Does Democracy Deliver in Islamic Societies?

Challenges to the Legitimacy of Democratic Institutions in the Muslim World

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Abstract

Is Islam compatible with democracy? While recent developments in Northern Africa and the Middle East have added new urgency to this question, the literature seems stuck with an apparent paradox of Muslims expressing a strong desire for democracy, but democratic institutions not actually taking hold in the Islamic world. We contribute to the debate, shifting focus to an essential issue that somehow has been overlooked in the literature, the matter of the sustainability of democratic institutions, in turn a function of the legitimacy of such institutions. We contrast a culturalist perspective that argues that Islam is fundamentally incompatible with democratic institutions (the incompatibility or clash-of-civilizations view) with a modernization perspective that finds that the legitimacy of democratic institutions in Muslim (or other newly democratizing) societies hinges critically on these institutions delivering the individual freedom and welfare gains that are expected from them. Key novelty is that we provide an ex-post assessment of whether democracy indeed improves the lives of people in the Muslim world, also analyzing potential causes—rooted in Islam or otherwise—of a failure of democracy to deliver. We start by estimating inter-societal differences in the gains in happiness, freedom and income caused by democratic institutions. If democracy has a weaker positive effect on these variables in Islamic countries, we interpret this as an indication that democracy delivers less in Islamic countries, making disappointment with the functioning of democracy and a resulting loss of legitimacy more likely. Our results indicate that democracy indeed delivers less freedom in Islamic countries than it does elsewhere. However, the evidence also shows that were democracy to bring Islamic countries the same levels of perceived individual freedom and welfare as it does in the rest of the world, people in Islamic countries appreciate democracy just as much. Further analysis reveals the nature of the Islamic gap in the democracy-performance nexus, which traces back much further than Islam itself to historical clan-based social structures and political constellations. It is not Islam or Islamic teachings but rather clannishness that appears to hold the key to democratization (not) taking off in certain societies.

Keywords: values, democracy, religion, Islam, culture, measurement
INTRODUCTION

Two years after the Arab Spring, there are worrying signs of democratic stagnation or even reversal in the Muslim world. The relatively open elections following the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia have so far mainly pushed Islamist movements to the forefront, which increasingly show tendencies towards authoritarianism, erosion of women’s rights, and intolerance towards other groups. Worries that radical elements are starting to dominate the opposition in Syria are increasing. In Libya, the removal of the Qaddafi regime has not yet inspired all militias to lay down arms and abide by the rule of law and democratic decision-making. All together, the Islamic democratic deficit has not disappeared during the Spring. Fear exists that the Arab Spring goes the way that earlier openings in the political system in Muslim countries—such as the Iranian revolution in 1978 or the democratic elections in Algeria in 1991—have went, towards increased anti-Westernness amid continued repression.

This scenario is precisely the scenario predicted two decades ago by Samuel Huntington (1993). He argued that any potential openings of the political system in the Islamic world would only serve to strengthen authoritarian political forces, resulting in new, more vehemently anti-Western dictatorships rather than in broadly supported liberal democracies (Huntington 1993, p. 32). Underlying this claim is the argument that something in Islamic civilization makes it incompatible with democracy, rendering Muslims less supportive of democratic institutions (Huntington 1993, 1996; Lewis 1996, 2002). Recent events seemingly corroborate this clash of civilizations or incompatibility view. The question seems warranted whether democracy indeed lacks legitimacy in Islamic societies?

Remarkably enough, a large body of research on democratic attitudes in Muslim majority societies concludes that Muslims deem democracy just as desirable as other people do, or even more so (Bratton 2003; Hoffman 2004; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Jamal and Tessler 2008; Maseland and van Hoorn 2011; Mogahed 2006; Rose 2002; Rowley and Smith 2009). Indeed, the mass uprisings of the Arab Spring themselves seem evidence enough of a strong desire for democratic change in the Muslim world. We are thus left with a paradox: if attitudes towards democracy are no
different among Muslims, then why does democracy not consolidate in Islamic societies (as the most recent developments in Egypt and Tunisia also show) and why is there still a large democratic deficit in the Muslim world?

This paper seeks to provide an answer to these questions by considering the sources of (il)legitimacy of democratic institutions. Thus far, the literature on Islam and democracy has focused on the presence of abstract democratic ideals in populations, which provide only superficial insight into the actually relevant issue of support for real-life democratic institutions. For the sustainability of democratic institutions, it matters less whether people find democracy desirable in principle than whether they view the actual democratic regime they are living with as legitimate. For this reason, in this paper, we investigate whether people in the Muslim world are more likely to be disappointed by democracy once it is in place, and specifically whether the ex-post valuation of actually lived-in democratic regimes may be a source of democracy’s apparent lack of legitimacy in Islamic societies and its subsequent failure to consolidate.

Central to our analysis is the actual appreciation of the democratic institutions people are exposed to, comparing Islamic societies to the rest of the world. We also consider potential causes of any differences in appreciation. As in most young democracies (Fukuyama 2011; Prezeworski et al. 1996, 2000; Teorell 2010), the potential legitimacy problem of democracy in Islamic societies may be either that democracy is not considered desirable in itself (cf. Huntington 1993), or that it fails to deliver the individual freedom and welfare gains that are expected from it. Hence, we seek to answer the following series of questions: Do people in Islamic societies appreciate democratic institutions less? If so, is this difference caused by lower appreciation of individual freedoms and clean, transparent government? Or is any difference due to democracy, for some reason, failing to deliver these “goods” in Islamic societies?

We measure Muslim / non-Muslim differences in the appreciation of democracy using a novel method that involves comparing the impact of democratic institutions on subjective well-being in Islamic societies vis-à-vis their impact on well-being in the rest of the world (cf. Alesina et al. 2004 and, especially, van Hoorn and Maseland 2013). This is an important methodological novelty as it provides us
with direct information on how people experience democracy and on how much they like their actually lived-in democratic institutions. If democracy’s effect on well-being is lower in Islamic societies, we have a strong indication that democracy is appreciated less by the people in these societies and thus lacks legitimacy. We analyze data on democracy, well-being, and regime performance for 67 countries and find that democracy indeed has done less for people’s subjective well-being in Islamic societies than for people in other societies, not surprising given the dearth of democracy in the Muslim world. However, when delving deeper into the causes underlying this difference, we find that it is not due to Muslims valuing democratic freedoms less, as the incompatibility or clash of civilizations argument would have it. Rather, democracy’s apparent lack of legitimacy is rooted in democratic institutions delivering less perceived freedom and prosperity in Islamic countries than they do elsewhere. Were democracy to bring the population of Islamic countries the same levels of perceived individual freedom and material welfare as it does in the rest of the world, these populations would appreciate democracy just as much as others.

