

## Resolving Civil Wars before they Start: The UN Security Council and Conflict Prevention

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Abstract: A large body of literature has demonstrated that international action can promote the successful resolution of civil wars. However, international actors do not wait until violence starts to seek to manage conflicts. We argue that different actions of the United Nations Security Council—including condemnations, sanctions, various forms of diplomatic engagement, and the authorization of force—can make civil wars less likely. We test this argument by examining how the content of UN Security Council resolutions in all disputes over self-determination from 1960 to 2005 affect whether these disputes escalate to civil war and find that UN action can have a substantial preventive effect. Specifically, we find that diplomatic actions that directly address a self-determination movement of concern can reduce the likelihood of a subsequent armed conflict. We also find that coercive actions of military force and sanctions have more indirect preventive effects.

Over the last several decades, international actors, often working through international organizations such as the United Nations, have focused increasing attention on managing violent conflict. This trend accelerated after the end of the Cold War as efforts at the United Nations and other international bodies were not stymied by superpower competition. Former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's Agenda for Peace (1992) emphasizes four areas of action that the international community could and should undertake in order to promote peace: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding. A large body of literature has developed examining the effect of the latter three types of action, and many of the conclusions reached have been quite optimistic. Studies have concluded that the United Nations can be effective at building peace (e.g., Doyle and Sambanis 2000), that peacekeeping works (e.g., Fortna 2008, Hultman et al. 2013), that mediation can help facilitate settlement (e.g., Bercovitch and Gartner 2008), and that legal dispute resolution is especially effective (e.g., Gent and Shannon 2010).

While this literature on conflict resolution has advanced academic understanding of the effect of international actions and led to implications for policymakers seeking to resolve violent conflicts, there is still a substantial gap in our understanding of international efforts to prevent violent intrastate conflicts. Virtually all existing work focuses on the effect of efforts in managing or resolving ongoing violent conflicts. Yet, international actors do not wait until violence starts to seek to resolve conflicts within countries, rather, substantial effort is devoted to preventing the outbreak of violence from ever occurring, such as the preventative deployment of UN peacekeepers to Macedonia in 1992. We know little about whether these preventative efforts are effective.

This gap in our knowledge is likely because it is difficult to identify cases of the successful prevention of violent conflict—that is, disputes between a government and some internal group that would have become violent in the absence of some outside intervention. In studies of conflict termination, scholars can, say, examine all armed conflicts and see which were ended through an

implemented peace agreement and which were not. In conflict prevention, however, it is difficult to identify the set of *potential* civil wars—i.e., those intra-state disputes that have the potential to escalate to violence but have not.

In this article, we address this gap by examining all intra-state disputes over self-determination from 1960 to 2005. Disputes over self-determination involve state governments and some ethnic group seeking increased local control over some territory in the state, and while disputes over self-determination represent the most common cause of civil war in the last two decades, it is far from certain that all self-determination disputes lead to civil war. Indeed, from 1960-2005, the majority of self-determination disputes—including, for example, Puerto Ricans in the United States, Scots in the United Kingdom, and ethnic Tatars in Russia—never escalated to armed conflict (Cunningham 2013, 659). Additionally, while all civil wars over self-determination stem from a self-determination dispute, self-determination disputes can exist independent and prior to—or after—violent conflict. Accordingly, we treat these disputes as a set of *potential* civil wars. In this article, we examine whether various types of resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)—including condemnations, diplomatic measures, and authorizations of sanctions and force—affect the likelihood that these disputes become civil wars. We find that UNSC resolutions can have a substantial preventive effect, albeit often an indirect effect through the prevention of other potential conflicts than the ones with which the UNSC is directly engaging.

### **Civil War in Self-Determination Disputes**

Before turning to these analyses, we begin by presenting a brief theoretical discussion of the process leading to civil war in self-determination disputes. Civil wars are violent conflicts between a state and one or more organized non-state actors that reach some threshold of violence. Civil wars are typically either fought over control of the central government or over some piece of territory in the

state. In this article, we focus on self-determination (SD) disputes, so we only examine territorial disputes. Disputes over self-determination are those in which a group demands greater local control over some piece of territory, which can include greater cultural, economic, or political autonomy up to a demand for secession to form an independent state or to unite with another state.

Why do some disputes over self-determination become civil wars and others do not? In general, disputes become civil wars when dissidents decide to use violence targeted against state forces to pursue their aims. This focus on dissidents does not mean that states are rarely culpable; however, when states use violent repression, this is treated as a different phenomenon (such as one-sided violence or, at the extreme, genocide) unless dissidents respond with violence.<sup>1</sup>

There are three main factors that affect whether dissidents choose to use violence targeted against the state to pursue their aims. First, dissidents must perceive some potential benefit from doing so. The clearest way in which dissidents may benefit through violent rebellion is by winning the conflict. Through military victory, rebels have the chance to impose whatever outcome they want on the state. In a civil war stemming from a self-determination dispute, this outcome could be the full secession of the territory in dispute from the state.<sup>2</sup> Outright rebel victory in territorial conflicts, however, is extremely rare, and it is unlikely that many dissidents believe that they can win the conflict in this way. Yet, even if they cannot win conflicts by defeating the government on the battlefield, dissidents can benefit from targeting violence against state forces if states grant concessions to them in return for an end to the conflict. Negotiated outcomes are much more common than military victory by rebels and are part of the process by which the rebels' concerns

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<sup>1</sup> For a discussion of interaction of dissident protest and state repression—short of civil war—see, for example, Francisco (1995), Lichbach (1998), and Moore (1998).

<sup>2</sup> In civil wars over the nature or composition of the government total rebel victory would likely manifest itself in the overthrow of the government.

and grievances, often related to horizontal inequalities, are addressed (Cederman et al. 2013). Rebel groups can also perceive a benefit from fighting if it provides them with the ability to extract resources—natural resources and/or resources from local communities and economic actors—in areas they control (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). For dissidents to anticipate gaining some benefit from civil war, then, they must expect that they can either win the conflict outright or that they can impose sufficient costs on the state to gain concessions or access to a stream of resources. They also must expect that their chances of achieving their aims and addressing their grievances via the legitimate political process are slim.

