King's need to attract support from some sectors of the Army. Some scholars see the 1914 Royal Order as another step in the consolidation of the King-soldier (single ruler) that counted with general obeisance from the Army (Cardona, 1983: 78; Puell de la Villa, 2009: 110). However, the law can also be viewed as an instrument that the King created to have better access to relevant officers and sectors of the Army. Rather than confirming the existence of a single agent with total control of the Army, the law was indicative of the King's need to attract and ensure the support of powerful officers and sectors of the Army in order to forge a coalition that stabilized the regime. In Lleixà's words, the King acted as "the principal hinge that united the civil and military branch of the state" in a social order in which the Army had to be "*coordinated* but not subordinated to the remaining public powers" (1986: 66, his italics).⁷

The end of parliamentary monarchy in the *Restauración* was also marked by military intervention. In 1923, Primo de Rivera, an Infantry officer, took power after a military coup and established a dictatorship that lasted seven years (1923-1930). Between 1923 and 1925 Primo formed a "Military Directory" (*Directorio Militar*) in which the Army took control of the majority of the Spanish political system. In González Calleja's words, "the Directory freed the Administration from political parties and turned it in to (...) the Army, which rapidly occupied the main administrative posts" (2005: 69). After 1925, the regime became a "Civil Directory" but Primo stayed as the head of the government, only subordinated to the King. After Primo stepped down in 1930, two shorter dictatorships led by Berenguer and Aznar (two officers) followed until April 1931, when the Second Spanish Republic was declared.

Regimes before the Second Spanish Republic varied in character but among them the Army was a relevant political player in its own right. NWW's words are useful to restate the inevitable conclusion: "If active support of the military forces is necessary to hold or obtain control of the civilian government institutions, then a society does not have political control of the military. If military officers serve as officers (...) in the civilian government, for example as legislators or executives, then a society does not

⁷ "[El Ejército como centro de poder] debía ser luego *coordinado*, que no subordinado, con los restantes poderes públicos. (...)La Corona (...) actuaba como el principal gozne unitivo de las ramas civil y militar del Estado"

have a political control of the military” (NWW, 2009: 170). The Second Spanish Republic inherited and operated in an institutional arrangement lacking political control of the military.

3.2. Factions in the Army and Azaña’s Military Reforms

“The old internal divisions that existed within the Army before 1931 did not disappear with the coming of the Second Spanish Republic”
Puell de la Villa (2012: 83)

The most important changes in the Spanish Army during the Second Spanish Republic took place during Manuel Azaña’s term in office as the Minister of War between April 1931 and September 1933. When studying Azaña’s military reforms and their impact in the Army, some scholars emphasize the minister’s legalism and his desire to limit the influence of the Army in Spanish politics (Cardona, 1983: 117) and his attempts to reaffirm the political neutrality of the military (Navajas, 2011: 92). But political neutrality was simply impossible for Azaña’s reforms: the Minister faced political choices that, given the conflicts of interests within the Army, would necessarily benefit some factions and hurt others. Many contemporary testimonies to the 1931-1933 military reforms bear witness to the existence of losing factions and discontent in certain military sectors (e.g. Cebreiros, 1931; Mola, 1940:925-1170). The military coup in July 1936 took place only four months after a coalition similar to the one that implemented military reforms during the first two years of the Republic won the elections in February. In May 1936 Manuel Azaña was named President of the Spanish Republic. Understanding the factions that coexisted within the Army and the way Azaña’s reforms between 1931 and 1933 affected their interests is crucial to derive the incentives that military groups had to support or be against the republican ruling coalition in July 1936.

3.2.1 *Corporatist Divisions in the Army*

The most important Army corps was Artillery, Engineering, Infantry, Cavalry, and Aviation. Each of these corps had actively been involved in politics or conflicts that shaped the life and stability of regimes before the Second Republic.

The Aviation corps is a good example of the Spanish Army involvement in politics and the changing nature of the military alliances that each regime established. After playing an active role in disputes and conspiracies against Primo de Rivera's dictatorship, the Aviation corps was one of the great beneficiaries of the arrival of the Second Spanish Republic. Republican military reforms consolidated the corps and increased its professional and economic standing. During his mandate as Minister of the War between 1931 and 1933, Manuel Azaña cancelled all the decrees against aviation officers approved by Primo de Rivera, increased the independence of the corps vis-à-vis the remaining structure of the Army when creating the *Cuerpo General de Aviación*, and gave aviators economic bonuses for their services (Cardona, 1983: 157).

Corps in the Army also had rivalries based on different interests concerning military education or methods of promotion. The most important corporatist conflict opposed Artillery and Engineers against Infantry and Cavalry. Artillery and Engineers were the most elitist branches and received longer and more technical education. These corps defended the existence of separate academies with respect to Infantry or Cavalry. Primo created a General Military Academy where all the corps shared the first two years of studies increasing the animosity of engineers and artillerymen vis-à-vis his regime. During the first years of the Second Republic Manuel Azaña aligned with the interests of the technical corps by closing Primo's Military Academy and having three military academies: one for Infantry, Cavalry, and Quartermaster corps; another for Artillery and Engineers; and a third for Military Health where officers pursued their *entire* careers.

Artillery and Engineers were also strong supporters of promotions determined by seniority (as opposed to the ones determined by combat merit). Methods of promotions are studied in the next section because they were a key aspect that generated divisions in the Army between troops in Africa and the mainland.

Some officers in the Spanish Army were part of the Assault Guard (*Cuerpo de Seguridad y Asalto*). This police force specialized in the suppression of demonstration in large cities and was under the authority of the Spanish Interior Ministry (*Ministerio de la Gobernación*). Members of the Assault Guard had to be "strong and athletic youths,

taller than 5'11" and of proven republican loyalty"⁸ (González Calleja, 2012: 113), so it was considered one of the most loyal republican units.

For other corps whose interests were not directly affected by Azaña's military reforms (e.g. Civil Guard or Frontier Guards) expectations on their loyalty vis-à-vis the republican government in 1936 is less clear. The Civil Guard was a militarized police force in charge of preserving order in rural areas. Based on their historical dependence on old Spanish elites, González Calleja states that "during the Republic, civil guards kept their reticence towards the regime" (2012: 103), but he also recognizes that in 1936 the government of the *Frente Popular* eliminated from its ranks those officers significantly involved in the repression against leftist movements in the previous years.

3.2.2 *Promotions and Geographic Divisions in the Army*

The second division in the Spanish Army was along geographical lines and revolved around the preferred methods of promotion. Therefore, in order to understand the conflict between geographic factions, an understanding of how promotions worked in the Spanish Army is necessary.

Officers in Spain were divided in three broad rank categories (Table 1): the highest category were the General Officers (GO, which included the ranks of Lieutenant General, Major General, and Brigadier General), the second group were the Senior Commissioned Officers (SCO; Colonels, Lieutenant Colonels, and Majors), and the third group was formed by Junior Commissioned Officers (JCO; Captains, Lieutenants, and *Alféreces*). For each rank, officers were classified on a scale according to their seniority in the rank. Whenever there were vacant posts in a given rank, top officers on the scale of the rank below were eligible for promotion. Depending on the law in force, promotions of rank or within the scale in a given rank could also be determined after remarkable actions in the battlefield (promotions by combat merit) or by appointment of the military authority (promotions by election). Officers' attached great importance to changes in their position on the scale because it determined their eligibility to be promoted to the next rank and increase their economic and social standing in the Army.

⁸ "Sus agentes habían de ser jóvenes fuertes y atléticos, con una estatura superior a 1,80 m y de probada fidelidad a la República".

From a geographical point of view, the Army was divided into two groups: the *peninsulares* or *junteros* (officers posted in the Iberian Peninsula), and the officers in the Spanish North-African colonies (*africanista* officers). The *africanistas* were strong proponents of promotions by combat merit, whereas the *peninsulares* preferred promotions strictly determined by seniority. *Peninsulares'* critic of combat merit often pointed to problems of arbitrariness and favoritism. In this sense, the military journal *La Correspondencia militar* wrote in 1912:

“There are 2,300 senior officers of Infantry and Cavalry who do not want to be politicians, and who reject any government policy that tries, by means of favoritism, to introduce hated rivalries into the Army. They regard any reward for service that is opposed to their vehement desire to ascend by seniority as a menace to their only safeguard, the scale of seniority” (Payne, 1967: 124).

Despite its ecumenical and apolitical pretensions, the article itself is indicative of the political activism of the Army in its attempts to influence the methods of promotions. Favoritism and arbitrariness aside, the reasons for that type of activism were linked to officers' self-interest and the impact that methods of promotion had in the careers and economic rewards they expect. On one hand, *Africanista* officers were regularly exposed to combat against native tribes in North Africa between 1910 and 1927, and therefore defended promotions by combat merit as a way to obtain faster progress through the scale. On the other hand, *peninsulares* were opposed to combat merit because, lack of contact with the battlefield in the mainland, minimized their chances of benefitting from that type of promotion. Allowing promotions determined by combat merit harmed their future prospects in favor of the *Africanista* faction. This was particularly worrying in an Army that suffered a severe problem of excess officers. Nazario Cebreiros, an officer of the Spanish Army in the first half of the twentieth century, showed how self-interest loomed behind officers' defense of one method of promotion over the other. This is how Cebreiros described officers that benefited from promotions by combat merit during Primo de Rivera's dictatorship:

“When the Juntas [*peninsulares'* lobbies⁹] had an unyielding force, they were *junteros* [i.e. *peninsulares*] and fierce defendants of promotions by seniority when they were at the [Iberian] Peninsula; but if, following their desires or by chance, they crossed the strait [of Gibraltar], then they became rapidly convinced that

⁹ More precisely, The Military Defense Juntas were peninsular organizations of military men who “were opposed to *Africanistas*, the *méritos* system, the palace clique, and the generals” (Payne, 1967: 127).

promotion by seniority was not in the interest of the State”¹⁰ (Cebreiros, 1931: 14, translation is mine).

Thus, rather than acting as the agents of liberal or conservative elites in Spain, officers “would be more concerned with promoting their own interests as military men above or outside of party conflicts”, constituting an active political organization in Spain (Payne, 1967: 37). Governments’ decision over the methods of promotion would attract the support of the *peninsulares* (if emphasis was put on seniority) or the *Africanistas* (if promotions by combat merit were allowed). Decisions over methods of promotion were important determinants of the support that geographic factions of the Army gave to Spanish governments.¹¹

In a series of laws passed between 1924 and 1926, Primo de Rivera allowed promotions by combat merit¹² and by election¹³. This meant that the Second Republic inherited a military structure where combat merit and election had determined several officers’ ranks. In other controversial law, Primo had also eliminated the closed scale¹⁴ for Artillery and Engineers, -an event without precedent in the history of these corps which had always relied on seniority to determine the promotions in their ranks.

Between 1931 and 1933, Azaña finished with Primo’s *status quo* and implemented a series of military reforms that altered the system to determine promotions in the Army. Two decrees passed in 1931 cancelled Primo’s promotions by elections¹⁵ and revised those promotions that the dictator passed on combat merit grounds.¹⁶ Promotions were cancelled except if, at the moment of revision, they could be justified using the seniority criteria. Many officers lost position in the scale as a result of Azaña’s revisions of promotions by combat merit. When cancelling some of Primo’s promotions by election, there were officers that lost a rank.

¹⁰ “Cuando las Juntas tenían una fuerza incontrastable, eran junteros: y terribles defensores de la escala cerrada, mientras estaban en la península; pero si, por voluntad o por suerte, pasaban el Estrecho, entonces se convencían rápidamente de que la escala cerrada no convenía a los intereses del Estado (...).”

¹¹ To a certain extent, those decisions also reflected the relative force of each faction. When in 1917 the government approved a law that restored promotions by combat merit, the *peninsulares* reacted creating the Defense Juntas and forcing the fall and creation of a new government. One of the first measures of the new government was restoring the preeminence of promotions determined by seniority as demanded by the peninsular faction (Alpert, 2008: 126; Cardona, 1983: 145).

¹² Law of May 11, 1924

¹³ Law of July 26, 1926.

¹⁴ The “closed scale” was another term to designate systems in which promotions were only determined by seniority.

¹⁵ Order of May 18, 1931. Only the promotions by election that could be justified on seniority grounds were maintained.

¹⁶ Order of June 3, 1931.

Far from being a purely technical debate, the reform of methods of promotion had a considerable political impact in Spain. In his diary, Azaña echoes the rumors that Melquiades Álvarez, an important political figure of the Republic, “has agreed to combat in the Parliament the cancellation of promotion by combat merit”¹⁷ (1981: 20). The interests of the Army were important political issues during the Second Republic and military factions had enough political relevance to make their voices heard in the Spanish Parliament.

Azaña’s reforms of the methods of promotion were completed with the passing of a law on May 2, 1932 that established the criteria followed during the Second Spanish Republic. The law was partly inspired by a Law of 1918, which had been approved under the pressure of *peninsulares* and other proponents of the seniority criteria for promotions. The republican-socialist government established that promotions would be determined by seniority within the ranks corresponding to JCO, SCO, and GO (See Table 1). In addition to the seniority criteria, promotions from JCO to SCO (i.e. from Captain to Major) or from SCO to GO (i.e. from Colonel to Brigadier General) required the successful completion of a course and a final exam.

The reform of methods of promotions in 1932 as well as the reversion of many of Primo’s promotions affected officers and military factions’ attitude vis-à-vis the Second Spanish Republic through three different channels. First, by strengthening the role of seniority and study to determine promotions, the 1932 law favored *peninsulares’* interests and, consequently, alienated the *Africanista* faction. Second, emphasis on seniority was also in line with the interests of those corps historically attached to the closed scale, namely Engineers and Artillerymen. Third, the officers who lost positions or were demoted a rank after revising Primo’s promotions by combat merit would have been more likely to be against the newly formed Azaña’s republican government in 1936.¹⁸

¹⁷ “Otros afirman que Melquiades se ha comprometido a combatir en las Cortes la anulación de los ascensos por méritos de guerra”

¹⁸ On April 19, 1932, Azaña wrote in his diary that General Goded, who was executed four year later after his failed attempt to lead the military coup in Catalonia, was “very angry because the reforms cut off his career” (Azaña 1981: 459; “está muy dolido de que las reformas le hayan cortado la carrera”)

3.2.3 *Elimination of Ranks*

One last aspect of Azaña's military reforms in the first two years of the Republic is that it did not affect any military faction in particular but had significant consequence for some officers' career prospects. In 1931, a decree eliminated the rank of Lieutenant General which was the highest rank in Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers.¹⁹ This measure affected the officers that in 1931 aspired to achieve the rank of Lieutenant General in the future, namely Majors and higher ranks. By worsening their professional prospects (and, of course, the economic rewards and prestige that were attached), it is possible that these officers were more likely to oppose Azaña's government in 1936 (Cardona, 1983).

4 Data Set and Variables

In order to test the relationship between military policies, factional interest, and officers' behavior during the 1936 coup, I build a dataset that uses data in Engel (2008) and the Spanish military yearbooks between 1910 and 1936. The dataset gathers information on the 15,098 officers that were active in the Spanish Army in July 1936 to determine their individual characteristics in 1936, the evolution of their careers during the Second Republic, and their proximity to the *africanista* faction by looking at their geographical location between 1910 and 1927.

To date, Engel (2008) is the most complete and exhaustive study of Spanish officers' chosen side during the military coup and Civil War. Besides the side that officers chose, his dataset also provides information on officers' rank in July 1936, the garrison where they were posted and, when possible, the city where the officer was at the outbreak of the military coup²⁰ and some relevant officers' biographical information about their ups and downs during the conflict. His data covers both the Army and the Navy.

The Spanish military yearbooks were published by the Spanish Ministry of War and contain information on officers' date of birth, date of entry in the Army, corps, rank, seniority in the rank, and position on the scale. Given that the yearbooks were usually

¹⁹ Diario Oficial del Ministerio de la Guerra n. 132, June 17, 1931, p. 788.

²⁰ Due to summer leaves and other exceptional or personal circumstances several officers were not in their garrisons in July 1936.

published in January, they reflected changes that occurred during the previous year. The 1936 military yearbook was published in late April, so it reflected all the changes in ranks and positions on the scale that occurred between January 1935 and April 1, 1936 (i.e. three and a half months before the coup).

Information on the military yearbooks is merged with Engel's data using officers' names. Officers' date of birth and date of entry in the Army are also used to match officers in the military yearbooks between 1931 and 1936 in order to determine their evolution on the scale and changes of rank during the Second Republic. Matches between names in 1936 and military yearbooks between 1910 and 1927 are used to determine officers' geographical location in that period and their proximity to the *africanista* faction.

The final sample is formed by the 11,873 active officers in July 1936 that belonged to the corps of General Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Engineers, Artillery, Aviation²¹, Transportation (*Cuerpo de Tren*), Civil Guard (*Guardia Civil*), and Frontier Guards (*Carabineros*). The 3,078 active officers in July 1936 that are excluded from the final sample fall into two categories. The first category is formed by corps in which all the officers rebelled: "Sea Companies Corps" (*Patrones de Compañía*, eight officers) and the African Regulars (*Oficialidad del Tercio*, eight officers after excluding those that actually belonged to the Aviation corps). Following Puell de la Villa (2012), the second category is formed by those officers belonging to corps that are excluded because they lacked the ability to command armed forces or, strictly speaking, were not part of the Spanish Army: Quartermaster, *Intervención* (fiscal control of the Army), Medical corps, Pharmacy, Church, Military Veterinarians, Military Offices, Music directors, Horseback riding teachers, Topographic Brigade, Infantry Moorish Officers, and Moorish Cavalry.