In addition, we show that the lack of performance of democracy in Islamic countries itself appears largely without religious basis. Clannishness, which is not a unique feature of Islam, fully accounts for the Muslim / non-Muslim differences in the extent to which democratic institutions make a positive contribution to the lives of citizens.

We conclude that, when it comes to Islam and democracy, no clash of civilizations exists. Although there seems to be lower appreciation of lived-in democratic institutions in Islamic countries indicating a legitimacy problem, this is not because Muslims like democratic freedoms less than non-Muslims do. Rather, this lack of appreciation derives from democracies in Islamic countries having failed to deliver, at least so far. If democratic regimes in the Muslim world get their act together and improve their performance, there is no reason why democracy would not be celebrated in the Muslim world. The biggest barrier to democracy living up to its promise appears to be the existence of long-standing clan structures that continue to constrain present-day democratic institutions in trickling down and positively affecting the masses.
In summary, our paper makes three important contributions. First, we consider the issue of the sustainability of democratic regimes, which appears most fundamental, but is not taken up in analyses of the Islam-democracy nexus, except very implicitly. Second, we develop a method for assessing a lack of legitimacy of democracy in the Muslim world (or elsewhere) by considering the valuation of democracy as people actually experience it in their daily lives. This is a particular important advance as the legitimacy of democracy in the Islamic world has not yet been assessed in such a direct manner, but only indirectly, for instance, by comparing professed democratic attitudes. Having gathered insight on the extent to which democracy lacks appreciation in Islamic societies, we can then consider the sources of this legitimacy deficit. Accordingly, our third contribution is that we flesh out various reasons why countries have little appreciation of democracy, specifically whether the lack of appreciation (and thus lack of legitimacy) is rooted in Islamic culture or whether it derives from a general failure of democratic institutions to deliver the spoils that people expect from them.

BACKGROUND AND PROPOSITIONS

Two Perspectives on the Emergence of Democracy

The recent wave of protests sweeping through Northern Africa and the Middle East raises important questions about the nature of these “revolutions.” Are they evidence of a universal evolutionary path towards democratic institutions that for some reason until now largely surpassed the region? Or are they just directed against the disfunctionality and excesses of particular regimes, and not genuinely democratic in nature?

Answers to these questions depend on one’s view on the determinants of democracy. Broadly speaking, in the literature, two perspectives may be distinguished. The first, which we dub the modernization perspective, sees democratic transitions as part of the broader social and economic development of societies. Lipset (1959) shows that democratic institutions are related to economic prosperity. Part of this relation runs through economic prosperity’s effects on education and the size of
the middle class (Epstein et al. 2006; Evans and Rose 2007; Glaeser et al. 2007; Hadenius 1992; Kamens 1988; Lipset 1959; Shafiq 2010), although income also has an independent effect (Barro 1999). This general trend towards more democracy with rising standards of living may be hampered by more specific social and economic characteristics of societies, such as income inequality, urbanization, and ethnic heterogeneity (Barro 1999), primary resource wealth (Barro 1999; Gassebner et al. 2009; Ross 2001), and geographical circumstances such as country size and insularity (Anckar 2002; Barro 1999; Clague et al. 2001; Hadenius 1992).

The modernization perspective suggests that democratic transitions in the Islamic world are an expected, almost inevitable outcome of socio-economic development (Epstein et al. 2006). The historically low level of democracy in the Muslim world is strongly tied to the low standards of living and education that prevailed and the absence of a sizable middle class in the region. With economic prosperity and educational standards rising, however, an emerging middle class increasingly demands democratic changes (Esposito and Piscatori 1991). In this view, then, the recent wave of uprisings is attributable to rapid increases in human capital formation over the past decade (Kuhn 2012). Telling evidence is that the wave of revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa started in Tunisia, the most economically advanced country in the region.

The second position, which we refer to as the culturalist perspective, attributes differences in levels of democracy to religious background and cultural traditions (Clague et al. 2001; Huntington 1993; Inglehart 1988). In this view, some religious and cultural traditions are more compatible with democracy than other traditions are. While Huntington (1984) was still concerned with both Confucianism and Islam as impediments to democratization, since the 1990s Islam in particular has been singled out as having a negative influence on democracy (Lakoff 2004; Lewis 1996, 2002). Following this perspective, current unrest in the Middle East and North Africa is unlikely to lead to democratic transitions, as the required cultural basis is lacking. The revolutions in the Islamic world are primarily driven by economic hardship rather than by fundamental support for democracy, and will most likely result in new, anti-Western autocratic regimes (Huntington 1993).
Islam and Democracy: The Incompatibility Argument

The idea that Middle Eastern culture is incompatible with democracy has a long tradition, going back to even before the emergence of Islam. Ancient Greece already opposed its own more democratic institutions to the one man-rule characterizing the societies of Persia and Asia Minor (see, for instance, Aeschylus in “The Persians,” lines 241-244). In the centuries to come, the vision of a despotic “Orient,” fundamentally different from the enlightened societies in Western Europe, became firmly entrenched in Western discourse (Said 1978). Recent contributions have largely focused on Islamic doctrine, most notably on the absence of separation of church and state in Islam, which is argued to inhibit democratization (Facchini 2010; Huntington 1993, 1996; Lewis 1996, 2002; see also Minkenberg 2007). The argument is that Christianity, developing in the context of the Roman Empire, was forced to distinguish between God and Caesar, whereas in the Islamic world religious and secular authority remained one and the same (Lewis 2002). In addition, Christianity has been argued to differ from Islam in the former’s focus on individual salvation. This idea provided the breeding ground for the conception of the individual as someone with certain self-evident and inalienable rights, no matter which position in society (s)he assumes (Facchini 2010). Alternatively, gender inequality has been identified as a factor (Fish 2002; Inglehart and Norris 2003), although the attribution of gender inequality to Islamic beliefs is itself debatable (see Beitz 2006 and Ross 2008 for opposing views on this).