A second variable that affects dissidents' decisions to engage the state in violence is the anticipated costs incurred while trying to achieve those benefits. Violent conflict is always costly, as dissidents face the potential for violent repression.<sup>3</sup> Additionally, much of the fighting in self-determination disputes generally takes place in the territory under dispute, and destruction of this territory is costly for dissidents. Pertinent to costs, state strength is a key determinant of civil war onset (Fearon and Laitin 2003). While conflict is always costly, states vary dramatically in their ability to impose costs on dissidents. In some cases, the state is so weak that rebels can operate largely outside of its coercive reach—particularly in peripheral areas. In others, states are so strong that they can effectively repress violence throughout their territory by imposing large costs on dissidents.

The third factor that affects dissident decisions on whether to violently rebel is whether they and their state counterparts are able to reach compromise settlements to avoid civil war when they recognize compromise to be mutually preferable to war. Reaching settlements can be difficult

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<sup>3</sup> Opportunity costs also shape a self-determination movement's incentives, as fighting often precludes the ability to pursue demands via more legitimate political channels.

because of potential barriers to bargaining.<sup>4</sup> Foremost, states and dissidents may be unable to reach compromise settlements that avert civil war if they do not agree on the likely course of that war. If states under-estimate, or dissidents over-estimate, how costly conflicts will be for states, then the state may offer insufficient concessions and civil wars may emerge as a consequence of the bargaining failure.

States and dissidents may also be unable to settle disputes if one or both sides cannot commit to abide by the terms of an agreement reached. If, for example, a state promises a self-determination group greater control over its own affairs, but the group does not believe that the state will follow through on that promise, especially if the group is vulnerable to prosecution or coercion and when high levels of mistrust persist, then dissidents within the group may choose to rebel. These commitment problems can lead to civil war even if states and dissidents have similar perceptions about the likely costs and outcome of the conflict.

Another barrier to resolving disputes short of civil war arises if one or both sides view the issues involved as indivisible. Compromise settlements involve both sides getting some of what they want. In territorial disputes, this could include part of the territory going to each side, or each side having control over some issue areas in each territory. However, in some cases—such as Kashmir or Jerusalem—the territory has strong symbolic importance for each side and so the actors may perceive the issues as indivisible (e.g., Toft, 2006).

Domestic or intra-party politics offer another potential route to conflict through positive externalities that leaders may experience from conflict, which can serve to make war less costly, and even profitable, exacerbating the problem of identifying an agreement that both sides prefer to fighting. While normally applied to international conflict, in the domestic context, the "audience

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<sup>4</sup> This discussion of bargaining draws heavily on the bargaining approach to war, summarized most clearly in Fearon (1995). For a discussion of bargaining approaches to civil war, see Walter (2009).

costs" that a leader pays for backing-down in a dispute when a deterrent threat fails (e.g., Fearon 1994) may incentivize a leader to repress, rather than make concessions to, SD groups. Moreover, the "outbidding" logic in the terrorism literature (e.g., Kydd and Walter 2006) suggests incentives for dissidents to escalate to violent activity to gain political dividends within the constituent group.

### **UNSC Resolutions and Civil Wars over Self-determination**

International actions, including those by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), can address the underlying causes of civil war discussed above and thereby impact the likelihood of civil war. The UNSC is quite active in conflicts over self-determination, passing a significant number of resolutions related to these disputes. The focus here is on conflict prevention, and, in general, we can view the preventative actions taken by the UNSC as falling into four broad categories. First, the UN engages in diplomatic engagement—including good offices, mediation, fact-finding, or civilian monitoring missions, and the formation of special tribunals. Second, the UNSC authorizes the deployment of force, which can either include UN peacekeeping missions or authorizations of non-UN multinational forces.<sup>5</sup> Third, the UN levies sanctions on countries, and UNSC resolutions can impose, reauthorize, or expand sanctions on the country involved. Fourth, and more passively, UNSC resolutions often comprise condemnations, in which the Security Council deplors hostilities, non-compliance with prior UN directives or international agreements, or human rights violations. With these types of activities in mind, we argue that the UNSC can contribute to conflict prevention through two potential mechanisms: conflict management and deterrence.

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<sup>5</sup> While the resolutions authorizing the deployment of peacekeepers or authorization of other forces may not specifically authorize "force" as an action, and indeed may operate under Chapter 6 of the UN Charter, which explicitly pertains to the "peaceful settlement of disputes," we consider "force" to involve the deployment of military or police forces, not necessarily the use of violence.

## Conflict Management

UNSC resolutions that are directed *specifically* at disputes between SD movements and their states have the potential to prevent SD disputes from escalating to full-blown civil war.<sup>6</sup> Broadly, UNSC resolutions—either through the resolution itself or through the actions that a resolution authorizes—are able to do this by increasing the costs of conflict for the combatants, decreasing the costs of peace, facilitating a legitimate process by which grievances can be addressed, or by otherwise alleviating the barriers to efficient bargaining.

Diplomatic action initiated by UNSC resolutions can ameliorate the barriers to bargaining described above. Mediation, good offices, fact-finding missions, and other diplomatic efforts can help disputants to become more realistic about each others' capabilities and resolve, to overcome commitment problems, and to work to re-construct issues in a way that they are no longer seen as indivisible (e.g., DeRouen and Möller 2013; Gartner 2011; Kydd 2003, 2006; Quinn et al. 2013; Regan and Aydin 2006). Moreover, the dialogue it typically fosters can reinforce more legitimate, peaceful mechanisms by which rebel groups pursue their grievances. Diplomatic action by the UNSC is particularly relevant to reducing the domestic political incentives that leaders may have to resort to violence against SD movements—reducing the audience costs that leaders pay if they are perceived to have backed down in a SD dispute. The mediation literature has noted that third-party involvement can serve to dilute the leader's responsibility for making unpopular concessions, and also provide signals to the domestic audience that concessions are worthwhile (e.g., Beardsley and Lo 2013). Indeed, this may have been the case in 1997 when the leadership of Greek Cyprus began installing missile batteries which had the potential to reignite the unresolved Turkish Cypriot SD

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<sup>6</sup> We do not address the potential for the UNSC to resolve the underlying SD *dispute*—rather we examine its ability to prevent that dispute from escalating to violent conflict.



dispute into renewed armed conflict. UNSC resolutions (1117, 1146, and 1217) in response to the missiles seem to have provided political cover to the Greek Cypriot leadership, which had campaigned for election on the platform of installing the missiles.<sup>7</sup> The resolutions implicitly condemned the *Turkish* Cypriots for allowing 35,000 troops from Turkey onto the island in addition to deploring the "introduction of sophisticated weaponry." Along with other international pressures, this resolution is believed to have contributed to the ultimate resolution of the crisis.<sup>8</sup> By calling for concessions from both parties and sharing the blame, the resolutions may have allowed the Greek Cypriot leadership to "save face" with their domestic audience while still backing down.

