Shan Aman-Rana
- University : University of Virginia
- Department : Economics
- Country : United States
- Email : (Email addresses visible only to logged-in members)
Main research topics :
- Administration and Bureaucracy
- Economic Institutions and Performance
Representative publications : please login to update it
Meritocracy in a Bureaucracy
Abstract: Bureaucracies often design rules and constrain discretion to avoid nepotism. Yet such rules may not be necessary in cases where the interests of the decision-maker and the bureaucracy are aligned. I examine discretionary promotions of junior Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) bureaucrats, in a setting where corruption and nepotism are viewed as the norm. I compile unique data on the abilities of junior officers, including both publicly available recruitment exam rank and information on job performance that is private to senior officials. Results show that seniors use both public and private information meritocratically in making these fast-track promotions. Despite no explicit incentives, seniors are equally meritocratic when choosing and promoting juniors for other teams as for their own teams. This is consistent with implicit incentives aligning incentives.
Corruption as informal fiscal policy (with Clement Minaudier (University of Vienna) and Sandip Sukhtankar (UVA))
Abstract: Corruption is widespread and persistent, with governments often turning a blind eye to its existence. We explore a hitherto underappreciated reason explaining why governments may deliberately ignore corruption: its ability to serve as an informal, parallel fiscal system. We document that in settings with low state capacity and resources, governments expect low-level officials to informally extract rents from citizens in order to fund delivery of public goods and services. Using survey data and government accounts in Pakistan and India, we show that public officials use their own personal funds to complement official funding for public services, and part of these funds come from bribes. We propose a model of bureaucratic agency to explore when governments might want to sustain such systems. These systems are more likely to arise when bureaucrats face strong incentives to provide public services, the costs of monitoring corruption are high, and the government relies on the support of voters less affected by corruption.