A theoretical problem with relating political outcomes to Islamic teachings is that it freezes religion, favoring a monolithic textual reading of Islam above the variation of actual experiences of Islam in everyday life (Philpott 2007). Discrepancies exist between what religious texts state and how societies interpret and follow these religious codes; just like Christian societies are not governed by the ten commandments, Islamic societies are not reducible to Islamic scriptures. The argument that Islamic doctrine does not recognize secular authority, for example, goes by on the fact that most Muslims today do not see a conflict between the idea that political authority should meet the standards of sharī‘ah and
democratic principles as liberty and freedom of speech (Mogahed 2006; Philpott 2007). Indeed, various countries with Islam as state religion constitutionally guarantee democratic freedoms of religion, expression, association, and non-discrimination on basis of religion or gender (Stahnke and Blitt 2005). From this perspective, Platteau (2011) argues that it is the particular politics of interpretation of religion rather than something inherent in Islam itself that drives anti-democratic tendencies. Others object that a democratic deficit in the Muslim world is an Arab issue rather than an Islamic one, pointing out that many Islamic countries outside the Arab world have better democratic records (e.g., Malaysia, Mali, Indonesia, and Turkey) (Stahnke and Blittke 2005; Stepan and Robertson 2003). The Middle East’s specific geopolitical position has been argued to play a role in this; strongmen are often supported by Western governments for fear of radically anti-Western alternatives, and support for the Palestinian cause often provides legitimacy to otherwise illegitimate regimes (El Badawi and Makdisi 2007; Borooah and Paldam 2007).

In fact, studies attempting to measure democratic attitudes directly generally find that Muslims value democracy no less than non-Muslims do (e.g., Bratton 2003; Hoffman 2004; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Jamal and Tessler 2008; Mogahed 2006; Rose 2002). If anything, analysis of data from the World Values Survey (WVS) reveals that both individual Muslims and Muslim-majority countries have a relatively favorable perception of democracy (Maseland and van Hoorn 2011; Rowley and Smith 2009). This evidence suggests that the deficit of democracy in Islamic countries is not for a lack of desire for it.

**Threats to (Islamic) Democracy**

Even though there is reason to doubt the culturalist, incompatibility explanation for an absence of emergence of democracy in the Muslim world, the question of durability and legitimacy of democratic regimes is still open. The above two perspectives translate into two rather different threats to democracy.
in Islamic societies. In both scenarios, the main risk is that the support for democracy erodes because of decreased appreciation of established democratic institutions.

In the modernization perspective, democratization is a natural step in the evolution of societies. It occurs when societies have reached such a level of development that the rising aspirations of an educated, middle class youth can only be satisfied through openings in the political system. The main threat to democratic institutions in this perspective is that they will not live up to the aspirations of these educated, middle class urbanites. A lack of legitimacy may thus arise not because democracy in itself is undesirable or incompatible with religious or cultural beliefs, but because democracy fails to lead to the things expected from it: high incomes, a just society, and increased individual freedoms. In the modernization perspective, democracy is likely not to take hold when it fails to deliver these elements, or when other regime types appear to deliver them equally well or better (Fukuyama 2011; Prezworski et al. 1996; Prezworski and Limongi 1997; Prezworski et al. 2000). In many Islamic societies, this may well be the case: democratic institutions may only limitedly translate into individual freedoms because of persistent patrimonial structures in clan-based societies (Woodley and Bell 2013). At the same time, the practice of oil-rich countries such as Saudi Arabia to respond to any form of social unrest by handing out generous subsidies to citizens may stifle expectations that democracy will improve living conditions (Economist June 23 2012; Economist November 24 2012). As a result, people’s appreciation of democracy will be lower in Islamic societies. Following this reasoning, we formulate the following proposition concerning the appreciation of democracy and so-called regime performance (i.e. the extent to which democracy delivers gains in freedom, income, and clean institutions) in Islamic and non-Islamic societies:

Proposition I: If the modernization perspective is correct, differences in appreciation of democracy between Islamic and non-Islamic societies are caused by differences in regime performance.
If the culturalist theorists are correct, by contrast, the prospects for democracy in the Muslim world are bleaker. In this perspective, democratic institutions in Islamic societies are at odds with indigenous beliefs, causing a legitimacy problem (Lakoff 2004). The reason for the democratic deficit in the Islamic world then is that democracy is fundamentally not supported by underlying democratic values, such as a valuation of individual freedom and of a clean, impartial government. In this scenario, exposure to democracy renders individuals less happiness in Muslim countries, not because democracy performs worse, but because individuals in Islamic societies do not appreciate what democracy brings them. As a result, any democratic openings in the political system will be fragile, simply because people have no high stake in maintaining democratic institutions. Our second proposition thus rivals with our first proposition:

Proposition II: If the culturalist perspective is correct, differences in the appreciation of democracy between Islamic societies and non-Islamic societies are caused by differences in the valuation of democratic freedoms.

The next section discusses how we can bring these two propositions, reflecting the culturalist and the modernization view on Islam’s democratic deficit, to empirical data and turn them into testable hypotheses.

**APPROACH: MEASURING THE APPRECIATION OF DEMOCRACY**

Our approach to studying a possible lack of legitimacy of democracy in Islamic societies involves two steps. First, we establish whether there are any differences in the appreciation of democracy between various societies, specifically between Islamic and non-Islamic countries. We expect this to be the case, after which the second step is to assess the causes of this gap. We propose a sequence of hypotheses,
reflecting the theoretical insights depicted in Propositions I and II, and embark on a process of elimination. By confirming or rejecting the various hypotheses, four in total, we are able to do a complete study of the causes of democratic developments in the Muslim world and lack thereof, specifically whether it is the culturalist, incompatibility perspective or the modernization perspective that holds more sway. We develop these hypotheses next.

**Democracy and Subjective Well-Being**

Our method for measuring the appreciation of democracy builds on the large body of research on subjective well-being in psychology, sociology, economics, and increasingly also in political science. Subjective well-being can be defined as “a broad category of phenomena that includes people’s emotional responses, domain satisfactions, and global judgments of life satisfaction” (Diener et al. 1999, p. 277). Different approaches to measuring subjective well-being exist but, most commonly, measurement involves simply asking people either how happy or how satisfied with life they are. Though simple, such questionnaire items have been widely shown to be both reliable and valid indicators of subjective well-being (see, for instance, Diener et al. 2009; Frey and Stutzer 2002, Layard 2010, and Veenhoven 1996 and references therein).