The use of force can also have a variety of preventive effects. Scholars who study the effect of peacekeeping and observer missions on conflict termination (e.g., Fortna 2004, 2008 and Walter 2002) argue that these missions can help to overcome commitment problems between the parties. Additionally, having troops on the ground can raise directly the potential costs of fighting by actually enforcing the peace—by punishing and exposing violators, "inter-positioning" peacekeepers between potential combatants or otherwise making violence more difficult—or increasing the likelihood that further international action will be taken in the face of continued violence (Hultman et al. 2013).<sup>9</sup> Indeed, the effect of UNSC resolutions authorizing force can most clearly be seen in the preventative deployment of United Nations peacekeepers to Macedonia at the height of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992. With UNSC resolution 795, for the first time, UN peacekeepers were deployed not in response to an ongoing conflict but to forestall a dispute from escalating to

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<sup>7</sup> Reuters. 12/29/1998. "EU talks seen behind Cyprus missiles move." Accessed 6/30/2013.

<sup>8</sup> Middle East Review World of Information. 7/1/1999. "Cyprus-Review." Accessed 6/30/2013.

<sup>9</sup> While Sambanis (1999) notes that peacekeeping can have a negative effect on the ability of parties to resolve the underlying dispute behind a conflict, we examine here the ability of the UNSC to prevent such disputes from escalating to violence, not the resolution of the underlying grievances.

violence. There was a high probability of civil war occurring in Macedonia, given the self-determination dispute between Albanians and Macedonians in the country and the ongoing ethnic violence in the other former Yugoslav states. Hundreds of peacekeepers deployed along the border areas of Macedonia and into the interior, which served to raise the costs of violence by blocking the flow of fighters and weapons from other parts of the former Yugoslavia. Ultimately, UN intervention in Macedonia was instrumental in preventing the Albanian SD dispute in Macedonia from escalating to armed conflict (Ackerman and Pala 1996).

Sanctions impose immediate costs on the parties, particularly the government. Depending on the nature of the sanctions, they can directly impact a state's war-fighting capacity by putting an embargo on the importation of fuel or military material—as in the case of the 1992 arms embargo levied against Yugoslavia during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Resolution 713)—or more broadly damage a state's economy—as in the case of broad sanctions put in place against Taliban-ruled Afghanistan in 1999 (Resolution 1267). In particular, sanctions make large-scale repression more difficult, especially for the government, as the use of military force is now relatively more expensive, given import or financial restrictions and the exacerbated opportunity costs brought on by the broader damage to the economy. Further, sanctions also provide an inducement to the parties to settle because the lifting of sanctions is a benefit of a compromise settlement.

Resolutions containing condemnations—such as those calling on Israel to cease efforts to incorporate East Jerusalem after the June 1967 war (e.g., Resolution 252)—may serve to directly increase the *potential* costs of civil war because agreement by the permanent-five members of the UNSC (P-5)—five powerful states with disparate preferences<sup>10</sup>—is required for a UNSC resolution

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<sup>10</sup> The importance of the preference divergence of these states has been noted by Thompson (2009) and Chapman (2009), who find that UNSC resolutions serve an informational role precisely because a UNSC resolution is so hard to pass.

to pass. A condemnation in such a resolution is a clearer signal to governments (and potentially dissidents) that the UN is committed to imposing costs on them in the event of a violent conflict than a condemnation by a single state or even the UN General Assembly. Parties are put on notice that the UNSC is monitoring their dispute closely and stands ready to consider imposing more direct costs in the event that conflict is started or if the parties edge closer to actual fighting.

### Deterrence

In addition to the direct impact that UNSC resolutions—and the actions that they precede—can have on SD disputes, we anticipate that UNSC resolutions also can have an indirect effect on these disputes. In a number of cases, the UNSC takes actions in countries that are not directly designed to manage self-determination disputes, but that can still affect the degree to which states and dissidents see civil war as a viable option. These indirect deterrence effects may in some cases be unanticipated, and in other cases foreseen but unintended. They contrast with actions that are more intentional in helping the actors avoid armed conflict, which we consider in the realm of conflict management.

UNSC authorizations of force should be able to exert an indirect negative impact on the likelihood that a given SD dispute escalates to civil war. Put differently, the pacifying effect of peacekeepers should not be strictly limited to the conflict which drew them to a country or region in the first place. In line with the expectations of the literature (e.g., Fortna 2004, 2008), the presence of peacekeepers in a given country should decrease the likelihood of conflict escalation or recurrence wherever the peacekeepers are in a position to observe or prevent escalatory behavior. While mandates may provide strict rules of engagement and limits on the activity of peacekeepers, their presence and activities should have positive externalities to any dispute that is realistically within their reach. For example, the stationing of peacekeepers along the Iran-Iraq border at the close of the Iran-Iraq War (Resolution 619) can be understood to have indirectly reduced the

probability that the Kurdish SD disputes in both Iran and Iraq would escalate to civil war, given the location of the Kurds along the border areas where the peacekeepers were stationed. At the very least, the presence of international observers should make it harder for both potential rebels and the government to "get away with" the acts of violence or repression that may precipitate war. As another example, the deployment of UN peacekeepers in 1990 to post-civil war Nicaragua (Resolutions 650 and 653) destroyed thousands of former rebel weapons—including those of indigenous fighters (MAR 2009). This action can be understood to have made it more difficult for the subsequent indigenous SD dispute in the later 1990s to escalate to civil war. Thousands of would-be rebels were now without weapons—thanks to the efforts of UN peacekeepers years before. This—along with other factors—likely contributed to the relative peacefulness of the indigenous SD dispute in Nicaragua.

Sanctions directed at a state, even if they are not imposed because of a specific SD dispute, should also impact the likelihood that an indirectly-related SD dispute in that country escalates to armed conflict. Anything that impacts the state's ability to repress or fight a civil war should affect all potential civil wars in a country given the fungibility of the resources necessary for repression. Indeed sanctions directed against general Apartheid activities in South Africa (e.g., resolutions 418, 591) would have also served to increase the costs of state violence against any domestic opposition group, including against indirectly-related SD groups, such as the Khoisan and Zulus.