4.1 Officers' Affiliation at the Outbreak of the Civil War

Despite the 76 years that have passed since the military coup that started Spanish Civil War, there isn't precise and consensual data for the side that officers chose at the

²¹ The Aviation corps, the youngest of all corps which was in the process of consolidation, was not fully separated from the other corps in the 1936 military yearbook. The yearbook only separates the aviation officers from the rank of "alférez" (see table 1). Higher rank aviation officers were included in other corps like Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery or Engineers (see Cebreiros, 1931: 250 for the historical origin of this "dual scale" in the Aviation corps). Engel (2008) provides information to identify the officers belonging to the Aviation corps with a rank higher than *alférez*, so I use his data to find which officers in the 1936 yearbook were aviators.

outbreak of the Civil War. I use data from Engel (2008) to determine whether officers rebelled or stayed loyal to the Second Republic.

In his study, Engel restricted the data to active officers in July 1936.²² He used the bulletins from the Spanish Ministry of the War (*Diario Oficial del Ministerio de la Guerra*, DOMG) during the War period (1936-1939) and *Boletín Oficial del Estado* (BOE, equivalent to the American Congressional Record) between 1936 and 1945²³ to find dispositions and information concerning officers in the Army during the Civil War and the post war (promotions, trials, death penalties, expulsions, imprisonments...) to determine the side they chose.

Officers that were put in jail, sentenced to death or expelled from the Army by the republican government are labelled as rebels. Officers that were in the Army in July 1936 and remained in the military after the rebel victory in 1939 without any penalty or punishment in their records are considered rebels too. Following the same logic, officers punished on rebel's official bulletins or those that only appear as part of the Republican Army until 1939 are labelled as "republicans" (i.e. loyal to the republican regime).

Besides these clear cases, there are other examples in which officers' classification demand greater subjectivity. First, Engel identifies the "republican geographical loyal officers", namely officers that "stayed loyal to the republic for geographical reasons" (Navajas, 2011: 137). Rather than be influenced by their convictions or preferences, officers in this category probably stayed in the republican ranks during the conflict because they happened to be on republican controlled areas when the coup broke out. When officers stayed on the republican side during the Civil war but were integrated into Franco's army without punishment or sanction when the conflict ended, they were labeled "republican geographical loyal officers". There were also cases of "rebel geographical loyal officers" that, after fighting on the rebel side, were obliged to

²² After eliminating some repetitions and excluding the corps of Handicapped and the Moorish troops, my data show that the 1936 military yearbook contained 15,258 active officers in April 1936. 160 (1.05%) of those officers were excluded due to inconsistencies with the data provided by the military yearbook (e.g. typos in dates of birth) leaving us with 15,098 active officers. 14,893 of those officers (98.64%) could be matched with Engel's data, so 205 officials remained unmatched. Consulting the *Diario Oficial del Ministerio de la Guerra* (DOMG, bulletins of the Minister of the War) between April and July 1936, I was able to determine that among those 205 unmatched officials, 66 had retired, 9 passed to the reserve, and 25 passed away between April 1 and July 17 1936. This leaves us with 105 officers (0.7% of the 14,893 that constitute the population of reference) for whom either Engel did not provide data or I was unable to find the documental evidence proving that they were not active in July 1936.

²³ During the war, there were two *Boletín Oficial del Estado*: one issued by the military junta controlling the rebel area and another issued by the republican government in Madrid.

abandon Franco’s troops due to their “ambiguous” behavior or because their loyalty to the rebel cause was doubted. Given that republican geographical loyal officers did not have a strong identification with the Republic (otherwise they would have been repressed during Franco’s purge after the war) they are classified as rebels in my final sample. The reverse reasoning applies to geographical loyal officers on the rebel side, so they are labeled as “republicans”. The final sample contains 536 geographical loyal officers in total (4.5% of total officers). A second problematic category of officers is formed by those officers that were affected by the “Varela law”²⁴. The law imposed retirement from the Army on those officers “whose lack of aptitude put their subordinates at risk because of their indecisiveness or ineptitude.”²⁵ Given the impossibility of differentiating between officers affected by the law given their poor management skills (therefore not showing any weakness in their adhesion to the rebel cause) and those for whom weak loyalty resulted in hesitant command of the troops, all these officers in the sample are labeled as “rebels”. 61 officers (0.5% of the final sample) were affected by the Varela law.

4.2 Promotions during the Second Spanish Republic

One important consequence of Azaña’s military reforms was the loss of position or demotions for some officers after revising some previous promotions based on combat merit or election. In order to account for officers’ professional evolution during the Second Republic and identify those that lost with the revision of promotions, I create a variable that accounts for officers’ changes of position on the scale and effective rank promotions or demotions between 1931 and 1936.

The information on Spanish military yearbooks between 1931 and 1936 is used to measure officers’ changes on the rank scale. First, given officer i ’s rank r and corps c in year t , the relative position of officer i in the scale can be obtained as follows:

$$RP_{i,t,r,c} = \frac{\text{Position}_{i,t,r,c}}{\text{Total_officers}_{t,r,c}}$$

²⁴ Law of July 12, 1940 that updated, completed, and reenacted the Decree 100 of December 15, 1936 (see next footnote).

²⁵ Decree 100, BOE number 57, December 15, 1936.

Where $\text{Position}_{i,t,r,c}$ is officer i 's position on the scale of rank r and corps c according to the military yearbook of year t . It is useful to keep in mind that military yearbooks in t reflect the changes on the scales and ranks that occurred during $t-1$. $\text{Total_officers}_{t,r,c}$ is the total number of officers that appear on the scale for rank r of corps c in the military yearbook of t . Note that those officers with a higher position on the scale (i.e. those closer to be promoted) have a lower RP. The officer in the last position of the scale has a RP equal to 1 whereas being the first officer on the scale results in a RP equal to $1/\text{Total_officers}_{t,r,c}$.

Officers' RP are computed for every year between 1931 and 1936. Change of position on the scale between $t-1$ and t is calculated as follows:

$$\Delta \text{Position}_{i,t,r,c} = \begin{cases} RP_{i,t-1,r,c} - RP_{i,t,r,c} & \text{if } r \text{ in } t-1 = r \text{ in } t \\ \Delta r + RP_{i,t-1,r,c} & \text{if } r \text{ in } t-1 < r \text{ in } t \\ \Delta r - (1 - RP_{i,t-1,r,c}) & \text{if } r \text{ in } t-1 > r \text{ in } t \end{cases}$$

Where Δr = change in rank between military yearbook of t and military yearbook of $t-1$ ($\Delta r = 1$ if the officer is promoted one rank, $\Delta r = -1$ if the officer is demoted one rank, $\Delta r = 2$ if the officer is promoted two ranks, etc.).

If $0 < \Delta \text{Position}_{i,t,r,c} < 1$, officer i did not change his rank in $t-1$ but improved his RP in the scale with respect to $t-2$. If $1 < \Delta \text{Position}_{i,t,r,c} < 2$, officer i was promoted one rank in $t-1$. When $-1 < \Delta \text{Position}_{i,t,r,c} < 0$, officer i did not change his rank in $t-1$ but worsened his RP with respect to $t-2$. If $-2 < \Delta \text{Position}_{i,t,r,c} < -1$, officer i was demoted one rank in the year $t-1$.²⁶

The expression to compute $\Delta \text{Position}_{i,t,r,c}$ can be better understood through an example. In 1931, Infantry colonel José Moscardó Ituarte held the 129th position among the 177 officers that formed the scale for Infantry colonels. Therefore, Moscardó's RP in 1931 was 0.729 (=129/177). In 1932 the revision of promotions under the Republic resulted in

²⁶ The sample does not contain any case of one officer being promoted or demoted more than 2 ranks over two consecutive years.

officer Moscardó's demotion to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. He occupied the 14th position out of 160 Infantry Lieutenant Colonels. This implied a change in position between 1931 and 1932 equal to -1.271 (= -1-(1-0.729)). The (1-0.729) reflects the "fall" all over the Infantry Colonel scale. The "-1" (Moscardó's Δr between 1931 and 1932) reflects the punishment or economic and psychological costs of being demoted one rank. In 1933 Moscardó regained the rank of Colonel reaching the 67th position out of the 79 colonels on the scale. The resulting change in position between 1932 and 1933 equaled 1+0.0875. The 0.0875 reflect his progress in the Infantry Lieutenant Colonel scale (note that Moscardó's RP in 1932 was 14/160=0.0875). The "+1" (Moscardó's Δr between 1932 and 1933) represents Moscardó's promotion to the rank of Colonel. The RP in the 1933 scale for Infantry colonels was 0.848. In 1934, Moscardó maintained his rank of colonel and progressed to the 49th position in a year in which 71 officers formed the scale for Infantry colonels. Therefore Moscardó's RP in 1934 was 0.69. This implied a change in position in 1934 equal to 0.158 (=0.848-0.69).

I create the variable $\Delta \text{Position}_{i,1931-1936}$ to measure changes in relative officers' position during the Second Spanish Republic. $\Delta \text{Position}_{i,1931-1936}$ measures officer i's change in relative position during the Second Spanish Republic by aggregating the changes that officers experienced in each year between 1931 and 1936:

$$\text{Change position 1931-1936} = \Delta \text{Position}_{1931-1936}_i = \sum_{t=1931}^{t=1936} \Delta \text{Position}_{i,t,r,c}$$

4.3 *Africanista* Officers

In his study of the *africanista* group, Mas points out that "the majority of the [*africanista*] group was formed by officers who stayed many years in Morocco, Ifni or Sahara posted in *La Legión* [Spanish Foreign Legion], African regular Army, Marksmen, Nomads, Mehal-las, Police, Interventions, and so on"²⁷ (1988: 8-9). Balfour and La Porte defend a similar idea in their discussion of the military *Africanist* culture "in the course of the intermittent wars with the tribes of northern Morocco between 1909 and 1927, a new military culture called *Africanismo* was forged among an elite of colonial officers"

²⁷ "La mayoría del grupo en cuestión lo forman los Cuadros de Mando que permanecieron largos años en Marruecos, Ifni o Sahara o destinados en La Legión, Regulares, Tiradores, Nómadas, Mehal-las, Policía, Intervenciones, etc., es decir, en lo que genéricamente se llamaron Fuerzas Especiales".

(2000: 309). This elite excluded some of the officers posted to Africa “who had not volunteered to fight in, but had been posted to Morocco, and for whom military intervention there had little ideological or political appeal” (Balfour and La Porte 2000: 313). In the same line but more generally, Navajas affirms that “regular and Foreign Legion forces were the core of military africanism” (2011:66). In all these definitions, the *africanista* faction is restricted to a subset of those officers posted to Africa between 1909 and 1927. Following these definitions of the *africanista* military factions, Military yearbooks between 1911 and 1927 are used to construct a variable called “Years Core Africa (1910-1927)” that measures the number of years that active officers in July 1936 had spent posted to the special forces of the Spanish Protectorate between 1911 and 1927.²⁸ The special units permanently posted to the Spanish Protectorate in Africa comprised the Spanish Foreign Legion (*Tercio de Extranjeros*), the Native Regulars (*Grupos de Fuerzas Regulares Indígenas*), the Mehal.las, the Harkas, the Native Police (*Policía Indígena*), and African Military Intervention.²⁹

4.4 Other Officers’ Individual Covariates

Information on the 1936 Spanish military yearbook is used to get information on officers’ corps, rank, and tenure (computed as the difference between 1936 and officer’s year of entry in the Army). Engel provides additional information on officers’ military division³⁰, garrison in July 1936, the area where the officer was during the coup (republican or rebel-controlled area), and the city where the officer was when the coup broke out in July 1936. Information on officers’ garrison and their location is used to

²⁸ The first special forces of the Spanish Army in Africa were created in 1911.

²⁹ Despite the fact that almost the entire troops of the Mehal.las, Harkas or Native Regulars were formed by African soldiers, the great majority of their officers were Spanish.

³⁰ Spain was divided in eight military divisions plus Balearic Islands and Canary Islands. The first divisions included the provinces of Madrid, Toledo, Cuenca, Ciudad Real, Badajoz, and Guadalajara; the second, Seville, Huelva, Cádiz, Córdoba, Málaga, Granada, Almería, and Jaén; the third, Valencia, Alicante, Albacete, Murcia, and Castellón; the fourth, Barcelona, Tarragona, Llerida, and Gerona; the fifth, Zaragoza, Huesca, Soria, and Teruel; the sixth, Burgos, Navarre, Guipúzcoa, and Logroño; the seventh, Valladolid, Zamora, Salamanca, Avila, Segovia, and Cáceres; finally, the eighth division comprised Coruña, Lugo, Orense, Pontevedra, Oviedo, and León. The African territories formed a separate military administrative entity. I divide the Spanish possessions in Africa in seven regions: Western district (formed by Tetuán, Xauen, Ceuta, Larache, Arcila, and Alcazar), Eastern district (Melilla, Chafarinas Islands, Rock of Velez, and Rock of Alhucemas), Rif, Ifni, Jubu Cape, Río de Oro, and Gulf of Guinea. The thirteen officers in the Gulf of Guinea are excluded from the later empirical analysis because all rebelled.

create a dummy “Leader” that takes the value 1 for the officer(s) in the garrison holding the highest rank and 0 for the rest.

The dummy variable “Assault Guard” takes the value 1 for those officers recruited from different corps to be part of the Assault Guard and 0 for the others.

Finally, the dummy variable “Worse prospects after 1931” identifies those officers with worse professional prospects after the rank of lieutenant general was eliminated in 1931. It takes the value 1 for officers that held the rank of Major or higher in 1931 and 0 for the rest.

4.5 Summary Statistics

Table 2 shows the summary statistics for the whole country. On average, officers had been around twenty two years in the Army³¹ and 92% of them were posted to a garrison in July 1936. The remaining 8% were sick, injured, arrested or awaited a destination. 8% of officers were leaders or held the highest rank in the garrison when the coup took place.³² When looking at the distribution by corps, Infantry was the largest with 41% of officers in the sample. Artillery (18%), Engineers (8%), and Cavalry (8%) followed. One third of the sample stayed posted to Africa for at least one year. On average, officers spent a quarter of a year posted to special African units.³³ As it relates to professional evolution during the Second Republic, on average officers improved their relative position by 0.85 between 1931 and 1936. That is, the average official had a positive evolution in the scale within his rank (because $0.85 > 0$) but did not promote to a higher rank between 1931 and 1936 (because $0.85 < 1$). Finally, 12% of officers in the sample held a rank of Major or higher in 1931 and then had worse career prospects when the rank of Lieutenant General was eliminated in 1931.

Table 3 presents summary statistics for officers in rebel-controlled and republican-controlled areas separately (see Figure 1 for the geographical limits of each area). On average, areas under republican control had more experienced officers (average tenure of 23 years against 21.5) with a higher rank.³⁴ Rebel areas had more officers posted than

³¹ The date of entry in the Army marks the moment in which the officer entered the military academy. Studies in the academy usually took five years and then the officer passed to the scale (Ruiz Vidondo, 2004). This explains the minimum value of 5 for the variable “tenure” in the sample.

³² In July 1936 some garrisons were awaiting the designation of a new leader.

³³ If we focus on the 1335 officers that spent at least one year posted to special African units, the average stay in Africa was slightly above two years.

³⁴ The nine ranks shown at Table 1 are given a number that increases with their position in the military hierarchy.

republican areas, where 9.2% of officers awaited destination or were not ready to serve. When looking at the composition by corps, General Staff, Engineers, Aviation, Frontier Guards, Transportation, and Civil Guard were more present in republican areas; whereas officers from Artillery, Infantry and Cavalry were relatively more numerous in areas under rebel control. Officers in rebel-controlled areas spent more years posted to special African units than officers in areas under republican control.³⁵ Finally, a greater proportion of officers in republican areas were negatively affected by the elimination of the rank of Lieutenant General. Nevertheless, officers in republican-controlled areas also benefited from greater improvements in their relative position between 1931 and 1936.

The most relevant statistic relates to the split of the Army between rebel and republican officers. Despite the distribution of officers between areas under republican and rebel control was relatively equal (48.22% and 51.78% respectively, see Table 4) 80% of officers in the sample supported the coup against the Second Spanish Republic. This result is at odds with any theory that emphasizes the importance of factions and conflicts of interests within the Army but obscures an important difference in the distribution of affiliations shown in Table 4: 93.11% of officers in rebel-controlled areas aligned with the rebel Army, whereas in areas under republican control the distribution was more even (35% officers remained loyal to the Republic and 65% rebelled). The literature does not provide an explanation for this difference. Here it is argued that the different behavior of officers in each area was due to authorities' different response in each area.

In a law passed on July 18 (the day after the coup started in the Spanish African territories), the republican government in Madrid issued a law stating that “all the troops in which officers have positioned themselves against republican legality are discharged”³⁶. Manuel Azaña, President of the Republic when the coup broke out, commented on the intentions and effects of the law:

“Aiming at leaving the leaders of the coup without troops, the government freed all soldiers from obeisance to their superiors. Obviously, this decree was not followed in those cities already under rebel control, but it applied to important towns under republican command (Madrid, Barcelona, Cartagena, Valencia, and so on). Soldiers

³⁵ When focusing only on officers that spent at least one year in special African units, officers in rebel areas spent 2.16 years against 2 years for officers in republican-controlled areas.