Psychologists have been studying subjective well-being (happiness and satisfaction) for more than five decades already (see, for instance, Wilson 1967 for an early survey of the literature). During this time, the literature has uncovered a broad set of robust individual-level determinants of subjective well-being, including such factors as employment, marital status, income, and health (Diener et al. 1999; Easterlin 2003). From thereon, researchers have also started paying attention to the societal determinants of people’s level of subjective well-being, including the effect of democracy. Early interest in the role of democratic institutions in the well-being of nations came from psychologists (e.g., Diener et al. 1995) and, particularly, sociologists (e.g., Veenhoven 1994, 2000b; Veenhoven and Ehrhardt 1995). Political scientists, and especially economists, have increasingly followed suit, however. Democratic institutions
are found to have a strong positive relationship with subjective well-being (e.g., Bjørnskov et al. 2010; Frey and Stutzer 2000; Haller and Hadler 2006), a finding that extends to include clean government (Helliwell 2006; Tavits 2008).¹ Democracy and freedom have positive effects on subjective well-being according to this literature, although some research reports that political institutions matter only through individual sense of freedom (Inglehart et al. 2008).

Whereas the link between democracy and/or freedom and subjective well-being is universal across cultures (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, p. 140), the size of the effect may well differ between groups. In some countries, democracy and freedom carry more weight than in others. To elaborate on this idea, subjective well-being scholars have slowly started developing other ways in which to apply happiness and satisfaction data. At the forefront of developments in well-being research are so-called valuation exercises that use data on individuals’ subjective well-being to assess how much people value certain amenities and disamenities such as noise pollution (van Praag and Baarsma 2005) and even excise taxes on cigarettes (Gruber and Mullainathan 2005). Our approach to measuring the ex-post valuation of democracy is grounded in such work. More specifically, we build on work that has applied the subjective well-being approach to valuation to examine cultural differences in values between societies. Most notably, van Hoorn and Maseland (2013) use subjective well-being data to test the famous thesis by Max Weber that there is a specific Protestant work ethic. They look at how much people value work in terms of the contribution that having a job makes to an individual’s subjective well-being, comparing societies that have historically been Protestant with non-Protestant societies. Evidence shows that employment is indeed significantly more important for happiness and satisfaction in Protestant societies, which van

¹ There is also research that considers more specifically welfare state institutions and how they affect well-being (Radcliff 2001; Veenhoven 2000; Veenhoven and Ouweneel 1995). Other work, examines the effect of outcomes of political processes on people’s happiness and satisfaction (Álvarez-Díaz et al. 2010; Whiteley et al. 2010).
Hoorn and Maseland (2013) take as confirmation of Weber’s insights on the appreciation of work in Protestant religion.\(^2\)

Based on these latter advances in the subjective well-being literature, we find that any inter-country differences in the size of the effects of democracy on well-being can be interpreted as differences in appreciation of lived-in democratic institutions. Societies in which people appreciate their democratic institutions more, experience a stronger well-being boost than do people in societies that do not deem their democracy worthwhile. That is, differences in the effect size of democracy on subjective well-being indicate differences in the ex-post valuation of democratic institutions, which, in turn, has clear implications for the legitimacy of these institutions. If ex-post appreciation is low, democracy lacks legitimacy and is at risk of disappearing. A lower effect size in Islamic societies would indicate that democracies are less appreciated and particularly at risk in these societies. To start our analysis of the culturalist, incompatibility and the modernization views on the Islamic democratic deficit, we therefore test the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: The positive subjective well-being effect of democracy is lower in Islamic societies than it is in non-Islamic societies.

This hypothesis brings an important advance to the literature on the Islam-democracy nexus. Given the large democratic deficit in the Muslim world, we are quite confident that this hypothesis will hold up to empirical scrutiny. However, earlier, researchers dealt with the legitimacy and appreciation of democracy in Islamic societies only very implicitly, either considering levels of democracy or professed democratic attitudes. Our method, on the other hand, renders a direct assessment as we actually measure

\[^{2}\text{Another example of inter-societal differences in well-being valuation is Alesina et al.’s (2004) examination of the happiness effects of inequality, finding that inequality hurts the happiness of people in the US much less than it hurts the happiness of people in Europe.}\]
the extent to which democracy is experienced differently by people in the Muslim world and people elsewhere. Providing direct evidence on Islamic democracies’ legitimacy deficit, we are then able to consider the sources of this deficit. The hypotheses below do this, testing whether the deficit signifies a clash of civilizations or rather an obstruction in the modernization path towards democratization in the Muslim world.

**Why Differences in the Appreciation of Democracy?**

As stated, our method renders evidence on an Islamic legitimacy deficit that we can analyze further, testing for possible causes of observed differences in the appreciation of democracy. As also mentioned, in this second step, we go through a process of elimination, ruling out alternative explanations one by one, before finally settling on either the culturalist or the modernization perspective as providing most insight into democratization processes in Islamic societies. We find that there are two main explanations for the lacking appreciation of democracy by Islamic societies. This lower appreciation may either be part and parcel of Islamic culture or be due to a lower performance of democratic institutions in Islamic societies. What ultimately matters to people are not the formal institutions of democracy themselves, but what democracy commonly brings about: better incomes, cleaner government, or increased freedom of choice (Inglehart et al. 2008; Prezworski et al. 2000). If a democratic regime fails to deliver these goods, it risks losing legitimacy (Fukuyama 2011), as evidenced by lacking appreciation of democratic institutions. Based on this latter argument we propose the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 2:** *Democracy in Islamic societies is associated with smaller gains in regime performance compared to democracy in non-Islamic societies.*

We find that if we cannot confirm Hypothesis 2, it becomes quite likely that democracy’s lack of legitimacy is indeed inherent to Islam, as Huntington (1993) and other proponents of the incompatibility /
clash of the civilizations thesis would have it. If, on the other hand, we can confirm Hypothesis 2, it could very well be that there is nothing Islamic about the lack of appreciation of democracy in the Muslim world. To be sure, the result for Hypothesis 2 do not yet allow us to draw definitive conclusions, as this result itself is still open to alternative explanations. For one, if regime performance is not lacking in Islamic countries, it may still be that there is a third, omitted variable other than Islam that leads to a lack of appreciation of democracy in the Muslim world. Similarly, it may well be that Islamic democracies exhibit a performance deficit but that this performance deficit does not actually explain the lack of appreciation of democracy in the Muslim world.