Finally, UNSC condemnations that do not specifically address the SD dispute, but address another conflict or issue indirectly related to the dispute, will help signal to both dissidents and the government that any escalation of their latent conflict will likely draw the attention of the UNSC, thereby increasing the expected costs of conflict. For example, a resolution condemning Taliban rule in Afghanistan (Resolution 1267, 1996) indirectly pertained to the SD movements of the Tajiks and Uzbeks, because of the discriminatory policies of the Taliban government against those groups.

Our argument, then, is that UN Security Council resolutions have the potential to decrease the likelihood that disputes become civil wars in at least two ways. When resolutions authorize actions that are directly targeted at the dispute they can help manage the tensions and promote alternatives to violence. Additionally, UNSC resolutions that do not directly target but that indirectly affect the dispute also have the potential to deter the outbreak of civil war. In the next section, we will explore empirically whether UNSC resolutions have a preventive effect.

### The Potential for Moral Hazard

Before turning to that analysis, we should briefly address a potential harmful effect of UNSC action. While we expect that UNSC resolutions will generally work to decrease the likelihood of civil war, it is also possible that in some cases these resolutions will actually make civil war more likely. When UNSC resolutions are perceived by one side in a SD dispute to be in its favor, the UNSC resolution may actually increase the probability of civil war. The expectation of UN support decreases that actor's expected costs for civil war, thereby decreasing the likelihood that it is able to reach a negotiated outcome with its opponent. Put differently, with this logic, the expectation of UN support may inspire reckless behavior on the part of the actor that anticipates it.<sup>11</sup> If there are cases where UNSC action increases the likelihood of civil war, then it will make it less likely that we will find evidence of the preventive effect of resolutions. We expect, however, that the UNSC will be aware of this issue, and so will generally not act in cases in which it has reason to expect that resolutions will make civil war more likely.

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<sup>11</sup> This dilemma is noted in the literature as a potential draw-back to the UN's more aggressive stance on humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War era (e.g., Kuperman 2005; Rauchhaus 2009). Greig and Diehl (2005) find evidence for a related moral-hazard issue about how peacekeeping can diminish the incentives for the relevant parties to strike a lasting settlement.

## Data and Methodology

To test whether UNSC resolutions decrease the likelihood of civil war in disputes we use data from all years of a self-determination (SD) group's existence from 1960 to 2005. The population of SD movements comes from the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) Peace and Conflict Report (Marshall and Gurr 2003).<sup>12</sup> This report identifies 145 SD movements residing in 77 countries, which demand more self-determination—i.e., increased local control and autonomy for an ethnic group in some territory.<sup>13</sup> This list encompasses both groups that have participated in civil war, such as the Kurds in Turkey and Iraq, as well as those, such as the East Caprivians in Namibia, that have not. It is important to note also that the data reflects the resolution or emergence of SD disputes at different times between 1960 and 2005. For example, the Afrikaners in South Africa dispute only emerges in 1994 with the end of Apartheid, whereas the Kosovar Albanian dispute exits the data after 1999 with de-facto Kosovar independence.<sup>14</sup> We

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<sup>12</sup> The CIDCM data stem from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) data, which focuses on "politically active ethnic groups," (see Cunningham 2013) so "SD movements" here exclude separatist movements without a clear ethnic dimension, such as Texas separatists in the United States.

<sup>13</sup> In the analyses in this article, we use 142 of these groups, since Cunningham (2013) was unable to find any organizations representing the Indonesian Dayaks and Russian Avars for the entire period. Additionally, CIDCM includes Lebanese Palestinians as a group distinct from Israeli Palestinians, but Cunningham (2013) found no evidence of Palestinian groups in Lebanon advocating on behalf of self-determination separate from the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.

<sup>14</sup> While the emergence of groups such as the Afrikaners raises the possibility that the entry into the data of an SD group is endogenous to UNSC action, many of the SD movements in our data, such as the Scots in the UK or the Kurds in Iraq, exist prior to the modern era. Those that emerge within

include a list of all SD groups in the Appendix as well as an indication of whether or not the group experienced a civil war onset in this period. Of the groups that are at risk of a civil war during our time coverage, 44 percent experienced a civil war, and 67 percent are listed as violent or militant by CIDCM. Table 1 shows the number and percentage of SD groups from each region as well as the percentage of groups in the region experiencing a civil war.

### **TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE**

Our unit of analysis is the state-SD group dyad year. To capture the onset of a civil war stemming from a SD dispute, the dependent variable is an indicator of whether or not a new armed-conflict episode, as defined by the Uppsala Conflict Data Project/Peace Research Institute of Oslo Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Themner and Wallensteen 2012), began in the year. Armed conflict onsets are years when at least 25 battle-related fatalities occurred and in which there are at least two years of peace prior to the onset of hostilities. Our analyses drop the years in which there is an ongoing armed conflict, as well as the two years immediately following the end of an armed conflict. Some of the onsets are brand new armed conflicts and others are recurrences. We used Cunningham's (2013) related study of SD group fractionalization and the onset of armed conflict to tie the SD movements to the specific armed conflicts.

We conduct different analyses with different samples in order to assess if UNSC resolutions help prevent armed conflicts involving SD movements that have never experienced civil war, the recurrence of armed conflict involving SD movements that do have a history of war, or both. The first sample includes all groups at risk for conflict, whether it is recurrence or brand new. The second sample includes just those that have yet to experience a prior civil war.

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the time-frame of our data, often emerge as a result of events likely exogenous to UNSC action, such as decolonization in the 1960s, or the break-ups of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

With discrete binary time-series cross-sectional data, we run logit regressions that are essentially event-history models (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). To account for duration dependence, we follow Carter and Signorino (2010) and include a cubic polynomial of the time at risk.<sup>15</sup> Since our analysis begins in 1960, but many of the groups existed prior to 1960, we would run into the problem of left-censoring if we started the risk time for all groups at 0 in 1960 (Carter and Signorino ND). So, for the 34 groups that already existed in 1960, we chose as their origin point the later of the following: 1) the year after any post-1946 armed-conflict episodes ended; 2) the entrance into the international system of the respective country; or 3) 1946.<sup>16</sup> In addition to these controls for time dependence, we report standard errors that are robust to clustering on each SD movement.<sup>17</sup>

Our independent variables are measures of the content of recent UNSC resolutions related to the SD movement. Beardsley (2013) has coded information on the content of all the resolutions during the time period of our study. The content of the resolutions includes information on which countries were the concern of the resolutions, as well as which actions were mandated in the operative paragraphs—i.e., condemnations, diplomacy, force, or sanctions. After matching the resolutions to all the relevant countries with SD movements, we went through each resolution and

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<sup>15</sup> This allows the baseline hazard rate to vary along with the amount of time in which the SD movements have experienced peace, and it controls for temporal dependence in the same way as yearly "dummy" variables or splines of "peace-years" while at the same time providing greater efficiency and ease of interpretation (Carter and Signorino 2010).