³⁶ *Gaceta de Madrid*, n. 201, July 19, 1936, p. 201.

abandoned the garrisons and almost everyone went back home”³⁷ (2011: 55-6, translation is mine).

In other words, officers in areas under republican authority had some freedom and time to decide their side in the conflict.

The situation in rebel-controlled areas was very different. Since the early stages of the planning of the coup, the putschists seek to establish strong discipline and meticulous repression of opposing forces. While organizing the coup in April 1936, General Emilio Mola Vidal issued a series of secret orders that called for extreme violence to shock and intimidate loyal republican opposition. In another secret instruction dictated on the 20th of June (three days after the coup broke out in Africa), Mola declared that “the timid and the hesitant should be warned that he who is not with us is against us and will be treated as an enemy” (Preston, 2012:132).³⁸ The prescription was rapidly put into practice in the areas that fell under rebel control after the first hours or days of the coup. On the night of 17 July, only hours after the coup started, the rebels shot 225 soldiers and civilians in Morocco (Preston, 2012:133). In Cádiz, the first region of southern Andalucía that rebels controlled one day after the coup started, General Queipo del Llano issued an edict on 18 July decreeing that anyone who opposed the rising would be shot. In the northern mainland under rebel control, General Mola followed a similar logic when instructing the authorities in the area: “It is necessary to spread terror. We have to create the impression of mastery, eliminating without scruples or hesitation all those who do not think as we do” (Preston, 2012: 179). Officers in rebel controlled areas could hardly escape to the climate of terror, coercion, and strict discipline that the putschists created (see, for example, Navajas, 2011: 163-197).

The dynamics of the coup can be summarized in a three-stage sequence. In the first stage, the coup against the military republican authorities is attempted by a small group of generals and high-ranking officers. In those areas where the coup was successful, the second stage involved rebel authorities taking control of the area and imposing their coercive military government; in those areas where the coup failed, republican authorities controlled the region and issued the law discharging the troops.

³⁷ “El gobierno desligó de la obediencia a sus jefes a todos los soldados, pensando dejar sin tropas a los directores del movimiento. Este decreto, naturalmente, no fue obedecido en las ciudades ya dominadas por los militares, pero sí en las importantes plazas en poder del gobierno (Madrid, Barcelona, Cartagena, Valencia, etcétera). Los soldados abandonaron los cuarteles y casi todos se marcharon a sus casas”.

³⁸ Mola’s instruction was mainly addressed to civil repression, but, as Rivero points out, “it is likely that Mola had specific military units in mind that may remain loyal to the government” (2013: 25).

Finally, in the last stage, officers chose their side in the conflict given their personal preferences and the degree of coercion imposed by authorities in the region in the second stage.

5 Main Regression and Results

5.1 Determinants of Officers' Decision: Main Regression

The impact that republican military reforms had on officers' affiliation in the Civil War is estimated through the following probit regression:

$$\text{Prob}(\text{Rebel}_i=1)=\Phi(\beta_0+\beta_1 S_i+\beta_2 C_i+\beta_3 A_i+\beta_4 \Delta P_i+\beta_5 WP_i+\beta_6 X_i)+\varepsilon_i$$

Where:

S_i = Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if officer i was in an area under rebel control on July 22 and 0 otherwise.

C_i = Officer i 's corps.

A_i = Number of years that officer i spent posted to a special unit of the Spanish Army in Africa between 1910 and 1927.

ΔP_i = Change of position for officer i between 1931 and 1936.

WP_i = Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if officer i had the rank of Major or higher in 1931 and 0 otherwise.

X_i = Officer i 's additional covariates (rank, tenure, military division, and dummy for being posted or leader of the garrison).

5.2 Results for the Whole Country and Geographic Areas under Republican and Rebel control

Table 5 presents probit marginal effects for the regression of the whole country. Results indicate that officers with higher rank and lower tenure were more likely to revolt. This result is at odds with Puell de la Villa statement that “the greater the rank, and therefore the familiar charges, the greater the resistance to support the conspiracy”³⁹ (2012:92). The result is still consistent with rational economic behavior: risk aversion motives meant low-rank officers were less likely to revolt due to their greater inability to

³⁹ “(...) cuanto mayor era el empleo, y por tanto las cargas familiares, mayor fue la resistencia a embarcarse en la conspiración”

cope with an eventual failure. In general, officers with lower rank had lower wealth than high-rank officers and were less able to cope with the negative shock that would result if the coup failed.

When looking at the results by corps, the coefficients only provide partial confirmation for the hypothesis derived in section 3.2.1 about corps loyalty to the Republic given the impact of Azaña's reforms: Infantry and Cavalry were not significantly more likely to revolt than Artillery (the reference variable for corps in the regression) or Engineers. Aviation has the expected negative sign meaning that aviators were 14.6 points less likely to revolt than Artillerymen, Engineers or Cavalrymen. Frontier Guards (police in charge of the frontiers and fighting fraud and smuggling) were also significantly less likely to revolt against the Second Spanish Republic. Some scholars have argued that officers from General Staff corps were more involved in conspiracies against the Republic (Navajas, 2011: 96). The results do not support that claim. One result that is often mentioned and that is confirmed by the data is the greater loyalty of officers in the Assault Guard, to the republican government. Members of these units were on average 22 points less likely to revolt.

In line with the discussion in section 3, officers in rebel-controlled areas are found to be 21 points more likely to rebel against the Second Spanish Republic. Results are also supportive of the idea that officers were responsive to changes in their career prospects. The coefficient for "Change Position 1931-1936" indicates that for each rank that officers advanced between 1931 and 1936, the likelihood to rebel in 1936 decreases in 1.5 points.

Results for the whole country are weak for supporting significant relationships between officers' chosen side and republican military policies or factions in the Army. Given the different scenario that officers faced in rebel and republican areas, separate results for each area are shown in Tables 6 and 7. The different dynamics of the coup in the two territories is confirmed. In areas under rebel control (Table 6), only tenure and some corps variables have a significant impact on officers' affiliation: as in the regression for the whole country, the republic could count on greater loyalty from Infantry, Aviation, Frontier Guards, and Assault Guards. Transportation and Civil Guard were also (weakly) less likely to support the coup. The impact of Azaña's military policies does not have any significant influence on officers' behavior in rebel-controlled areas. *Years*

in Core Africa, however, show a surprising (even if relatively small) negative and significant sign indicating that *africanista* officers were 0.8 points less likely to revolt.

The significant relationship between republican military policies and officers' chosen side found for the whole country are mainly driven by officers' behavior in republican-controlled areas. Table 7 shows the results for officers' in areas under republican control and constitute the main result of the paper: aviation and Assault Guards remained significantly more loyal to the Republic but Artillerymen and Engineers are not found to be more loyal than Infantrymen or Cavalrymen. Contrary to rebel-controlled areas, in areas under republican control Azaña's military reforms had a significant impact on officers' chosen side. Change of position between 1931 and 1936 has a negative sign implying that officers with a negative change of position (demoted officers) were more likely to revolt: for each rank that officers lost (advanced) between 1931 and 1936, the probability to revolt increased (decreased) by 3.1 points. Moreover, the elimination of the rank of Lieutenant General in 1931 also had a significant impact in the expected direction: those officers that in 1931 held a rank of Major and higher and had worse career prospects after the top rank in the Army was eliminated were 6 points more likely to revolt.

In summary, the results are suggestive of a significant impact of republican military policies in republican-controlled areas, where officers were subject to less coercion and had greater freedom to reveal their preferences when choosing their side in the conflict: factions or officers that won with the reforms (i.e. those that, like *peninsulares*, were less affected by the revisions of promotions and could keep their position on the scale or improve it when others were demoted) were more likely to support the Republic in 1936. Those officers hit by demotions in 1931 or 1933 and those that lost with the elimination of Lieutenant Generals were more likely to revolt.

When analyzing Azaña's revisions of promotions the literature usually emphasizes that affected officers "were prominently in both sides during the Civil War"⁴⁰ (Alpert, 2006: 140; translation is mine). Conventional wisdom neglects the importance that revisions of promotions had in determining officers' affiliation in July 1936. After controlling for other variables, the results in Table 7 suggest a different story. Officers cared about

⁴⁰ "Muchos de estos 500 militares [afectados por las revisiones de las promociones] figurarían relevantemente en ambos bandos durante la guerra civil"

their evolution on the scale and the promotions they received. By hindering officers' progress on the scale or leading to demotions of a rank, early republican military reforms increased the likelihood of revolt for those officers whose promotions were revised and then cancelled.

5.3 *Africanista* Officers and the Revision of Promotions

Previous results confirm the influence that changes on the scale had on officers' affiliation but do not provide any direct link between the *africanista* faction and officers' affiliation during the coup. Indeed, the variable "Years in Core Africa (1910-1927)" is not significant for the whole country or republican-controlled area. The small negative coefficient in areas under rebel control does not have a ready interpretation. Contrary to the intuition in the literature, results suggest that spending more years posted to a special African unit between 1910 and 1927 is not associated with greater probability to rebel in 1936. The closing of the General Military Academy directed by General Franco or the alleged anti-republican *africanista* culture that are often invoked to explain *africanistas'* aversion towards Azaña and his republican government (see for example Balfour and La Porte, 2000) did not increase *africanistas'* propensity to revolt when compared to *peninsular* peers.

However, the importance of officers' change of position offers an indirect link between Azaña's reforms and *africanista* officers' attitude vis-à-vis the Second Spanish Republic. Table 8 runs a regression to determine the factors that influenced officers' change of position between 1931 and 1933 (years of republican-socialist government with Azaña as Minister of the War) and Table 9 performs a similar regression for the 1934-1936 period in which Spain had a series of center-right governments opposed to the 1931-1933 coalition and the *Frente Popular* that ruled in July 1936.⁴¹ Dependent variable in Table 8 is the sum of $\Delta\text{Position}_{i,t,r,c}$ for the years 1932, 1933, and 1934. Dependent variable in Table 9 adds $\Delta\text{Position}_{i,t,r,c}$ for the years 1935 and 1936.

The negative coefficient for "Years in core Africa (1910-1927)" in Table 8 shows that between 1931 and 1933, officers who spent more years in African special units progressed less on the scale. Table 9 shows that this effect does not exist for the 1934-

⁴¹ Given that the variable *tenure* measures the time passed between officer's year of entry in the Army and 1936, it can be used to control for officers' seniority in the Army either in 1931-1933 or in 1933-1935.

1935 period and is even reversed: when center-right governments ruled, *africanista* officers had greater positive changes in their position. For each year posted to a special African unit, relative position between 1934 and 1936 improved by 0.059. In other words, results suggest that the *africanista* faction did significantly worse during Azaña's mandate as Minister of the War.

Azaña's main measure affecting officers' rank and position on the scale was the revision of promotions in 1931 and 1933. *Africanista* officers' poor performance during Azaña's mandate could be in part due to the revisions of promotions during Azaña's term as Minister of the War. Table 10 explores this possibility by showing the average marginal effects of a probit regression in which the dependent variable ("Lost position in 1931 or 1933") identifies the officers affected by the revision of promotions. "Lost position" takes the value 1 when the officer lost a rank or worsened his absolute position on the scale in 1931 or 1933 and 0 otherwise. Tenure, rank and corps in 1931, and years posted to a special African unit are used as independent variables to explain the likelihood of being affected by Azaña's revisions of promotions. Results show that for each year posted to special African units, the probability of being affected by the revisions of promotions increased by 0.017. Officers posted more years to African special units were more likely to suffer a loss of position or demotion in 1931 or 1933 after promotions by combat merit and selection were revised. The Appendix shows that almost one third of *africanistas'* worst professional progress between 1931 and 1933 can be explained by the revisions of promotions. The remaining two thirds can be attributed to other unexplained discriminations against the *africanista* faction.

In his study of the Spanish Army, Navajas claims that the importance of the *africanista* faction and his impact on the Spanish Army in 1936 has been overstated for three reasons: the African wars had finished well before 1936 (in 1927), some *africanista* officers had also belonged to the peninsular faction and only later became *africanistas*, and there were no significant ideological differences between *peninsulares* and *africanistas* (2011: 110). The importance of self-interest in determining officers' support to *africanista* demands for promotions by combat merit has already been explained and the non-significance of the variable "Years Core Africa (1910-1927)" to determine officers' side in July 1936 is consistent with *peninsulares* and *africanistas* sharing similar culture or ideology. Concerning the importance of African wars before 1927 and

africanista officers’ incentive to rebel in 1936, results in this and previous sections suggest a different conclusion. Combats against Moroccan tribes led to promotions by combat merit during Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship that were revised (and often cancelled) by Azaña between 1931 and 1933. *Africanista* officers were significantly hit by these revisions and the resulting demotions and section 5.1 shows that there was a negative relationship between changes in rank or positions on the scale and the probability to revolt. Therefore, *africanista* officers had greater incentives to rebel against Azaña’s Popular Front than *peninsulares*. Rather than guided by ideology or any particular military culture, the involvement of *africanista* officers in the 1936 military coup can be linked to the negative impact that revision of promotions in 1931 and 1933 had on their careers, professional prospects and the economic rents that were attached.

5.4 Addressing Problems with Africanista Culture

The impact that revising promotions had on *africanista* officers could have been deliberate: if the *africanista* faction shared some unobservable ideological characteristic that made them politically dangerous for the Republic and the republican-socialist coalition in power between 1931 and 1933, Azaña’s reforms could have targeted *africanista* officers to reduce their importance in the Army by revising their promotions and lowering their position on the scale and their rank. In that case, the positive relationship found between change of position in 1931 and 1936 could be driven by Azaña’s deliberate attempt to target political rivals in the Army between 1931 and 1933. Balfour and La Porte make a similar point when they point out that

“The vast majority of Africanist officers, irrespective of their tendency, joined the uprising of July 1936. Above and beyond their shared military culture, they were united around a common political culture characterized by authoritarianism and a right-wing mythology of patriotism (...).” (2000: 319)

In order to isolate the effect of changes of position and rank from other ideological unobservable variables, I use two alternative measures of an officer’s change of position in the Second Spanish Republic: change of position between 1934 and 1936⁴² and change of position between 1934 and 1936 excluding the sergeants promoted to the rank of *alférez* by the law of December 5, 1935.

⁴² Change position 1934-1936 = $\Delta \text{Position}_{i,1934-1936} = \sum_{t=1935}^{1936} \Delta \text{Position}_{i,r,t,c}$

Using change of position between 1934 and 1936 has one important advantage with respect to the dummy for being demoted in 1931 or 1933. Between January 1934 and December 1935, the Republic was ruled by a series of center-right governments that held opposite views than the previous republican-socialist coalition or the government of the *Frente Popular* that followed in 1936. There is an abundance of anecdotal evidence pointing to the reversal in military policy between January 1934 and December 1935 with respect to Azaña's previous mandate. Cardona summarizes Hidalgo's policy as head of the Minister of War between January and November 1934 as an attempt to detract from Azaña's reforms and benefit some of the former minister's enemies (1983: 198). Moreover, José María Gil Robles, the main figure of the leading republican conservative party and Minister of the War between May and December 1935, reviewed his term in the Ministry as follows: "I relieved many officers of their post, I deprived of command many officers that did not deserve such responsibility and, consequently, I purged the Army from clearly undesirable elements" (1968: 238). The "clearly undesirable elements" could have been Azaña's loyal officers⁴³, even if Gil Robles adds that "not a single sanctioned officer could point to arbitrariness or present himself as the victim of an ideological prosecution"⁴⁴.

It is possible that Mr. Gil Robles' claim are true and promotion and changes of position between January 1934 and December 1935 were made through the channels of seniority and study that the law of May 1932 established (see section 3.2.2). However, if there was any bias at all it should be in favor of sectors of the Army that were contrary to Azaña' party and therefore more likely to rebel against the government of the Popular Front in July 1936. If anything, one should expect a *positive* bias in the effect that the coefficient of change of position between 1934 and 1936 had over the probability to revolt in 1936.

Results in Columns 1, 3, and 5 of Table 11 show that changes of position between 1934 and 1936 have a negative influence on the likelihood to revolt in the whole country (Column 1) and republican-controlled areas (Column 3). In other words, those officers

⁴³ That's Cardona's interpretation when he states that under Gil Robles' mandate "notorious *africanista* and peninsular conspirators replaced liberals and republicans" (Cardona, 1983: 212).

⁴⁴ "Ordené la disponibilidad de numerosos jefes y oficiales, privé del mando a muchos que no lo merecían y depuré, en consecuencia, de elementos claramente indeseables a gran parte del Ejército. Ni uno solo de ellos pudo, sin embargo, alegar arbitrariedad en la medida sancionadora, ni presentarse como víctima de una persecución por motivos ideológicos."

with greater (lower) increase in their position of the scale or rank were less (more) likely to revolt in republican-controlled areas. This confirms our previous finding that negative shocks on scale position or rank increased the likelihood of revolt. Coefficient for promotions between 1934 and 1936 is equal to zero in rebel-controlled areas (Column 5).