This latter idea can easily be transformed into a testable hypothesis. Specifically, we propose a revision of Hypothesis 1 to take into account differences in regime performance:

Hypothesis 3: *Any difference in the appreciation of democracy between Islamic and non-Islamic societies disappears when controlling for regime performance.*

Even with Hypothesis 3 confirmed, we cannot entirely rule out that Islamic cultural values play a role in the lack of appreciation of democracy in the Muslim world, however. Particularly, it may still be the case that Muslims value regime performance less, notably individual freedom and cleanliness of government. If so, we may find that controlling for regime performance renders a biased picture, hiding the true nature of the Islamic appreciation gap. Hence, a fourth hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4: *The positive well-being effect of regime performance is not smaller for people from Islamic societies than it is for people from non-Islamic societies.*

Hypothesis 4 completes a sequence that started with Hypothesis 2 and we find that if Hypotheses 2-4 are all confirmed we can reject the clash of civilization thesis. There really does not appear to be anything in Islam that makes Muslim people appreciate democracy and freedom less and if democratic
institutions were to lead to similar levels of freedom, prosperity and clean government as they do elsewhere, people in Islamic societies would value democracy equally highly as others do. Indeed, confirming Hypotheses 2-4 implies that the democratic deficit in the Muslim world can best be understood from a modernization perspective that highlights non-cultural barriers to democracy.

On the other hand, if one or more of the last three hypotheses are, in fact, rejected there appears to be something intrinsic to Islamic countries that is not compatible with (Western) democratic institutions. In this latter case, the question becomes—as indicated above—what exactly it is about Islamic countries that makes them incompatible with democracy. Islam and Islamic teachings are logical culprits. However, we cannot rule out a third, omitted variable in principle, notably the presence of large oil revenues or historical clan-based social structures, both of which seem to correlate with being an Islamic society. Our fifth and final hypothesis, actually a set of twin hypotheses, takes up this issue. Specifically, we seek to assess whether oil and/or clannishness act as barriers that sever the link between democracy and regime performance and can explain the lower appreciation of democracy in the Muslim world:

Hypothesis 5a: Any difference in democracy’s effect on regime performance between Islamic and non-Islamic societies disappears once we control for the role of oil or the clannishness of a society.

Hypothesis 5b: Any difference in the appreciation of democracy between Islamic and non-Islamic societies disappears once we control for the role of oil or the clannishness of a society.

If Hypotheses 5a and 5b are not rejected, we again have strong evidence against the incompatibility / clash of civilizations thesis. Even if Islamic societies exhibit lower appreciation of democracy and a gap in the democracy-performance nexus, there is nothing Islamic about these two deficits. If, on the other hand, the evidence rejects all the above hypotheses (2-5b), there really appears to be something intrinsic to Islam that makes the Muslim world continue to experience a large democratic deficit.
We test the five hypotheses below. First, however, we describe our sample and the data and measures that we employ in our empirical analysis.

SAMPLE AND MEASURES

Data Collection

Data on our dependent and independent variables come from a variety of sources. Key source is the World Values Survey or WVS (European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association 2006; World Values Survey Association 2009), which provides us with data both on subjective well-being and on perceived individual freedom. We supplement the WVS data with data on democracy, specifically Polity scores from the Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers 2011) and scores on a Gastil index from Freedom House (2011). Perceived individual freedom is one element of regime performance, with material prosperity and clean government being the other two. Data on these latter two variables come from the World Bank World Development Indicators and the World Bank World Governance Indicators respectively. Below we describe exactly how we have used the data from these sources to obtain the measures needed to test our hypotheses.

Variables in the Analysis

Islamic societies

3 The WVS has grown out of the European Values Survey (EVS) and currently contains representative samples for almost 100 societies, which together span some 90% of world population. Data have been collected in five waves. Availability of some of the other dependent and independent variables in our analysis restricts the data that we use to data collected in the last three waves. The websites of the WVS and the EVS, http://www.europeanvalues.nl and http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org, provide more information and have the complete data set available for downloading.
We draw on past literature to classify countries as either Muslim or non-Muslim (0/1 dummy variable). Starting point is the Islamic heartland as identified by Rowley and Smith (2009). Following other quantitative studies of the Islam-democracy nexus we further add countries that, according to the CIA Factbook, have a majority (>50%) Muslim population. Using these criteria, we classify the following set of 15 countries in our sample as Islamic countries (where the numbers in parentheses indicate the years of observation, if more than one year is available): Albania (1998 & 2002), Algeria, Bangladesh (1996 & 2002), Indonesia, Iran (2000 & 2007), Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey (1996 & 2007), Egypt (2000 & 2008), and Burkina Faso. All these countries are member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and featured on the List of Muslim-majority countries maintained at Wikipedia.


**Index of Subjective Well-Being**

As mentioned, the typical approach to measuring subjective well-being involves simply asking people how well they are doing. The WVS contains two subjective well-being items that serve our purpose, one
on happiness and one on life satisfaction. Individuals’ happiness is measured on a 1-4 scale by the following item: “Taking all things together, would you say you are…: 1 – Very happy; 2 – Quite happy; 3 – Not very happy; 4 – Not at all happy.” Similarly, life satisfaction is measured by the following item: “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?,” with the answer scale ranging from “1, Dissatisfied” to “10, Satisfied”. Together, these two items capture both the affective and the cognitive part of subjective well-being (cf. Diener et al. 1999, p. 277). For our analyses, we include only individuals with non-missing happiness and satisfaction scores. We calculate country means for both variables, reverse coding the happiness ratings so that a higher number reflects a higher level of happiness. We apply principal components analysis to these country mean scores to obtain a single well-being score for all countries in our sample. As data on some of the other variables in our analysis are missing, we calculate country means on the basis of 133,112 individual observations or almost 2,000 observations per country on average. The principal components analysis of country mean happiness and satisfaction scores renders one factor with Eigen value above 1 (1.82 to be precise), which captures 91.0% of total variation. As the subjective well-being scores can vary over time, we match the data from the WVS to data on other variables using both country and year of observation. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics, separately for Islamic and non-Islamic countries in our sample, and for the sample as a whole.

**Democracy**

The main measure of democracy that we use is the Polity measure from the Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers 2011). Polity democracy scores vary from -10 (lowest) to +10 (highest). Countries with the lowest level of democracy in our sample include Saudi Arabia, scoring -10, and Belarus (in 1996 & 2000) and China, scoring -7. Some of the most democratic countries include such Western countries as Sweden, Switzerland and the US, all scoring +10. The most democratic Islamic countries are Indonesia and Turkey (in 1996) with scores of +8. From the descriptive statistics presented in Table 1, we can already see that there is an Islamic democratic deficit with Islamic countries, on average, scoring about 6 points lower on the Polity democracy measure.
The measurement of democracy is hotly debated (see, for instance, Treier and Jackman 2008). Hence, to check the robustness of any results found, we also consider an alternative to the Polity democracy measure, specifically a Gastil index of democracy based on data from Freedom House (2011). We construct this Gastil index through principal components analysis of the Freedom House (2011) scores on Political rights (PR) and Civil liberties (CL). This principal components analysis draws on the complete set of country year observations available for these two indicators (n=6530, period 1973-2011). The analysis renders one factor with Eigen value above 1 (1.92 to be precise), which captures 96.1% of total variation. In our sample, scores on the Gastil democracy index range from a low of -1.60 for Saudi Arabia to a high of +1.34 for Sweden, Switzerland and the US, among others. Descriptive statistics (Table 1) again reveal a sizable democratic deficit in the Muslim world.