<sup>16</sup> By not going back prior to 1946, we are assuming that the international system fundamentally changed in 1945, with the end of WWII and the formation of the United Nations, which have direct implications for the protection of state sovereignty.

<sup>17</sup> This serves to additionally account for correlated data caused by repeated observations from the same subjects that can have multiple civil war onsets over the course of the observation period.



determined if the resolution directly pertained to the SD movement in question, indirectly pertained, or was not relevant.<sup>18</sup> This typology and the indirect/direct distinction stems from the theoretical discussion in the previous section of the potential for UNSC resolutions to have a conflict management or deterrent effect. We provide additional details of this procedure in the appendix.

In the analyses below, we examine whether different types of UNSC resolutions have different effects. We aggregate the various types of activities in the resolutions into the following categories: diplomacy; new force authorizations and mandate expansions; sanctions; force re-authorizations; condemnations; and “all else.” The categories are not mutually exclusive, except that the “all else” category is true only if there is no activity of the other listed types.<sup>19</sup> “**Diplomacy**” covers a wide range of action including UNSC instructions for the Secretary-General to offer his good offices, mediate or investigate an issue; mandates that empower fact-finding or monitoring entities; calls for other actors to mediate; the formation of special courts; and mandates that call for UN entities to carry out peacebuilding activities—those focused on strengthening political and economic institutions, including demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) programs. Although some of these actions are distinct from each other, they share an emphasis on non-

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<sup>18</sup> The International Peace Institute (IPI) provides important data on "Compliance with Security Council Resolutions" (Mikulaschek and Perry 2013). However, the IPI data only cover compliance of the parties in a dispute that has escalated to civil war. To examine the *prevention* of civil war, data on *potential* wars is needed, which is why we marry our UNSC resolution data to the Cunningham (2013) data on SD disputes, in which the bulk of disputes have not reached armed conflict.

<sup>19</sup> We drop the resolutions pertaining to admittance to the UN. The “all else” category does not mean that such resolutions are without substance, but that the resolutions do not fit into the above categories. "All else" includes many cases where the UN issues a declaration of concern for a conflict but does not condemn it outright.

coercive UN involvement. Moreover, Boutros-Ghali's "Agenda for Peace" similarly combines these activities as part of "preventive diplomacy." "**Force**" mandates include those pertaining to missions overseen by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), as well as missions carried out by multinational forces with explicit authorization from the UNSC. Mandates of "**new force**" are separated from "**force reauthorizations**" because, unlike other types of UN action, force authorizations carry an explicit expiration date that can only be extended with another resolution. Simple extensions of mandates to a later date are coded as their own category and generally considered to be involvement that is not nearly as active as resolutions that authorize or endorse new approaches. We include mandate expansions and all authorizations to use all necessary means as new force. "**Sanctions**" are explicit demands and authorizations for the international community to restrict the trade, financial privileges or movement of specific governments or leaders. Resolutions are coded for sanctions when they authorize new sanctions as well as when they call for the continuation or expansion of existing sanctions. Finally, "**condemnation**" covers explicit statements in the operative paragraphs that deplore such actions as hostilities, human rights abuses, and failure to comply with existing agreements. We also include in this category explicit threats—but not actual implementation—of sanctions or some other punishments.

With these definitions established, we then took two additional steps in creating the variables that would enter our models. The first was to create two separate indicators for each type of action: one for the resolutions that directly pertained to the SD movement in question, and one for the resolutions that indirectly pertained. Of the 142 SD movements at risk of armed conflict in our sample, 19 had some *directly*-pertinent UNSC resolution condemning the actors, 9 had sanctions, 12 had new force authorizations, 9 had re-authorizations, 11 had instructions for diplomacy, and 21 had resolutions in the "all else" category. Twenty-five had some *indirectly*-pertinent UNSC resolution

condemning the actors, 19 had sanctions, 17 had new force authorizations, 15 had re-authorizations, 24 had instructions for diplomacy, and 29 had resolutions in the “all else” category.<sup>20</sup>

Second, we used an exponential decay function to capture the history of the UNSC involvement. We posit that the effect of a resolution is likely to last much longer than a single year, but that the weight of its influence should decrease over time. Moreover, when multiple resolutions of the same type have been issued in the recent past, they should have a cumulative effect. Using a decay function allows us to capture these dynamics. We use a four-year half life, where a resolution has the weight of one in the year in which it was adopted, and then the weight decreases each year such that it has a weight of 0.5 after four years, 0.25 after eight years, etc.<sup>21</sup> As additional resolutions are adopted, they add a weight of 1 to the decaying measure, and a new decay function is applied to the weight of that resolution at its date of adoption. Multiple resolutions with the same actions in the same year are treated as having an initial weight equal to the number of resolutions. To avoid simultaneity bias, we lag all the independent variables one year.

The number of explanatory variables—due to having both direct and indirect measures of each type of action—and the considerable overlap among the actions caused an initial model with all the different types of UNSC action to behave poorly.<sup>22</sup> We thus performed separate regressions for each type of action while controlling for the combined weights of all the other types of action. The

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<sup>20</sup> These are just the counts of the SD movements with these resolutions. Since most of these movements experienced multiple resolutions, the number of relevant resolutions is much higher.

<sup>21</sup> We use a four-year half life in part because Beardsley (2009) finds that mediation no longer has a positive stabilizing effect after four years, due to the declining influence of the third parties involved. We also test and find that the key results are robust to a shorter half-life of 2 years.

<sup>22</sup> The model did not produce results for the estimated effect of direct sanctions and yielded unbelievably large coefficients for some of the other variables

estimated coefficients on the actions variables should thus be interpreted as the effects of those actions while holding constant the general level of other UNSC involvement. In addition to controlling for the time at risk, we control for a number of variables that correlate with the *ex ante* fragility of peace. If UNSC involvement is fairly reactive and tends to go to the cases at greatest risk of major violence (Beardsley and Schmidt 2012), then the analysis will tend to understate the ability for the UN to prevent armed conflict.