Columns 2, 4, and 6 in Table 11 take one further step to isolate the impact of change of position between 1934 and 1936 from unobservable “ideological” variables. In a law passed in December 1935, many sergeants were promoted to the rank of *Alférez* and appear in the 1936 military yearbook as “Alférez (law December 5, 1935)”⁴⁵. Some scholars argue that non-commissioned officers like sergeants had different mentality than commissioned officers (Puell de la Villa, 2012: 96). Furthermore, Azaña’s policies greatly improved the situation of non-commissioned officers between 1931 and 1933 (Cardona, 1983: 200). It is possible then that those sergeants promoted to *alférez* in December 1935 shared some ideological bias in favor of the Republic or Azaña’s *Frente Popular* in July 1936. In order to avoid this potential bias, I run a regression with changes of position between 1934 and 1936 that excludes all the sergeants promoted to the rank of “Alférez (Law of December 1935)”. Results are shown in Table 11 for the whole country (Column 2), areas under republican control (Column 4), and rebel-controlled areas (Column 6). Results are not substantially different. The positive relationship between improving the position on the scale and remaining loyal to the Second Spanish Republic in July 1936 still exists and is significant for areas under republican control.

5.5 Robustness Checks

By using a probit model, our main specification assumes that errors are normally distributed. Other possibilities when having a binary dependent variable are the logit model (which assumes that errors follow a logistic distribution) and Ordinary Least Squares (Linear Probability Model, LPM). Table 12 compares previous results for probit average marginal effects for the entire country, republican-controlled areas, and areas under rebel control (Columns 1, 4, and 7 respectively) with results using a Linear Probability Model (Columns 2, 5, and 8) or a Logit model (for which average marginal effect are shown in columns 3, 6, and 9). Signs, significance and magnitude do not suffer important changes across specifications.

⁴⁵ The sample contains 2166 officers (18.72%) with the rank “alférez (ley de 5 de diciembre de 1935)”.

Table 13 explores alternative definitions or specifications for variables used in baseline regressions for the whole country (reproduced in Column 1), republican-controlled areas (Column 5), and areas under rebel control (Column 9). Column 2, 6, and 10 shows the results for a regressions with officers that Engel (2008) attributes a “pure label” (either, clearly republican or clearly rebel). The 536 geographical loyal officers (both republican and rebel) are eliminated from the sample. Additionally, 36 officers for whom Engel expressed some doubts when classifying them as rebels or republicans and the 61 officers affected by Varela’s law are also excluded. The final subsample contains 11,187 officers. Results do not show any relevant change in the statistical significance, sign and magnitude of the coefficients for the whole country (Column 2) or areas under republican and rebel control taken separately (Columns 6 and 10 respectively).

An alternative definition for the variable $\Delta \text{Position}_{i,t,r,c}$ is explored in Columns 3, 7, and 11 of Table 13. The variable $\Delta \text{Position}_{i,t,r,c}$ measures changes in officers’ relative position for two years to account for his change in the rank scale, rank promotions, and rank demotions. The use of officers’ relative position might be problematic given the important reductions in the size of the scale of the Army between 1931 and 1932. One of the goals of Azaña’s military reforms was to reduce the excess of officers in the Spanish Army. In April 1931, Azaña passed a law allowing voluntary retirement from the Army with full pay. The policy was very successful in reducing the size of the Spanish Army because in 1932 between 8,000 and 8,200 officers (out of 20,576) had retired (Alpert, 2008: 99). $\Delta \text{Position}_{i,t,r,c}$ reflects the change of $\text{RP}_{i,t,r,c}$ between $t-1$ a t , a discrete time framework. In continuous time, $\Delta \text{Position}_{i,t,r,c}$ for those officers keeping the same rank between two consecutive periods is equal to the total differential of $\text{RP}_{i,t,r,c}$, (i.e. $d\text{RP}_{i,t,r,c}$):

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \text{RP}_{i,t,r,c}}{\partial \text{Position}_{i,t,r,c}} \cdot d\text{Position}_{i,t,r,c} + \frac{\partial \text{RP}_{i,t,r,c}}{\partial \text{Total_officers}_{t,r,c}} \cdot d\text{Total_officers}_{t,r,c} &= d\text{Position}_{i,t,r,c} \\ - \frac{\text{Position}_{i,t,r,c}}{\text{Total_officers}_{t,r,c}} \cdot d\text{Total_officers}_{t,r,c} &= d\text{Position}_{i,t,r,c} - \text{RP}_{i,t,r,c} \cdot d\text{Total_officers}_{t,r,c} \end{aligned}$$

Where $\frac{\partial x}{\partial y}$ indicates the partial derivative of x with respect to y , and dx stands for change in variable x .

The previous result shows that $d\text{RP}_{i,t,r,c} < 0$ if

$$d\text{Position}_{i,t,r,c} < \text{RP}_{i,t,r,c} \cdot d\text{Total officers}_{t,r,c} \quad (1)$$

In other words, when an officer *progresses* on the scale while keeping his rank (that is, $-1 < d\text{Position}_{i,t,r,c} < 0$) and there is a reduction in total officers on the scale ($d\text{Total officers}_{t,r,c} < 0$) such that (1) holds, the resulting change in officer's relative position will be *negative*, meaning that he worsened his relative position within the scale for rank r in corps c . Using change in relative position implicitly assumes that the officer only cares about his relative position on the scale. Progresses in absolute positions that still results in a negative change in officers' relative positions are taken as (relative) demotions on the scale. This could be exaggerating officers' computational sophistication when evaluating their changes of position on the scale. For those officers that, between $t-1$ and t , kept the same rank and experienced both a negative $\Delta \text{Position}_{i,t,r,c}$ and an improvement in his absolute position on the scale, I calculate an alternative measure

$$\Delta \text{Position2}_{i,t,r,c} = \frac{\text{Position}_{i,t-1,r,c}}{\text{Total officers}_{t-1,r,c}} - \frac{\text{Position}_{i,t,r,c}}{\text{Total officers}_{t-1,r,c}}$$

$\Delta \text{Position2}_{i,t,r,c}$ measures the difference between officers' relative position in $t-1$ and his relative position in t , had the number of officers on the scale in t remained unchanged with respect to $t-1$. $\Delta \text{Position2}_{i,t,r,c}$ will be greater than 0 for any officer that improved his absolute position on the scale. This assumes that officers' perceived improvements in absolute position as something positive (maybe because it advanced them to the top of the scale where they were eligible to be promoted to the next rank) independent of the resulting change in their relative position. $\Delta \text{Position2}_{i,t,r,c}$ is also applied to those officers that experienced a positive change in their relative position despite worsening their relative position on the scale. Changes of position for the remaining officers in the sample are calculated according to the standard formula for $\Delta \text{Position}_{i,t,r,c}$ in section 4.2. Results show that the new computation of change of position does not alter the main finding for the coefficient linking changes of position to the probability of rebelling in 1936. The coefficient remains strongly significant for the whole country (Column 3) and republican controlled-areas (Column 7), keeps its negative sign and magnitude.

Columns 4, 8, and 12 in Table 13 measure officers' proximity to the *africanista* faction with a broader definition than the one used in the baseline specification. Rather than

considering only officers posted to special units in Africa, the variable “Years in Africa (1910-1927)” measures the number of years that each officer spent in *any* garrison or military unit posted to Africa between 1910 and 1927. This measurement of “africanism” is broader than the one used in section 5.2 which was restricted to officers posted to special African units. Results do not change for the whole country (Column 4) or republican-controlled areas (Column 8). The variable for years in Africa is not significantly different from zero. In areas under rebel control (Column 12) the coefficient passes from being significantly negative to being not significantly different from zero.

6 Hierarchy

Until this point, the study of officers’ alignment during the coup has implicitly assumed that officers simultaneously chose their side given their individual characteristics, the impact that Azaña’s military policies had on their careers, and the intensity of the coercion established by the authorities in the region. A final effect in which senior officers’ side influence subordinates’ choice could exist. In other words, after learning if the coup failed or succeeded and the type of coercion imposed by the authorities, officers might have waited for their superior’s decision before taking their side. This is particularly plausible in an organization that emphasized the importance of hierarchy from the academy onward (Puell de la Villa, 2012: 89) and where one of the main demands of officers reluctance to join the coup was that “orders to move must come through the proper channels from senior commanders” (Payne, 1971: 99). Salas also points out that “in garrisons where the decision [to rebel] was taken by the natural and legitimate leaders, success always accompanied their action: the units obeyed the orders and resistances (...) were defeated without problem”⁴⁶ (1973:92).

The study of hierarchy must confront two difficulties: the precise identification of the chain of command in the Spanish Army and determining officers’ geographical location when the coup broke out in July 1936.

In a complex organization with more than 15,000 active officers, determining the exact structure of the Spanish military is an arduous task that goes beyond the scope of this

⁴⁶ “En las guarniciones en las que la decisión partió de los jefes militares naturales y legítimos, el éxito acompañó invariablemente a su acción: sus unidades obedecieron sus órdenes y las resistencias (...) fueron vencidas con pocas dificultades”.

paper. Nevertheless, the army’s chain of command can be roughly approximated by using the basic division of the Spanish Army into divisions, brigades, and regiments (see Figure 2). The military’s central headquarters were in Madrid. The mainland army was divided into eight military divisions with the Balearic Islands, Canary Islands, and African territories constituting three additional military regions. At the top of each division or military region a Major General commanded the brigades and the other troops posted to the division. Brigades were led by Brigadier Generals who commanded two regiments. Other troops in the division were the Engineers units (typically led by a colonel in the Engineers Headquarters), the Civil Guard (led by a general and subdivided in *tercios* and *comandancias*), and the Frontier Guards (which were divided in *comandancias*). Two corps (Aviation and Assault Guard) were under the authority of central commands in Madrid. There were also Catalan special units (*mossos* and *somatenes*, and Catalan municipal police forces) and Basque ones (e.g. *miñones* and *migueletes*).

The second difficulty arises because, when the military coup broke out on July 1936, many officers had abandoned their garrisons and were on summer leave. Engel (2008) provides information for those officers that were known to be out of their garrisons in July 1936. In order to assess the impact of hierarchy, the sample is restricted to those offices that were posted to a garrison (10,964 or 92.3% of the final sample). After excluding those officers for whom Engel provides information indicating that they were not at the garrison when the coup broke out, the final sample for the analysis of hierarchy is formed by 10,458 officers (or 95.3% of posted officers). The sample contains 791 military units (e.g. regiments, *comandancias*, or headquarters) with a total of 875 leaders (officer holding the highest rank in the garrison or the military unit).⁴⁷

The impact of hierarchy on officers’ side is measured through a dummy variable (“Follow”) that takes the value 1 when the leader of the garrison rebelled and 0 otherwise. For each leader i in a given garrison or military unit, “Follow” takes the value 1 if the leader of the unit above him (in other words, i ’s immediate superior) rebelled and 0 otherwise.⁴⁸ Given that Madrid, Catalan or Basque governments did not rebel, it is assumed that the ultimate authority for military units controlled by those governments remained loyal to the Republic.

⁴⁷ Some military units (e.g. those in which the leadership was vacant) held many officers that shared the highest rank in the unit.

⁴⁸ When the leadership of the garrison was vacant, the authority is assumed to rely on the leader of the garrison or military unit above.

Results introducing the impact of hierarchy in the main specification are shown in Table 14. The sample for regressions shown in Table 14 is restricted to posted officers that were in their garrisons when the coup broke out.⁴⁹ For the whole country (Column 1) the probability of rebelling increases by 7.4 points when the leader of the garrison or the officer commanding the superior military unit rebelled. Columns 2 and 3 of the table separate the sample geographically into the areas that remained republican and those that rebelled. The effect of hierarchy found for the whole country appears to be driven by officers' behavior in areas under republican control (Table 14 Column 2), where officers were 14.4 points more likely to revolt when senior officers supported the coup against the Republic. In the rebel area (Column 3), the leaders' behavior does not have a significant impact on subordinates' alignment. Despite the restriction of our sample to posted officers whose presence in the garrison can be determined, the remaining variables in the analysis do not suffer important changes in sign or significance with respect to regressions in Tables 5 to 7.

These results for the effect of hierarchy must be taken with caution given the rough approximation to the chain of command in the Army and the lack of precise individual information for all officers' geographical location in July 1936. Despite Engel's impressive effort to synthesize available information, there is no exhaustive study of each officer's geographical location during the coup. As the study of Spanish Civil War progresses and more data becomes available, it is possible that more officers are found to be outside the garrison in July 1936 due to summer leaves or other motives. Nevertheless, the coefficients for "Follow" are significant and large enough to suggest that, at least in the republican area, leaders' side had an impact on subordinates' alignment. The different dynamics of the coup in areas under rebel control reduced the hierarchical effect.

The analysis of hierarchy also adds to our previous discussion on the impact that demotions had on officers' alignment. In section 5.2., *africanista* officers were shown to be more likely to revolt against the Republic via the negative shock in their careers after promotions were revised. Table 15 analyzes the impact that some variables had on officers' rank in 1936. The dependent variable measures rank and goes from 1 (*alférez* after the 1935 Law, the lowest rank in the Spanish military) to 10 (corresponding to the

⁴⁹ Posted officers that Engel (2008) reported to be out of the garrison when the coup broke out are excluded from the sample because they were not under the direct authority of their superior.

highest rank held by the three Lieutenant Generals that remained in the Army). The positive coefficient associated with “Years Core Africa (1910-1927)” indicates that officers that were posted more years to special African units held higher ranks in 1936. This result is significant even controlling for tenure (years in the army) to account for the fact that *africanista* officers were likely to be older than other officers because they were already in the army before 1927. Therefore, the revisions of officers’ position had two channels that negatively affected officers’ loyalty to the Republic: first, it increased the likelihood of revolting for those officers whose position worsened and whose evolution on the scale was slowed down. Second, those officers more likely to be against the Republic could influence the alignment of an important number of officers, thanks to their higher rank and the hierarchical effect in officers’ decision. *Africanista* officers were more likely to act against the Republic through these two channels.

7 Counterfactual Policies and Impact on Officers’ Chosen Side

The previous results suggest that republican authorities’ military policy decision affected officers’ chosen side during the Civil War. Promotions or demotions of officers under the Republic significantly relate to officers’ likelihood to revolt against the Republic in two senses. First, if the rank of lieutenant general had not been eliminated in 1931, officers with the rank of major or higher in that year would not had worse promotion prospects and would have been more likely to support the Republic in 1936. Second, officers that promoted more rapidly during the Second Republic were less likely to revolt.

Table 16 shows the result from a regression that estimates the impact that revision of promotions had on officers’ change of position between 1931 and 1933. Results indicate that those officers whose position was revised in 1931 or 1933 saw their total change in relative position reduced by 0.421 with respect to officers not subject to the revisions. In other words, had Azaña not implemented the revision and cancellation of some promotions, those officers that did experience revisions would have improved their relative position by 0.421 for the 1931-1933 period.

Concerning the elimination of lieutenant generals, the coefficient of “Worse Prospects in 1931” in Table 7 suggests that holding rank constant, the probability of rebelling would have decreased by 0.06 for those officers that held the rank of Major or higher in 1931. A word of caution concerning the interpretation of the coefficient for the variable

“Worse Prospects in 1931” is needed. The variable is a dummy that takes the value 1 for officers having the rank of Major or higher in 1931 and 0 otherwise. Among Azaña’s military reforms usually mentioned in the literature, only the progressive elimination of the rank of Lieutenant Generals can be directly linked to the interests and prospects of the group identified by “Worse Prospects in 1931”. The dummy variable may, however, capture some other (unobservable) resentment or aversion towards Azaña’s republican coalition among the officers that held the highest ranks in 1931 and were still active in 1936. For the moment, the worse professional and economic prospects after the access to the rank of Lieutenant General disappeared, is the clearest explanation linking Azaña’s policies with 1931 high rank officers’ greater likelihood to revolt in July 1936.

In order to assess the distribution of officers in a counterfactual where Azaña did not cancelled promotions and kept the rank of lieutenant general, I proceed in two steps. First, I compute the change of position between 1931 and 1933 that would have occurred had officers not experienced revisions of promotions. The coefficients in tables 16 suggests that without revisions of promotions officers would have improved their change in relative position between 1931 and 1933 by 0.421. Table 7 shows that an increase of one unit in relative position between 1931 and 1936 decreased the probability of rebelling by 0.031. Combining both results, a world without revisions of promotions between 1931 and 1933 would have resulted in a decrease of 0.031×0.421 in the likelihood to revolt for those officers that suffered a revision of promotions and were in republican-controlled areas in 1936. Second, Table 7 also suggests that keeping the rank of lieutenant general would have decreased by 0.06 the probability to revolt for those officers that had the rank of Major or higher in 1931. Combining the two results it is possible to estimate officers’ probability to rebel in a scenario where promotions were not revised and the rank of lieutenant general was kept.

Predictions for officers’ probability to rebel in republican-controlled areas when using coefficients in Table 7 result in 1,070 officers remaining loyal to the Second Republic. The remaining 4645 officers are predicted to rebel. Using the counterfactual probabilities to rebel in a scenario without revisions of promotions and keeping the rank of lieutenant general, 1129 officers are predicted to remain loyal to the Republic. Therefore, the direct effect of the counterfactual policies is a 5.5% increase in officers being loyal to the Republic in republic-controlled areas.