We follow the same matching procedure as for subjective well-being scores, meaning that we match the democracy data to other data using both country and year of observation. As a robustness check, we also repeat our main analyses replacing the current level of democracy with a moving average of the level of democracy during the last five years. The idea is that a given level of democracy needs to prevail for a certain time before we can reasonable expect democratic institutions to settle in and affect people’s individual freedom, prosperity, and lead to clean government. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for these five-year moving averages as well.

Index of Regime Performance (Freedom, Prosperity, and Clean Government)

As indicated above, we discern three key components of regime performance, individual freedom, prosperity, and clean government. We measure these three components using data from the WVS (freedom), the World Bank World Development Indicators (prosperity) and the World Bank World Governance Indicators (clean government). Principal components analysis is used to obtain a single index
of regime performance. The WVS measures individual freedom via the following item: “Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale where 1 means “none at all” and 10 means “a great deal” to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out.” This freedom item is used by many researchers across fields (e.g., Hopcroft and Bradley 2007; Inglehart et al. 2008; Tabellini 2010). In the same way as for happiness and satisfaction (see above), we draw on 133,112 individual observations to calculate mean country freedom scores. For prosperity, we use per-capita gross domestic product measured in US dollars where we take into account differences in purchasing power across countries (so-called real income per capita). For clean government, we use the measure of so-called government effectiveness from the World Governance Indicators project. This measure combines data from 30 separate data sources (e.g., think tanks, non-governmental organizations, et cetera) that in turn draw on a large number of respondents including enterprises, citizens and country experts.  

Principal components analysis of these three separate measures—freedom, prosperity, and clean government—rendered one factor with Eigen value above 1 (2.01 to be precise), which captures 67.0% of total variation. The country with lowest regime performance in our sample is Albania in 1998 with a score of -1.58, while the US has the highest regime performance with a score of 1.78. We also construct an alternative index of regime performance, replacing the measure of government effectiveness with a measure of so-called control of corruption also available from the World Governance Indicators project. The factor analysis for this index rendered one factor with Eigen value


5 Albania has witnessed some strong improvements, scoring -1.06 in 2002, comparable to Moldova in 2002.
above 1 (2.00 to be precise), which captures 66.9% of total variation. We use this alternative measure of regime performance to check the robustness of our initial results.  

Not surprisingly, the descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 show that the Muslim world not only lacks democratic institutions but also trails the rest of the world in terms of regime performance.

**EMPIRICAL RESULTS**

**Islamic / Non-Islamic Differences in the Appreciation of Democracy**

We first look at the appreciation of democracy and potential differences therein between Islamic and non-Islamic countries. Table 2 presents the results of a regression analysis with the index of subjective well-being as the dependent variable and a measure of democracy and the dummy for being an Islamic country as independent variables. Models 1-3 show that democracy has a positive effect on subjective well-being, while living in an Islamic country does not have a statistically significant effect. These results are in line with the literature (e.g., Bjørnskov et al. 2010).

Model 4 presents the results of a regression with an interaction term between democracy and the Islamic society dummy. While we continue to find a positive effect of democracy on well-being for non-Islamic countries (the baseline category), democracy has a significantly lower impact in Islamic countries. In fact, the sizes of the coefficients of democracy and the interaction term roughly cancel each other out, implying that democracy only adds to well-being in non-Islamic countries. To show that democracy does not bring the same advances in Islamic countries as it does in non-Islamic countries in a more easily

---

6 Government effectiveness and control of corruption turn out to be highly correlated and so are our two indexes of regime performance.
interpretable way, we also estimate the well-being effect of democracy for samples comprising only Islamic and only non-Islamic countries (Models 5 and 6). Results again show the limited contribution of democracy to well-being in Islamic countries: democracy does not have a significant effect on well-being within the sample of Islamic countries, while it is highly significant for non-Islamic countries. These results indicate that there are important differences in appreciation of democracy between Islamic and non-Islamic countries. Islamic countries appear to get significantly less out of democratic institutions, to the extent that democracy does not add to their well-being at all. In spite of the widespread observation that democracy has a similar or even stronger appeal among Muslims as among other people (Rowley and Smith 2009), the enjoyment from actually living under democratic regimes is substantially lower in the Muslim world. The question is where this difference in appreciation is coming from.

What Democracy is About: The Role of Regime Performance

The first possible explanation for the Islamic world’s comparative lack of appreciation of democracy that we explore is that democracy is simply less effective in Islamic countries. Where democracy is associated with prosperity, cleaner government and more individual freedom in general (what we simply call regime performance), for some reason, these relations may not hold in Islamic countries. To investigate this possibility, we model regime performance as a function of democracy, our Islamic society dummy, and their interaction term. This model allows us to see whether there are any differences in the effects of democracy between Islamic countries and non-Islamic countries. Does democracy deliver similarly in Islamic societies? Table 3 presents the results.

Models 7 and 9 confirm that democracy in general has a significant, positive effect on regime performance. Perhaps equally unsurprising is the finding that regime performance is on average lower in
Islamic countries than elsewhere (Models 8-9). More interesting are the results for Model 10, which includes the interaction term. Here, we observe that the positive performance effects of democratic institutions in general are absent in Islamic countries—the interaction term is statistically significant and sizeable, outweighing the direct effect positive effect of democracy on regime performance. Models 11 and 12 confirm this finding. Regressing regime performance on democracy for Islamic countries and non-Islamic countries separately again shows rather clearly that democracy only improves performance in the latter set of countries but not in the former.

To see whether these results are dependent on our choice of democracy indicator (Polity IV), we run the same regressions using a Gastil index of democracy, and five-year moving averages of both the Polity and the Gastil indexes. The results, presented in Table 4, are similar to the results in the main analysis. Regardless of the indicator used, democracy has a positive effect on regime performance in non-Islamic countries, but has no impact in Islamic countries. Apparently, democracy does not increase prosperity, cleanliness of government and freedom in Islamic countries. It only increases regime performance elsewhere.

⟨⟨ Insert Table 4 about here >>⟩

Is this difference in regime performance responsible for the lower appreciation of democracy in Islamic countries? To investigate this contingency, we repeat the analysis of Table 2, while adding our index of regime performance to the various regression models. If differences in regime performance are behind the lower appreciation of democracy among Muslims, then controlling for regime performance should make this difference disappear. Table 5 presents the results.