Many of our control variables follow from Cunningham (2013). We control for the number of SD movement factions (logged), which Cunningham shows to robustly increase the chance of civil war. Cunningham also finds the occurrence of previous concessions to play a role in the outbreak of violent conflict, and we include this measure as well in order to control for the history of conflict management that exists between many of the movements and governments. We include a binary indicator of democracy in the models, since democratic states have more legitimate political avenues by which the SD's grievances can be heard, and therefore are less likely to experience civil war (e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre et al 2001).<sup>23</sup> The presence of ethnic kin groups in neighboring states has been shown to increase the propensity for armed conflict, and so we include a binary indicator of such groups (Jenne 2007). GDP per capita has a robust correlation with intrastate conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Hegre and Sambanis 2006), as does the number of active SD groups (Walter 2006). Finally, we control for the average amount of economic discrimination in the country from the Minorities at Risk data, since Cederman et al. (2013) find discrimination in ethnic conflicts to shape the propensity for political violence. In addition to these core control variables, we have conducted additional robustness checks by adding additional regional and temporal control variables in order to account for other possible confounds.

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<sup>23</sup> Democracies are those with a Polity index greater than 6 (Marshall and Jaggers 2000).

Specifically, we included dummy variables for sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe,<sup>24</sup> as well as a dummy variable for the Cold War. The key results are robust to these extensions and are reported in the appendix. Finally, we include in models in the appendix a measure of whether peacekeeping operations, from the International Military Interventions data, are deployed to the respective countries. We do not include this as a core control variable because it is an intermediate variable between the force authorization measures and the outcomes of interest, and it is thus not a potential confound needing to be controlled. That being said, it is telling that the findings are similar with and without this variable, which suggests that the movement of the force mandates does not solely operate through the deployment of troops on the ground, and that there is likely to be a broader signaling effect of strong UNSC action

Table 2 presents the regression results for our models of the more active types of UN activity. For space constraints, the results for the more passive types of UN involvement—condemnations and simple reauthorizations of force—are shown in the appendix and indicate that such actions do not have a statistically significant relationship with the onset of conflict. Our theoretical discussion highlighted two potential mechanisms through which UNSC resolutions can contribute to conflict prevention. If UNSC resolutions directly related to self-determination disputes are associated with a decreased likelihood of civil war, that is evidence of conflict management. If indirectly-associated resolutions lead to a decreased likelihood of civil war, that is evidence of deterrence. We discuss the evidence for each of these mechanisms in sequence below.

## **TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE**

### **Results**

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<sup>24</sup> We include regional dummies in lieu of country fixed effects, because the inclusion of country fixed effects would exclude from the analysis all cases where there was no civil war.

The results from the first two models depict evidence of efficacious conflict-management from diplomatic engagement. UNSC resolutions authorizing diplomacy directly-related to the SD dispute are strongly associated with a decrease in the likelihood of armed-conflict. The top panel in Figure 1 uses the results from the first model to show this relationship substantively. In expectation, periods immediately after UNSC resolutions that contain instructions for diplomatic measures (when the weight variable increases by 1) are about 60 percent less likely to experience armed-conflict onset. It is important to note, as we see in the second model, that the preventive role of diplomacy holds for cases in which the self-determination movement had never participated in a civil war. So, this finding is capturing prevention before conflict erupts and not simply previous conflict management during a violent conflict that only delays the relapse of the same conflict.

#### **FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE**

Turning to the third through sixth columns, we do not find evidence of preventative conflict management for authorizations of new force or sanctions. The coefficient on the direct authorizations of new force variable is not statistically significant, while that on sanctions is actually positive and significant, meaning that civil war is more likely following UNSC authorizations of sanctions.<sup>25</sup> This positive effect is potential evidence for a moral hazard effect in which sanctions embolden one side in the dispute. However, it is also possible that this positive correlation occurs because the UNSC is more likely to impose sanctions in disputes that are escalating to civil war, and thus the likelihood of civil war causes the UNSC resolution, and not the other way around. We discuss below alternative approaches that help identify the causal direction and mitigate this possible source of endogeneity bias.

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<sup>25</sup> The estimation did not produce a coefficient for the direct sanctions measure because there were only two observations in which the direct-sanctions weight was non-zero for this subsample.

Examining the deterrent effects of UNSC resolutions, we find that indirect authorizations of new force and sanctions decrease the likelihood of civil war. The bottom panels in Figure 1 show these relationships and also how the authorization of force has a much stronger substantive effect than sanction declarations. Recent indirectly-pertinent resolutions that authorize force almost completely eliminate the likelihood of armed-conflict onset, while indirectly-pertinent resolutions that authorize sanctions decrease that likelihood by about 40 percent in expectation. Moreover, the observed deterrent effect of indirectly-pertinent new authorizations of force is robust to when the sample only includes those movements that have never experienced a civil war, while indirectly-pertinent authorizations of sanctions are not. In support of the deterrence logic presented above, it appears that more heavy-handed UN action can have strong indirect effects, where SD movements are much less likely to end up in civil war if the UN has been active in using coercive measures related to another issue in the same country.

These findings are particularly striking given the implausibility that they can be explained by endogeneity bias. While the UNSC may take *direct* action regarding an SD dispute in anticipation of the outcome,<sup>26</sup> the same logic does not extend to *indirectly*-related SD disputes. It seems very unlikely, for example, that in the face of the general threat of the ongoing famine and inter-clan warfare in Mogadishu, the UNSC authorized the deployment of peacekeepers to Somalia in the early 1990s (e.g., Resolution 794) in anticipation of the projected outcomes of the Isaaq and Puntland Darod SD disputes in that country. If the UNSC actively intended an action to have a preventative effect, it would most likely mention this intention in the authorizing resolution and thus make it a directly

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<sup>26</sup> For example, recent literature on economic sanctions finds that implemented sanctions are ineffective in compelling behavior (Pape 1997), but this is largely driven by a selection effect (Nooruddin 2002). This may explain our positive finding for directly-relevant sanctions. This literature does find that *threatened*—but not implemented—sanctions are effective (Drezner 2003).

relevant action in our coding. The analysis of these indirect actions can thus be thought of as a quasi-experimental approach that is less susceptible to concerns about selection effects.