An additional step is required to compute the total effect of the counterfactual scenario. Among the 59 officers that switched their predicted side as a direct consequence of the counterfactual policies, 31 (52.5%) held the highest rank in their garrison or military unit. Results in column 2 of Table 14 suggest that the hierarchical effect of leaders passing from rebelling to being loyal would be a 0.144 decrease in subordinates' probability to rebel. The inclusion of the hierarchical effect in the counterfactual for republican-controlled areas results in 1355 officers predicted to be loyal. In other words, the estimated total effect of the counterfactual policies equals to a 26.6% increase in loyal officers in areas under republican control with respect to the probabilities estimated with coefficients in Table 7.

How important could an increase in the number of officers who remain loyal to the Republic have been? Contest functions provide one means to perform a crude estimation of how the increase in loyal officers would have translated into greater probabilities to win the war for the Republic. Contest functions are used to compute players' probability to win in a contest. The probability of winning is usually assumed to be increasing with respect to one's effort and decreasing with respect to other players' effort (see Jia et al., 2012, for a review). One possibility to model the probability of winning the contest as function of efforts with two players is the logistic function:

$$p_1(e_1, e_2) = \frac{\exp(\mu e_1)}{\exp(\mu e_1) + \exp(\mu e_2)} = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(\mu(e_2 - e_1))} \quad (2)$$

Where $p_1(e_1, e_2)$ represents player 1's probability to win the contest and e_i stands for player i 's effort.

In the case of the Spanish Civil War, the two contestants were the rebel and the republican Army. The effort can be (roughly) approximated by using the quantity of officers on each side. The constant μ is assumed to be equal to 1.

The sample contains 2,356 loyal officers against 9,517 rebels. In other words, rebels counted with 80.16% of officers against 19.84% for the republican government. Using the shares of officers as a proxy for the effort of each side in (2), the contest function yields a probability of 0.3536 for the Republic winning the War.⁵⁰ Table 4 shows that

⁵⁰ The low probability of victory attributed to the Republic is due to the naïf measurement of the effort of the two contenders in the Spanish Civil War. Despite the republican government could only count with one fifth of total officers, it held control of the main industrial cities in mainland Spain. Furthermore,

1,969 out of the 5,715 officers in areas under republican control remained loyal to the Republic. The 26.6% increase in loyal officers estimated in the counterfactual would therefore result in 2,493 loyal officers and 3,222 rebel officers in republican-controlled areas. In the whole country, the distribution of officers would have been 2,880 loyal officers (24.26% of total) against 8,993 rebel officers (76.74%). Using the counterfactual shares of rebel and republican officers' in equation (2), the probability of the Republic winning the Civil War would have been 0.3741. In other words, the implementation of alternative military policies would have resulted in a 2.05 point increase in the probability of the Republic winning the War.

The computations for the distribution of officers in the counterfactual scenario reflect a partial equilibrium because they only take into account part of the effects of alternative military policies. The analysis does not consider how counterfactual promotions would impact careers after 1933 or the ones of officers non-affected by revisions between 1931 and 1933. Given that greater promotions in the counterfactual for officers that would have avoided revisions would reduce the possibilities to promote or would crowd-out other officers from enjoying promotions, the omission of these effects could result in an overestimation of the importance of counterfactual policies to reduce officers' likelihood to rebel. However, the counterfactual also omits other potential channels that could increase officers' loyalty towards the Republic. First, keeping the rank of lieutenant general would have increased the possibilities of upward mobility. With officers experiencing greater changes of position between 1931 and 1936, the likelihood to revolt would have been lower. Second, the hierarchical effects in the counterfactual are only computed within the garrison. The analysis omits the complex inter-garrison effect, that is, the impact that leaders that switch to be loyal in the counterfactual would have over leaders of subordinated garrisons or military units. All these two channels would result in an underestimation of the ability of counterfactual policies to reduce the number of rebel officers.

The counterfactual estimates are only presented as a way to get a handle on the question "how big" were the effects. The increase in the number of Republican officers by 26.6% seems like a large number, the increase in the probability that the Republic

during the first days of the Civil War rebels faced many problems to secure the supply of arms to the troops in the north of the Iberian Peninsula. The majority of the Navy and the Aviation remained loyal to the republic, so the transportation of rebel forces from Africa to mainland Spain was also very difficult during the first days of conflict (see Preston, 2007: 115-116). Mussolini and Hitler's help after August 1936 solved some of the most important logistic problems of the rebels.

would win the Civil War by 2% seems like a small number. The point of the empirical estimates, however, is not to show whether a different set of republican policies would have averted the rebellion or led to victory in the Civil War that followed. The point is to show that the Army did not respond to Republican policies in a monolithic way. Interest groups with different interests did exist in the Spanish Army in the early 1930s, and the way they responded to the coup in 1936 is, in part, explained by those different interests.

8 Conclusion

Traditional accounts of the Second Spanish Republic emphasize the role of radical leftist organizations or blocks of conservative economic and political elites (Army, Church, landowners...) to explain the sources of instability during the Second Spanish Republic. The paper has developed an alternative view that emphasizes the role and interests of elite factions to understand the failure to consolidate democracy in Spain. The new view is applied to the Spanish Army in order to show that the military was not a monolithic organization and that it was a relevant political player in its own right. When focusing on the behavior of officers in the Spanish Civil War, the paper shows that the republican military reforms performed between 1931 and 1933 had a significant influence on officers' choice of side. The aviation corps (which benefited from more independence and greater economic rewards) was more loyal to the republican government. Officers that experienced more rapid promotion between 1931 and 1936 were more likely to stay loyal to the Second Republic. Officers whose professional prospects were worse after the rank of lieutenant general was eliminated were more likely to rebel in July 1936. These effects are significant for officers in areas of mainland Spain that remained under republican control in the first days after the military coup that started the Civil war. In the areas that quickly fell to the rebels, 94% of officers joined the coup and factional and military reforms barely show any significant relationship to officers' chosen side. The different reaction of authorities in each area after the coup could be at the heart of officers' different behavior in rebel and republican-controlled areas. Rebel authorities immediately established a highly coercive regime whereas republican authorities freed soldiers from obedience to their superiors and therefore gave greater freedom to the officers to choose their side.

Contrary to the ideas widely argued about officers' behavior during the Spanish Civil War and the 1936 military coup, results are not consistent with the *africanista* faction

or infantry and cavalry officers being more likely to join the coup. The variable measuring officers' proximity to the *africanista* faction is not statistically different from zero for the country as a whole or for areas under rebel control, and the effect of being in the *africanista* faction is negative (even if small) for rebel-controlled areas. The *africanistas'* shared culture or ideology does not seem to have induced a greater support to the coup by the faction. However, the results show that *africanista* officers were negatively affected by the revisions of promotions that Azaña implemented between 1931 and 1933. This could be the reason behind *africanista* officers' lower change in position between 1931 and 1933 as compared to officers that were never posted to Africa. The trend disappears and is even reversed during the ruling of center-right governments (1934-1936), when members of the *africanista* faction had greater improvements in their position and rank than officers never posted to Africa between 1910 and 1927. Professional and economic prospects during the Second Republic seem more relevant than ideology or culture in explaining the likelihood of *africanista* officers to join the coup.

The results for the influence of hierarchy on officers' choice of side must be taken with caution until a detailed study of the chain of command in the Army and officer's exact location in July 1936 is available. The current results indicate that hierarchy was also a significant determinant of officers' behavior in republican-controlled areas. The fact that subordinates' tended to follow superiors' side and that *africanista* officers had higher ranks in the army (and therefore could command a higher number of troops) increases the importance of previous results relating the reforms of promotions and their negative impact on *africanistas'* incentives to support the Second Spanish Republic.

All in all, results suggest that the dynamics of the Second Republic and the 1936 military coup were more complex than the ideological block views that have dominated existing interpretations of the Republic's failed democratic experiment. The way republican military policies relate to officers' chosen side during the Civil War is in line with NWW's insights into the dynamics of developing societies and the mechanisms of elite formation. NWW explain that social orders in developing societies ("natural states" in their words) control violence forming elite coalitions through the creation of economic rents. The economic system is used to generate rents that are captured by elite factions that consequently find it in their interest to cooperate rather than fight.

Azaña's reforms of promotions, the elimination of ranks, or the changes in the rewards going to particular corps were policies that changed officers' professional prospects and affected the distribution of economic rents among the different factions that coexisted within the Spanish Army. The paper showed that, at least in areas under republican control, those factions and officers that won with the republican military reforms were more likely to remain loyal to the republican regime led by Azaña. Had Azaña not implemented the revision of promotions and kept the rank of Lieutenant General, the counterfactual estimation suggests that the Republic would have counted with 26% more officers in the areas they controlled after the coup. A rough estimation using basic contest functions indicate that the increase in loyal officers would have translated into a 2% increase in the likelihood of the republican army winning the Civil War.

By taking elites as non-monolithic organizations and studying the changes in the distribution of economic rents between factions during the Second Spanish Republic, the paper suggests an alternative view of an important period of Spanish history. During its brief existence, the Second Republic implemented an ambitious reform program that affected many aspects of the Spanish political and economic system. By increasing our understanding of the different factions and interests that coexisted within Spanish political and economic elites and the way republican reforms affected them, more light can be shed on the dynamics of the republican regime and the ultimate reasons of its failure to consolidate democracy in Spain. This paper is a first step towards a new perspective of the Second Spanish Republic from which both, the restless Spanish society and the countries undergoing processes of democratic consolidation, might derive useful lessons.

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Tables and Figures

Table 1. Ranks in the Spanish Army (1931-1936)

General Officers (GO)	[Lieutenant Generals (<i>Tenientes Generales</i>)] Eliminated in 1932 1. Major Generals (<i>Generales de División</i>) 2. Brigadier General (<i>Generales de Brigada</i>)
Senior Commissioned Officers (SCO)	3. Colonels (<i>Coroneles</i>) 4. Lieutenant Colonel (<i>Tenientes Coroneles</i>) 5. Major (<i>Comandante</i>)
Junior Commissioned Officers (JCO)	6. Captain (<i>Capitán</i>) 7. Lieutenant (<i>Teniente</i>) 8. Alférez


Table 2. Summary Statistics (Whole Country)

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Tenure	11870	22.26	8.48	5	59
Rank	11873	3.36	1.52	1	10
Leader	11873	0.07	0.26	0	1
Posted	11873	0.92	0.27	0	1
Military Districts					
Division 1	11836	0.22	0.42	0	1
Division 2	11836	0.11	0.31	0	1
Division 3	11836	0.08	0.28	0	1
Division 4	11836	0.09	0.29	0	1
Division 5	11836	0.06	0.23	0	1
Division 6	11836	0.09	0.29	0	1
Division 7	11836	0.07	0.26	0	1
Division 8	11836	0.08	0.27	0	1
Balearic Island	11836	0.04	0.19	0	1
Canary Island	11836	0.02	0.15	0	1
Western African District	11836	0.08	0.27	0	1
Eastern African District	11836	0.04	0.19	0	1
Rif	11836	0.01	0.07	0	1
Ifni	11836	0.00	0.05	0	1
Cape Juby	11836	0.00	0.04	0	1
Rio de Oro	11836	0.00	0.02	0	1
Gulf of Guinea	11836	0.00	0.03	0	1
Rebel Variables					
Rebel	11873	0.80	0.40	0	1
Rebel Area	11851	0.52	0.50	0	1
Corps					
General Staff	11873	0.02	0.14	0	1
Infantry	11873	0.41	0.49	0	1
Cavalry	11873	0.08	0.27	0	1
Engineers	11873	0.08	0.27	0	1
Artillery	11873	0.18	0.38	0	1
Aviation	11873	0.04	0.19	0	1
Frontier Guard	11873	0.06	0.24	0	1
Transportation	11873	0.01	0.09	0	1
Civil Guard	11873	0.12	0.32	0	1
Assault Guard	11873	0.03	0.17	0	1
Factions and military policies					
Years Core Africa (1910-1927)	11873	0.24	0.83	0	13
Change position 1931-1936	11873	0.85	0.65	-2.78	3.09
Worse prospects after 1931	11873	0.12	0.32	0	1

Table 3. Summary Statistics (rebel and republican-controlled areas)

Variable	Rebel-Controlled Areas			Republican-Controlled Area			p-value (equal means)
	Observ.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Observ.	Mean	Std. Dev.	
Tenure	6133	21.5	8.34	5715	23.08	8.557	0
Rank	6136	3.25	1.486	5715	3.477	1.554	0
Leader	6136	0.07	0.262	5715	0.071	0.257	0.493
Posted	6136	0.94	0.242	5715	0.908	0.289	0
Military Districts							
Division 1	6119	0.02	0.135	5714	0.445	0.497	0
Division 2	6119	0.16	0.364	5714	0.058	0.234	0
Division 3	6119	0	0.054	5714	0.169	0.375	0
Division 4	6119	0	0.061	5714	0.19	0.393	0
Division 5	6119	0.1	0.302	5714	0.006	0.077	0
Division 6	6119	0.12	0.327	5714	0.065	0.247	0
Division 7	6119	0.13	0.341	5714	0.004	0.066	0
Division 8	6119	0.13	0.336	5714	0.024	0.154	0
Balearic Island	6119	0.04	0.198	5714	0.031	0.173	0.003
Canary Island	6119	0.04	0.204	5714	0.001	0.035	0
Western African District	6119	0.15	0.359	5714	0.003	0.056	0
Eastern African District	6119	0.07	0.262	5714	0.001	0.03	0
Rif	6119	0.01	0.103	5714	0	0	0
Ifni	6119	0	0.064	5714	0	0	0
Cape Juby	6119	0	0.051	5714	0.001	0.023	0.004
Rio de Oro	6119	0	0.026	5714	0	0	0.045
Gulf of Guinea	6119	0	0.046	5714	0	0.013	0.002
Rebel Variables							
Rebel	6136	0.94	0.242	5715	0.655	0.475	0
Corps							
General Staff	6136	0.02	0.125	5715	0.023	0.15	0.006
Infantry	6136	0.47	0.499	5715	0.359	0.48	0
Cavalry	6136	0.09	0.287	5715	0.073	0.26	0
Engineers	6136	0.06	0.241	5715	0.104	0.306	0
Artillery	6136	0.19	0.394	5715	0.161	0.367	0
Aviation	6136	0.03	0.155	5715	0.05	0.218	0
Frontier Guard	6136	0.05	0.214	5715	0.077	0.266	0
Transportation	6136	0.01	0.077	5715	0.012	0.109	0.001
Civil Guard	6136	0.09	0.291	5715	0.142	0.349	0
Assault Guard	6136	0.02	0.132	5715	0.045	0.208	0
Factions and military policies							
Years Core Africa (1910-1927)	6136	0.25	0.877	5715	0.215	0.776	0.013
Change position 1931-1936	6136	0.84	0.646	5715	0.871	0.658	0.008
Worse prospects after 1931	6136	0.1	0.301	5715	0.131	0.338	0

Figure 1. Rebel and Republican Areas (July 22, 1936)



Source: Preston (2012: 658)

Table 4. Officers' Side: Whole Country and by Area.

	Rebel Officers		Republican Officers		TOTAL	
Rebel-controlled Area	5,751	93.74%	384	6.26%	6,135	100%
	<i>60.57%</i>		<i>16.32%</i>		<i>51.78%</i>	
Republican-controlled Area	3,744	65.53%	1,969	34.47%	5,713	100%
	<i>39.43%</i>		<i>83.68%</i>		<i>48.22%</i>	
TOTAL	9,495	80.14%	2,353	19.86%	11,848	100%
	<i>100%</i>		<i>100%</i>		<i>100%</i>	

Table 5. Probit Average Marginal Effects for Being a Rebel (Whole Country).