⟨⟨ Insert Table 5 about here >>⟩
Looking at the results of Model 19, we observe that it is indeed the things that are associated with democracy—increased prosperity, freedom of choice and better government—that contribute to well-being rather than democracy itself. The coefficient for regime performance is statistically highly significant, while the coefficient for democracy becomes much smaller and is no longer statistically significant. What is more, non-significance of the interaction term indicates that there is no longer any difference in the well-being effect of democracy between Islamic and non-Islamic countries. The divergence in appreciation that we observed before seems to have been caused by differences in regime performance of Muslim and non-Muslim democracies rather than by differences in value attached to democratic freedoms. These results are robust to replacing our Polity IV democracy indicator with the Gastil index (Models 20-21) and with five-year averages of the Polity and Gastil indexes (Models 22-23 and 24-25 respectively). These results are also robust to employing an alternative index of regime performance, one that measures clean government not as government effectiveness but as the control of corruption (Table 6).

For some reason, democratic institutions in Islamic countries perform worse and this is the reason why they are less appreciated. Were democratic regimes in the Muslim world to perform similarly to democratic regimes elsewhere, the populations of Islamic countries would be no less appreciative of their democratic institutions than people in other countries are.

**Is There a Culture Clash?**

So far, we have seen that democracy is appreciated less in Islamic countries, but that this difference seems to be caused by weaker performance of Islamic democracies rather than by a difference in appreciation of what democracy brings. Muslims do not like democracy less; it is just that their democracies bring them
less freedom. To substantiate these claims further, we investigate the appreciation of freedom, clean
government and prosperity in Islamic and non-Islamic countries by comparing the well-being effect of
our performance index between these groups of countries (Table 7). If we find that added regime
performance causes less well-being gains among Muslims, there is still some support for the clash of

Results again indicate that performance is strongly positively associated with well-being. More
importantly, there seems to be no difference between Islamic and non-Islamic countries in this regard.
Both groups equally enjoy freedom, prosperity and clean government, when they have it. A difference in
democratic preferences does not seem to exist.

Why the Islamic Democracy-Performance Gap?
A logical follow up question to the above results concerns the source of the apparent Islamic gap in the
democracy-performance nexus. There are many potential reasons for the absence of performance of
Islamic democracies. Given the infancy of democratic institutions in most Muslim countries, their lower
performance is perhaps not surprising. In many places, such as Libya or Yemen, democratic institutions
need to be built from scratch. Political systems that are both accountable and effective are usually the
products of a long evolution. Muslim societies in the Middle East and North Africa have only just
embarked on this journey. Completing it and developing effective democracies will take a long time. Our
use of democracy scores averaged over five preceding years in Tables 4-6 is meant to account for this
contingency. Although the infancy argument is theoretically highly plausible, the results in these tables do
not provide any support for it. If anything, considering five-year moving averages strengthens the finding
that Islamic societies are less appreciative of democracy and that the performance of democratic institutions in Islamic countries lags the performance of these same institutions in other countries.

Looking at the performance of non-democratic regimes, the presence of oil money in many Middle Eastern autocracies may be a further reason for the severed link between democratic institutions and regime performance in the Muslim world. We have actually empirically tested this idea, but found that the presence of oil does almost nothing to diminish the Islamic democracy-performance gap (detailed results available on request). A final issue to consider is the role of long-standing social conventions that might limit freedom of choice, even where political institutions do not infringe on individual liberties. A particular concern is clannishness, which is prevalent in Islamic societies, and may work against democratic institutions actually trickling down to have a positive impact on people’s lives, their level of freedom and their material prosperity. Empirically analyzing the effect of clannishness, we find that it indeed accounts for the observed Islamic democracy-performance gap, drastically reducing the difference between Islamic and non-Islamic countries and rendering it statistically significant (detailed results again available on request). It is thereby interesting to note that the importance of clans in many Muslim societies actually predates Islam and Islamic teachings. Hence, even the Islamic democracy-performance gap does not really support the idea that Islam is incompatible with either democracy itself or with democracy reaching out to make a positive difference in people’s lives.

**Conclusion: How Much Do Muslims (Dis)Like Democracy?**

The above analyses analyze the ex-post appreciation of democratic institutions, comparing Islamic countries to non-Islamic countries. We show that there are significant differences in appreciation of democracy, with people in Islamic countries appreciating democratic institutions substantially less. This lower appreciation may create legitimacy problems for democratic regimes in Islamic countries, making democratic reversals more likely.
Delving into the causes of these differences, we find that this gap in appreciation is not caused by a lower cultural appreciation of democracy, as some theorists have claimed (Huntington 1993, 1996; Lewis 1996, 2002). Instead, the difference appears to be caused by an absence of performance of democratic regimes in the Muslim world. The problem is not that Muslims value freedom and prosperity less. The problem is that democracies present in Islamic countries fail to deliver freedom and prosperity to their populations. If the democratically chosen governments of Islamic countries would do an equally good job as democratic governments elsewhere, Muslims would be just as appreciative of democracy as other people are.

As stated, there are many potential reasons for the absence of performance of Islamic democracies. Empirical evidence indicates a strong role for clannishness, which has deep historical roots in many Islamic societies and has taken hold in the Middle East long before the appearance of the Prophet Mohammed and the advent of Islam as a religion. Hence, the conclusion that, in the end, there is no reason to believe that populations in the Muslim world are any less positive towards freedom and prosperity than others, or that they are culturally disinclined to support democracy. While there are real threats to the legitimacy of democracies in Islamic societies, our results highlight that Muslims like democratic freedom just as much as non-Muslims do.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This paper questions the durability of the Arab Spring, investigating the legitimacy and sustainability of democratic regimes in the Muslim world. Building on the large literature on subjective well-being, we compare the effects of democracy and the spoils of democracy (freedom, good governance, higher incomes) on well-being in Islamic societies and elsewhere. We find that democracy affects well-being globally, but less so for people in Islamic societies, indicating a legitimacy deficit. Freedom, good governance and high incomes, on the other hand, have similar well-being effects in the Muslim world and
outside it. The problem seems to be that these factors are less associated with democracy in Islamic societies than elsewhere, however. For some reason, democracy does not deliver in Islamic societies.