While the observed deterrent effects of indirectly-relevant authorizations of new force and sanctions are not likely to be explained by selection effects, the findings related to direct diplomacy and direct sanctions warrant additional scrutiny. If the process by which the UN chooses to directly act is related to the likelihood of civil war, then our results may be biased. Consider two possibilities: If the United Nations chooses to become involved in the easiest disputes—those in which the likelihood of civil war is the lowest—then the negative correlation between direct diplomacy and civil war may just indicate that these disputes were unlikely to escalate to civil war anyway, not that diplomacy has any effect. On the other hand, if the United Nations chooses to become involved in the disputes with the highest likelihood of civil war, then a positive correlation between direct sanctions and civil war may indicate simply that sanctions are used in the most severe disputes, not that they increase the likelihood of civil war on their own.<sup>27</sup>

To determine whether the UNSC tends to become involved in the toughest cases or the easiest cases, we compared the means of the control variables during the years in which there was a resolution of each type to years in which there were no resolutions with that type of action. This allows us to determine whether UNSC resolutions occur in dyad-years where factors found to make civil war more likely had higher or lower values. As can be seen in a figure in the online appendix, we find that, with regards to *direct* UNSC involvement, there is not much by way of a specific pattern. Many direct UNSC actions are more likely when there are more factions, less democracy, and more neighboring kin groups—which are indicators of a greater likelihood of armed conflict—but also more likely when there have been many previous concessions, a fewer number of

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<sup>27</sup> For consideration of similar issues of selection effects related to peacekeeping, see Fortna (2004; 2008). Gartner (2011) and Beber (2012) discuss selection effects in the study of mediation.



competing groups, and lower economic discrimination—which are indicators of a more stable security environment and a lower likelihood of civil war. There is more of a consistent pattern for the *indirect* types of actions, which tend to be associated with more difficult SD disputes that should have a higher likelihood of civil war onset. Accordingly, it is important to emphasize again that the findings with regard to the indirect actions are thus especially robust to critiques that any observed effects are the result of the non-random assignment of UN actions. Not only are the indirect actions more likely in the tough cases, but it is not likely that the ex ante probability of violence regarding the *indirectly* related SD groups played much into the initial decision calculus of the UNSC.

To further analyze whether some factors were jointly affecting the likelihood of UNSC involvement and civil war, we also conducted a Seemingly Unrelated Regression model to simultaneously estimate an equation of UN involvement and the outcome equation while controlling for the correlation in errors between the equations.<sup>28</sup> In doing so, we control for some of the processes left outside the model that potentially shape both how active the UN is in addressing a SD dispute and the ultimate potential for violence to escalate. The dependent variable in the involvement equation is the summed weights of the direct and indirect lagged UN activity, excluding the “else” category. We used the number of previous civil war onsets that the group had experienced, and dummies for the Cold War, Western states, P-5 status, and P-5 allies as variables in the UN-involvement equation that did not appear in the outcome equations.<sup>29</sup> The dummy variables are likely to affect the political feasibility of UNSC action, while the number of previous civil war onsets shapes externality or humanitarian interests in intervention (Beardsley and Schmidt 2012).

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<sup>28</sup> Each equation was estimated with OLS, so the outcome equations were linear probability models.

<sup>29</sup> All the variables in the selection first equation are lagged one year, since the endogenous variable is the lagged UNSC activity.

In these regressions, none of the correlations in the errors across the equations were statistically significant, so there is no evidence that unobserved processes are causing endogeneity bias. The direct effects of diplomatic activity and the indirect effects of new force remain robustly significant, as seen in the appendix. We are therefore comfortable relying on the logit models in Table 2 for our analyses. The selection analyses also do not suggest that the effects of direct authorizations of sanctions are driven by the ex ante likelihood of civil war, which strengthens the plausibility that there may be a moral hazard effect in those cases. However, we remain skeptical that UNSC resolutions systematically induce moral hazard on theoretical grounds as discussed above. We recommend for future research close analysis of the specific cases in which sanctions were followed by civil war to see if there is evidence that UN action emboldened one of the adversaries.

## **Conclusion**

This paper provides strong evidence that UNSC involvement can substantially dampen the propensity for disputes between SD movements and their respective governments to escalate to civil war. We find robust support for the direct preventive effect of UNSC resolutions related to diplomatic activity. Actions such as UN-led mediation, fact finding, good offices, and institution-building can go a long way to keep SD movements from engaging in violent conflict. We also find robust support for the ability for military force and sanctions to indirectly deter other SD movements from turning violent. Strong UN intervention has downstream effects that shape the expected costs for dissident groups and the government alike to resort to armed conflict.

We also do not see any evidence that these relationships are driven by the non-random adoption of UNSC resolutions. The findings regarding UNSC resolutions' indirect effects are particularly noteworthy, because it is especially difficult to form a story for there being spurious indirect effects—the prospects for peace of indirectly related self-determination movements are

unlikely to strongly weigh on the decisions of the Security Council. For example, the United Nations deployed ONUCA to Nicaragua in order to preserve the fragile peace that ended the civil war there between the leftist Sandinista government and the Contras and to prevent a recurrence of that conflict and not to “cherry-pick” the forestalling of the indigenous self-determination dispute from escalating to armed conflict. Moreover, the indirect resolutions that authorize new force and sanctions tend to be more likely in the more difficult conflicts.

We believe that the findings regarding the ameliorative effect of both sanctions and force on SD disputes not directly pertinent to the authorizing UNSC resolution are particularly striking. Here we observe positive externalities to UN action that are very likely not actively intended by the UNSC authors. The policy implications are clear—we cannot judge the efficacy of UN action vis-a-vis SD disputes solely on the basis of the specific dispute at which the UN action was directed, but should also take into account the strong pacifying effect that UN action may have on SD disputes peripheral to the dispute at which the action is targeted.