VARIABLES	(1) rebel	(2) rebel	(3) rebel	(4) rebel	(5) rebel	(6) rebel
Officers' individual covariates						
Tenure	-0.008*** [0.001]	-0.008*** [0.001]	-0.008*** [0.001]	-0.008*** [0.001]	-0.008*** [0.001]	-0.008*** [0.001]
Posted	-0.003 [0.017]	-0.001 [0.014]	-0.007 [0.015]	-0.008 [0.015]	-0.010 [0.015]	-0.010 [0.015]
Rank	0.029*** [0.003]	0.028*** [0.003]	0.025*** [0.003]	0.026*** [0.003]	0.023*** [0.003]	0.022*** [0.004]
Leader	-0.101*** [0.015]	-0.102*** [0.015]	-0.068*** [0.015]	-0.068*** [0.015]	-0.064*** [0.015]	-0.066*** [0.015]
Area (Rebel Area = 1)		0.220*** [0.018]	0.209*** [0.016]	0.209*** [0.016]	0.209*** [0.016]	0.209*** [0.016]
Corps						
Cavalry			0.043* [0.022]	0.044** [0.022]	0.043* [0.022]	0.043* [0.022]
General Staff			0.006 [0.025]	0.005 [0.025]	0.000 [0.025]	-0.002 [0.025]
Infantry			-0.015 [0.017]	-0.013 [0.017]	-0.016 [0.017]	-0.016 [0.017]
Engineers			0.025 [0.024]	0.025 [0.024]	0.026 [0.024]	0.026 [0.024]
Aviation			-0.143*** [0.026]	-0.142*** [0.026]	-0.146*** [0.026]	-0.146*** [0.026]
Frontier Guard			-0.081*** [0.019]	-0.080*** [0.019]	-0.085*** [0.019]	-0.082*** [0.019]
Transportation			-0.160*** [0.027]	-0.160*** [0.027]	-0.177*** [0.028]	-0.178*** [0.029]
Civil Guard			0.004 [0.021]	0.005 [0.021]	0.004 [0.021]	0.006 [0.021]
Assault Guard			-0.219*** [0.026]	-0.219*** [0.026]	-0.221*** [0.026]	-0.220*** [0.026]
Africa and professional prospects						
Years in Core Africa (1910-1927)				-0.005 [0.005]	-0.005 [0.005]	-0.005 [0.005]
Change position 1931-1936					-0.015** [0.006]	-0.015*** [0.006]
Worse prospects after 1931						0.018 [0.015]

Table 5 (Continued)

Military region

Division 2	0.138***	-0.005	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008
	[0.025]	[0.026]	[0.021]	[0.021]	[0.020]	[0.020]
Division 3	-0.114***	-0.108***	-0.111***	-0.111***	-0.111***	-0.111***
	[0.025]	[0.024]	[0.021]	[0.021]	[0.021]	[0.021]
Division 4	-0.075***	-0.070***	-0.071***	-0.072***	-0.071***	-0.071***
	[0.023]	[0.022]	[0.018]	[0.018]	[0.018]	[0.018]
Division 5	0.217***	0.011	-0.003	-0.003	-0.004	-0.003
	[0.029]	[0.031]	[0.027]	[0.027]	[0.027]	[0.027]
Division 6	0.123***	0.006	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.004
	[0.031]	[0.026]	[0.023]	[0.023]	[0.023]	[0.023]
Division 7	0.278***	0.068**	0.062**	0.061**	0.061**	0.061**
	[0.029]	[0.031]	[0.026]	[0.026]	[0.026]	[0.026]
Division 8	0.160***	-0.009	-0.017	-0.017	-0.017	-0.017
	[0.033]	[0.032]	[0.026]	[0.026]	[0.026]	[0.026]
Balearic Islands	0.127***	0.029	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.014
	[0.044]	[0.027]	[0.022]	[0.022]	[0.022]	[0.022]
Canary Islands	0.211***	-0.002	-0.015	-0.015	-0.016	-0.016
	[0.037]	[0.038]	[0.033]	[0.033]	[0.032]	[0.033]
Western African District	0.233***	0.018	0.007	0.009	0.008	0.009
	[0.033]	[0.034]	[0.025]	[0.025]	[0.025]	[0.025]
Eastern African District	0.258***	0.040	0.016	0.017	0.016	0.017
	[0.042]	[0.042]	[0.037]	[0.037]	[0.037]	[0.037]
Rif	0.294***	0.069*	0.049	0.051	0.051	0.051
	[0.041]	[0.041]	[0.038]	[0.038]	[0.038]	[0.038]
Ifni	0.098**	-0.119**	-0.135***	-0.135***	-0.138***	-0.137***
	[0.048]	[0.048]	[0.042]	[0.042]	[0.043]	[0.043]
Cape Juby	0.040	-0.132	-0.092	-0.089	-0.093	-0.091
	[0.120]	[0.113]	[0.080]	[0.080]	[0.080]	[0.080]
Río de Oro	0.097	-0.117	-0.108	-0.108	-0.117	-0.113
	[0.155]	[0.150]	[0.128]	[0.128]	[0.130]	[0.131]
Prob > chi2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pseudo R2	0.1539	0.1855	0.2148	0.2149	0.2155	0.2157
Observations	11,819	11,816	11,816	11,816	11,816	11,816

Robust standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: Cluster by garrison. *Rebel* takes the value 1 when the officer was part of the rebel Army, was repressed by the Republican Army or was a republican geographical loyal; and 0 otherwise. *Tenure* is the number of years passed between officer's date of entry in the Army and 1936. *Posted* takes the value 1 if the officer was posted to a garrison and 0 otherwise. *Rank* is a variable that takes the value 1 for the lowest rank in the sample (*alférez*) and increases until reaching 10 for Lieutenant Generals. *Leader* takes the value 1 if the officer had the highest rank in the garrison or unit to which he was posted and 0 otherwise. *Area* takes the value 1 if the officer was in an area under rebel control and 0 otherwise. *Years in Core Africa* measures the number of years that the officer was posted to a special African unit (Mejal.la, Harka, Native Regular Forces, Foreign Legion, Native Police, or African Military Intervention) between 1910 and 1927. *Change position 1931-1936* aggregates officer's change in relative position between 1932 and 1936. *Worse prospects after 1931* takes the value 1 if the officer held a rank equal or higher than Major in 1931 and 0 otherwise.

Table 6. Probit Average Marginal Effects for Being a Rebel (Areas under Rebel Control).

VARIABLES	(1) rebel	(2) rebel	(3) rebel	(4) rebel	(5) rebel
Officers' individual covariates					
Tenure	-0.003*** [0.000]	-0.003*** [0.000]	-0.004*** [0.000]	-0.003*** [0.000]	-0.003*** [0.001]
Posted	-0.007 [0.014]	-0.000 [0.011]	-0.002 [0.011]	-0.002 [0.011]	-0.003 [0.011]
Rank	0.003 [0.003]	0.000 [0.003]	0.001 [0.003]	0.001 [0.003]	0.002 [0.003]
Leader	-0.060*** [0.011]	-0.044*** [0.012]	-0.043*** [0.012]	-0.042*** [0.012]	-0.041*** [0.012]
Corps					
Cavalry		0.015 [0.014]	0.018 [0.014]	0.018 [0.014]	0.018 [0.014]
General Staff		-0.020 [0.015]	-0.022 [0.015]	-0.023 [0.015]	-0.021 [0.016]
Infantry		-0.023** [0.011]	-0.020* [0.011]	-0.020* [0.011]	-0.020* [0.011]
Engineers		-0.007 [0.015]	-0.007 [0.015]	-0.007 [0.015]	-0.007 [0.015]
Aviation		-0.111*** [0.019]	-0.109*** [0.019]	-0.110*** [0.020]	-0.110*** [0.020]
Frontier Guard		-0.066*** [0.014]	-0.064*** [0.013]	-0.065*** [0.014]	-0.067*** [0.014]
Transportation		-0.076* [0.039]	-0.077* [0.040]	-0.081** [0.040]	-0.080** [0.041]
Civil Guard		-0.035** [0.014]	-0.032** [0.014]	-0.033** [0.014]	-0.034** [0.014]
Assault Guard		-0.142*** [0.023]	-0.141*** [0.023]	-0.141*** [0.023]	-0.142*** [0.023]
Africa and professional prospects					
Years in Core Africa (1910-1927)			-0.008** [0.003]	-0.008** [0.003]	-0.008** [0.003]
Change position 1931-1936				-0.003 [0.005]	-0.003 [0.005]
Worse prospects after 1931					-0.012 [0.011]
Military region					
Division 2	-0.035 [0.030]	-0.017 [0.027]	-0.018 [0.027]	-0.018 [0.027]	-0.018 [0.027]
Division 3	-0.078 [0.052]	-0.067 [0.050]	-0.068 [0.050]	-0.068 [0.050]	-0.067 [0.050]
Division 4	-0.062 [0.045]	-0.059 [0.043]	-0.057 [0.043]	-0.057 [0.043]	-0.056 [0.042]
Division 5	-0.013 [0.029]	-0.012 [0.028]	-0.013 [0.028]	-0.013 [0.028]	-0.013 [0.028]
Division 6	0.004 [0.030]	0.007 [0.028]	0.006 [0.028]	0.006 [0.028]	0.006 [0.028]

Table 6 (continued)

Division 7	0.026 [0.030]	0.032 [0.028]	0.031 [0.028]	0.031 [0.028]	0.031 [0.028]
Division 8	-0.015 [0.030]	-0.011 [0.028]	-0.012 [0.028]	-0.012 [0.028]	-0.013 [0.028]
Balearic Islands	-0.004 [0.035]	0.003 [0.029]	0.002 [0.030]	0.002 [0.030]	0.002 [0.029]
Canary Islands	-0.014 [0.032]	-0.015 [0.029]	-0.014 [0.029]	-0.014 [0.029]	-0.014 [0.029]
Western African District	-0.006 [0.030]	-0.004 [0.027]	-0.000 [0.027]	-0.000 [0.027]	-0.000 [0.027]
Eastern African District	0.005 [0.032]	-0.005 [0.030]	-0.003 [0.030]	-0.003 [0.030]	-0.003 [0.030]
Rif	0.019 [0.032]	0.013 [0.031]	0.017 [0.031]	0.017 [0.032]	0.017 [0.031]
Ifni	-0.075** [0.033]	-0.075** [0.030]	-0.074** [0.030]	-0.075** [0.030]	-0.075** [0.030]
Cape Juby	-0.088 [0.064]	-0.055 [0.044]	-0.053 [0.043]	-0.054 [0.043]	-0.054 [0.043]
Río de Oro	-0.066 [0.083]	-0.044 [0.069]	-0.045 [0.069]	-0.047 [0.069]	-0.049 [0.069]
Prob > chi2	0	0	0	0	0
Pseudo R2	0.0802	0.1304	0.1329	0.133	0.1334
Observations	6,103	6,103	6,103	6,103	6,103

Robust standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: Sample with the officers that were in areas under rebel control by July 22. Cluster by garrison. *Rebel* takes the value 1 when the officer was part of the rebel Army, was repressed by the Republican Army or was a republican geographical loyal; and 0 otherwise. *Tenure* is the number of years passed between officer's date of entry in the Army and 1936. *Posted* is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the officer was posted to a garrison and 0 otherwise. *Rank* is a variable that takes the value 1 for the lowest rank in the sample (alférez) and increases until reaching 10 for Lieutenant Generals. *Leader* takes the value 1 if the officer had the highest rank in the garrison or unit to which he was posted and 0 otherwise. *Years in Africa* measures the number of years that the officer was posted to a special African unit (Mehalla, Harka, Native Regular Forces, Foreign Legion, Native Police, or African Military Intervention) between 1910 and 1927. *Change position 1931-1936* aggregates officer's change in relative position between 1932 and 1936. *Worse prospects after 1931* takes the value 1 if the officer held a rank equal or higher than Major in 1931 and 0 otherwise.

Table 7. Probit Average Marginal Effects for Being a Rebel (Areas under Republican Control).

VARIABLES	(1) rebel	(2) rebel	(3) rebel	(4) rebel	(5) rebel
Officers' individual covariates					
Tenure	-0.012*** [0.001]	-0.014*** [0.001]	-0.014*** [0.001]	-0.013*** [0.001]	-0.014*** [0.001]
Posted	0.004 [0.025]	-0.016 [0.027]	-0.015 [0.028]	-0.019 [0.028]	-0.021 [0.028]
Rank	0.060*** [0.006]	0.056*** [0.006]	0.055*** [0.006]	0.051*** [0.006]	0.046*** [0.006]
Leader	-0.113*** [0.027]	-0.053* [0.027]	-0.053* [0.027]	-0.046* [0.028]	-0.054* [0.028]
Corps					
Cavalry		0.071 [0.045]	0.067 [0.045]	0.065 [0.045]	0.065 [0.045]
General Staff		0.032 [0.048]	0.033 [0.048]	0.025 [0.048]	0.019 [0.048]
Infantry		-0.010 [0.033]	-0.013 [0.034]	-0.019 [0.034]	-0.019 [0.034]
Engineers		0.064 [0.047]	0.065 [0.047]	0.068 [0.047]	0.067 [0.048]
Aviation		-0.174*** [0.048]	-0.177*** [0.048]	-0.184*** [0.048]	-0.183*** [0.048]
Frontier Guard		-0.106*** [0.037]	-0.108*** [0.038]	-0.115*** [0.038]	-0.104*** [0.038]
Transportation		-0.243*** [0.048]	-0.244*** [0.048]	-0.275*** [0.050]	-0.280*** [0.049]
Civil Guard		0.044 [0.042]	0.042 [0.042]	0.041 [0.042]	0.049 [0.042]
Assault Guard		-0.300*** [0.046]	-0.300*** [0.046]	-0.303*** [0.046]	-0.298*** [0.046]
Africa and professional prospects					
Years in Core Africa (1910-1927)			0.010 [0.008]	0.009 [0.008]	0.010 [0.008]
Change position 1931-1936				-0.030*** [0.011]	-0.031*** [0.011]
Worse prospects after 1931					0.060** [0.026]
Military Region					
Division 2	0.085* [0.046]	0.099*** [0.036]	0.099*** [0.036]	0.099*** [0.035]	0.101*** [0.035]
Division 3	-0.155*** [0.036]	-0.155*** [0.032]	-0.155*** [0.032]	-0.154*** [0.032]	-0.153*** [0.032]
Division 4	-0.099*** [0.034]	-0.097*** [0.029]	-0.097*** [0.029]	-0.096*** [0.029]	-0.093*** [0.029]
Division 5	0.066 [0.092]	0.033 [0.088]	0.033 [0.088]	0.034 [0.087]	0.035 [0.088]
Division 6	-0.024 [0.045]	-0.014 [0.041]	-0.014 [0.041]	-0.014 [0.041]	-0.013 [0.041]

Table 7 (continued)

Division 7	-0.115 [0.080]	-0.127* [0.075]	-0.126* [0.075]	-0.122 [0.075]	-0.122 [0.075]
Division 8	-0.045 [0.086]	-0.054 [0.075]	-0.053 [0.075]	-0.052 [0.076]	-0.049 [0.075]
Balearic Islands	0.055 [0.039]	0.031 [0.035]	0.031 [0.035]	0.033 [0.035]	0.037 [0.035]
Canary Islands	-0.064 [0.181]	-0.101 [0.175]	-0.098 [0.175]	-0.097 [0.178]	-0.102 [0.176]
Western African District	-0.018 [0.147]	-0.035 [0.145]	-0.037 [0.145]	-0.037 [0.144]	-0.033 [0.143]
Eastern African District	-0.174 [0.150]	-0.182 [0.141]	-0.177 [0.141]	-0.183 [0.136]	-0.174 [0.133]
Cape Juby	-0.105 [0.168]	0.000 [0.126]	-0.012 [0.121]	-0.018 [0.118]	-0.012 [0.120]
Prob > chi2	0	0	0	0	0
Pseudo R2	0.066	0.0975	0.0977	0.0989	0.0997
Observations	5,713	5,713	5,713	5,713	5,713

Robust standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: Sample with the officers that were in areas under republican control in July 22. Cluster by garrison. *Rebel* takes the value 1 when the officer was part of the rebel Army, was repressed by the Republican Army or was a republican geographical loyal; and 0 otherwise. *Tenure* is the number of years passed between officer's date of entry in the Army and 1936. *Posted* is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the officer was posted to a garrison and 0 otherwise. *Rank* is a variable that takes the value 1 for the lowest rank in the sample (alférez) and increases until reaching 10 for Lieutenant Generals. *Leader* takes the value 1 if the officer had the highest rank in the garrison or unit to which he was posted and 0 otherwise. *Years in Core Africa* measures the number of years that the officer was posted to a special African unit (Mehalla, Harka, Native Regular Forces, Foreign Legion, Native Police, or African Military Intervention) between 1910 and 1927. *Change position 1931-1936* aggregates officer's change in relative position between 1932 and 1936. *Worse prospects after 1931* takes the value 1 if the officer held a rank equal or higher than Major in 1931 and 0 otherwise.

Table 8. OLS Analyzing Determinants of Officers' Change of Position Between 1931 and 1933 (Azaña's Term as Minister of the War)

VARIABLES	Change position 1932-1934
Years Core Africa (1910-1927)	-0.053*** [0.005]
Tenure	-0.001 [0.001]
Rank 1934	0.140*** [0.007]
Corps 1934	
Cavalry 1934	-0.180*** [0.018]
General Staff 1934	-0.488*** [0.029]
Infantry 1934	-0.226*** [0.012]
Engineers 1934	-0.008 [0.018]
Frontier Guard 1934	0.181*** [0.023]
Civil Guard 1934	0.188*** [0.019]
Constant	-0.041** [0.020]
Observations	8,187
R-squared	0.218

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: *Change position 1932-1934* adds the change in relative position between 1931 and 1933. *Tenure* is the difference between 1936 and officer's year of entry in the Army. *Rank 1934* is a variable that takes the value 2 for the lowest rank in the sample in 1934 (alférez) and increases until reaching 10 for officers being Lieutenant Generals in 1934.

Table 9. OLS Analyzing Determinants of Officers' Change of Position between 1934 and 1935 (Center-Right Governments).

VARIABLES	Change Position 1935-1936
Years Core Africa (1910-1927)	0.038*** [0.006]
Tenure	0.038*** [0.001]
Rank 1936	-0.238*** [0.003]
Corps 1936	
Cavalry 1936	0.117*** [0.019]
General Staff 1936	0.138*** [0.034]
Infantry 1936	-0.006 [0.013]
Engineers 1936	0.128*** [0.018]
Frontier Guard 1936	-0.297*** [0.021]
Civil Guard 1936	-0.083*** [0.017]
Constant	0.561*** [0.016]
Observations	11,870
R-squared	0.351

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: *Change position 1935-1936* adds the change in relative position in 1935 and 1936. *Tenure* is the difference between 1936 and officer's year of entry in the Army. *Rank 1936* is a variable that takes the value 1 for the lowest rank in the sample in 1936 (*alérez* law of 1935) and increases until reaching 10 for the remaining Lieutenant Generals in 1936.

Table 10. Determinants of Suffering a Loss in Relative Position in 1931 or 1933. Probit Average Marginal Effects.