On the basis of these findings, we conclude that there is a real risk that the current wave of democratization in the Arab world recedes, as the valuation of democracy in the Islamic world is much less strong than it is elsewhere. However, the reason for this is not that Muslims for some reason value democratic freedoms less, as proponents of the idea of a clash of civilizations would have it. Rather, the reason is that democratic institutions in the Muslim world, as yet, fail to deliver the individual freedoms and material gains that are expected from them. Failure to deliver, democracy faces a glaring legitimacy problem in the Muslim world. Were democratic institutions to bring Islamic societies the same levels of perceived individual freedom and material welfare as it does in the rest of the world, people in Islamic societies appreciate democracy just as much, but meanwhile Islam’s democratic deficit appears unlikely to vanish anytime soon.

Importantly, further analysis reveals the nature of the Islamic gap in the democracy-performance nexus, which turns out to be unassociated with Islam itself. Rather, this gap traces back much further to before the rise of Islam, to historical clan-based social structures and political constellations. It is not Islam or Islamic teachings but rather clannishness that appears to hold the key to democratization (not) taking off in certain societies. Overall, our empirical evidence unambiguously shows that, when it comes to Islam and democracy, no clash of civilizations exists.

REFERENCES


### TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Islamic countries (n=20)</th>
<th>Non-Islamic countries (n=76)</th>
<th>Whole sample (n=96)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polity democracy measure</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>7.26</td>
<td>6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5.72)</td>
<td>(4.38)</td>
<td>(5.28)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Well-being index</td>
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<td>.065</td>
<td>-.003</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1.860)</td>
<td>(.109)</td>
<td>(.105)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Regime performance index (Freedom, Prosperity &amp; Government effectiveness)</td>
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<td>.213</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.490)</td>
<td>(.992)</td>
<td>(1.00)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gastil democracy measure</td>
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<td>.457</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1.614)</td>
<td>(.744)</td>
<td>(.828)</td>
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<td>Five-year moving average of Polity democracy measure</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5.41)</td>
<td>(3.92)</td>
<td>(5.04)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five-year moving average of Gastil democracy measure</td>
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<td>.377</td>
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<td>(1.633)</td>
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<td>Ten-year moving average of Polity democracy measure</td>
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<td>5.38</td>
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<td>(5.08)</td>
<td>(3.99)</td>
<td>(5.13)</td>
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<td>Ten-year moving average of Gastil democracy measure</td>
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<td>(1.562)</td>
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<td>Alternative regime performance index (Freedom, Prosperity &amp; Absence of corruption)</td>
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<td>.210</td>
<td>.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1.455)</td>
<td>(.999)</td>
<td>(1.00)</td>
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</table>

Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Data are matched on country and on year (if applicable). For the sample, countries (and years) with missing data on the Polity measure, the Well-being index and/or the Performance index (Freedom, Prosperity & Government effectiveness) have been dropped. Detailed country-level data are available on request.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable = Well-being</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
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<th>Non-Islamic countries</th>
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<td>Intercept</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.103)</td>
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<td>(.132)</td>
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<td>Democracy (Polity)</td>
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<td>.086***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(.023)</td>
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<td>(.034)</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(.230)</td>
<td>(.298)</td>
<td>(.317)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy * Islamic society</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.090**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(.046)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>R² adjusted</td>
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<td>.064</td>
<td>.089</td>
<td>-.055</td>
<td>.107</td>
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Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust standard errors (bootstrapped with 1000 repetitions). *, ** and *** denotes significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively. Democracy scores are mean-centered based on the largest sample (n=96).
TABLE 3. Does Democracy Deliver? Differences Between Islamic and Non-Islamic Countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable = Regime performance (Freedom, Prosperity &amp; Government effectiveness)</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
<th>Model 9</th>
<th>Model 10</th>
<th>Model 11</th>
<th>Model 12</th>
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<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.213*</td>
<td>.124</td>
<td>.080</td>
<td>-.849***</td>
<td>.207*</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(.088)</td>
<td>(.114)</td>
<td>(.101)</td>
<td>(.108)</td>
<td>(.246)</td>
<td>(.117)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democracy (Polity)</td>
<td>.092***</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.071***</td>
<td>.105***</td>
<td>-.015</td>
<td>.114***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.015)</td>
<td>(.017)</td>
<td>(.026)</td>
<td>(.032)</td>
<td>(.027)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Islamic society</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-1.02***</td>
<td>-.595***</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Democracy * Islamic society</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.115***</td>
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<td>.166</td>
<td>.268</td>
<td>.322</td>
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<td>.189</td>
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Notes: See table 2. Democracy scores are mean-centered based on the largest sample (n=96).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable = Regime performance</th>
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<th>Five-year moving average of Polity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 13</td>
<td>Model 14</td>
<td>Model 15</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.024</td>
<td>.103</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Democracy * Islamic society</td>
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<td>-.126***</td>
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<td>No. of observations</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² adjusted</td>
<td>.457</td>
<td>.504</td>
<td>.273</td>
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Notes: See table 3.
TABLE 5. Does Lacking Performance Explain Islamic Societies’ Lower Appreciation of Democracy?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable = Well-being</th>
<th>Polity</th>
<th>Gastil index</th>
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<th>Five-year moving average of Gastil index</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 19</td>
<td>Model 20</td>
<td>Model 21</td>
<td>Model 22</td>
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<td>Intercept</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.094)</td>
<td>(.134)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
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<td>.671***</td>
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<td>.092***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.024)</td>
<td>(.163)</td>
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<td>Islamic society</td>
<td>.514*</td>
<td>-.138</td>
<td>.569**</td>
<td>-.255</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.287)</td>
<td>(.360)</td>
<td>(.285)</td>
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<td>Democracy * Islamic society</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>-.613*</td>
<td>.141</td>
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<td>(.037)</td>
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<td>Regime performance (Freedom, Prosperity &amp; Government effectiveness)</td>
<td>.807***</td>
<td>.846***</td>
<td>.820***</td>
<td>.882***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.100)</td>
<td>(.107)</td>
<td>(.108)</td>
<td>(.116)</td>
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No. of observations 96
R² adjusted .485 .169 .486 .081 .485 .180 .489

Notes: See table 2.
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<td>Dependent variable = Regime performance with corruption instead of government effectiveness</td>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>Gastil index</td>
<td>Five-year moving average of polity</td>
<td>Five-year moving average of Gastil index</td>
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<td>Model 27</td>
<td>Model 28</td>
<td>Model 29</td>
<td>Model 30</td>
<td>Model 31</td>
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<td>.072</td>
<td>.047</td>
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<td>.460</td>
<td>.510</td>
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Notes: See Tables 3 and 4.
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Notes: See Table 2.