While the results point to the valuable role that an IGO like the UN can play in conflict prevention, this does not mean that UN intervention, especially the use of sanctions and military force, should necessarily increase for all SD disputes. We find a positive relationship between direct sanctions and the onset of armed conflict. It is possible that this positive relationship is a product of selection effects from the reactive nature of UN involvement, especially since consensus support for costly actions such as sanctions is difficult to muster unless there is a clear threat to stability. While it is also possible that the UN is liable to create a moral hazard situation in which one of the sides feels protected and thus less eager to strike a compromise, we believe this is unlikely. The process by which UNSC resolutions are issued requires the consensus of five actors with disparate preferences, and it is unlikely that this is conducive to rapid or cavalier decision-making in which the UNSC would unwittingly engender moral hazard. Rather, we believe that the UNSC, even if not perfectly

so, takes into account the potential for moral hazard in SD disputes and issues resolutions accordingly. And it is important to emphasize that, while there is a positive relationship between directly-relevant sanctions and civil war onset, at the same time the findings suggest that when there are strong, non-preventative justifications for the use of force or sanctions, indirectly affected SD disputes in that country will be less likely to escalate to the level of major armed conflict.

We find strong evidence that the UNSC can have an important role in reducing the likelihood that SD disputes escalate to civil war, but there are clear avenues for future research. Future analysis also may be able to examine when and how actions by other IGOs combine to affect the likelihood of civil war in SD disputes. UNSC resolutions often occur concurrently with similar actions by like-minded regional and international security organizations—UNSC resolutions pertaining to the Balkans and Sudan have often accompanied military action by NATO and the African Union, respectively. While some of the robustness checks in the online appendix control for non-UN and UN peacekeeping missions, more could be done to unpack the role of non-UN actors.

Future study should also consider the preventive effects of UNSC action in non-self-determination disputes. While disputes over self-determination are the underlying cause of the majority of civil wars in the past two decades (Cunningham 2013, 659), there is an important class of civil wars that stem from disputes over the nature and composition of governments—separate from the grievances of self-determination groups. These are civil wars over what the ACD terms "incompatibilities over government" (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Themner and Wallenstein 2012). Our analysis does not address how the UNSC can affect the likelihood that these disputes escalate to armed conflict, given the absence of data on disputes over government short of civil war. While it is possible that the same patterns found here exist with regards to UNSC action in disputes over government, different effects may be observed, given the different underlying structural causes (Sambanis 2001). It may be also that given the higher stakes for governments in these disputes and a

potentially greater reluctance to negotiate, the preventative effects observed here may be weakened. On the other hand, the relative brevity of non-ethnic civil wars compared to ethnic civil-wars (Fearon 2004) suggests that there is something particularly intractable about *SD disputes*, not disputes over government. If this is the case, it may be that the ameliorative effect of UNSC resolutions found here will be strengthened in the case of disputes over government. Future research should seek to identify whether the effects identified here apply not only to potential civil wars over self-determination, but to all potential civil wars.

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**Table 1: Regional Distribution of SD Movements and Civil Wars**

<b>Region</b>	<b>Number of SD disputes</b>	<b>Percent of Total SD disputes</b>	<b>Percent with civil war</b>
North America	5	3.52%	0.00%
South/Latin America	8	5.63%	0.00%
Western Europe	16	11.27%	12.50%
(former) Soviet Union	18	12.68%	27.78%
Eastern Europe	13	9.15%	46.15%
Oceania	2	1.41%	50.00%
Sub-Saharan Africa	32	22.54%	53.13%
East Asia	20	14.08%	60.00%
South Asia	21	14.79%	61.90%
Middle East/North Africa	7	4.93%	85.71%
<b>Total</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>43.66%</b>

Table 2: Logit Models of Armed Conflict Onset

	Diplomacy		New Force		Sanctions	
	All	First	All	First	All	First
Direct respective action	-1.358** (0.690)	-5.434** (2.165)	0.345 (0.231)	-0.0148 (0.405)	2.756*** (0.965)	
Other direct actions	0.180** (0.0762)	0.657*** (0.185)	-0.0198 (0.0223)	0.214* (0.117)	-0.0781 (0.0660)	0.159 (0.123)
Indirect respective action	0.0723 (0.496)	-1.552 (1.014)	-3.847** (1.582)	-4.477* (2.638)	-0.411*** (0.157)	-0.201 (0.301)
Other indirect actions	-0.0616 (0.0866)	0.149 (0.136)	0.00442 (0.0472)	0.000328 (0.0730)	0.0128 (0.0375)	-0.0193 (0.0429)
Factions (logged)	1.030*** (0.200)	0.945*** (0.267)	0.957*** (0.199)	0.842*** (0.272)	1.037*** (0.200)	0.864*** (0.261)
Previous concessions	-0.283 (0.257)	-0.587 (0.426)	-0.253 (0.257)	-0.622 (0.425)	-0.258 (0.255)	-0.598 (0.442)
Democracy	-0.553* (0.292)	-0.826** (0.382)	-0.523* (0.289)	-0.782** (0.376)	-0.590** (0.300)	-0.761** (0.380)
Neighboring kin groups	0.648** (0.260)	0.176 (0.388)	0.641** (0.258)	0.176 (0.397)	0.591** (0.269)	0.120 (0.397)
GDP per capita (logged)	-0.143 (0.110)	-0.345* (0.195)	-0.158 (0.104)	-0.295 (0.198)	-0.140 (0.111)	-0.307 (0.201)
Number of groups	0.0788** (0.0320)	0.0430 (0.0398)	0.0823*** (0.0314)	0.0503 (0.0392)	0.0796** (0.0337)	0.0448 (0.0404)
Economic discrimination	0.0427 (0.0899)	0.0154 (0.156)	0.0429 (0.0882)	0.0110 (0.154)	0.0424 (0.0915)	0.0135 (0.156)
Risk time	-0.378*** (0.0645)	-0.387*** (0.107)	-0.368*** (0.0629)	-0.365*** (0.104)	-0.361*** (0.0653)	-0.327*** (0.102)
Risk time squared	0.0169*** (0.00370)	0.0172*** (0.00544)	0.0163*** (0.00351)	0.0161*** (0.00524)	0.0161*** (0.00374)	0.0142*** (0.00505)
Risk time cubed	-0.000214*** (5.84e-05)	-0.000208*** (7.41e-05)	-0.000206*** (5.41e-05)	-0.000194*** (7.09e-05)	-0.000204*** (5.93e-05)	-0.000169** (6.80e-05)
Constant	-2.365** (0.979)	-0.321 (1.738)	-2.230** (0.935)	-0.657 (1.756)	-2.409** (1.011)	-0.681 (1.778)
Observations	2334	1869	2334	1869	2334	1867

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.10, two-tailed test





Figure 1: Marginal Effects of Types of UNSC Resolutions, with 95% Confidence Intervals