VARIABLES	Lost Position 1931 or 1933
Years Core Africa (1910-1927)	0.017*** [0.001]
Tenure	-0.000 [0.000]
Rank 1934	0.013*** [0.003]
Cavalry 1934	0.107*** [0.013]
General Staff 1934	0.083*** [0.015]
Infantry 1934	0.055*** [0.013]
Frontier Guard 1934	0.079*** [0.015]
Civil Guard 1934	0.028* [0.016]
Prob > chi2	0
Pseudo R2	0.2064
Observations	7,468

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: The sample is composed by 1936 officers in the total sample that were active in 1934. The dependent variable *Lost position 1931 or 1933* takes the value 1 when the officer had a lower absolute position in 1932 or 1934. *Years Core Africa (1910-1927)* measures the number of years that the officer was posted to special African units between 1910 and 1927. *Tenure* measures the years passed between officer's date of entry in the Army and 1936. *Rank 1934* is a variable that takes the value 2 for the lowest rank in the sample in 1934 (*alférez*) and increases until reaching 10 for Lieutenant Generals. Controls for corps reflect officers' corps in 1934.

Table 11. Probability of Rebelling Using Change of Position Between 1934 and 1936 (Center-Right Governments).

VARIABLES	Whole Country		Republican Area		Rebel Area	
	rebel (1)	rebel (2)	rebel (3)	rebel (4)	rebel (5)	rebel (6)
Officers' individual covariates						
Tenure	-0.008*** [0.001]	-0.008*** [0.001]	-0.013*** [0.001]	-0.014*** [0.001]	-0.003*** [0.001]	-0.004*** [0.001]
Posted	-0.012 [0.016]	-0.010 [0.015]	-0.026 [0.029]	-0.022 [0.028]	-0.003 [0.011]	-0.004 [0.012]
Rank	0.019*** [0.004]	0.024*** [0.007]	0.039*** [0.007]	0.050*** [0.013]	0.002 [0.003]	0.001 [0.005]
Leader	-0.064*** [0.016]	-0.060*** [0.016]	-0.050* [0.028]	-0.057** [0.029]	-0.042*** [0.012]	-0.037*** [0.013]
Area (Rebel Area = 1)	0.209*** [0.016]	0.182*** [0.016]	No	No	No	No
Corps						
Cavalry	0.045** [0.022]	0.037 [0.023]	0.071 [0.045]	0.051 [0.046]	0.018 [0.014]	0.017 [0.015]
General Staff	0.006 [0.025]	-0.003 [0.024]	0.034 [0.049]	0.013 [0.046]	-0.019 [0.015]	-0.015 [0.016]
Infantry	-0.014 [0.017]	-0.015 [0.017]	-0.015 [0.034]	-0.022 [0.033]	-0.019* [0.011]	-0.015 [0.012]
Engineers	0.027 [0.024]	0.011 [0.022]	0.069 [0.048]	0.029 [0.043]	-0.007 [0.015]	0.001 [0.017]
Aviation	-0.145*** [0.026]	-0.147*** [0.025]	-0.180*** [0.048]	-0.186*** [0.046]	-0.109*** [0.019]	-0.108*** [0.020]
Frontier Guard	-0.084*** [0.019]	-0.080*** [0.020]	-0.109*** [0.038]	-0.101*** [0.038]	-0.067*** [0.014]	-0.064*** [0.016]
Transportation	-0.181*** [0.029]	-0.174*** [0.030]	-0.289*** [0.050]	-0.276*** [0.051]	-0.077* [0.040]	-0.075* [0.041]
Civil Guard	0.005 [0.022]	-0.002 [0.022]	0.046 [0.043]	0.020 [0.041]	-0.034** [0.014]	-0.023 [0.017]
Assault Guard	-0.221*** [0.026]	-0.219*** [0.029]	-0.302*** [0.046]	-0.281*** [0.047]	-0.142*** [0.023]	-0.158*** [0.031]
Years in Core Africa (1910-1927)	-0.004 [0.005]	-0.004 [0.005]	0.011 [0.008]	0.009 [0.008]	-0.008** [0.003]	-0.007** [0.004]
Worse prospects after 1931	0.019 [0.015]	0.017 [0.015]	0.063** [0.026]	0.057** [0.027]	-0.013 [0.011]	-0.011 [0.012]
Change position 1934-1936	-0.020*** [0.007]		-0.044*** [0.013]		-0.000 [0.006]	
Change position 1934-1936 (without alféreces 1935)		-0.025***		-0.050***		-0.002

Table 11 (Continued)

Military region	[0.008]		[0.014]		[0.007]	
	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Prob > chi2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pseudo R2	0.2159	0.2085	0.1004	0.1024	0.1333	0.153
Observations	11,816	9652	5,713	4770	6,103	4882

Robust standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: Cluster by garrison. *Change position 1934-1936* is the result of adding the change in relative position in 1935 and in 1936. *Change position 1934-1936 without alféreces 1935* excludes the officers that in 1936 had the rank “Alférez (Law 1935)”. See Table 5 for the definition of the remaining variables.

Table 12. Comparison between Results for Probit Average Marginal Effects, Logit Average Marginal Effects, and LPM. Results for Whole Country, Area under Republican Control, and Area under Rebel Control.

VARIABLES	Whole Country			Republican Area			Rebel Area		
	Probit Mg. Effects	OLS	Logit Mg. Effects	Probit Mg. Effects	OLS	Logit Mg. Effects	Probit Mg. Effects	OLS	Logit Mg. Effects
	(1) rebel	(2) rebel	(3) rebel	(4) rebel	(5) rebel	(6) rebel	(7) rebel	(8) rebel	(9) rebel
Officers' individual covariates									
Tenure	-0.008*** [0.001]	-0.008*** [0.001]	-0.008*** [0.001]	-0.014*** [0.001]	-0.014*** [0.001]	-0.015*** [0.001]	-0.003*** [0.001]	-0.003*** [0.001]	-0.003*** [0.000]
Posted	-0.010 [0.015]	-0.010 [0.017]	-0.010 [0.014]	-0.021 [0.028]	-0.017 [0.026]	-0.022 [0.031]	-0.003 [0.011]	-0.007 [0.011]	-0.006 [0.008]
Rank	0.022*** [0.004]	0.023*** [0.004]	0.021*** [0.003]	0.046*** [0.006]	0.050*** [0.007]	0.051*** [0.007]	0.002 [0.003]	0.000 [0.004]	0.002 [0.002]
Leader	-0.066*** [0.015]	-0.079*** [0.019]	-0.069*** [0.020]	-0.054* [0.028]	-0.063** [0.030]	-0.060* [0.033]	-0.041*** [0.012]	-0.085*** [0.022]	-0.034** [0.015]
Area (Rebel Area = 1)	0.209*** [0.016]	0.209*** [0.018]	0.212*** [0.017]	No	No	No	No	No	No
Corps									
Cavalry	0.043* [0.022]	0.028 [0.021]	0.037** [0.017]	0.065 [0.045]	0.063 [0.042]	0.072 [0.044]	0.018 [0.014]	0.008 [0.009]	0.011 [0.009]
General Staff	-0.002 [0.025]	0.007 [0.026]	0.001 [0.025]	0.019 [0.048]	0.021 [0.046]	0.027 [0.053]	-0.021 [0.016]	-0.015 [0.020]	-0.022 [0.018]
Infantry	-0.016 [0.017]	-0.013 [0.016]	-0.013 [0.016]	-0.019 [0.034]	-0.019 [0.034]	-0.020 [0.038]	-0.020* [0.011]	-0.014 [0.009]	-0.016* [0.009]
Engineers	0.026 [0.024]	0.035 [0.024]	0.025 [0.021]	0.067 [0.048]	0.062 [0.042]	0.075 [0.049]	-0.007 [0.015]	0.000 [0.011]	-0.007 [0.014]
Aviation	-0.146*** [0.026]	-0.168*** [0.036]	-0.185*** [0.045]	-0.183*** [0.048]	-0.188*** [0.053]	-0.221*** [0.059]	-0.110*** [0.020]	-0.150*** [0.038]	-0.204*** [0.060]
Frontier Guard	-0.082*** [0.019]	-0.113*** [0.022]	-0.083*** [0.026]	-0.104*** [0.038]	-0.116*** [0.040]	-0.117** [0.046]	-0.067*** [0.014]	-0.094*** [0.022]	-0.083*** [0.027]
Transportation	-0.178*** [0.029]	-0.213*** [0.043]	-0.250*** [0.053]	-0.280*** [0.049]	-0.295*** [0.051]	-0.333*** [0.057]	-0.080** [0.041]	-0.079 [0.053]	-0.150 [0.118]
Civil Guard	0.006 [0.021]	0.003 [0.023]	0.010 [0.020]	0.049 [0.042]	0.047 [0.043]	0.055 [0.044]	-0.034** [0.014]	-0.035** [0.016]	-0.036** [0.017]
Assault Guard	-0.220*** [0.026]	-0.305*** [0.042]	-0.320*** [0.052]	-0.298*** [0.046]	-0.322*** [0.051]	-0.356*** [0.053]	-0.142*** [0.023]	-0.268*** [0.071]	-0.300*** [0.078]
Africa and professional prospects									
Years Core Africa (1910-1927)	-0.005 [0.005]	-0.001 [0.005]	-0.004 [0.005]	0.010 [0.008]	0.009 [0.008]	0.010 [0.009]	-0.008** [0.003]	-0.009 [0.006]	-0.006** [0.002]

Table 12 (Continued)

Change position 1931-1936	-0.015*** [0.006]	-0.015** [0.007]	-0.014** [0.006]	-0.031*** [0.011]	-0.031*** [0.012]	-0.032** [0.013]	-0.003 [0.005]	-0.004 [0.006]	-0.002 [0.003]
Worse prospects after 1931	0.018 [0.015]	0.018 [0.017]	0.018 [0.013]	0.060** [0.026]	0.058** [0.027]	0.064** [0.027]	-0.012 [0.011]	-0.025 [0.017]	-0.011 [0.010]
Military region									
Division 2	0.008 [0.020]	0.013 [0.024]	0.010 [0.018]	0.101*** [0.035]	0.096*** [0.031]	0.103*** [0.032]	-0.018 [0.027]	-0.019 [0.024]	-0.014 [0.025]
Division 3	-0.111*** [0.021]	-0.178*** [0.034]	-0.124*** [0.030]	-0.153*** [0.032]	-0.163*** [0.035]	-0.181*** [0.040]	-0.067 [0.050]	-0.103 [0.094]	-0.082 [0.096]
Division 4	-0.071*** [0.018]	-0.109*** [0.029]	-0.072*** [0.022]	-0.093*** [0.029]	-0.095*** [0.030]	-0.107*** [0.035]	-0.056 [0.042]	-0.079 [0.068]	-0.075 [0.076]
Division 5	-0.003 [0.027]	-0.002 [0.025]	-0.000 [0.027]	0.035 [0.088]	0.016 [0.067]	0.039 [0.096]	-0.013 [0.028]	-0.009 [0.024]	-0.007 [0.024]
Division 6	0.004 [0.023]	-0.001 [0.027]	0.003 [0.021]	-0.013 [0.041]	-0.016 [0.040]	-0.018 [0.046]	0.006 [0.028]	0.011 [0.023]	0.007 [0.019]
Division 7	0.061** [0.026]	0.032 [0.024]	0.052*** [0.019]	-0.122 [0.075]	-0.127 [0.080]	-0.152* [0.091]	0.031 [0.028]	0.028 [0.022]	0.020 [0.015]
Division 8	-0.017 [0.026]	-0.010 [0.027]	-0.017 [0.028]	-0.049 [0.075]	-0.045 [0.077]	-0.054 [0.091]	-0.013 [0.028]	-0.010 [0.024]	-0.009 [0.025]
Balearic Islands	0.014 [0.022]	0.008 [0.022]	0.013 [0.020]	0.037 [0.035]	0.030 [0.033]	0.037 [0.037]	0.002 [0.029]	0.003 [0.024]	0.003 [0.022]
Canary Islands	-0.016 [0.033]	-0.011 [0.027]	-0.014 [0.036]	-0.102 [0.176]	-0.099 [0.174]	-0.116 [0.224]	-0.014 [0.029]	-0.013 [0.026]	-0.012 [0.028]
Western African District	0.009 [0.025]	-0.007 [0.023]	0.014 [0.025]	-0.033 [0.143]	-0.029 [0.125]	-0.028 [0.174]	-0.000 [0.027]	0.002 [0.022]	0.001 [0.021]
Eastern African District	0.017 [0.037]	-0.014 [0.025]	0.025 [0.035]	-0.174 [0.133]	-0.181 [0.154]	-0.216 [0.157]	-0.003 [0.030]	-0.003 [0.024]	-0.001 [0.025]
Rif	0.051 [0.038]	0.019 [0.027]	0.061** [0.025]	-0.012 [0.120]	No	No	0.017 [0.031]	0.022 [0.024]	0.017 [0.016]
Ifni	-0.137*** [0.043]	-0.112** [0.049]	-0.203** [0.085]	No	No	No	-0.075** [0.030]	-0.100** [0.044]	-0.110 [0.073]
Cape Juby	-0.091 [0.080]	-0.083 [0.092]	-0.128 [0.124]	No	-0.006 [0.127]	-0.016 [0.130]	-0.054 [0.043]	-0.083 [0.095]	-0.071 [0.069]
Río de Oro	-0.113 [0.131]	-0.099 [0.178]	-0.177 [0.203]	No	No	No	-0.049 [0.069]	-0.091 [0.191]	-0.064 [0.100]
Constant		0.860*** [0.030]			0.897*** [0.046]			1.038*** [0.030]	
Prob χ^2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
R2 / Pseudo R2	0.2157	0.203	0.2142	0.0997	0.123	0.0993	0.1334	0.078	0.1322
Observations	11,816	11,816	11,816	5,713	5,713	5,713	6,103	6,103	6,103

Robust standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 13. Alternative Definitions for Variables. Probit Average Marginal Effects

VARIABLES	Whole Country				Republican-Controlled Areas				Rebel-Controlled Areas			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	Africa 1910- 1927 (4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	Africa 1910- 1927 (8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	Africa Chao 1910- 1927 (12)
	rebel	Sure Affiliation rebel	Change position rebel	rebel	rebel	Sure Affiliation rebel	Change position rebel	rebel	rebel	Sure Affiliation rebel	Change position rebel	rebel
Officers' individual covariates												
Tenure	-0.008*** [0.001]	-0.008*** [0.001]	-0.008*** [0.001]	-0.008*** [0.001]	-0.014*** [0.001]	-0.015*** [0.001]	-0.013*** [0.001]	-0.014*** [0.001]	-0.003*** [0.001]	-0.003*** [0.000]	-0.003*** [0.001]	-0.003*** [0.001]
Posted	-0.010 [0.015]	-0.009 [0.018]	-0.010 [0.015]	-0.010 [0.015]	-0.021 [0.028]	-0.013 [0.034]	-0.021 [0.028]	-0.022 [0.028]	-0.003 [0.011]	-0.011 [0.013]	-0.003 [0.011]	-0.002 [0.011]
Rank	0.022*** [0.004]	0.025*** [0.004]	0.022*** [0.004]	0.022*** [0.004]	0.046*** [0.006]	0.054*** [0.007]	0.046*** [0.006]	0.047*** [0.007]	0.002 [0.003]	0.003 [0.003]	0.002 [0.003]	0.002 [0.003]
Leader	-0.066*** [0.015]	-0.068*** [0.016]	-0.066*** [0.015]	-0.067*** [0.015]	-0.054* [0.028]	-0.055* [0.030]	-0.053* [0.028]	-0.054* [0.028]	-0.041*** [0.012]	-0.040*** [0.011]	-0.041*** [0.012]	-0.042*** [0.012]
Area (Rebel Area = 1)	0.209*** [0.016]	0.228*** [0.016]	0.209*** [0.016]	0.209*** [0.016]	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Corps												
Cavalry	0.043* [0.022]	0.047** [0.024]	0.043** [0.022]	0.041* [0.022]	0.065 [0.045]	0.080 [0.050]	0.066 [0.045]	0.069 [0.045]	0.018 [0.014]	0.013 [0.014]	0.018 [0.014]	0.015 [0.014]
General Staff	-0.002 [0.025]	-0.021 [0.025]	-0.002 [0.025]	-0.003 [0.025]	0.019 [0.048]	-0.010 [0.052]	0.019 [0.049]	0.018 [0.048]	-0.021 [0.016]	-0.027* [0.014]	-0.020 [0.016]	-0.022 [0.016]
Infantry	-0.016 [0.017]	-0.014 [0.017]	-0.016 [0.017]	-0.017 [0.017]	-0.019 [0.034]	-0.015 [0.036]	-0.019 [0.034]	-0.016 [0.034]	-0.020* [0.011]	-0.019* [0.011]	-0.020* [0.011]	-0.023** [0.011]
Engineers	0.026 [0.024]	0.028 [0.025]	0.026 [0.024]	0.026 [0.024]	0.067 [0.048]	0.064 [0.051]	0.068 [0.048]	0.067 [0.048]	-0.007 [0.015]	0.003 [0.017]	-0.007 [0.015]	-0.008 [0.015]
Aviation	-0.146*** [0.026]	-0.134*** [0.025]	-0.146*** [0.026]	-0.147*** [0.027]	-0.183*** [0.048]	-0.171*** [0.047]	-0.184*** [0.048]	-0.181*** [0.048]	-0.110*** [0.020]	-0.102*** [0.019]	-0.110*** [0.020]	-0.113*** [0.019]
Frontier Guard	-0.082*** [0.019]	-0.092*** [0.020]	-0.082*** [0.019]	-0.083*** [0.019]	-0.104*** [0.038]	-0.133*** [0.043]	-0.104*** [0.038]	-0.102*** [0.038]	-0.067*** [0.014]	-0.063*** [0.013]	-0.067*** [0.014]	-0.071*** [0.014]
Transportation	-0.178*** [0.029]	-0.213*** [0.034]	-0.178*** [0.028]	-0.178*** [0.029]	-0.280*** [0.049]	-0.379*** [0.052]	-0.280*** [0.049]	-0.280*** [0.049]	-0.080** [0.041]	-0.072 [0.051]	-0.080** [0.040]	-0.081** [0.041]
Civil Guard	0.006 [0.021]	0.012 [0.022]	0.006 [0.021]	0.005 [0.021]	0.049 [0.042]	0.064 [0.046]	0.049 [0.042]	0.051 [0.042]	-0.034** [0.014]	-0.032*** [0.012]	-0.034** [0.014]	-0.037*** [0.014]
Assault Guard	-0.220*** [0.026]	-0.217*** [0.026]	-0.220*** [0.026]	-0.220*** [0.026]	-0.298*** [0.046]	-0.316*** [0.049]	-0.298*** [0.046]	-0.297*** [0.046]	-0.142*** [0.023]	-0.124*** [0.020]	-0.142*** [0.023]	-0.144*** [0.023]
Africa & professional prospects												
Years in Core Africa (1910-1927)	-0.005 [0.005]	-0.006 [0.006]	-0.005 [0.005]	-0.002 [0.003]	0.010 [0.008]	0.009 [0.009]	0.010 [0.008]	0.000 [0.005]	-0.008** [0.003]	-0.007** [0.003]	-0.008** [0.003]	-0.003 [0.002]

Table 13 (Continued)

Change position 1931-1936	-0.015*** [0.006]	-0.015*** [0.006]	-0.015*** [0.006]	-0.016*** [0.006]	-0.031*** [0.011]	-0.032*** [0.012]	-0.032*** [0.011]	-0.031*** [0.011]	-0.003 [0.005]	-0.003 [0.004]	-0.002 [0.005]	-0.003 [0.005]
Worse prospects after 1931	0.018 [0.015]	0.013 [0.015]	0.018 [0.015]	0.018 [0.015]	0.060** [0.026]	0.060** [0.027]	0.061** [0.026]	0.060** [0.026]	-0.012 [0.011]	-0.018* [0.011]	-0.012 [0.011]	-0.013 [0.012]
Military region												
Division 2	0.008 [0.020]	0.015 [0.021]	0.008 [0.020]	0.009 [0.020]	0.101*** [0.035]	0.113*** [0.038]	0.101*** [0.035]	0.100*** [0.035]	-0.018 [0.027]	-0.008 [0.025]	-0.018 [0.027]	-0.016 [0.027]
Division 3	-0.111*** [0.021]	-0.135*** [0.022]	-0.111*** [0.021]	-0.111*** [0.021]	-0.153*** [0.032]	-0.202*** [0.036]	-0.154*** [0.032]	-0.154*** [0.032]	-0.067 [0.050]	-0.062 [0.044]	-0.067 [0.050]	-0.066 [0.050]
Division 4	-0.071*** [0.018]	-0.076*** [0.019]	-0.071*** [0.018]	-0.071*** [0.018]	-0.093*** [0.029]	-0.109*** [0.032]	-0.094*** [0.029]	-0.094*** [0.029]	-0.056 [0.042]	-0.051 [0.038]	-0.056 [0.042]	-0.056 [0.042]
Division 5	-0.003 [0.027]	-0.003 [0.027]	-0.003 [0.027]	-0.003 [0.026]	0.035 [0.088]	0.058 [0.096]	0.035 [0.088]	0.036 [0.087]	-0.013 [0.028]	-0.008 [0.026]	-0.013 [0.028]	-0.011 [0.028]
Division 6	0.004 [0.023]	0.011 [0.023]	0.004 [0.023]	0.004 [0.023]	-0.013 [0.041]	0.004 [0.045]	-0.013 [0.041]	-0.013 [0.041]	0.006 [0.028]	0.014 [0.026]	0.006 [0.028]	0.007 [0.028]
Division 7	0.061** [0.026]	0.068** [0.027]	0.061** [0.026]	0.062** [0.026]	-0.122 [0.075]	-0.118 [0.073]	-0.122 [0.075]	-0.124* [0.075]	0.031 [0.028]	0.038 [0.027]	0.031 [0.028]	0.033 [0.028]
Division 8	-0.017 [0.026]	-0.017 [0.027]	-0.017 [0.026]	-0.017 [0.026]	-0.049 [0.075]	-0.039 [0.078]	-0.049 [0.075]	-0.050 [0.075]	-0.013 [0.028]	-0.008 [0.026]	-0.013 [0.028]	-0.011 [0.028]
Balearic Islands	0.014 [0.022]	0.003 [0.024]	0.014 [0.022]	0.014 [0.022]	0.037 [0.035]	0.005 [0.038]	0.037 [0.035]	0.036 [0.035]	0.002 [0.029]	0.005 [0.029]	0.002 [0.029]	0.004 [0.029]
Canary Islands	-0.016 [0.033]	-0.012 [0.032]	-0.016 [0.033]	-0.016 [0.033]	-0.102 [0.176]	-0.094 [0.177]	-0.103 [0.175]	-0.105 [0.176]	-0.014 [0.029]	-0.008 [0.027]	-0.014 [0.029]	-0.015 [0.029]
Western African District	0.009 [0.025]	0.008 [0.026]	0.008 [0.025]	0.008 [0.025]	-0.033 [0.143]	-0.028 [0.146]	-0.034 [0.143]	-0.031 [0.144]	-0.000 [0.027]	0.007 [0.025]	-0.000 [0.027]	-0.001 [0.027]
Eastern African District	0.017 [0.037]	0.037 [0.042]	0.017 [0.037]	0.017 [0.037]	-0.174 [0.133]	-0.167 [0.133]	-0.175 [0.133]	-0.179 [0.133]	-0.003 [0.030]	0.013 [0.029]	-0.003 [0.030]	-0.004 [0.030]
Rif	0.051 [0.038]	0.094 [0.089]	0.051 [0.038]	0.050 [0.038]	No	No	No	No	0.017 [0.031]	0.043 [0.045]	0.017 [0.031]	0.015 [0.031]
Ifni	-0.137*** [0.043]	-0.162*** [0.041]	-0.137*** [0.043]	-0.137*** [0.044]	No	No	No	No	-0.075** [0.030]	-0.075*** [0.027]	-0.075** [0.030]	-0.074** [0.030]
Cape Juby	-0.091 [0.080]	-0.101 [0.078]	-0.091 [0.080]	-0.094 [0.080]	-0.012 [0.120]	-0.008 [0.123]	-0.012 [0.120]	0.000 [0.124]	-0.054 [0.043]	-0.047 [0.038]	-0.054 [0.043]	-0.055 [0.043]
Río de Oro	-0.113 [0.131]	-0.123 [0.124]	-0.113 [0.131]	-0.114 [0.130]	No	No	No	No	-0.049 [0.069]	-0.040 [0.060]	-0.049 [0.069]	-0.050 [0.069]
Prob > chi2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
R2 / Pseudo R2	0.2157	0.263	0.2157	0.2156	0.0997	0.1242	0.0998	0.0995	0.1334	0.1525	0.1334	0.1317
Observations	11,816	11,187	11,816	11,816	5,713	5,230	5,713	5,713	6,103	5,957	6,103	6,103

Robust standard errors in brackets
 ***p<0.01, **p<0.05 *p<0.1

Figure 2. General Structure of the Army




Table 14. Probability of Being a Rebel Introducing the Effect of Hierarchy.

	Whole country	Areas under republican control	Areas under rebel control
VARIABLES	(1) rebel	(2) rebel	(3) rebel
Follow	0.074*** [0.013]	0.144*** [0.025]	0.008 [0.009]
Officers' individual covariates			
Tenure	-0.008*** [0.001]	-0.013*** [0.001]	-0.003*** [0.001]
Rank	0.023*** [0.004]	0.049*** [0.007]	0.002 [0.003]
Leader	-0.045*** [0.017]	-0.020 [0.033]	-0.036*** [0.013]
Area (Rebel Area = 1)	0.197*** [0.018]	No	No
Corps			
Cavalry	0.040* [0.021]	0.049 [0.042]	0.018 [0.015]
General Staff	-0.022 [0.027]	-0.027 [0.052]	-0.026* [0.014]
Infantry	-0.019 [0.016]	-0.031 [0.031]	-0.023* [0.012]
Engineers	0.030 [0.023]	0.074* [0.042]	-0.006 [0.015]
Aviation	-0.124*** [0.031]	-0.143** [0.058]	-0.108*** [0.020]
Frontier Guard	-0.077*** [0.018]	-0.106*** [0.036]	-0.069*** [0.014]
Transportation	-0.008 [0.180]	-0.020 [0.275]	
Civil Guard	0.006 [0.020]	0.040 [0.039]	-0.037*** [0.014]
Assault Guard	-0.191*** [0.027]	-0.241*** [0.035]	-0.141*** [0.024]
Africa and professional prospects			
Years in Core Africa (1910-1927)	-0.012** [0.006]	-0.006 [0.010]	-0.008** [0.004]
Lost position 1931 or 1933	-0.018*** [0.006]	-0.036*** [0.013]	-0.003 [0.005]
Worse prospects after 1931	0.012 [0.016]	0.044 [0.029]	-0.010 [0.012]

Table 14 (Continued)

Military region			
Division 2	0.010 [0.023]	0.107*** [0.040]	0.070*** [0.011]
Division 3	-0.082*** [0.022]	-0.105*** [0.034]	No
Division 4	-0.064*** [0.017]	-0.086*** [0.027]	No
Division 5	-0.012 [0.031]	No	0.073*** [0.015]
Division 6	0.013 [0.022]	0.007 [0.038]	0.096*** [0.014]
Division 7	0.082*** [0.031]	No	0.123*** [0.015]
Division 8	-0.012 [0.027]	-0.101 [0.067]	0.075*** [0.013]
Balearic Islands	-0.011 [0.024]	-0.022 [0.035]	0.086*** [0.018]
Canary Islands	0.002 [0.035]	No	0.081*** [0.016]
Western African District	0.035 [0.031]	No	0.093*** [0.013]
Eastern African District	0.034 [0.038]	No	0.086*** [0.017]
Rif	0.048 [0.040]	No	0.104*** [0.021]
Ifni	-0.124*** [0.036]	No	0.014 [0.017]
Cape Juby	-0.108 [0.071]	No	0.034 [0.033]
Río de Oro	-0.091 [0.131]	No	0.040 [0.063]
Prob > chi2	0	0	0
Pseudo R2	0.2389	0.1153	0.1438
Observations	10,387	4,861	5,524

Robust standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: If the officer is not a leader, *Follow* takes the value 1 if the leader of the garrison rebelled and 0 otherwise. If the officer is a leader in the garrison, *Follow* equals 1 if the leader in the unit or garrison above rebelled and 0 otherwise. For a brief definition of the other variables, see Table 5.

Table 15. Determinants of Rank in 1936

VARIABLES	(OLS) Rank 1936
Years Core Africa 1910-1927	0.373*** [0.015]
Tenure	0.075*** [0.002]
Cavalry	0.026 [0.052]
General Staff	1.374*** [0.092]
Infantry	-0.254*** [0.035]
Engineers	0.048 [0.051]
Aviation	0.192*** [0.070]
Frontier Guard	-0.582*** [0.058]
Transportation	-0.839*** [0.132]
Civil Guard	-0.707*** [0.047]
Constant	1.796*** [0.042]
Observations	11,870
R-squared	0.244

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: *Rank 1936* takes the value 1 for the lowest rank in the sample (*alferez* law 1935) and increases until reaching 10 for the three Lieutenant Generals that remained in the Army in 1936. *Years in Core Africa (1910-1927)* reflects the number of years that the officer was posted in a special African unit (Mehalla, Harka, Native Regular Forces, Foreign Legion, Native Police, or African Military Intervention) between 1910 and 1927. *Tenure* is the number of years passed between officer's entry in the Army and 1936. Corps variables relate to officers' corps in 1936.

Table 16. Impact of Revisions of Promotions on Officers' Change of Position between 1931 and 1933 (OLS)

VARIABLES	Change position 1931-1933
Lost position 1931 or 1933	-0.421*** [0.024]
Tenure	0.000 [0.001]
Rank 1934	0.137*** [0.007]
Corps 1934	
Cavalry 1934	-0.154*** [0.018]
General Staff 1934	-0.461*** [0.028]
Infantry 1934	-0.238*** [0.012]
Engineers 1934	-0.009 [0.018]
Frontier Guard 1934	0.185*** [0.022]
Civil Guard 1934	0.175*** [0.019]
Constant	-0.043** [0.020]
Observations	8,187
R-squared	0.235

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: *Change position 1932-1934* adds the change in relative position between 1931 and 1933. *Lost position 1931 or 1933* takes the value 1 if the officer lost positions in his scale or was demoted one rank in 1931 or 1933 and 0 otherwise. *Tenure* is the difference between 1936 and officer's year of entry in the Army. *Rank 1934* is a variable that takes the value 2 for the lowest rank in the sample in 1934 (*alferez*) and increases until reaching 10 for officers being Lieutenant Generals in 1934.

Table 17. Impact of Revisions of Promotions on the *Africanista* faction

VARIABLES	(1) Lost Position 1931 or 1933
Dummy Core Africa (1910-1927)	0.017***
	[0.001]
Tenure	Yes
Rank 1934	Yes
Corps 1934	Yes
Prob > chi2	0
Pseudo R2	0.217
Observations	8,187

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: The sample is composed by 1936 officers in the total sample that were active in 1934. The dependent variable *Lost position 1931 or 1933* takes the value 1 when the officer had a lower absolute position in 1932 or 1934. *Dummy Core Africa (1910-1927)* takes the value 1 if the officer spent at least one year posted to special African units between 1910 and 1927 and 0 otherwise.

Table 18. Determinants of Officers' Change of Position between 1931 and 1933 Excluding the Effect of Revisions of Promotions

VARIABLES	Change position 1932-1934 Counterfactual without effect of revisions (OLS)
Years Core Africa (1910-1927)	-0.036*** [0.005]
Tenure	-0.001 [0.001]
Rank 1934	0.147*** [0.007]
Corps 1934	
Cavalry 1934	-0.175*** [0.017]
General Staff 1934	-0.458*** [0.028]
Infantry 1934	-0.223*** [0.012]
Engineers 1934	-0.009 [0.018]
Carabineers 1934	0.220*** [0.022]
Civil Guard 1934	0.188*** [0.019]
Constant	-0.066*** [0.020]
Observations	8,187
R-squared	0.227

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: *Change position 1932-1934* adds the change in relative position between 1931 and 1933 excluding the effect of revisions. *Tenure* is the difference between 1936 and officer's year of entry in the Army. *Rank 1934* is a variable that takes the value 2 for the lowest rank in the sample in 1934 (*alférez*) and increases until reaching 10 for officers being Lieutenant Generals in 1934.

Appendix

Results in table 8 showed that *africanista* officers were promoted less often than peers with the same characteristics that were never posted to any special African unit between 1910 and 1927. Results in table 17 suggests that this could be partly due to the revisions of promotions between 1931 and 1933. The positive coefficient associated to the variable “Dummy Core Africanista” indicates that those officers that spent at least one year in special African units between 1910 and 1927 were more likely to suffer a revision of promotions in 1931 or 1933. However, besides the revisions of promotions, there might be other channels that negatively affected *africanista* officers during Azaña’s mandate as Minister of the War. This annex measures the extent to which Azaña’s revisions explain the lower change of position and rank of the *africanista* faction during the first years of the Second Republic.

I first compute a counterfactual for officers’ careers that eliminate the effect of revisions between 1931 and 1933. In the counterfactual, officers suffering a negative change in absolute position in 1931 and/or 1933 are assumed to keep their position on the scale (so their change in their relative position in that year is set equal to zero). Then, total change in position during liberal republican governments is calculated by adding changes in relative position between 1931 and 1933. The new total change of position without the effect of revisions is used in Table 18 to study how the fact of being an *africanista* officer affected change in relative position during Azaña’s mandate as Minister of the War.

The coefficient for years posted to African special units in Table 17 is -0.36 and significantly different from zero, meaning that there were factors beyond the revision of promotions that negatively affected *africanista* officers’ change of position during the ruling of republican liberal governments. Given that Table 8 showed a decrease of 0.053 in change of position for each year posted to Africa when including the effect of revisions, Azaña’s cancellation of promotions can explain 32% of *africanista* officers’ worst professional progress between 1931 and 1933. The remaining two thirds of the coefficient found in Table 8 can be attributed to some sort of discrimination against *africanista* officers when Azaña’s government determined promotions. The idea of some type of discrimination against the *africanista* faction is supported by the fact that members of that group did significantly better than *peninsulares* between 1934 and 1936 (see Table 9). This suggests that *africanista* officers did not share any unobservable

characteristic that precluded them from promoting as much as *peninsulares* between 1931 and 1933.